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 At the time of writing, the expectation for a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula is 
greater than ever due to ongoing inter-Korean summits as well as the historic encounters between 
the two leaders of the US and North Korea. Although the second Hanoi DPRK-US summit in 
February, 2019 ended without reaching an agreement, it is still a positive sign that formerly hostile 
nations are willing to talk to find a way of coexistence. However, at the same time, the degree of 
inner conflict within the South has grown significantly since the impeachment of former President 
Park Geun-hye in 2017, and there exist deep discrepancies over how to approach and how to pursue 
cooperation with the North. The dissertation examines how and why a variety of reforms led by the 
progressive administrations of South Korea, ranging from foreign policies toward the North and the 
US to domestic policies, have intensified social conflicts and division, rather than contributing to 
the conflict transformation and reconciliation that they originally aimed at. In doing so, this research 
contributes to the field of identity politics and peacebuilding by offering novel insights into the role 
of narrative identity and history in contexts of protracted, identity-based conflict, and the 
peacebuilding process. Its particular focus is on the Korean peninsula, one of the areas where the 
legacy of the Cold War is still lingering and history is deeply contested and politicized. 
 This study primarily claims that the social and political polarization within South Korea 
stems from fundamental disagreements over two important concepts in the formation of national 
identity: 1) the self, how to define South Korea, which means whether the birth of a South Korean 
government should be celebrated as a lawful and legitimate process, or treated as failure to establish 
one united nation; and 2) the significant others, the question of how to identify North Korea and 
the US. The research highlights the fact that narratives on the national identity of South Korea were 
initially crafted in the context of intractable conflicts with the North. Narrative identities created 
during or after the war have been formed with a strong certainty of the good self and evil others, 
thus being resistant to change. In particular, the narrative of conservatives was formed with the firm 
certainty about the North as an evil enemy. Thus, those who see the reality of the nation through 
the lens of this narrative find it extremely difficult to adapt to the alternative that identifies the North 
as a normal neighboring state with which to coexist. 
 Secondly, this study argues that it is identity politics, in which the rhetoric of 
othering/exclusion is frequently applied, that has significantly affected the intensification of social 
and political polarization in South Korea through creating a dichotomy of good self and evil others. 
Both narratives have constructed antagonism toward their own hostile “others”: North Korean 
sympathizers, whether called pro-North, the reds, commies, or anti-South forces, in the “state-
centered nationalism narrative” of conservatives that identifies the North as an arch enemy; and 
anti-nationalists, including pro-Japanese and pro-American collaborators, and ruling elites, in the 
“ethnic nationalism narrative” of progressives that views the North as part of the self based on the 
ethnic notion of the Korean nation, and thus as a partner for coexistence and ultimately for 
unification. More importantly, both of these contradictory narratives have been politicized to 
delegitimize political opponents, consequently intensifying societal and political conflicts within 
South Korea. 
 Lastly, the study maintains that reforms led by progressive regimes failed to create an open 
and inclusive “dialogical space” where competing parties can reassess and redefine their narratives 
in the process of policy decision making and its enactment, thus deepening conflicts. Establishing 
a positive domestic context toward peace through creating consensus and cooperation with those 
who have different values and ideologies is a necessary condition for conflict transformation and 
peace settlement on the peninsula. Attempts to transform the master narrative on the national 
identity of South Korea led by progressive regimes without efforts to engage in cooperation with 
their political opponents have simply replaced an old narrative with a new one, rather than 
constructing a transcendent and integrative narrative on which conflicting parties can agree. Hence, 
conservatives’ resistance to narrative transformation and related policy changes has grown 
intensified. 
 The present study can not only contribute to extending generality in the study of the 
narrative basis of conflict, but also offer theoretical grounds for rethinking inner conflicts in South 
Korea to lead to conflict transformation and an ultimate peace settlement on the Korean peninsula. 
We have seen in post-conflict societies like Germany or Northern Ireland that a political declaration 
or peace agreement does not necessarily lead to genuine peaceful relations and reconciliation 
between the former adversaries. This justifies the argument that the narrative of rightists in South 
Korea who construct a strong national identity that still views the North as an arch enemy should 
be taken into consideration in advancing peaceful relations with the North. It is a challenging task 
to transform narrative identity with firm certainty based on a dichotomy of good self and evil other 
crafted in the context of intractable conflicts. In the process of the engagement policy toward the 
North and peace initiatives on the peninsula, however, some degree of consensus and cooperation 
between conflicting groups in South Korea who have radically different conceptions of national 
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1.1. Divided Nation and Divided Society: Inner Conflicts in South Korea 
 
 “Who are the Koreans?” had not been a difficult question to answer throughout Korean 
history before the national division. But since the partition right after the liberation from colonial 
rule in 1945, more questions concerning identity have been added, such as “Who are the South 
Koreans?” and “What does North Korea mean for South Korea?” Consequently, the question of 
national identity has become much more complicated and contested among South Koreans.  
 The Korean peninsula is widely known for being the only remaining part of the world where 
the legacy of the Cold War is still preventing peaceful coexistence. Since the partition of one nation 
into two states, both Koreas have presented themselves as being the only legitimate entity on the 
peninsula. Due to a strong, almost mythical faith in the ethnic homogeneity of the Korean nation, the 
division is generally regarded as a temporary disruption of Korean identity, and unification, as an 
ultimate goal of the nation. In contrast to this mythical homogeneity, the reality has been more than 
70 years of political division, during which the two Koreas have developed their own identities that 
are not only distinct but also hostile to each other. The fundamental assumption for this research is 
that it is the tension between these two contradictory aspects of Korean politics, the strong myth of 
homogeneity and the actual reality of oppositional identity practices, that creates and intensifies the 
internal division in South Korean society.  
 While the antagonistic forms of identity, based on an anti-communist stance, which identifies 
the North as the hostile enemy to its own existence, have been deeply entrenched in the social 
consciousness of South Korea throughout the past years, an alternative narrative which attempts to 
view South Korean contemporary history and North Korean identity from a different point of view 
has emerged in the context of political democratization in South Korea. With two progressive 
presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun who were in office from 1998 to the 2008, this 
alternative narrative came to be dominant and institutionalized in different areas from foreign policies 
to domestic ones, such as a policy of “clearing up the past wrongs” and history textbook revision. It 
is, however, a challenging task to transform the identity of the North from the former enemy toward 
a partner state for peaceful coexistence, as well as changing the perspectives on the United States 
(US) from the closest ally, or even the savior of South Korea, toward being one of the imperial powers 
that has pursued its own interests on the peninsula. It is even more difficult to transform the narrative 
about the violent past of the war and the self-identity as a victim of suffering from evil communists’ 
invasion. By analyzing the outcomes of the survey research on South Korean national identity 
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conducted jointly by three organizations of the East Asian Institute (EAI), Asiatic Research Institute 
(ARI) and Joongang Ilbo every five years from 2005 to 2015, Lee Nae-young (2016) argues that 
many South Koreans show ambivalent attitudes toward the North. That is, there coexist two 
ambivalent perspectives toward North Korea: as an arch enemy that has developed nuclear weapons 
and consistently caused armed conflicts; and as part of the “self”, brethren of one Korean nation. 
Thus, many South Koreans have feelings of both love and hatred toward North Korea. According to 
the survey in 2015, people who have such favorable views on North Koreans as “part of self”, 
“brothers” or “neighbors” still outnumber those with a negative notion of the North, such as “an 
enemy” or “the other” (Lee Nae-young 2016, p. 212). However, what should be noted is that if we 
focus on changes of perspectives toward the North from 2005 to 2015, negative responses that 
identify the North as “an enemy” or “the other” have sharply increased from 18% in 2005 to 29.6% 
in 2015. Lee points out that the most interesting observation is that the negative perception of the 
North among the younger generation in their 20s and 30s has shown a dramatic rise, from 18.9% to 
37.3% for those in their 20s, and from 17.6% to 36.2% for those in their 30s, in 2005 and in 2015 
respectively, which signifies a growing conservatization of young generations in their view of the 
North (ibid., p. 214). 
 Furthermore, according to the survey research mentioned above, South Koreans increasingly 
acknowledge the seriousness of social conflicts, in particular between political parties, classes, and 
ideologies. Those who regarded conflicts between political parties as “serious” have remained very 
high, at 86% in 2005, 82.5% in 2010 and 85.3% in 2015. What should be noted is that those who 
regarded the conflicts between political parties as “very serious” accounts for 45.1% in 2015, 
showing considerable increase compared to about 37.9 % in 2005, 29.7% in 2010 (Kang Won-taek 
2016, p. 186). Along with this, the number of respondents who identified ideological conflicts as 
serious, including responses of both “serious” and “very serious”, marks a sharp increase to 74.8% 
in 2015 from 62.8% in 2005 (ibid.). This clearly displays that people generally acknowledge the 
seriousness of political division in South Korea. What is interesting is that in the 2015 survey, the 
preference for specific former presidents shows a meaningful difference according to the ideological 
line, compared to outcomes in the past surveys in 2005 and 2010. In 2015 the assessment over three 
former presidents, Park Chung-hee, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, shows a stark difference 
according to the ideological identity. In the case of Park Chung-hee, the former authoritarian 
president and the father of conservative president Park Geun-hye, positive assessment among those 
who identify themselves as conservatives increased to 82.7% (2015) from 75.3% (2005), while 
positive assessment among progressives dropped to 63.6% (2015) from 69.3% (2005) (ibid., p. 191). 
This indicates that the support for President Park intensified among conservatives, while the positive 
view among progressives weakened. In contrast, positive assessment of two former progressive 
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presidents of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun shows a dramatic rise among respondents who are 
self-identified as progressives. 78.7% of progressives assessed President Kim positively in 2015, 
while 55.1% did so in 2005. The preference for President Roh among progressives also shows a 
similar rising pattern to that of President Kim, growing from 72.9 % in 2010 to 79.1% in 2015 (ibid.). 
These outcomes indicate that conservatives have increasingly intensified their positive perspective 
on President Park, while positive assessment of Kim and Roh, progressive presidents, has been 
intensified among progressives. This is of great significance given that the collective identity within 
each group concerning political tendency has been intensified and thus difference in perspectives 
among different political groups has been sharpened, which is related to the solidification of division 
and polarization of the society according to political or ideological preference.   
 This research aims to identify two dominant, and at the same time, contentious narratives 
within South Korean discourses on national identity, and to sketch out the way in which they 
influence contemporary political agendas represented by two key political strains: conservative 
(rightists) and progressive (leftists). The dissertation seeks to demonstrate how different conceptions 
of the Korean nation (or the South Korean state) have competed for dominance within contemporary 
South Korean discourses, and how certain historic events have strengthened the credibility of one set 
of narratives at the expense of others. Its main focus is hence on the changing “content” of the 
national category within the South. The main area of contestation has been the meanings of the self-
identity: one that puts the two Koreas into one category of the Korean nation; and the other that 
categorizes only those who are loyal to South Korea, and who agree with the political and economic 
ideology of South Korea into a category of self.  
 Internal divisions of societies and separatism within a single political unit have been more 
frequently observed than international wars between nation states since the mid-1960s (Psaltis et al. 
2017, p.1). As Kelman (2004; 2008) argued, this changing nature of wars ignited the research interest 
in the notion of “reconciliation.” In the process of reconciliation, the primary challenge is for former 
enemies to find the way to not only live together peacefully, but also at times to cooperate and share 
power. In this regard, the past progressive regimes’ efforts to transform the identity of the North from 
a hostile state to a partner for coexistence can be understood as a stepping stone toward reconciliation, 
which was a challenging task for South Korea to achieve. Although President Kim Dae-jung’s 
engagement policy toward North Korea, called the Sunshine Policy, was a turning point that caused 
bitter contentions between conservatives and progressives to come to the surface, inner conflicts in 
South Korea have been inherent since its establishment (Son Ho-chŏl 2006). Clashes between South 
Korean conservatives (rightists) and progressives (leftists) are now found in almost all areas from 
the policy toward North Korea and the US to the interpretation of history, creating the phenomenon 
of deep domestic conflicts, called “a house divided” (Hahn Chaibong 2005), or more commonly 
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known as “South-South conflict” to South Koreans. The fissure was especially evident under 
President Roh Moo-hyun, who took every opportunity to challenge the conservatives. For instance, 
the Roh government passed a law on March 22, 2004, to identify and punish those who collaborated 
with the Japanese during the colonial period, such as former president Park Chung-hee, who served 
as officer in the Japanese Imperial army before liberation. It is believed that in the view of 
progressives, many of the pro-Japanese collaborators became ruling elites of the South and have 
enjoyed benefits as a privileged class, largely due to the lack of judicial action after liberation and 
strong support from the US. In addition, the progressives tried to abolish the National Security Law 
that the staunchly anti-communist conservatives believe to be necessary to fight against North Korea. 
However, the most contentious and ideologically conflicting issue, which more importantly reaches 
far beyond the South Korea’s domestic political arena, was the effort of the progressive governments 
to redefine the country’s relationship with North Korea on the one hand, and with the US on the other. 
While the US is traditionally the closest ally and the most important security partner for anti-
communism, a growing number of the population has been turning anti-American and pro-North 
Korean. If the South Korean governments before democratization consistently took a hard line when 
dealing with the North while the US played a restraining role, under the two successive progressive 
regimes the US tried to pressure, sanction, and punish the North for its behavior, such as nuclear 




1.2 Traditional Approach 
 
 Some observers try to explain that the policy change toward the North and the US, which 
caused severe inner conflicts in South Korean society in the 2000s, occurred as a result of inherent 
conflicts along ideological lines. Hahm Chaibong (2005) sees that change toward anti-American and 
pro-North Korean views is the logical extension of the progressives’ “leftist-nationalist” ideology, 
which lies at the root of South Korea’s deep division between conservatives and progressives (p. 58). 
On the other hand, Kang Won-taek (2005) in his analysis on characteristics of the political division 
focusing on the generational gap points out that there is a clear distinction between generations in 
terms of whether anti-communism as a dominant ideology of South Korea should be embraced or 
not. Kim Geun-sik (2013) finds the fundamental cause of inner conflicts of South Korea in dualistic 
aspects of Korea’s nationalism. That is, considering the historical context, the Koreas have two 
unfinished tasks: the completion of the establishment of a modern nation-state; and overcoming the 
national division. Some see this in a positive way, saying that the changes in views toward the North 
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and the US are a reflection of the country’s democratization, of increasing pluralism and diversity of 
opinions (Choi Yong Seob 2011). Others point out that the inner conflicts in the South cannot be 
explained by one causal factor because the conflict regarding policies toward North Korea and the 
US has become complicated and multilayered, mixed with other aspects ranging from region and 
ideology to generation (Son Ho-chŏl 2006; Kang Won-taek 2004; Kwon Sook-do 2012; Kim Chang-
Hee 2010; Kim Kap-sik 2007; Kim Jong Gab 2003; Byun Chang-Ku 2011). While emphasizing the 
multilayered characteristic of the societal conflict, Son Ho-chŏl (2006) points out that the conflicts 
are intrinsically connected to the question of South Korea’s self-identity (p. 230), that is to say, how 
to interpret the birth and development process of South Korea. 
 From the early 1960s to the late 1980s, the military and the conservative coalition put 
emphasis on the “industrialization first” policy that prioritized the country’s economic and military 
developments, delaying democracy. Also, in the name of national security, which refers to the 
prevention of another North Korean invasion, strong anti-communism was promoted. This coalition 
regarded the US as South Korea’s most important ally and even savior, supporting the continued 
presence of US troops on its territory. However, Roh’s election in 2002 marked the rise of the 
progressives in South Korean politics. The progressives in South Korea consisted of politicians, 
intellectuals, and students who formed a coalition against the military dictatorship during the 1980s. 
While the ideals of liberal democracy greatly affected the earlier generation of pro-democracy 
fighters, it was the structural injustice of capitalism resulting from South Korea’s fast 
industrialization during the 1960s and 1970s that inspired the world-view of progressives and 
mobilized them into action (Hahm Chaibong 2005, p.59). As they witnessed laborers struggling 
under inhuman conditions during the country’s development process, they came to view capitalism 
as a dehumanizing system. Thus, they began searching for a deeper structural factor, which led to a 
conclusion that the US had supported dictators in South Korea for its own imperial interests on the 
peninsula and in the region. Furthermore, they came to argue that the Japanese colonial period was 
a source of current social inequality and injustice continuously afflicting South Korea. According to 
them, it was colonial industrialization that not only distorted the industrial structure of Korea as a 
dependent economy of the Japanese empire, but also created a Korean bourgeois class that prospered 
by collaborating with the imperial powers. What should be noted here is that in this narrative the 
crucial link between leftism and nationalism is constructed (ibid., p. 61). Given the capitalist nature 
of the Japanese empire, to be a true nationalist meant being not only anti-Japanese, but also anti-
capitalist. For the leftists, who believed they were the only true nationalists, the legacies of the 
Japanese and the capitalist system were the fundamental problems of South Korean society. 
 In the view of the progressives, then, leftist nationalism should have been Korea’s guiding 
ideology after liberation in 1945. It, however, failed to emerge largely due to the US that imposed 
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direct military rule in South Korea during the period 1945-1948, recruited the collaborators to high 
official positions in its military government and backed the establishment of a capitalist regime in 
1948. As a result, Cold War anti-communism began to overwhelm nationalism in South Korea (Choi 
Jang Jip 1993). Until the mid-1990s, such views were limited to the radical strain of South Korea’s 
intellectual and political spectrum. However, the political democratization in the late 1980s provided 
golden opportunities for progressive intellectuals and politicians to actively promote their ideology 
and view. The financial crisis in 1997, furthermore, offered an opening through which the 
progressives and their ideology could enter South Korea’s mainstream politics. Hahm (2005) argues 
that one of the most direct political consequences of the financial crisis was the election of Kim Dae-
jung, a dissident and opposition leader under the authoritarian regime, to the presidency in 1997 (p. 
63). The Kim Dae-jung administration, along with former leaders of the radical student movement, 
began introducing South Korea to many ideas and policies once considered too leftist, and thus 
prohibited, one of which was the Sunshine policy. The engagement policy to the North fits perfectly 
with the leftist-nationalist ideology of the progressives that sees the two Koreas as one nation divided 
into two states cooperating to decide the common fate of the peninsula without the interference of 
foreign powers, the US in particular. For them, national reconciliation can be, thus, made possible 
only through overcoming imperialist ploys that had brought about national division in the first place. 
 Another way in which the progressives have managed to dominate the political agenda and 
discourses is by igniting national controversies on history through a policy of “clearing up the past.” 
With a strict nationalistic standard that was often criticized as a troubling or simplistic interpretation 
of the complex legacy of the Japanese colonial period by political opponents, the progressives have 
managed to categorize anyone who had worked under Japanese rule as a collaborator. These include 
not only those Koreans who worked in colonial bureaucracy, the police, and the military, but also 
industrialists, intellectuals, artists, and composers. By opening the debate on colonial history, 
conservatives argue that the progressives are trying to undermine the legitimacy of past authoritarian 
regimes as well as the opposition. The issue of pro-Japanese collaborators [ch’inilp’a] is an emotional 
issue for Koreans. Human rights violations during the authoritarian years, about which progressives 
are most critical, is also a painful issue. By taking the emotional high ground through this 
nationalistic and pro-democracy rhetoric while elevating history as the main topic of domestic 
politics, progressives have succeeded in dominating and leading the political agenda and discourses 
after democratization. The debate on collaboration thus has a risk of turning into a witch hunt, in 
which opposing sides discover past wrongs of their political opponents’ parents and grandparents, 
while the accused attempt to defend the honor of themselves as well as their family members. 
Likewise, South Korea’s deep division is deeply connected to radically different interpretations of 
the modern nation’s birth and development. As much of the rest of the world does, conservatives 
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celebrate South Korea’s industrialization and democratization despite the many shortcomings, such 
as human rights violations. The progressives, in contrast, are relentlessly critical of the nation’s 
history despite these achievements. This is because progressives believe that South Korea achieved 
the current results through too many compromises and much injustice, including dictatorship, human 
rights violations, and dependence on foreign powers. 
 In traditional approaches to inner conflict within South Korea, the most common analysis is 
that it is conflicting perspectives over its political system, ideology, economy, and history, and 
foreign relations that essentially divided the society of South Korea. In addition, with other factors 
such as class, generation, region, and gender, the country is now further polarized. 
 
 
1.3 Alternative Approach 
  
 This dissertation suggests that to have better understanding of the inner conflicts in South 
Korea, the issue of national identity should be taken into consideration. This paper conceptualizes 
national identity from a discourse-analytic perspective, which means that national identity is socially 
constructed and its social and political meanings are contextually bound. Thus, the nation is not seen 
as a “given” primordial entity but as an “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) which is 
constructed through “narration” (Bhabha 1990). The members of the national community, who tend 
to understand their ties to the nation as primordial and given, normally do not recognize the 
constructed nature of the nation (Anderson 1991, p. 143). According to Hall (1980), this 
naturalization is a central mechanism of the discursive construction of identity, concealing the 
discursive practices which produce meanings around national identity. 
 Nations are modern entities emerging as a result of particular historical conditions in Europe, 
although various scholars explain it from different perspectives. For instance, Anderson (1991) 
emphasizes the important role of print capitalism for the development of the modern nation-state, 
whereas Giddens (1985) highlights the importance of capitalism, industrialism, surveillance and 
military power. In Anderson’s view, the constitution of national identity is deeply bound up with 
modernity. However, within the modern nation, pre-modern ethnic features frequently remain 
important (Smith 1986). In reality, modern nations are rooted in pre-modern ethnic identities, and in 
cultural properties such as language, religion or institutions (Smith 1995, p. 69). This emphasis on 
the existence of pre-modern cultural factors within modern national identity is significant. However, 
it is also vital to note that ethnic characteristics are in turn not simply given but articulated and 
politically mobilized within discourses of identity. In the South Korean case, ideology is discursively 
constructed as a crucial element of national identity discourses in order to draw the line between the 
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self and others. Under the authoritarian regimes especially, and currently among conservatives, 
Korean communists are excluded from the category of self, that is, South Korea, the “true” Korean 
nation, because of their political ideology. 
 In this research, adopting a discursive approach to identity construction does mean that not 
only symbolic constructions but also institutional practices are regarded as significant. Identities, 
whether ethnic, national or other, are created, recreated and transformed through institutional 
practices including state policies and everyday interactions. The term, “discourse” will, therefore, be 
used not in the narrow sense of “texts” but rather in broader terms, as “systems of meaning, including 
all types of social and political practice, as well as institutions and organizations (Howarth 1995)”. 
Identity is not only constructed in the context of relations of meaning but also within institutionalized 
relations of power. Discourses around national identity operate in the context of institutional supports 
and practices that they rely upon. Foucault’s discourse analysis seeks to explore how specific 
discourses reproduce or transform relations of power as well as relations of meaning. Consequently, 
the term, discourse, in this paper refers to the macro-level of structural orders of discourse (Foucault 
1971), that is, broad historical systems of meaning, which are relatively stable over considerably 
long periods of time. 
 It is specific individual and collective narratives that reproduce and transform discourses. 
Although there are various definitions of “narratives”, like “a story with a beginning, middle and end 
that reveals someone’s experiences” (Manning & Cullum-Swan 1998) or “an original state of affairs, 
an action, or an event, and the consequent state of events” (Czarniawska 1998), narratives in this 
research are considered in the more limited sense of “stories” or “storytelling.” As such, narratives 
are possible forms of discourse. Therefore, discourses include narratives but are not reducible to 
narratives. Specific narratives of the nation are construed as important component parts of broader 
discourses of national identity. Different narrative forms such as historical accounts, myths and 
metaphors contribute to discourses of national identity. Relying on Plummer (1995), this research is 
more concerned with the social and political role of narratives (p. 19). 
 Conceptualizing identity as narratives highlights the importance of stories and storytelling 
for processes of identity construction. Giddens (1991), for example, argues that identity is constituted 
through the continuous formulation and re-formulation of narratives of “the self,” which means that 
self-identity is reflexively understood through “stories” by the individual concerned as well as by 
others. This applies to collective identities that are continuously reconstituted in both individual and 
collective narratives. Relying on Austin’s (1962) speech act theory and Goffman’s (1959) theatrical 
model of identity, the “performative” nature of collective identity narratives has particular 
significance in this study. Narratives do not simply express a pre-given national identity but function 
as performative, that is, speech acts that bring narratives into being and that both enact and perform 
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the nation through reiteration (Butler 1993). Policy texts, historical accounts or myths, regardless of 
whether they are based on historical facts, are all examples of narrative enactment and performance 
of national identity. 
 Individual and collective identities are specific forms of narrative which constitute 
commonalities and differences between self and others. As Plummer (1995) explains, “stories mark 
out identities; identities mark out differences; differences define ‘the other’; and ‘the other’ helps 
structure the moral life of culture, group, and individual” (p. 19). National identities are thus 
narratives which are concerned with the drawing of boundaries between us and them, that is, between 
members of the nation and non-members. Such boundaries are crucially bound up with political 
processes. Mechanisms of othering, in which specific groups of people are constructed as 
fundamentally different others, are politically important aspects of identity narratives. In times of 
war, mechanisms of othering of the enemy become particularly intense, often taking the form of 
presenting the other as non-human or evil being. In political discourses, the enemy is frequently 
represented through evil imagery. 
 With experience of protracted conflicts with North Korea, many South Koreans have drawn 
the line between the self and the other according to the ideological line and thus, the North was 
identified as the hostile other or the evil enemy. However, with democratization, those who have 
constructed a different national identity came to power and tried to transform the master narrative on 
national identity. These attempts meant an identity crisis for those who held the pre-existing narrative 
and they, thus, opposed the new alternative narrative. These fundamental disagreements on the 
identification of significant others, in particular, the North and the US, initially came to the surface 
with the policy change toward those others under the progressive administrations in the early 2000s. 
The main argument of the dissertation that inner conflicts within South Korea are deeply connected 
to the issue of narrative national identity is well supported by the fact that inner conflicts in South 
Korea, which initially arose around the identification of significant others, is now centering around 
how to interpret the birth and development processes of South Korea. That is to say, the levels of 
identity conflicts in South Korea were high regarding how to view significant others of the North 




1.4 Conceptual Framework and Key Concepts 
 
 The discrepancy over national identity that has been a source of inner conflicts in South 
Korea and a major challenge for national reconciliation between conflicting groups in the post-
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conflict era has resulted in two competing and contentious narratives, which in this dissertation are 
named as the “state-centered nationalism” narrative of conservatives and the “ethnic nationalism” 
narrative of progressives. The former stems from the state-sanctioned narrative of authoritarian 
regimes, which blames uncivilized communists and the North Korean regime for Koreans’ sufferings. 
On the contrary, in the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives, which prioritizes one ethnic 
Korean nation over the South Korean state, it is emphasized that the masses [minjung] from the two 
Koreas suffered at the hands of ruling elites who pursued the division, cooperated with the imperial 
powers, formerly Japan and later the US, and thus betrayed the nation for the sake of their own 
interests. 
 Unlike the time under authoritarian regimes when the hegemonic state-sanctioned narrative 
was propagated and allowed by the government at the cost of alternatives, an alternative narrative of 
progressives has gained dominance since the democratization in the late 1990s, but has not been able 
to be instilled into those who still have strong faith in the state-sanctioned narrative. The self-
understanding of a nation is primarily formed in relation to its own history. We learn who “we” are 
by gaining an awareness of how we got where we are now, that is by gaining an understanding of 
our own history. Thus, history becomes a highly contested and debated matter, with contradictory 
accounts openly competing in the public realm to this day, often reflecting political tendencies in 
South Korea. The dilemma, that is, the discrepancy between a single ethnic identity and the reality 
of political divisions, lies at the core of North and South Korean people. Therefore, national identity 
for a contemporary Korean is ambivalent, between being a member of the Korean nation and a citizen 
of either of the divided states. 
 Because the Korean nation was divided along the ideological line of communists and 
capitalists, ideology among all other factors that influence the formation of national identity is the 
most important component. Thus, traditional approaches focused on ideology as a major cause of 
societal conflicts in South Korea. However, a multitude of factors from war to economic development 
can have a significant impact on national identity. National identity is crafted around two important 
concepts of “the self” and “the significant others” because national identity exists not only to define 
who we are, but also to separate us from others (Triandafyllidou 1998, pp.596-99). Thus, the concept 
of the other is inextricably linked to the notion of national identity. A significant other “refers to 
another nation or ethnic group that is territorially close to, or indeed within, the national community 
and threatens, or rather is perceived to threaten, its ethnic and/or cultural purity and/or its 
independence” (ibid., p. 600). Significant others could be neighboring countries which share a set of 
cultural traditions or historical experiences, a country which plays an important role while the nation 
is in trouble, or one which threatens the existence or the sense of distinctiveness of the self. In this 
light, North Korea and the US are the most significant others to the South. The fact that the “South-
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South conflict” phenomenon has initially occurred around the issue of policies toward those two 
significant others, and recently the issue of how to interpret modern and contemporary South Korean 
history, well illustrates that the polarization of South Korean society and politics intrinsically pertains 
to the conflicting narratives of national identity. 
 As explained, this research assumes that the social conflicts and security dilemma South 
Korea currently faces should be seen emerging not only from conventional ideological and 
geopolitical contexts, but also from a fundamental but largely ignored tension between two 
conflicting master narratives regarding South Korean identity. It necessarily tries to find the roots of 
conflicts in history. That is, the contending interpretations of historical events such as colonization, 
division of the nation, and the birth of the two Koreas have left a legacy of embedded conflicts that 
continue to inform domestic political discourses. This dissertation examines two competing master 
narratives of national identity by taking historical case studies. In the following section(s), key 
concepts which are of significance in forming the theoretical framework of the dissertation will be 
introduced. 
 
1.4.1 Colonization and Nationalism 
 
 In Korea, ethnicity has undoubtedly been a key marker of nation and national identity, which 
is well displayed in the poll (BBC World Service 2016) on the most important factors in the 
conception of self-identity. In the poll, South Korea has the highest rate, given for “race and culture”, 
at 25%, which is remarkably high compared to the global average of 8%. Unlike other countries, 
South Korea has long maintained a coherent political community within a stable territorial boundary. 
Also, Korea has had fairly homogeneous ethnic or historical experiences, in contrast to Western 
Europe, where the current geographical and political boundaries were not formed until the modern 
era and nationalism primarily functioned as a political ideology to integrate diverse ethnic groups 
into a coherent political entity, called the “nation.” However, Korea has been divided since 1945, 
violating Gellner’s (1983) nationalist principle, according to which state and nation are congruent. 
The Korean case, one ethnic nation and two states, is the opposite of most other cases where multiple 
ethnic groups are integrated into one political entity contending for state power. Not only do North 
and South Korea share a common identity as a nation, but also the Korean nation is so thoroughly 
naturalized that Koreans take the homogeneity of the Korean nation for granted as an objective truth. 
For Koreans, the Korean nation is, therefore, a concrete object that has existed for over five thousand 
years on the Korean peninsula and that shares a common language, culture, and history. 
 Korean nationalism arose in the context of Japanese aggression and was, consequently, 
constructed as a strong anti-imperial ideology (Shin Gi-wook 2005, p. 22). As the first modern East 
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Asian nation, Japan increased its influence and power on the peninsula in the late nineteenth century, 
provoking a strong nationalist reaction from Korean society. While nationalism was developed as an 
ideology to integrate diverse ethnic groups into a unified political community in western Europe, for 
Korea, which had its long period of political, linguistic and geographic continuity, the threat of 
imperialism rather than unification was a more urgent problem to solve. Nationalism was naturally 
called into service as an anti-imperialist ideology, opposing Japanese aggression or assimilation, and 
at the same time as an agent of modernization. Under colonial rule, nationalists tried to redefine 
Korean identity as distinct from China and Japan, and promoted this identity through various means 
such as the reinterpretation of history and the use of Korean script, in opposition to the colonial 
policy that forced Koreans to use Japanese. For them, it was nation, not region or race, which should 
be the basis of a collective identity to which Koreans had to belong. Japanese colonial policy of 
assimilation intensified Korean nationalist sentiment, consequently leading to further radicalizing of 
the Korean notion of nation. While early Korean nationalists pursued diverse versions of political 
nationalism from liberal to Marxist, they all uniformly agreed on the homogeneity of the Korean 
nation. 
 However, territorial division after liberation from Japan in 1945 created a problem of 
national representation, although the notion of ethnic nation as social identification remained firm. 
Koreans still strongly identify with the Korean ethnic community, but territorial partition created an 
additional factor that strongly influenced the conception of national identity. Each regime claimed 
their legitimacy for sole representation of the whole Korean ethnic nation. Korean nationalism 
developed as an anti-colonial ideology now became a highly valuable political tool in both North 
and South, making the issue of representation all the more salient and contentious. With liberation 
from colonial rule and the subsequent partition, the battle lines shifted from confrontation with the 
Japanese and an effort to prove the distinctiveness of the Korean nation toward conflicts between the 
two Koreas and an effort to justify the legitimacy of the respective political regimes in ethnic 
nationalist terms. The “politics of representation” or “identity politics” produced competition 
between the two Koreas over which side should represent the entire Korean nation, with the other 
being portrayed as having betrayed the nation and lost its “true” national identity (Shin et al. 1999, 
p. 472). More importantly, this intra-ethnic contention between the two states has significantly 
affected domestic conflicts within South Korea. Under the authoritarian regimes, the legitimacy of 
South Korea as a true representation of the Korean nation was never doubted and North Korea was 
uniformly described as an arch enemy or the evil to be destroyed, while people in the North were 
depicted as fellow countrymen to be liberated. With the democratization, however, this hegemonic 




 The Korean case resembles divided Germany in the sense that both nations maintain a strong 
sense of ethnic homogeneity and were split into two parts in the context of WWII. Still, Korea differs 
from Germany, where a similarly strong ethnic nationalism was dismissed after 1945 due to its close 
link with Nazism. In contrast, nationalism as a strong political instrument, has been extensively used 
and promoted in the postcolonial Koreas. A South Korean case can shed light on the study of conflict 
resolution as an interesting empirical case to show how national identity is formed when there exists 
strong competition between definitions of nation and nationalism. With prolonged conflicts, the two 
Koreas’ competition for the sole representation of the Korean nation has resulted in contradictory 
definitions of nation and nationalism reflected in two dominant but contentious narratives on national 
identity, which hinders conflict transformation as well as a/any settlement of peace on the peninsula. 
National identity is relational and transformation of relations with enemy states necessarily involves 
changes in national identity and security conceptions, which is a challenging task in itself. 
Furthermore, the fact that national identities of the two Koreas were constructed in the context of 
protracted conflicts makes it even more difficult to change, which will be elaborated in the following 
section. 
 
1.4.2 Intractable Conflicts and National Identity 
 
 One of the important points to be taken into consideration is that the national identity of 
South Korea was constructed in the context of the war, and even after the truce was agreed in 1953 
the two Koreas have been in a protracted conflictual situation, each publicly declaring the integration 
of the other into its own political system and arguing that each is representing the true Korean nation. 
While war has played a central role in the making of the modern nation (Tilly 1975; Giddens 1985; 
Smith 1991), it has been particularly important in the construction of national identity in both Koreas. 
Although there are many different types of conflicts which are classified in different ways, such as 
according to their severity or longevity, intractable conflicts are a very particular type of conflict that 
are prolonged because the parties engaged in them can neither win nor are willing to compromise 
(Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013, p. 924), involving great animosity and vicious cycles of violence. They 
are exhausting, demanding, stressful and costly in human as well as material terms. Intractable 
conflicts require, therefore, that society members adapt to the conflictual situations both in their 
individual and social lives. Without such adaptation, a society might have difficulty in withstanding 
the opponent. The socio-political-psychological perspective on intractable conflicts focuses on the 
study of the beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and behavior of the individuals and groups involved in 
conflicts (ibid., p. 925). These beliefs and emotions have significance in that they play a crucial role 
as a lens through which the involved society members understand the reality of conflict and take 
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action on the basis of this view. Intractable conflicts are, further, made salient through the 
construction of stories that motivate inter-group antagonism (Hammack 2008; Liu & Hiton 2005). 
Those narratives contain core societal beliefs, which are typically characterized by claims of 
exclusive legitimacy, victimization, and the justness of one group’s goal. Narratives provide social 
representations of collective history that contributed to the positive distinctiveness of a group (Liu & 
Hiton 2005). These social representations are themselves utilized, referenced, and exploited by those 
in power to serve larger political interests, often specifically to the nation-state. Thus, stories are 
inherently political and provide a motivational force for collective (in) action or (im)mobilization 
(Hammack 2010, p. 179). 
   The notion of the Korean nation was initially founded on the struggle against foreign 
domination, as explained in the earlier section. Consequently, liberation from the Japanese oppressor 
is central in both South and North Korea’s historical narratives. The combination of the centrality of 
war to the making of the two Korean states and strong faith in the Korean nation’s homogeneity 
results in contentious narratives on national identity that have been constructed based on external 
threats from each other, whether they are real or perceived, while ironically accepting the common 
culture of the Korean nation. The discursive mechanisms of “othering” in South Korea thus focus in 
particular on whether North Korea can be counted as the self or not. These discourses and consequent 
conception of national identity are of great importance given that they condition foreign, security, 
and unification policy as well as domestic discourses on norms and ethics, such as the issue of North 
Korea’s human rights violations. South Korean national identity has been described as negative, 
emerging through “difference” and in particular through the demarcation of enemies. However, as 
discourse theory teaches us, identity is always constituted relationally, through demarcations of 
others who do not belong to it (de Saussure 1972). In other words, any identity is negative. Thus, 
negative identity is not exclusively Korean. What is distinctive in the Korean case is not negativity 
but rather the specific mechanisms of othering and the attendant political processes of inclusion and 
exclusion, which are exclusively strong. This is largely because they were constructed in the specific 
context of intractable conflicts, which characterize South Korean national identity. 
 All human beings cherish the value of peace and wish to live in a peaceful environment. But 
achievement of peace is not that simple. Human beings are not usually willing to harm other humans. 
Killing or even hurting other human beings is considered the most serious violation of the moral 
code. In intractable conflict groups, however, hurt each other most violently, even committing mass 
killings, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. It is the socio-psychological infrastructure formed in the 
context of intractable conflict that makes this extreme violence possible. It justifies and legitimizes 
the most immoral acts and allows the attribution of one’s own immoral behavior to the hostile other’s 
violence and external situational factors (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013, p. 945). In the context of 
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intractable conflict, collective identities are shaped with strong beliefs about us and them and, more 
importantly, with a degree of “non-reflective certainty” about them (Chhabra 2016, p. 253). That is, 
in normal situations, people have an ability to tolerate some uncertainty about their own beliefs and 
accept the fact that their beliefs about the self and others might be wrong. However, in contexts of 
conflict, psychological mechanisms come into play to shut down new information contradicting 
existing beliefs, and as a result of firm certainty about their assessment of the self and other people, 
they become resistant to any change (ibid.). In the light of this, two contending narratives on national 
identity in South Korea that were initially formed in the context of the war, and consequent protracted 
conflicts between the two Koreas, were shaped with rigid certainty about their assessment of self and 
others and with intolerance over any doubts about their beliefs, thus being resistant to change. 
 In addition, during the course of a conflict, each party intensifies their belief that the ultimate 
intention of the other is to destroy itself. This belief is called the “zero-sum view of national identity” 
(Kelman 1999, p. 589) and refers to the fact that “fulfillment of the other’s national identity is 
experienced as equivalent to destruction of one’s own identity” (Kelman 1987, p.355). An example 
of this zero-sum view of national identity is found in the case of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict. 
Israel has identified the Palestinian movement’s goal of liberating Palestine with the intention of 
eliminating Israel. Palestinians have also seen the establishment of the Israeli state in 1948 and the 
occupation of the territory as stepping stones to realize Israeli’s ultimate goal of removing the 
Palestinians from the territory. This zero-sum view of national identity is also discovered in the case 
of the two Koreas. For both Koreas, which have strong ethnic homogeneity, unification is essentially 
the ultimate goal but they hope to achieve it through integrating the other into one’s own political 
and economic system either by force or peaceful means. Therefore, the goal of unification ironically 
becomes an existential threat to each other. At the time of writing, summits between the North and 
the US as well as the two Koreas are in progress to deal with the denuclearization of the North, yet 
each party is not fully convinced that the counterparty of the summit has really abandoned the project 
of destroying them nor is genuinely committed to their claims of the peaceful coexistence of two 
independent states on the peninsula. 
 In existential conflicts between identity groups, each group is to a considerable degree 
defined and shaped by the conflict. Its relationship to the conflict is a central part of the group’s self-
definition and worldview. This in itself often creates a psychological mechanism that becomes a 
barrier to conflict resolution. A change in the conflict relationship may be resisted because it would 
require major revisions in the way people think about significant parts of their national and personal 
lives (Kelman 1997, p. 222). Reconciling with an enemy state is particularly challenging in a 
protracted conflictual relationship. Its success is uncertain, and requires a dramatic policy shift from 
a policy of containment to one of reconciliation. Furthermore, reconciliation with an enemy often 
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faces harsh criticism and opposition within the domestic politics of the reconciling state, which was 
exactly what happened in South Korea when President Kim Dae-jung first applied the policy of 
engagement toward the North. A new idea is politically fragile, lacking solid domestic support, while 
the old idea of containment may enjoy habitual but firm support. South Korea’s comprehensive 
engagement policy with the North for the ten years of the Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun 
administrations (1998-2007) not only created fierce opposition from the conservative section of 
Korean society, but also faced tension in the traditionally strong alliance with the US under George 
W. Bush. Since, for critics of the Sunshine policy, the goal of unification with the North essentially 
constituted their identity, particularly in the form of anti-communism, the notion of peaceful 
coexistence through reconciliation came as an existential challenge to what they saw as the core of 
South Korea’s national identity. The opponents of the Sunshine policy perceived inter-Korean 
relations as inherently conflictual and resisted the engagement policy. South Korean national identity 
cannot be separated from the identity of the North and, more importantly, its security. Underlining 
identity does not mean denying that security/foreign policies and social conflicts within South Korea 
have been dominated by strategic and ideological motives. The point, rather, is to acknowledge that 
the dilemma South Korea has experienced was, and still is, part of a much deeper entrenched practice 
of defining security through a stark opposition between self and the most significant other, North 
Korea. This mind-set, which defines security as a protection of the inside from the threat of a hostile 
outside, turns into a collective mind-set that greatly affects the conception of a nation’s when it faces 
the risk of instability and violence (Bleiker 2001, p. 123). Thus, the issue of national identity 
inherently pertains to that of security. 
 While intractable conflicts are often rooted in a competition between material resources and 
political or territorial control (Kriesberg 1993), they are made salient through the construction of 
stories that motivate intergroup antagonism (Hammack 2008; Liu & Hilton 2005). Narratives provide 
social representations of collective history, which help to define the national identity, especially how 
it relates to other states and to current issues of international politics and internal diversity. History 
textbooks in narrative construction of identity have their importance as a key pedagogic vehicle for 
transmitting official knowledge and narratives of national identity. History textbook revision poses 
challenges, in particular for post-conflict societies, and often serves as a battlefield for opposing 
narratives and interests, which will be introduced in the following section. 
  
1.4.3 History and National Identity 
 
 The controversies about the modern and contemporary history of South Korea, which are 
often called “history wars,” are closely related to one of the important concepts in national identity 
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formation, the self, how to view South Korea itself. This research argues that historiography and 
history textbook revisions in South Korea have been the battlefields of the self-identity formation 
reflecting two contentious narratives: (1) the “state-centered nationalism narrative” generally 
supported by conservatives based on anti-communism, which emphasizes the legitimacy of South 
Korea as the only lawful government on the Korean peninsula, and its liberal democracy and free 
economic system as the core values to be protected, and as a result, still considers North Korea the 
hostile other and the US the most important ally for its security; and (2) the “ethnic nationalism 
narrative” supported by progressives that prioritizes one ethnic nation [minjok] and thus views the 
North Korean regime as a partner for peaceful coexistence or even part of the self. This narrative, 
based on strong ethnic nationalism and anti-imperialism, negatively describes the US as one of the 
imperial powers who only pursue their own interests on the Korean peninsula and conservative ruling 
elites as collaborators with the imperial powers of Japan and the US. 
 The self-understanding of a nation is primarily formed in relation to its own history. We learn 
who we are by achieving a consciousness over how we became what we are now, that is, through 
gaining a better understanding of our own history. The history of South Korea has become a highly 
contested and debated matter, with contradictory accounts openly competing in the public realm to 
this day, often with a political tendency. The discrepancy between a single ethnic identity and the 
reality of political divides lies at the core of North and South Korean people. Therefore, national 
identity for a contemporary Korean is very complicated and ambivalent, between being a member of 
the Korean nation and as a citizen of either of the divided states. Competing memories and narratives 
of the country’s past in two political strains, conservative and progressive, have manifested 
themselves in exclusive commemorations such as the March First Independence Movement Day. 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK), institutionalized by the 
second progressive government of Roh Moo-hyun, aimed to clear up past wrongdoings and injustice 
so that the “correct” history could be established by discovering hidden and silenced historical events. 
However, efforts to clear up the past through the enactment of related laws and the establishment of 
institutions like TCRK ignited strong resistance from conservatives and controversies over what is 
the “correct” history and what should be taught to the younger generation, intensifying conflicts 
rather than contributing to the conflict transformation and reconciliation that they initially aimed at. 
 In societies emerging from recent violent conflicts, the past is of critical importance in 
presenting events and policies. Furthermore, the past impacts how the society perceives notions of 
justice and equality, constitutes relations and perceptions between groups in society, and determines 
how people envision the future of their nation (Korostelina 2016, p. 289). The past is revealed in 
different forms, like personal memories of those who lived through violence, stories passed onto 
younger generations, representations in the mass media and official narratives, one of which is 
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history education. Although it is not the only mechanism that deals with the past, history education 
provides the official and most systematic account of a nation’s past and established beliefs about 
relations between groups within a given society. Schools, key instruments of socialization, are 
inherently affected by societal dynamics and tensions in post-conflict context (Bentrovato 2016, p. 
221). Accordingly, history education that is innately political, serving as an instrument to form the 
notion of citizenship and loyalty to the nation in the process of nation-building, is greatly influenced 
by the complex processes and changing nature of politics, and in turn impacts on the (re)definition 
of national identity in post-conflict societies. History education depends on the views of ruling elites 
regarding how to define the nation itself. Thus, history education in post-conflict societies is 
dependent upon both the meaning derived from the past, and the power structures of the society and 
connotations of identity promoted by existing political regimes (Korostelina 2016, p. 289). In 
addition, history education as the object of great political and societal contention in societies 
emerging from violent conflict has been frequently functioned a battlefield. However, it is important 
to note that school history education can also play a key role in peacebuilding and reconciliation 
processes, as shown in recent empirical research in history education and peace studies (Bentrovato 
2016, p. 221). 
 One of the dilemmas post-conflict societies face is making a choice between either 
monumental or critical history, which refers to the most important functions of history in society 
(Korostelina 2016, p. 290). Monumental history serves to legitimize the ruling regime and develop 
loyalty to a nation among the younger generation. The intention of monumental history is not to 
provide an understanding of what actually happened in reality, but to promote selective remembering 
of particular narratives and events, based on explicit judgments about the importance of specific 
events in the history, as well as promoting selective forgetting of events that are contradictory of 
intended narratives. The judgments as to what to remember or to forget are made based on the 
ideology of a ruling regime that favors some events over others because they are regarded as a 
significant and essential foundation for the regime’s ideas and goals (ibid.). In this light, the state-
sanctioned narrative of South Korea that had been constructed by the authoritarian regimes and 
remained dominant until the democratization in the late 1980s was clearly monumental. It served the 
function of justifying legitimacy of the governments and raising patriotism towards the new state of 
South Korea. 
 Monumental history can be constrained by critical history that holds all perpetrators 
accountable and shows the complex roots of violence without promoting loyalty to one particular 
side. History is no longer restricted by a regime or powerful group but rather becomes open to 
constant reinterpretations. In critical history, the process of confronting and considering alternative 
narratives contributes to reconstruction of narratives (ibid., p. 293). Through this process, stories that 
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combined different groups and communities within the nation allow multiple interpretations and 
analyses of the roots and causations of violence, as well as reconfiguration of dominant narratives. 
Progressive intellectuals and politicians in South Korea have sought to see the past events through 
different perspectives to bring multiple narratives into the representation of history. These attempts, 
however, have been undermined by several factors. Among those, the most crucial is the 
politicization of history, in which narratives of two competing political strains have not been put 
together, but have only been constantly competing. In addition, the ethnic nationalism narrative of 
progressives, in itself, still shows some features of monumental history. For instance, it fails to 
provide complex roots of violent history and creates another dichotomy between nationalists and 
anti-nationalists, thus intensifying conflict rather than resolving it. 
 Narratives about historical events and processes are not created by individuals but are rather 
the collection of memories of social groups, transmitted from one generation to the next one through 
the scientific production of historians, school teaching, the mass media, and symbolic resources 
constructed by societies. This everyday knowledge about the common past is not only the result of 
transforming scientific knowledge into common-sense knowledge, but also a result of educational 
and school teaching interventions. Any narrative of the past has a political dimension in that it can 
be used to either negate or legitimize the historical foundations claimed by social groups, in particular, 
political elites, which provide them with temporal continuity (Sibley et al. 2008). It is, therefore, 
natural to have a constitutive tension between hegemonic narratives and counter-narratives. Multiple 
versions of narratives naturally coexist, and systems of knowledge are heterogeneous and unstable. 
Hence, possibilities for critique, argumentation, and discussion are always open. In this regard, 
hegemonic and counter-narratives not only coexist side by side but penetrate each other, informing, 
arguing, and questioning. The conflicts between different, in fact, contradictory versions of the same 
historical process can coexist in everyday life in the same social group, resulting in a state called 
“cognitive polyphasia” (Barreiro et al. 2017, p. 127). Changes in collective narrative discourses are 
unlikely to happen merely because new facts or evidence are found. Rather, it is the representation 
and interpretation of facts, the meanings made of facts, that are of significance yet are frequently in 
dispute. The notion of a state of cognitive polyphasia suggests that people develop their own 
strategies to deal with conflicting information without changing their beliefs and interpretations. 
Thus, when it comes to the collective memories of past violence, it is the state of polyphasia, not 
mere information, that must be addressed (ibid., p. 140).  
 One example of cognitive polyphasia can be found in the case of Korea. When the 
progressive regimes initiated a policy of “clearing up the past wrong-doings”, policy opponents, 
mostly conservatives, developed their own strategies and narratives to deal with conflicting 
memories, such as mass killings of civilians by the state forces, without changing their beliefs and 
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interpretations over history. In the alternative narrative of ethnic nationalism, the act of mass killings 
is attributed to the authoritarian regimes who were blinded by the anti-communistic ideology and 
exerted extreme violence on its own people. The same historical event is, however, interpreted from 
a different angle for those conservatives, saying it is a tragedy that many civilians were sacrificed 
but it was a necessary measure to protect the country from communist rebellion at the time. Thus, 
the alternative narrative was not able to change their beliefs and interpretations of the event. In the 
South Korean case, the conflict between contradictory narratives has greater significance given that 
some South Koreans, mostly conservatives and rightists, believe that they are still at war with the 
North, so for them the challenge from another narrative that views the North as a normal state to 
coexist on the peninsula is, in fact, regarded as an existential threat. As a result, conflicts between 
contradictory narratives are further intensified in South Korea than in other countries. Each 
government of South Korea since the 2000s has attempted to invest prominence in interpretations of 
the past and narratives on national identity by arguing their version of narrative as “true” and “right” 
for the nation. 
 
1.4.4 Knowledge Production and Identity Politics 
 
 To analyze conflicting discourses over various issues from history to policies in 
contemporary South Korean politics and society from the point of view of the struggles for “true” 
and “correct” narratives, this study relies on a critical school of thought such as Foucault’s, that 
assumes that there are always political motives behind the creation and promotion of particular 
narratives. Foucault (2000) argues, in line with Nietzsche, that knowledge is the outcome of a battle 
and functions as a strategic relation between humans. In this regard, truth and power are interlinked. 
They are generating and maintaining each other, resulting in a specific “regime of truth” which is 
differently constructed from society to society (Foucault 2002, p. 132). This regime defines which 
discourses are allowed and accepted as “true”, and provides the mechanisms to distinguish between 
“right” and “wrong” (ibid.). The political battle is fought by using the discursive weapons of 
knowledge and power which determine the formation of a context-specific truth (Foucault 2004, p. 
190). This battle is more about the status of being accepted as truth with all its economic and political 
implications, rather than about the truth itself. Dynamics of power and knowledge create conflicting 
versions of truth and rightness which function as tactical weapons in politics (Foucault 2000, p. 61). 
As in Foucault’s assertion (2004) that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (p. 13), 
war is not only constantly dividing societies, but it is also the foundation of all institutions of power, 
just as military institutions are at the heart of all political institutions. The expression that “politics is 
the continuation of war by other means” well describes the post-war South Korea. After the truce 
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agreement in 1953, many of the government’s policies worked like a military strategy to fight against 
an arch enemy, that is, the North and its communist ideology. Much effort was put into keeping the 
image of the very enemy alive through such measures as the re-production of history, creation of fear, 
propaganda and censorship, selective commemoration and victimization. 
 With the legal establishment of the South Korean state in 1948, the first government of Rhee 
Syngman highlighted anti-communistic ideology in the face of the North Korean threat. The military 
government that followed continued to promote anti-communism and nationalism to legitimize its 
power and mobilize the public. It largely focused on the formation of an anti-communistic 
consciousness. Thus, the North was undoubtedly an important element in South Korea’s national 
identity formation (Shin & Burke 2008). The Korean case is one of the most typical examples, with 
national identity being strengthened due to the presence of a significant contending identity, hence 
reflecting the important role of significant others in identity construction, as Triandafyllidou (1998) 
argues. In South Korea, state-designed legislations and institutions were also put in place in order to 
consolidate a national identity by excluding the possibility of any sympathy toward North Korea. 
While less antagonistic policies toward the North have been imposed during the past decades after 
the democratization, South Korea still employs National Security Law principles that restrict 
freedom to politically support the North. 
 While the national identity of South Korea was created and propagated by state power under 
the authoritarian regimes, democratization in the late 1980s not only changed this pattern but also 
fostered a new feature of identity. Identity is a more influential element in South Korea’s foreign 
policy and due to the innately ambivalent nature of national identity in South Korea, inter-Korean 
relations are much more complicated. It was Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine policy toward the North that 
intensified identity politics in the South with attempts at the reformation of national identity. This 
has resulted in a polarized and divided South Korean society between Sunshine’s proponents, mostly 
progressives and leftists, and opponents, conservatives and rightists, on how to engage one of the 
most significant others, North Korea. Furthermore, the development of a civil society in South Korea 
has contributed to the redefinition of both South Korean politics and South Korean national identity, 
which has significant meaning given that knowledge about what is right for the nation is now not 
determined solely by the state, but by many other actors like civic groups. This has naturally led to 
the emergence of challenging perspectives regarding many issues. In the democratized society of 
South Korea, the formerly dominant narrative on national identity created by the state now faces 
challenges and has lost its hegemony in providing “truth” and “rightness.” While knowledge 
production used to be dominated by the sole state power in the past, now various agents, including 
the state itself, compete to claim a hegemonic status in providing the “true” stories for the society. 
 Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that there are multiple narratives about past events, 
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depending on the varying perspectives and interests of the social or national groups implicated in the 
stories. This is of great importance given that historical narratives influence how groups define their 
rights and duties, legitimize their political agreements, and judge the rightness or wrongness of their 
actions. Any account of the past thus has a political dimension, and all such accounts can be used to 
negate or legitimize the historical bases of claims made by social groups. Hence, there is necessarily 
constitutive tension between hegemonic narratives and counter-narratives. Hegemonic narratives 
convey the more stable, dominant, and consensual version of history, whilst counter-narratives are 
defined by their opposition or resistance to the dominant or hegemonic narratives. 
 The Sunshine policy of President Kim Dae-jung was not simply a policy change but an 
attempt to transform the hegemonic narrative about South Korea’s relational identity with North 
Korea. Before the democratization, the North was only described as an evil enemy to be destroyed, 
and its leader as irrational. Policy change from containment to engagement and the positive portrayal 
of the leader of the North essentially required transformation of the hegemonic narrative, leading to 
a transformation of national identity. Furthermore, the transformation of South Korean national 
identity that had seen only the South as a lawful political entity on the peninsula takes on a special 
meaning because of the rather peculiar circumstance of a nation with a strong sense of ethnic 
homogeneity being divided into two political entities. The controversy over whether to call the North 
the main enemy [chuchŏk] is another example to show the fact that the inner conflict of South Korea 
pertains to the issue of national identity. The main enemy controversy comes from the reality that the 
two Koreas are pursuing dialogue and cooperation while they are technically at war, with a massive 
military standoff creating a practical threat to one another. It is, in fact, very awkward to define one’s 
counterpart as the enemy while pursuing reconciliation and cooperation, but the North is still an 
enemy in a military sense. Hence, the dilemma associated with in-group discrepancy over a variety 
of issues in South Korea we currently witness can be properly understood only by taking identity 
politics into consideration. For instance, Shin Gi-wook (2012) claims that to adequately understand 
South Korean policies related to US-South Korea relations, one necessarily has to acknowledge the 
role of national identity that extends beyond policy and domestic politics. That is, the US-ROK 
relationship is linked to the issue of national identity for Koreans, while it is largely a matter of policy 
for Americans. To South Korea, the US is one of the most significant others that has shaped South 
Korea’s national identity in the post-liberation era, rather than simply another state in the 
international system with which it shares certain interests. Thus, US-ROK relations along with inter-
Korean relations have become a pillar of national identity for Koreans. Hence, the changes in South 
Korean views on the US during the 1990s and 2000s must be considered in the context of identity 
politics and identity transformation, reflecting a larger social effort or trend, led by South Korean 
progressives and leftists, to redefine South Korea’s position (Shin Gi-wook 2012, p. 295-296). 
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During the Cold War, the anti-communist years, the world-view and interests of the South accorded 
with those of the US on the peninsula. However, with the end of the Cold War, South Korea’s 
domestic regime change, and its subsequent engagement with the communist countries, South Korea 
transformed its views about the role they could play in emerging global and regional orders. Such 
revitalized thinking about national identity necessarily included reevaluation of South Korea’s two 
most important relationships, those with its significant others: North Korea and the US. As a result, 
identity plays an increasingly important role in shaping Korea’s relations with these nations and 
policy regarding them. Competition for narrative dominance and identity politics are in a constitutive 
relationship. That is, policy changes based on identity transformation toward the significant others 
have been influenced by narrative transformation, and dominance of narratives is, in turn, affected 
by institutional changes such as policies. 
  
 
1.5 Hypotheses and Justification 
 
 The aim of the dissertation is to research how and why a variety of reforms led by the 
progressive administrations of South Korea, from foreign policies to the North and the US, toward 
domestic policies like “clearing up the past wrong-doings” and history textbook revision, have 
intensified social conflicts in politics and society, rather than contributing to the conflict 
transformation and reconciliation that they originally aimed at. While conflicts were initially 
centered around the policies toward two most significant others, inner divisions within South Korea 
now seem to extend beyond foreign policy areas. The most notable case is the current controversy 
over how to interpret the modern and contemporary history of South Korea, termed “history war,” 
pertaining to self- identity. 
 This study primarily assumes that the social and political polarization within South Korea 
stems from fundamental disagreements over two highly important concepts in the formation of 
national identity: 1) the self, how to define South Korea, which means whether the birth of a South 
Korean government should be celebrated as a lawful and legitimate process, or treated as failure to 
establish one united nation; and 2) the significant others, the question of how to identify North Korea 
and the US. By closely examining two contentious narratives over South Korea’s past that greatly 
influence the conceptions of national identity, the research highlights the fact that narratives on the 
national identity of South Korea were initially crafted in the context of intractable conflicts with the 
North, which has had great impacts on the consolidation of social conflicts. Narrative identity created 
during or after the war has been formed with a strong certainty of the self and others, thus being 
resistant to change. In particular, the “state-centered nationalism narrative” of contemporary 
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conservatives is in accordance with the state-sanctioned narrative in the authoritarian era that was 
formed with the firm certainty about the North as an evil enemy. Thus, those who see the reality of 
the nation through the lens of state-centered nationalism find it extremely difficult to adapt to the 
alternative narrative that identifies the North as a normal neighboring state to coexist with. It is 
important to note that it is a challenging task to transform narrative identity crafted in intractable 
conflicts. The two contentious narratives show a resistance to any change because they were initially 
formed during the intractable conflicts with the North. Reforms led by progressive regimes were not 
able to construct a transcendent and integrative narrative over national identity, while conservatives’ 
opposition to narrative transformation grew strong. 
 Secondly, this study assumes that it is identity politics in which the rhetoric of 
othering/exclusion is frequently applied that has significantly affected the intensification of social 
and political conflicts in South Korea through creating a dualistic conception of self and others. In 
the state-centered nationalism narrative, Koreans who agree with the founding values of South Korea, 
liberal democracy and the free market system, are constructed as the self, and North Korea, a 
communist and totalitarian state, and its followers, whether they are currently South Koreans or 
North Koreans, are identified as an evil enemy to South Korea. In conservatives’ rhetoric, the national 
division and the war are attributed to the North Korean regime and its evil ideology of communism. 
The rhetoric of exclusion in which political dissenters are categorized as pro-North or commies has 
been very common in South Korean politics. While framing opponents as pro-North is still frequently 
adopted in discourses of conservative politicians and their supporters, a new frame, that is “anti-
South,” has been adopted since the New Right movement emerged in the 2000s. In the anti-South 
frame, political opponents or those who are critical of South Korea are classified as anti-South 
Korean forces that deny the legitimacy of South Korea as the only lawful political entity on the 
peninsula and underline its birth as a failure of the united Korean nation. Hence, the narrative of 
conservatives presents a strong nationalism, yet South Korea-centered, so it is named the “state-
centered nationalism narrative” in this dissertation. On the other hand, the “ethnic nationalism 
narrative”, based on strong ethnic nationalism and anti-imperialism, sees North Korea as part of the 
self to be united regardless of political ideologies. In this narrative, the nation and masses [minjok] 
are defined as pure and absolute self, while pro-Japanese collaborators, who later turned into pro-US 
ruling elites in South Korea, are constructed as the hostile others, traitors to the nation. What is 
problematic in this narrative is that Japanese collaborators are perceived as a single entity with 
uniform beliefs and attitudes, without considering personal and social contexts in which they served 
or related to the colonial government. Hence, those who were once categorized as collaborators by 
historians are depicted as homogeneously evil, and the descendants of those collaborators also often 
fall into the same category of evil traitors who demonstrate the same fixed vicious patterns of 
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behavior. In the statement on the March 1 Independence Movement Day in 2019, President Moon 
openly mentioned that “the term, the reds [ppagaengi], is the legacy of pro-Japanese collaboration 
that should be cleared up for the nation’s better future” (SŏngYŏn-ch’ŏl 2019). His statement 
intended to warn of the danger in the rhetoric of exclusion of rightists, in which whoever is critical 
of South Korea is treated as commies and North Korean sympathizers. However, this also creates 
itself another danger, which is already revealed in his supporters’ rhetoric, that opponents who are 
critical of his ideas and against the North fall into a category of pro-Japanese collaborators based on 
the dichotomy between good self “nationalists” and evil “anti-nationalists.” He also mentioned in 
the luncheon with the descendants of Korean independence fighters who currently live abroad that 
there is a saying that “three generations of pro-Japanese collaborators will be prosperous while those 
of fighters for independence will be impoverished.” And he emphasized that it is time to clear up. 
This is also to point out the lack of legal justice toward acts of collaboration and their consequent 
results. Although this is indeed true in many cases in which families of independence fighters have 
struggled with poverty and have not been rewarded by the state, this idea has a risk that many 
privileged and rich people that enjoyed wealth in the post-liberation era are treated as descendants of 
collaborators without considering historical and social contexts. This historical view clearly accords 
with the ethnic nationalism narrative in which the pro-Japanese collaborators are blamed for all the 
injustice and wrongs current South Korean society experiences. 
 This study assumes that both narratives have constructed antagonism toward their own 
hostile “others,”: North Korean sympathizers, whether called pro-North, the reds, commies, or anti-
South, in the state-centered nationalism narrative of conservatives; and anti-nationalists, including 
pro-Japanese and pro-American collaborators, and ruling elites in the ethnic nationalism narrative of 
progressives. More importantly, these two contending narratives have been politicized to exclude 
opponents from South Korean society and politics, intensifying societal and political conflicts within 
South Korea. 
 Lastly, the study assumes that reforms led by progressive regimes failed to create an open 
and inclusive “dialogical space” between competing groups in the process of policy decision making 
and its enactment, thus deepening conflicts. The lesson learned from past experiences in the Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations that enthusiastically promoted the engagement policy 
toward North Korea is that peace between the two Koreas cannot be attainable simply if all agree on 
the ideal of peace, yet it can be achieved only through patient and inclusive processes. Establishing 
a positive domestic context of South Korea toward peace, that is, consensus and cooperation with 
those who have different values and ideology, is a necessary condition for conflict transformation 
and peace settlement on the peninsula (Choi Jang Jip 2017). In order for an eventual unification to 
be achievable and sustainable, it is not enough just to say that both Koreas must be united under one 
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system. Unification must address the emotional and personal components of individuals which a 
country consists of. People will not naturally develop a sense of unity and belonging to a reunited 
Korea even if a political decision for unification is made. In Bloom’s (1990) words, “nation building 
means both the formation and establishment of the new state itself as a political entity, and the process 
of creating viable degrees of unity, adaptation, achievement and a sense of national identity among 
the people” (cited in Grzelczyk 2014, p. 179). In this sense, unifying the two Koreas will essentially 
require the same complicated processes through which a new state is established. Hence, during the 
process of pursuing the engagement policy toward the North or a peace initiative on the peninsula, 
some degree of consensus and cooperation between groups in South Korea who have radically 
different national identity conceptions is a necessary condition for ultimate peace settlement between 
the two Koreas. 
 Throughout the last few decades, social scientists and activists have come to realize that in 
order to settle peaceful relations between the former rivals and move them into a phase of sustainable 
and stable peace, extensive changes are required in the emotions and mind-sets of group members 
on both sides. Stable and lasting peace can be defined as “consisting of mutual recognition and 
acceptance of an ultimate goal of maintaining peaceful relations through full normalization with 
cooperation in all possible domains of collective life that provide secure and trustful coexistence” 
(Bar-Tal &Halperin 2013, p. 945). In this framework, in almost every peace-building process, 
reconciliation between past rival parties is a necessary condition for establishing stable and lasting 
peace, and it is related to socio-psychological restructuring of relations between past rivals that 
allows healing from the pains of past conflict. This can be achieved through mutual recognition and 
acceptance, through open and free discussions about past conflict, and by taking responsibility and 
correcting past injustices and wrongdoing. Thus, building lasting and stable peace requires, on the 
one hand, structural changes that reformulate the nature of relations between the parties. On the other 
hand, fundamental socio-psychological changes of members in society are necessary, which means 
“adoption and internalization by society members of values, beliefs, attitudes, emotions, norms and 
practices that cherish peace, justice, respect of human rights, cooperation, trust, sensitivity and 
respect of cultural differences – all the foundations of a culture of peace” (ibid.). 
 At the time of writing, the expectation for a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula is 
greater than ever due to ongoing inter-Korean summits as well as the first and historical encounter 
between the two leaders of the US and North Korea, even though the second DPRK-US summit 
ended without reaching an agreement. Still, it is a positive sign that formerly hostile nations are 
willing to talk to find a way of coexistence. However, the degree of inner conflict within the South 
has grown even higher since the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye in 2017, and there 
exist deep discrepancies over how to approach, and how to pursue, cooperation with the North. 
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Furthermore, we have seen in other post-conflict societies like Germany or Northern Ireland that a 
political declaration or peace agreement does not necessarily lead to genuine peaceful relations and 
reconciliation between the former adversaries. This justifies my argument that the narrative of 
rightists in South Korea who construct a strong national identity that still views the North as an arch 
enemy should be taken into consideration in advancing peaceful relations with the North. In the 
process of the engagement policy toward the North and peace initiatives on the peninsula, some 
degree of consensus and cooperation between conflicting groups in South Korea who have radically 
different national identity conceptions is a prerequisite for ultimate peace settlement between the two 
Koreas. Even if a peace agreement or a decision of political integration is made in high politics, it 
can be always dissolved by the public as we are just witnessing in the case of the UK’s withdrawal 
from the European Union (EU). Reconciliation goes beyond conflict resolution in representing a 
transformation in each party’s identity. 
 With the impeachment of the former President Park, the conservative parties in formal 
politics are in crisis, losing their political power, and pro-Park supporters are commonly described 
as uniformly old and irrational, disregarded in academics and the media. However, there are still 
quite a good number of South Korean people who see the current political and societal issues through 
the prism of the conservative narrative identity, even if the hegemonic power of the traditional 
conservative camp in formal politics has been lost. More importantly, with Park’s impeachment, 
groups of young conservatives who criticize political elites who abandon the “true” values and 
principles of conservatism have emerged, with the goal of the revitalization of conservatism. In 
addition, it seems evident that the political rhetoric of exclusion by politicians, whether progressives 
or conservatives, based on their own identity concepts, cannot bring genuine peace on the Korean 
peninsula. It is, therefore, now the time to examine the inherently divided nature of Korean national 
identity among South Koreans and to seek to develop an integrative and transcendent narrative both 
parties can accept through an open “dialogical space.” In this regard, Kelman’s (1999) argument that 
the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which is also a conflict based on strong identity 
conceptions, requires the development of a transcendent narrative in which each group recognizes 
its positive interdependence on the other has significant implications for the Korean case as well. 
 
 
1.6 Methodology: Historical Case Studies 
 
 In researching the distinctive and performative roles played by dominant and alternative 
narratives, this study examines some historical case studies in which four critical junctures have been 
significant in the narrative transformation of South Korea. The dominant narrative contains key 
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national identity conceptions that structure the state’s responses to contentious political issues. In 
other words, national identity conceptions about the self and the significant others set the context for 
political debate. I propose the concept of narrative identity as a useful tool to understand inner 
conflicts within South Korean society and examine how various actors, including the state and non-
state, have struggled to attain the dominance of narrative identity at times of identity disagreement 
or competition through historical case studies. The study draws on a variety of sources and methods, 
including discourse analysis of written or spoken texts, official documents, media articles and in-
depth interviews conducted in Seoul during field research in 2017 and 2018. The study regards 
narrative, understood here as social constructs largely shaped by power and politics, as a key 
analytical tool with which we can better understand societies, their power structures, and internal 
dynamics and tensions. Inspired by Michael Foucault’s work, the research employs discourse 
analysis to deconstruct the relationship between power and knowledge in the society examined, and 
more specifically, to discern how particular knowledge becomes dominant and operates through 
societal institutions, thus suppressing alternative truths and exerting social control. 
 In the process of narrative identity transformation in South Korea, there have been four 
important junctures: 1) democratization in the late 1980s which provided dissident intellectuals with 
opportunities to raise their voices and promote their narratives in the public sphere, and the financial 
crisis in 1997 that well revealed the structural problems in South Korea’s economy and accelerated 
political and economic democratization; 2) the rise of progressives and regime change to the two 
successive progressive administrations (1998-2008), through which the alternative narrative of 
progressives could be institutionalized in policies and regulations; 3) the resistance of conservatives 
in the 2000s to reforms led by progressives, and the emergence of the New Right which has a 
significance in that it contributed to revitalizing the historical view of conservatives; and 4) the crisis 
of conservatism with the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and consequent self-reflection 
process on the part of conservatives. The study additionally draws on the outcomes of in-depth 
interviews with right-wing activists and participant observation in right-wing events, seminars, 
lectures and conferences conducted during the field research in 2017 and 2018 in Seoul to examine 
the influence of the historical juncture of the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye in the 
narrative identity of conservatives. 
 Importantly, given the contentious nature of political and social discourses on various issues 
in South Korea, this research refrains from providing its own account but instead describes the 
various ways in which master narratives are disseminated and endorsed or politicized. The terms 
conservative and progressive are direct translations of the Korean posu and chinbo, respectively, 
which are the most commonly used terms for the two political strains in South Korea. In a South 
Korean context, the term, conservative [posu], covers republican, conservative and rightist, while 
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progressive [chinbo] also includes a broad range of the political spectrum, from liberal, progressive, 
to leftist, socialist, communist. To define the exact meanings of those political sects in a South Korean 
context is beyond the scope of this dissertation, and thus the most common terms, conservative and 
progressive, will be generally adopted in this study, although rightist and leftist are often used as well. 
 
1.6.1 First Juncture: Democratization and the Financial Crisis 
  
 Chapter 3 focuses on the emergence of an alternative narrative around the first critical 
juncture: the democratization movement in June 1987. The democratization movement that started 
in the 1980s opened the door to different voices being accepted in politics and academia, and 
challenged the hegemony of the state-sanctioned narrative that was created under authoritarian 
regimes. Since the 1980s, nationalist historiography in South Korea that had not been allowed for 
open discussion under the authoritarian regimes has been associated with leftist and progressive 
politics (Em Henry 2013, p. 16), aiming at not only looking to the future of the nation but also coming 
to terms with the legacies of past wrongdoings. Furthermore, the financial crisis in 1997 that 
seriously damaged the South Korean economy provided the opening through which the progressives 
and their ideology could enter the mainstream of South Korea’s formal politics (Hahm Chaibong 
2005, p. 62). The crisis exposed the structural problems of the old system of politics and the economy 
in South Korea, about which the progressives had always been highly critical. The financial crisis 
revealed the inefficiency of the economic system that had been praised with South Korea’s fast 
growing economic development. One of the most direct political outcomes of the financial crisis was 
the election of Kim Dae-jung to the presidency in 1997, who used to be a long-time dissident and 
opposition leader. The financial crisis created widespread panic and anger among the population 
toward the ruling conservative coalition’s corruption and mismanagement of the economy, providing 
an opportunity for Kim Dae-jung. The Kim administration together with former radical student 
leaders began introducing South Korea to many ideas and policies that had been once considered too 
leftist, and hence forbidden. 
 
1.6.2 Second Juncture: Successive Progressive Administrations of Kim Dae-jung and 
Roh Moo-hyun 
 
 The second critical juncture in the process of national identity transformation was the regime 
change from authoritarian conservative to the progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung (1997-
2002) and Roh Moo-hyun (2002-2008). Roh Moo-hyun’s election in 2002 marked the rise of the 
progressives in South Korean politics. The progressives consist of those politicians, intellectuals, and 
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activists who led the student movement and formed a coalition against military dictatorship during 
the 1980s. Many of the new policies adopted by the Kim and Roh administrations caused inherent 
disagreement and conflict over South Korean national identity to come to the surface. Under the 
progressive regimes of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, the ethnic nationalism narrative became 
institutionalized as an official narrative through policy changes ranging from foreign policies toward 
the North and the US to domestic ones, such as the policy of “clearing up the past wrongdoings” and 
history textbook revision. Thus, chapter 4 focuses on policy changes related to two important 
concepts of national identity, the self and the significant others, North Korea and the US.  
 The institutionalization of this new narrative was regarded as an identity crisis for the 
conservative camp and its followers. As a result, the identity conflicts became more intense than ever 
in the 2000s. Many observers argue that competition between the two political camps was largely 
due to ideological difference. This is partly true since ideology is the most influential factor in the 
national identity construction of South Korea given that the nation was divided along ideological 
lines. However, this research aims to show that conflicts in South Korean politics and society were 
more about winning the dominance of narratives that greatly impact the reformation of national 
identity led by the two political strains of conservatives and progressives, which does not mean that 
competition happened only between political parties and politicians, but was expanded beyond the 
political arena, moving into the various realms of society such as education, civil society, and religion. 
Chapter 4 examines policy reforms divided into two sections: first, foreign policy changes under 
Kim and Roh which led to the reformation of the two significant others’ identities; and second, the 
reconstruction of the self-identity, through such policies as “clearing up past wrongdoings” and the 
establishment of related laws and institutions like the Truth and Reconciliation Committee, Republic 
of Korea (TCRK), as well as reinterpretations of the war and war crimes. 
 
1.6.3 Third Juncture: Emergence of the New Right and History War 
 
 The third critical juncture in narrative transformation is the emergence of the New Right 
movement around the same time of the Roh administration, which is closely examined in chapter 5. 
Thus, there is a temporal overlap between the second and third junctures. The New Right movement 
has led to sharp debates over how to interpret South Korean modern history, which is elaborated in 
chapter 6. The New Right separating from the traditional conservative strain was a kind of 
reactionary movement to progressives’ attempts to institutionalize their narrative into policies and 
laws. Such revitalized thinking about national identity necessarily included reevaluation of South 
Korea’s important relationships with North Korea and the US, as well as the self, the legitimacy of 
South Korea. Consequently, identity plays an increasingly important role in shaping Korea’s relations 
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with these nations and policy regarding them (Shin Gi-wook 2012), which raised the strong 
opposition from conservatives/rightists. Amid such political and societal shifts, the so-called “New 
Right” emerged. The New Right was a conservative political movement motivated by the necessity 
to reinvent conservatism for a democratic context. At the core of this movement was the free market 
system based on the perspective of neoliberalism, from which scholars advocating the movement of 
the New Right began to reinterpret Korea’s past (Macrae 2016, p. 329-300). With the emergence of 
the New Right movement and its effort to turn South Korean history away from the allegedly left-
leaning narrative of progressives, the state-sanctioned narrative, which dominated before 
democratization, has now evolved into the “state-centered nationalism narrative”, which emphasizes 
the legitimacy of South Korea as a true representation of the Korean nation and treats the North as 
an illegal entity and enemy. 
 The New Right as a reactionary movement to the dominance of the progressive narrative in 
society ignited the controversy over how to assess the past events of South Korea. Reforms in foreign 
policies under two progressive regimes which sought to set a different perspective over how to view 
the significant others have consequently led to conflicting narratives on how to identify the self, 
South Korea and its history. Thus, currently, the most controversial conflict in South Korean politics 
and society pertains to how to assess its modern and contemporary history, which is elaborated in 
chapter 6. Controversies over history are closely related to the core of national identity. The ethnic 
nationalism narrative of progressives has been widely adopted as an official narrative since history 
textbook revision in 2003 from the state-issued history textbook to privately published textbooks. 
With this change, the master narrative over national history and identity has been transformed, more 
in line with the ethnic nationalism narrative. Since 2004 when the Text Forum, the New Right civic 
organization, was founded, conservative intellectuals and politicians who felt a threat from the 
prevailing progressives’ narrative adopted in the textbooks and accepted among the public have 
consistently raised criticism over allegedly left-leaning textbooks. The controversy reached its peak 
when the former conservative president Park Geun-hye sought to return to the adoption of the single 
state-issued history textbook system, which was later abolished when the current progressive 
president Moon Jae-in took office. The debates over how to interpret South Korean history and how 
to identify the North and the US are still ongoing, including other issues such as enacting National 
Foundation Day and abolishing the National Security Law. 
 
1.6.4 Fourth Juncture: The Impeachment of President Park Geun-hye 
 
 With the retaking of office under the two successive conservative regimes of Lee Myung-
bak and Park Geun-hye, conservatives seemed to successfully regain a hegemonic political power 
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but the impeachment of President Park in 2017 totally changed the political scene in institutional 
politics as well as in civic political activism. Chapter 7 focuses on a new type of political activism 
of conservative civic groups, which emerged after one of the most significant historical junctures in 
South Korean history, Park’s impeachment. The crisis of conservatism in institutional politics 
awakened the feeling of threat and crisis among conservative supporters, who then started to redefine 
the values and principles of South Korean conservatism, criticizing politicians who abandoned those 
norms and values for the sake of their own interests. This group of conservatives identify themselves 
as true conservatives, most of whom have been strongly against Park’s impeachment, arguing that 
the rule of law in South Korea was damaged by the leftist populism. On the other hand, many of the 
media and academic intellectuals view this new trend of conservatism after the impeachment as the 
emergence of right-wing extremism in South Korea. Based on 15 in-depth interviews with right-wing 
activists and participant observation in right-wing events, seminars, and lectures, conducted in 2017 
and 2018, chapter 7 aims to have a better understanding of the self-reflective processes of 
conservatism. Although the hegemonic status of the traditional conservative party in South Korea 
has been lost with Park’s impeachment, there still exist quite a considerable number of people who 
see the reality of South Korea through the lens of the state-centered nationalism narrative. Political 
activism of conservatives is going through self-reflective processes, consolidating supporters of 
conservatism. It is noteworthy that young conservatives have emerged as leaders in this new trend 
of conservatism, which has never happened before. The lessons learned from the past progressive 
regimes advise us that it is a necessary condition for conflict transformation and reconciliation to 
include those who have different ideologies and values in decision making and the processes of peace 
initiatives. In order to do so, understanding the world-views of the two competing camps in South 



















2. Theoretical Framework 
 
 
2.1 Narrative Identity 
 
 In psychology, the idea of narrative began to emerge in the 1980s. Bruner (1986, 1990), one 
of the key scholars in the field, argues that narrative is the primary mode of thought and we 
understand the social world by constructing narratives. Through this process of story-making 
individuals can connect their mind to a social reality, taking its particular cultural and political 
contexts into consideration (Hammack & Pilecki 2012, p. 76-77). While there exist various 
definitions of narrative, this study takes a narrow definition of narratives as “stories” that are “a 
spoken or written account of connected events” (ibid., p. 76) and storytelling. As such, narratives are 
possible forms of discourse, while discourses include narratives but cannot be reduced to narratives. 
Certain narratives of the nation constitute broader discourses of national identity as important 
components. Different narrative forms, such as historical accounts, myths and metaphors, contribute 
to discourses of national identity. Also, narratives are told in media such as novels, films, textbooks, 
or other spaces like news media in which discourses are actively produced. The speeches of leaders, 
the conversation of a community group, or the telling of an individual life story are other forms of 
narrative. Likewise, these storied accounts are found at every level of analysis and thus the idea of 
narrative transcends disciplinary boundaries. 
 
2.1.1 Narrative Identity at the Individual Level 
 
 Through analysis of time and narrative to examine the difference between history and fiction, 
Ricoeur (1988) argues that both historical action and interpretive imagination shape narratives. In 
his book, Time and Narrative, he explains that history can be different from fiction, considering that 
it claims to be the “real” and “true” past (Ricoeur 1988, p.5). That is, it is fictive imagination that 
makes it possible for the past to be grasped. Mead (1970) made a similar comment about how the 
past is reinterpreted in light of the present and facilitates future plans (p. 241). History borrows from 
fiction the interpretive forms that allow the past to be reinterpreted in light of new experience that 
includes possibly conflicting information. According to Ricoeur, narratives about human pasts 
intermingle historical events and the resources of fiction that provide the narrative plot within which 
events are interpreted. Hence, a sense of identity is constructed through integrating the process of 
emplotment, which synthesizes experience in a narrative (Ricoeur 1991, p. 21). Events do not just 
happen but they carry the story along. Events may seem discordant until they are integrated and made 
sense of in the story. Plot, which is the organizing theme of a narrative, can weave together a complex 
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set of events into a single story. A plot is not only imposed but is also produced through a complex 
process that moves back and forth between events and plot structure until they are fitted together. 
Through the process of emplotment, the experience of time is given with meaning. The remembered 
and anticipated events of a person’s life become the person’s life story. 
 Ricoeur’s analysis of narrative goes beyond just a semiotic or linguistic aspect of a text, 
merely concerned with the internal relationships within a text (Ricoeur 1992, p. 301). Rather, he 
himself describes his analysis of narrative as “hermeneutic”, which indicates he is concerned with 
the text’s relationship to the events of lived experience, as well as its internal workings. That is, while 
not denying the significance of language, he explicitly includes the analysis of the relationship 
between linguistic narratives and practical action. Ricoeur’s hermeneutics approach to narratives 
emphasizes the reality of lived experience, of acting in the world, as a foundation to any attempt to 
understand the interpretive process. In his hermeneutics, the central focus is the process of 
interpretation, how past and future are refigured in the present. The complete hermeneutic circle of 
narrative and action involves the process of prefiguration, configuration, and refiguration (Ezzy 1988, 
p. 244). The narrative imagination prefigures lived experience with a symbolic structure and temporal 
schema of action. These events are then configured into a story with a central theme or plot that 
“mediates between the individual events or incidents and the story taken as a whole” (Ricoeur 1984, 
p. 65). This story, or text, then encounters lived experience again in the world of the listener or reader, 
who refigures and interprets the story as it influences his or her choices about how to act in the world. 
 Based on his analysis of narrative, Ricoeur (1988) develops a conception of self-identity. For 
him, identity is a narrative construction that is the product of the reflective process. Narrative identity 
constructs a sense of self-sameness, continuity and character in the plot of the story a person tells 
about him- or herself. The story then becomes the person’s actual history (Ricoeur 1988, p. 247). 
What should be noted is that “identities are neither unchangeable substances nor linguistic illusions” 
(Ezzy 1988, p. 245). The self-continuous nature of identity is a result of the self-consistent character 
of narratives throughout lifetime changes. Narratives are integrally temporal because they take the 
events of the past, present, and future into a consistent narrative. While narratives can and do change, 
this does not mean that they cannot provide a sense of self-sameness that is substantial enough to 
justify talking about character as “a persistent unity of preferences, inclinations and motivations” 
(Pucci 1992, p. 193). Narrative identity is “coherent but fluid and changeable, historically grounded 
but “fictively” reinterpreted, constructed by an individual but constructed in interaction and dialogue 
with other people” (Ezzy 1998, p. 246). Thus, Ricoeur (1984) emphasizes that narrative identities 
are not static in their structures, but are produced through an ongoing integrative process (p. 48). In 
the same way, other scholars also emphasize the reinterpretation process in narrative construction. 
For instance, Mead (1959) also emphasizes the process of reinterpretation of the past to make sense 
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of one’s actions in the present, and Goffman (1976) underlines how the past is reinterpreted for use 
in current situations. More importantly, Goffman emphasizes the influence of society’s “basic values” 
on the construction of the story (p.139). Ricoeur (1991) also points out that shared cultural symbols 
have impacts on the development of narrative identities, mentioning “narratives handed down in our 
literary tradition” (p.33). However, the plot of a self-narrative is affected by a wide range of 
preexisting narratives, such as myths, films, and past conversations. 
 Another interesting point is elaborated by Goffman, who examines the force of the 
institutionally sanctioned narratives of hospital staff. In group therapy sessions for mental patients, 
the therapist attempts to “disabuse” the patient of the face-saving narratives and to “encourage an 
interpretation suggesting that it is he himself who is to blame and who must change” (Goffman 1976, 
p. 149). This is greatly significant in that it indicates the role of power and politics in the narrative 
construction of identity, which is more visible in constructing narrative identity of collectives such 
as a nation. Evans and Maines’ (1995) study about incest has the similar argument of the “politics of 
storytelling.” They demonstrate that the conventionally plotted structure used to interpret narratives 
of incest forced many victims of incest to remain silent. This is because there are no plausible, 
culturally acceptable plots within which they could narrate their experiences (p.303). 
 Concerning the role of power and politics, Ricoeur (1992) comments that a self-narrative 
takes on meaning, and an evaluation as “good” (p. 172), and can be the bridge to an ethical life (p. 
187), which indicates that a theory of narrative identity has sociopolitical implications, although this 
aspect of Ricoeur’s thought remains to be further elaborated. Goffman (1976) also mentions that 
behind each self is an institutional system. That is, “the self dwells in the pattern of social control 
that is exerted in connection with the person by himself and those around him” (p. 154). Thus, it is 
not simply the rhetoric of a narrated identity that supports a sense of a unified self. Relations with 
others through regular interaction with social networks and the routines of everyday life are also 
central to a person’s ability to maintain a consistent and satisfying narrative. That is to say, narrative 
identities are sustained and transformed through the influence of social relationships as mediated by 
institutional structures. 
 
2.1.2 Narrative Identity at the Collective Level 
 
 Narratives operate not only at the level of individual psychology but also at the collective. 
Just as the personal narrative of identity provides a sense of continuity, the collective narrative 
provides a sense of group meaning (Hammack & Pileck 2012, p. 84). In psychology or sociology, 
narrative identity at the level of individual functioning and development has been emphasized. In 
fields such as history and politics, on the other hand, the focus has been put on narratives at the 
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collective level, with analysis of institutionally produced texts, political rhetoric, and discourses more 
generally. A recent study has moved toward identifying the relationship between master narratives 
and personal narratives in an attempt to link the idea of narrative identity at multiple levels 
(Hammack 2008), which thinks of master narrative as dominant scripts that can be identified in 
cultural products and storylines, ranging from a group’s history to meanings behind belonging to a 
particular social category (Hammack 2010, p. 178). Identity as narrative is thus not static, but 
narrative identity development is understood as a process that is closely mediated by social 
experience. In other words, identity development involves a process of narrative engagement in 
which individuals face multiple discursive choices to make meaning from life and experience 
through language (Hammack 2008). In this regard, identity is regarded as an internalization of speech 
(Vygotsky 1978), and is accessible through the act of narration (Hammack 2008), and of using 
language to make sense of individual and collective experience (Bruner 1987). The construction of 
narrative identity, assessed at the individual level through the telling of a life story and at the 
collective level through historical and ethnographic analysis (Hammack 2008), thus provides a 
window not only into processes of personal psychological adjustment and development, but also 
larger processes of social reproduction or resistance. 
 Narratives provide social representations of collective history that contribute to the positive 
distinctiveness of a group (Liu & Hilton 2005). They are embodiments of collective memory 
(Wertsch 2008), realized in an internalized psychological and societal speech (Vygotsky 1978) that 
provides both individual psychological and societal functions. These social representations are 
themselves utilized, referenced, and exploited by those in power for the sake of political aims and 
interests, often specifically to the nation-state (Liu & Hilton 2005; Wertsch 2008; Hammack 2010). 
Hence, stories are “inherently political and provide a motivational force for collective (in)action or 
(im)mobilization” (Hammack 2010, p. 179). Individuals have to identify themselves as society 
members for a society to exist. Social identity combines identifications, to a varying extent, with 
different groups (Tajfel 1982). The formation of social identity is based on a self-categorization 
process in which individuals group themselves cognitively as belonging to the same social category, 
in contrast to some other classes of collectives (Tuner & Reynolds 2001). In particular, as members 
of an ethnic group or a nation, individuals share a sense of belonging and identification with their 
group, which creates “cognitive, affective, and behavioral effects on a collective level” (Bar-Tal 2007, 
p. 1443). 
 Collective memory is generally defined as a set of representations of the past that are 
collectively adopted and accepted (Kansteiner 2002; Wertsch 2008; 2002). These representations are 
placed in narratives that remind a society’s members of the past events on a certain topic. Collective 
memory is a broad category under which there exist various kinds of memories as subcategories. The 
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two most important of such subcategories are popular memory and official memory (Nets-Zehngut 
& Bar-Tal 2013, p. 68). The former refers to the narratives held by society members, best revealed 
through public opinion surveys. This memory significantly influences the psychological and 
emotional reactions of the people holding it, and therefore is considered to be of great importance. 
The latter are the narratives adopted by a society’s formal institutions, mainly state institutions. 
Official memory is discovered in media such as official publications by state institutions, television 
programs on state controlled channels, and history textbooks in countries with centralized 
educational systems. The narratives adopted in the official memory may be accepted, at least, by 
parts of society, hence permeating into the popular memory. In addition, official memory has its own 
significance given that it is delivered to society members continuously, affects the formal decision 
making of a nation, and is presented to other states as the official national narrative of the nation 
(ibid.). 
 One of the most important factors that influence collective memory is formal history such as 
how historians view the events of the past. History is typically regarded as a more accurate and true 
narrative of the past than collective memory (ibid., p. 69). According to Bartlett (1995), memory of 
individuals is fundamentally influenced by the social context in which they function (cited in Wertsch 
2008, p. 121), which means that social organization gives a consistent framework into which all 
detailed memories must fit. 
 By examining the role played by narratives in organizing collective memory, Wertsch (2008) 
points out the issue of a distinction between two levels of narrative analysis: “specific narratives” 
and “schematic narrative templates” (pp. 122-124). Typically, narratives have to do with specific 
events, which Wertsch terms “specific narratives.” The events involved in specific narratives are 
uniquely situated in specific space and time, and they may have occurred during one’s own lifetime 
or in an earlier period. However, in the study of collective memory the focus is more on the level of 
narrative organization, concerned with general patterns rather than specific events and actors. This 
level of narrative organization is grounded in Wertsch’s term, “schematic narrative templates” (ibid.). 
Based on these narrative templates, stories can reflect a single general story line, while varying in 
their details. Each template takes the form of a generalized schema that is evident and visible in any 
one of several episodes. A generalized narrative form may underlie a range of narratives in a cultural 
tradition. The focus in analyzing the narrative organization of collective memory is placed on 
identifying an underlying pattern that is expressed in each of specific narratives, not on each of the 
specific narratives (Wertsch 2008, p. 123). Bruner’s (2002) expression that a narrative template is “a 
cookie cutter imposing a shape” on people’s understanding of the past well displays its significance 
(p. 6-7). In the study of Russian accounts of WWII during its transition from Soviet to post-Soviet, 
Wertsch (2008) observes a transition from strict, centralized control over collective memory to open 
３８ 
	  
public debate and disagreement, resulting in an unusually wide range of collective memory forms. 
As Wertsch argues that state control of memory can be found anywhere in the world, it may also be 
found in the case of South Korea. Throughout the period from the authoritarian era to post-
democratization, a transition from state control of memory to open public debates over the past has 
been observed, resulting in two dominant but contentious master narratives, which are the two 
contending schematic narrative templates of South Korea in Wertsch’s terms. In democratized 
societies, states are not the only social entities concerned with memory, but groups of all types are 
routinely concerned with the past for a variety of reasons. However, the state is an obvious focus of 
this study since it is the institution that has engaged in the largest single effort to control collective 
memory in modern times in South Korea. In particular, its capacity to control the production of the 
narrative resources employed in contemplating the past is generally the greatest among any other 
collectives (Wertsch 2008, p. 124). 
 The narrative theory of history and identity draws from social representations theory 
(Moscovici 1984), social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979), collective memory (Halbwachs 
1980; Wertsch 2002) and narrative psychology (Bruner 1986, 1990). According to Liu and Hilton 
(2005), social representations of history provide people with a set of socially shared beliefs that 
legitimize their arrangements for society, especially government and relationships between groups. 
Historical representations condition the collective so as to make the same action easy for some people 
and almost impossible for others, even where their objective interests are similar. They shape content 
and context for the social identities of people through such things as traditions and collective 
memories of past conflict. As social identities are constructed in the context of relationships with 
relevant out-groups and act to protect the in-group unit and self esteem, histories, in turn, tend to be 
in-group favoring, emphasizing either positive aspects or important lessons from the group’s past, 
and concealing the group’s shameful pasts or focusing on its own victimhood while denying that of 
others. Because of their critical role in identity politics, social representations of history are strongly 
linked to state production and control, through such institutions as the public education system and 
official commemorations. However, this control must be negotiated internally with its own citizens, 
who often believe in alternative versions of history, and externally with other states that may disagree 
with versions of history that they view as untrue or distorted. 
 One of the most developed areas of narrative study which links psychological and political 
phenomena is concerned with the function of stories that serves to construct collective identity 
through the transmission of collective memory and the creation of myths to support that memory 
(Hammack & Pilecki 2012, p. 85). In this frame, narratives refer to the institutionalization of social 
memory into a coherent story, either to provide the legitimacy of ruling elites or to justify dissenters’ 
resistance (ibid.). For example, the narrative of Jewish victimization in the Holocaust justifies Israelis’ 
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military occupation of Palestine territory and influences the beliefs about security as the top priority 
in Israeli national psychology. 
 The conception of narrative in this study is anchored in the notion that the process of 
narration is inherently social and political, and is concerned with a fundamental need for collective 
meaning. The focus is placed on the study of collective memory embodied in official documents such 
as textbooks that aim to instill a particular historical narrative. In the study on collective memory, 
there is an emerging consensus in empirical research as a social process. That is, studies that link 
levels of analysis reveal a process of dynamic engagement with narratives of collective memory, as 
opposed to a static, linear account of the relationship between social memory and individual 
subjectivity. Thus, individuals are deemed as active social meaning-makers whose appropriation of 
particular narratives over others offers insight into the political trajectory of a society (Hammack & 
Pilecki 2012, p. 87). Another line of theoretical and empirical work that is concerned with the role 
of narrative in providing collective meaning focuses on social representations. According to 
Moscovici (1988), social representations “… concern the contents of everyday thinking and the stock 
of ideas that gives coherence to our religious beliefs, political ideas and the connections we create as 
spontaneously as we breathe” (p. 214). As such, it is social representations that provide individuals 
with a way of making sense of socially significant events or phenomena (Hammack & Pilecki 2012, 
p. 87). Liu and Hilton (2005) argue that social representations of history play a crucial role in the 
development of group identity. At the national level, social representations of history are woven into 
a temporal form and serve as narratives that inform members about their identity, that is, who they 
are, where they come from, and where they are going. Narratives of history can thus be a useful 
instrument to strengthen and/or position national and ethnic identities in relation to others. 
 
2.1.3 National Identity and Nationalism 
 
 Although many have prophesied the end of the nation in the era of the globalization, it still 
remains the most appropriate form of collective identity. There are two basic foundations of 
nationalism: first, the idea that the world is divided into nations; and second, that the nation is the 
only legitimate source of political power, notions which are still accepted as unquestionable 
principles (Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 593). Smith (1991) defines a nation as “a named human 
population sharing an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public 
culture, a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members” (p. 14). Based on 
this, Connor (1993) emphasizes one of the most important components of the nation, that is, the 
essentially irrational, psychological bond that ties fellow nationals together. This psychological or 
emotional bond is usually termed “a sense of belonging” (Connor 1978), which refers to the strong 
４０ 
	  
attachment between the individual and the nation as collective self (Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 595). 
 In understanding national identity as a concept or a social phenomenon, it is essential to take 
nationalism into consideration. Nationalism is the “ideological movement for attaining and 
maintaining autonomy, unity and identity on behalf of a population deemed by some of its members 
to constitute an actual or potential nation” (Smith 1991, p. 73). Nationalist doctrine is established 
based on three fundamental propositions: first, the world is divided into nations, each of which has 
its own culture, history, and destiny that make it distinctive from other nations; second, each human 
belongs to a nation and allegiance to the nation triumphs all other loyalties; and third, nations must 
be united and enjoy autonomous and free will to pursue their goals. In particular, the third proposition 
is of greatest significance because it actually implies that the nation is the only legitimate power in 
society and politics (Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 595). Not only does each nation think of itself as unique 
and distinctive, but it is also certain that the world is made up of nations, all of which have equal 
worth and value, because they are all unique, thus enjoying the “universalism of the particular” (ibid.). 
Moreover, all nations have sovereignty, the right to self-determination, although in reality it can 
happen that the autonomy of one nation is called into question or denied by another nation. Hence, 
conflict arises between two national communities that compete for the legitimacy of their territory 
or cultural traditions. The reason why the propositions of nationalism have a significant meaning is 
that they emphasize that the existence of “others” is an inherent element in national identity and in 
nationalism. Nationalism does not only make a claim for the existence of the specific national 
community, but also distinguishes itself from others in a world that is composed of other separate 
and unique nations (ibid., p. 596). 
 National identity is the feeling associated with the concept of a nation. National identity is 
sometimes understood simply as a category of identification such as British, American, Japanese, 
and Korean. This simple form of definition does not offer much about individuals’ self-understanding 
and social positioning (Todd et al. 2008, p. 14). Regarding national identity as the category of 
identification, in the case of South Korea, there has been a simple but complicated category change 
since the division. Some who value the ethnic Korean nation prefer to identify themselves as Koreans 
and to include North Koreans in the same category. But others who feel more loyal to the separate 
state of South Korea tend to identify themselves as South Koreans and view their neighbor, North 
Korea, as the other, whether hostile or friendly. 
 It is change in the content of national identity that is much more common than category 
change, and sometimes more significant politically is the content of national identity (ibid., p. 20). 
The content of national identity is revealed primarily through the “national narrative”, which narrates 
the origins, history, and trajectory of the ethno-national group. A national identity gives people a 
sense of belonging and a way to relate to one another through a heightened “awareness of affiliation” 
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(Keane 1993), but differs from a state’s identity. While both identities of a nation and state are 
constructed out of similar factors such as people, geography, religion and customs, a state is clearly 
different because it incorporates governing structures through regimes. As Jones and Smith (2001) 
argue, there seem to be two largely different yet related concepts to form a national identity: 
ascriptive qualities, such as ethnicity and kinship, that provide a more organic and biological 
grounding in one group’s relationship to another; and voluntaristic qualities, such as civic roles and 
duties, that determine one’s place within a political entity. There exists an inherent tension and 
complication in the relationship between the ethnic and civic components of a nation. Establishing a 
“nation-state” that consists of only one ascriptive group, that is, a homogeneous ethnic group 
evolving within the realms of the state, a fixed population, fixed border, and a government with an 
ability to enter into relations with other states, is simply non-realistic. Japan, Israel and the two 
Koreas are often referred to as the closest to the concept of a nation-state in this sense, largely because 
of their faith in ethnic homogeneity. Contrastingly, it is more common in contemporary society to 
have multi-ethnic backgrounds, just as many other states like most of the European states and the US 
do. 
  National identities are most often distributed though “regulated” knowledge transmission 
processes such as education, with schooling systems providing a top-down approach through which 
loyalty to the nation can be fostered by a government (Bourdieu & Passeron 1977). With educational 
systems providing the matrix for national identity to develop, especially by focusing on historical 
and civic elements that should be acquired in nation-building, the concept of pride and loyalty is 
largely seen as being one of the most recognizable manifestations of national identity (Grelczyk 2014, 
p. 180). A multitude of factors from war to economic development can have a significant impact on 
national identity. Because national identity is connected to most aspects of a group through their 
history, places, governmental structures and sense of pride, almost all countries would be interested 
in maintaining a strong feeling of national identity in order to both foster unity from within and 
communicate this unity to outsiders who might be seen as a threat, or a significant other. A significant 
other makes it possible for one group to develop its own identity in relation to another by 
distinguishing itself from another. A significant other could be a neighboring group that has shared a 
set of cultural traditions and/or historical experiences, one that threatens the sense of distinctiveness 
of the self, or one that plays a significant role when the self is in crisis (Triandafyllidou 1998).While 
the concept of a significant other is the most important component in national identity formation, it 
has been of great importance in the case of South Korea, which was established in the face of threat 
from the most significant other, North Korea, which competed with the South for ownership of the 
territory and cultural tradition, and is part of the same ethnic group, which makes the issue of South 




2.1.4. The Others in Identity Construction 
 
 National identity has a two-sided character: on the one hand, it is about defining who 
members of the community are, and on the other, who are non-members. The notion of the other is 
inherent and essential in the nationalist doctrine itself, as seen in the former section. The existence 
of their own nation presupposes the existence of other nations. Most of the nations existing today 
had to fight to secure their survival and to achieve their independence. Most nations have significant 
others, from which the nation distinguishes itself. Triandafyllious (1998) thus argues that the identity 
of a nation is defined and/or redefined through the influence of “significant others,” that is, other 
nations or ethnic groups which are generally perceived to threaten the nation, its distinctiveness, 
authenticity and/or independence (p. 594). Likewise, the concept of the other is inseparably linked 
to the notion of national identity. The opposition to the other is thus regarded as an intrinsic feature 
of nationalism by most theorists. For instance, Kedourie (1992) highlights that “there is a duty laid 
upon us to cultivate our own peculiar qualities and not mix or merge them with others” (p.51). The 
fundamental question of national identity is to define who “we” are and who “they” are. 
 Triandafyllidou develops her argument regarding the role of “the others” in defining national 
identity, depending on the concept of national identity proposed by Connor (1978; 1993) and the 
theory of nationalism and social communications developed by Deutsch (1966). According to Connor, 
objective resources like culture and religion cannot fully explain which group constitutes a nation. 
Therefore, specific characteristics such as geographical location, religious composition or linguistic 
homogeneity are significant components in that, to a certain extent, they reinforce national identity 
(Connor 1978, p. 389). They are not static but can be subject to change, while keeping the sense of 
autonomy and uniqueness that are crucial to give members the meaning of belonging to a nation 
(Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 597). Connor stresses that the belief in a psychological bond, one universal 
feature of nationalism, ties community members together. Whether members of a nation are, indeed, 
ethnically related or not, does not matter, but what is important is that they believe they are (Connor 
1993, pp. 367-77). It is this belief that leads them to a dichotomous conception of the world, through 
which members of a nation define themselves as a collective self, that is, fellow nationals, and the 
others as out-members of a nation (ibid., p. 386). Although Connor’s definition of nationality, only 
focusing on ethnicity, fails to account for the existence of territorial or civic nations, his contribution 
is of great significance considering that he stresses that national identity induces a dichotomous view 
of the world. Having national identity thus means knowing not only who “we” are, but also who 
“they” are (Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 597). Triandafyllidou points out that elements like culture, 
religion or language are important not only in national identity formation, given that they reinforce 
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the nation’s identity to a certain degree, but also that they distinguish the in-group from the out-group 
and thus justify this dualistic worldview. Also, cultural traits, myths, traditions, and historical 
territories are integral components that distinguish “us” from “them,” providing a clear contrast in 
concrete form between the nation and the others. At the same time, such traits are influenced by this 
contrast and so they further reinforce it (Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 597). 
 To make explicit the role that the other plays in the (re)definition of national identity, 
Triandafyllidou claims that the conception of the other is a functional element inherent to the notion 
of nationality, based on Deutsch’s (1966) functional definition of national identity. In his view, 
members of the national community are characterized by their ability to communicate with their 
fellow members better than they do with outsiders (Deutsch 1966, p. 97). Nationality, from this 
functional perspective means that members of a nation share with one another more than they share 
with foreigners. This definition also necessarily involves the concept of otherness. 
 Nationalist activists as well as scholars of nationalism tend to consider national identity as 
an absolute relationship. Either it exists or it does not. Either a group of people share some specific 
features, whether they are civic or ethnic in character, that make them of a nation, or they do not. 
However, national identity expresses a feeling of belonging that is relative. It is meaningful only to 
the extent that it is contrasted with the feelings that members of the nation have toward non-members. 
Fellow nationals are not simply very close or close enough to one another, they are closer to one 
another than they are to outsiders, so the definitions of self and others are likewise relative 
(Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 598-99). National identity, thus, has a double-edged relationship: it is 
inward-looking as it involves a certain degree of commonality within the group; at the same time, its 
existence presupposes the existence of ‘others’, other nations or other individuals, who do not belong 
to the in-group and from which the in-group must be distinguished. That is, national identity is based 
on a set of common features that bind the members of the nation together. Contrary to Connor’s 
assertion, these features cannot be summarized in the faith in common descent, nor can the national 
bond be equivalent to effective communication, as Deutsch argues. Rather, it includes a variety of 
elements, ranging from ethnic ties to a shared public culture, common historical memories and links 
to a homeland, and also a common legal and economic system (ibid., p. 599). On the other hand, 
national identity implies difference. In other words, it is both commonality and difference that render 
national identity meaningful. This means that national identity has no meaning in itself but it becomes 
meaningful in contrast to other nations. 
 National identity is two-sided (ibid.). Internally, the national bond is related to a certainty in 
common ethnic origin and/or to such a common culture as a system of traditions, ideas, symbols and 
patterns of behavior and communication that are shared by the members of the community. Also, 
national identity can be related to a specific territory, the homeland of the nation, as well as the 
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natural setting in which it can exercise its sovereign powers. Each national identity is usually based 
on a combination of these elements, although for some communities civic and territorial ties are 
stronger, and for others common ethnicity and cultural affinities are prevalent. These elements define 
the nation from within. They constitute a set of potential identity features. However, identity is 
always “constituted in interaction” (ibid.), which means that some of these features become 
significant because they separate the in-group from others. In this light, it is also true that the nation 
is defined from outside, through the contrast to other communities. 
 What separates the “significant others” from many others of a nation is that they are 
perceived to pose a threat to the existence of the nation, whether it is a physical threat or another, 
which blurs the uniqueness of the nation. This threat pertains to the nation’s independence and self-
determination, and in this perspective the significant other may be a nation that is in conflict with the 
nation because of territorial or ethnic dispute (Triandafyllidou 1998, p. 600). A significant other has 
significance in that the nation seeks to identify itself against it and, in turn, national identity is greatly 
influenced by it. According to this assertion, the most significant other for South Korea is the North, 
in that some South Koreans believe it indeed threatens or is perceived to threaten the very existence 
of the South. One of the main arguments this dissertation raises is that it is the discrepancy over the 
identity North Korea that creates and reinforces inner conflicts within the South Korean society 
between those who perceive the North as a threat and others who do not. 
 However, the significant other may also be a group that threatens to weaken the 
distinctiveness of the in-group. This may be an out-group that is culturally related to the nation, and 
therefore blurs the authenticity and uniqueness of its identity. These might, as such, be neighboring 
nations which share a set of cultural traditions and/or historical experiences with the nation, and 
hence they threaten the sense of distinctiveness and uniqueness of the latter (ibid.). In this light, for 
South Korea, China or Japan can be significant others in that they often attempted to argue that Korea 
was part of their nations in the past. 
 There is a third group of significant others that become salient in periods of social, political 
or economic crisis during which the identity of the nation faces crisis. The significant other in these 
cases serves to help the nation to overcome the crisis by uniting the people in front of a common 
enemy, reminding them “who we are” and “how we are different and unique.” According to this, the 
US becomes one of the most significant others for the South. The US helped South Korea to fight 
against the communist invasion and reminded many South Koreans opposed to communism of who 
they were and how they were different from those communists in the North. In times of crisis, the 
significant other becomes the lever for the transition towards a new identity. Through confrontation 
with the significant other, the identity of the nation is transformed in ways that make it relevant under 
a new set of circumstances and/or respond better to the emotive and/or material needs of the members 
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of the nation (ibid., p. 603). This is exactly what happened in South Korea in the confrontation with 
the North, since the newly built nation, while having been greatly influenced by the US, had to adapt 
to the new environment of the Cold War.  
 
 
2.2 Identity and Intractable Conflicts 
 
 Out of the 352 violent conflicts that have erupted since World War II, only 144 have ended 
with peace agreements (Harbom et al., 2006). In addition, Bercovitch’s (2005) analysis points out 
that 75 serious interstate conflicts were violent, lasted at least 15 years, and were resistant to peaceful 
settlement among 309 conflicts that took place from 1945 to 1995. This ably demonstrates that many 
conflicts of contemporary times belong to the category of intractable conflicts, which are 
characterized by their protracted nature and resistance to any peaceful resolution (Bar-Tal & Halperin 
2013, p. 923). The Korean War, lasting from 1950 to 1953, when the ceasefire was agreed, which 
resulted in partition of the Korean nation, can be regarded as one of these conflicts. The war lasted 
three years but the two separate Korean states have never reached a peace agreement so far and, more 
importantly, there have been armed conflicts between them until recent times. 
 Conflicts erupt when two or more groups perceive their goals or interests to be contradictory 
to one another and thus irreconcilable, and decide to act based on this assessment (ibid.). In human 
life, it is quite natural to have conflict and conflicts erupt from many different causes. Among 
different categorizations of conflicts, Kriesberg’s (1993, 1995) suggestion of the intractable-tractable 
as a criterion of conflicts is most useful in that it well reflects the core features of contemporary 
conflicts. Tractable conflicts refer to ones in which the involved parties seek to resolve them through 
negotiation, while avoiding violence. In contrast, intractable conflicts are prolonged largely because 
neither party involved in the dispute can win nor is willing to compromise for peaceful resolution. 
They involve great hostility and vicious cycles of violence, thus appearing seemingly irreconcilable 
and self-perpetuating. The conflicts between Protestants and Catholics in Northern Ireland and 
between Turks and Kurds in Turkey are the most notable cases of intractable conflicts (Bar-Tal 1998, 
p. 23). In addition, the fact that intractable conflicts pertain to issues of identity, values and beliefs, 
tends to cause the conflict to be protracted (Bercovitch 2005). They are thus exhausting, demanding, 
stressful, painful and costly in both human and material terms. Thus, from a human perspective, it is 
necessary that society members adapt to the conflictual situations, both in their individual and social 
lives. In material terms, it requires certain appropriate military, economic, political, societal, and 
psychological conditions for the society to successfully adapt to and cope with intractable conflict 
(Bar-Tal 1998, p. 23). The term “intractable” itself well represents one of the most significant features 
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of intractable conflicts, that is, their resistance to peace settlement (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013, p. 924). 
In the context of intractable conflicts, deep feelings of fear and hostility coupled with destructive 
behaviors make these conflicts very difficult to deal with and to further resolve. Hence when it comes 
to intractable conflicts, it is vital to take the emotional issues of the involved society members into 
consideration (Bar-Tal 1998; 2007; Kelman 2007). 
 Different perspectives in the fields of foreign policy and international relations have 
provided their own explanations about the sources of conflicts. Realism is very critical of the view 
that sees ideational elements as an important factor in understanding conflicts, instead focusing on 
material elements or exclusively on benefits and cost based on material incentives. The liberal 
tradition believes that humans are able to rationally pursue their ends and, thus, the preferences of 
the majority or public opinion can be a useful indicator for understanding conflicts. On the other 
hand, the constructivist school emphasizes the causal significance of ideational factors, arguing that 
social and historical contexts should be taken into consideration in understanding international 
conflicts. Nations have shaped varying identities and the clash or convergence of those cognitive 
factors can influence their choices in international politics. For constructivists, a secure community 
requires its members to possess compatible core values, mutual identity and loyalty, and a sense of 
belonging. Constructivism further emphasizes the role of emotion, arguing emotion matters at all 
levels of relationships. Although interstate perceptions or images of each other may not be by 
themselves the direct causes of interstate conflict, they help the parties involved in conflict to 
interpret the situation and perceive threats, and can therefore explain or anticipate the behavior and 
choices of one party towards the other. The identity of the significant others, especially in the context 
of conflict, is thus inseparable from the issue of security. Hence, national identity inherently pertains 
to the security policy decision making of a nation. 
 
2.2.1 The Role of the Other in Intractable Conflicts 
  
 The important role of others in the construction of a national identity has already been 
elaborated in the earlier section. Here, the focus is put on the fact that the conception of the significant 
others, in particular, has greater impacts on national identity, especially in the context of intractable 
conflicts. Many of the conflicts that erupted in the post-Cold War era have been intense, protracted, 
and often deadly conflicts between identity groups within the same political structure (Kelman 1999, 
p. 582). For instance, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been long-lasting between two national 
movements claiming the sole occupation of the same territory (Bar-Tal 1998, p. 31). The Korean 
conflict can be regarded as similar to this, in that it has lasted for more than half a century since the 
truce agreement without creating a peace agreement. Both of the Koreas, who shared the same history, 
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language, and culture, claim that their own state is the only legitimate political entity and 
representation of the whole Korean nation, which shows the conflict between the two Koreas is 
deeply concerned with national identity. Even though both sides are now more pragmatic than before, 
a large element of the two societies is not prepared to abandon their ideological claim to have an 
exclusive legitimacy in the territory, or to modify their national narratives in a way that would 
concede that the other too has legitimate and authentic links to the land. 
 It is vital to note for this research that the psychological core of intractable conflict, as is the 
case between Israel and Palestine, is the perception by both parties that it is a “zero-sum” conflict, 
not only with respect to territory but, most importantly, the very existence of the other, which means 
that the other’s status as a nation is a threat to its own existence and status as a nation (Bar-Tal 2007, 
p. 1443). Each holds the view that only one can be a nation in the territory, that is, either we are a 
nation or they are. Over the course of the conflict, each side has been convinced that the ultimate 
intention of the other is to destroy it. Indeed, it is believed as truth that its own destruction is inherent 
in the other’s ideology. At the time of writing, in the Korean case, even when the parties prefer to 
step toward a peace agreement on the peninsula, they are not fully convinced that the other has really 
abandoned the goal of destroying them and is sincerely determined to achieve the peaceful 
coexistence of two sovereign states in the land they both claim. When mutual trust of the two sides 
is at a low point, even the South Korean progressive regimes, who are generally more open to a 
compromise solution, have found it hard to remove the serious doubts people have about the other’s 
real intentions. At a deep level, the perceived threat from the other still brings into each group the 
sense of fear about its own existence. This is the same for North Korea, who openly expresses its 
doubts over the real intentions of South Korean conservatives and the US. Thus, the zero-sum view 
of national identity is still very much in place, based on the idea that “fulfillment of the other’s 
national identity is experienced as equivalent to destruction of one’s own identity” (Kelman 1987, p. 
355). It is this zero-sum view of national identity that creates a state of negative interdependence 
between two identities, which refers to the status in which the negation of the other’s identity is 
mandatory in order to assert a group’s own identity. Negative interdependence has significance in 
that it not only prevents conflict resolution and ultimate reconciliation, but also makes it more 
difficult and costly for each group to form and assert its own identity. In the relations established 
based on negative interdependence, it is not enough for one group to demonstrate its own legitimacy 
and authenticity as a nation, but it has the additional task of proving the illegitimacy and 
inauthenticity of the other, thus allowing time and energy consuming identity politics in which 
rhetoric of exclusion and othering is frequently used to delegitimize the other. One of the 
consequences of this zero-sum view and the negative interdependence of the two identities is the 
mutual denial of each other’s national identity that is inherent in the conflict from the beginning 
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(Kelman 1999, p. 590). This is well displayed in the case of the Israeli and Palestinian conflict, where 
the zero-sum view of national identity and the negative interdependence of the two parties’ identities 
greatly contributed to the escalation and perpetuation of the conflict over the decades, and hindered 
its peaceful resolution. 
 The zero-sum view of national identity and the negative interdependence is one of the 
characteristics of the inter-Korean conflict. Since the division of the nation into two states in 1948, 
the authoritarian regimes in the past and conservative administrations in the post-democratization era 
in South Korea have identified the North as a threat to its own existence and vice versa. For instance, 
it is articulated in Article 3 of the South Korean Constitution that “the territory of the Republic of 
Korea shall consist of the Korean peninsula and its adjacent islands (Constitution of Republic of 
Korea 1988 [1948]).” Therefore, the territory North Korea currently occupies belongs to the ROK 
according to its constitution. In addition, this is the foundation on which North Korean defectors are 
eligible to achieve citizenship when they arrive in South Korea. North Korea also regards the South 
as the hostile enemy, seen in its justification of the nuclear weapons program that it has developed to 
protect its regime from the threats of South Korea and the US. Furthermore, North Koreans have 
regarded the military practices between the US and South Korea as steps to eliminate the North 
Korean regime on the peninsula. However, the situation in South Korea has been changed a lot since 
the progressives, who hold a different view on North Korea, emerged as a political power in the 
2000s. Their narrative identity has collided with conservatives who still hold the traditional view of 
their northern neighbor. The progressives further argue that the goal of the North in developing 
nuclear weapons is not to threaten South Korea but to secure its regime (Lee Chi-yŏng 2018) or to 
develop its economy by decreasing the military expense in the long term (Kwak Dong-ki 2014), 
which is irreconcilable with the view of the conservatives. 
 Negative interdependence is expressed through the systematic effort to delegitimize the other 
by portraying its negative aspect as something beyond universal norms and ethics (Kelman 1999, p. 
590). Equating Zionism with racism and Palestinian nationalist movements with terrorism can be the 
most extreme examples of delegitimization of the other. This tactic of delegitimization is effective in 
making the other’s national movement inherently illegitimate from the beginning because racism and 
terrorism are morally unacceptable. Delegitimization in these cases often goes further through 
dehumanization of the other. It excludes the other from the moral community shared by all members 
of human society (ibid.). This extreme delegitimization and dehumanization have often been found 
in the condemnation from South Korean rightists of the North Korean human rights violations based 
on the universal norm of human rights. It declares that North Korea has no right to exist as a state 
because it does harm to its own people as well as disregarding its responsibility as a normal state to 
protect them. This is also one of the reasons why progressives and leftists in South Korea, who 
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generally take the lead regarding other issues of human rights, have remained passive or silent about 
the North Korean human rights abuses. 
 In politics, negative independence is expressed through the two involved parties’ refusal to 
recognize each other for a long period of time (ibid.). Official recognition of the other could mean 
legitimizing the other, and thus lead to bringing one’s own legitimacy into question. One of the 
frequently used tactics between the parties that rely on negative interdependence is creating and 
maintaining the demonic image of the enemy (ibid., p. 591). Affirming the enemy image is a common 
feature of conflict and indicator of group loyalty in deep-rooted conflicts. Advocates of a softer 
enemy image and of communication with the enemy run the risk of attracting intense suspicion and 
often accusations of treason, which is what happened in South Korea when the first progressive 
president Kim Dae-jung initiated the engagement policy with the North for the first time since the 
partition, and portrayed the leader of the North as rational. President Kim and successor President 
Roh Moo-hyun, who kept Kim’s policy of cooperation and engagement with the North, were harshly 
criticized by opponents as North Korean sympathizers or traitors to the national security of South 
Korea. Another reason for maintaining the evil image of the enemy is that it is considered vital to 
justify the group’s own cause. In the zero-sum view of identity in relation to conflict, any attempt to 
acknowledge the enemy’s legitimacy is seen to detract from the group’s own legitimacy. The zero-
sum view of identity does not admit the possibility that both parties may have some justice on their 
side. In the context of intractable conflicts, the rigid certainty of the enemy image becomes a serious 
obstacle to efforts at conflict resolution. Each party is resistant to accept the fact that the other side 
might change (ibid., p. 591). 
 Another consequence of the negative interdependence of the two identities that has a 
significant meaning for the Korean case is the fact that the ideology and symbols that support each 
side’s positive group identity and sense of legitimacy have entirely negative connotations for the 
other side (ibid., p. 592). That is why anti-communism among South Korean conservatives and 
rightists still works as a strong ideology to support their national identity conception, and as long as 
the North remains a communist, non-democratic state, this would be difficult to change, in particular 
for those who see the national identity of South Korea through the zero-sum view. Each party in the 
negative dependence relations perceives that the other has only one ultimate goal of destroying its 
own national existence and this makes it difficult to recognize the positive elements in the other’s 
ideology and symbols. Hence, in relations based on negative dependence, it is not easy for both 
parties to develop the kind of empathy for the other, which is a necessary condition for reconciliation 
and a settlement of peace. 
 More importantly, the negative interdependence of the two identities derives from a view of 
the other’s identity as a direct threat to one’s own identity in which only one can prevail, which 
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means that asserting one’s own identity necessarily requires negating the identity of the other. 
Kelman (1999) points out that there are two major types of negative identity elements that often 
come to the surface through the relationship to the other in a protracted conflict: the view of the self 
as weak and vulnerable; and the view of the self as violent and unjust (p. 593). These also characterize 
the narrative of conservatives who see inter-Korean relations based on the zero-sum view. The 
success of the other in achieving power or legitimacy may remind one of one’s own group’s 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities, which is often found in the Israeli and Palestinian conflicts. While 
Palestinians’ own weakness and vulnerability is directly related to Israel’s power, Israelis suffer from 
a feeling of vulnerability deeply rooted in the Jewish historical experience, particularly the Holocaust, 
despite its far more powerful military capabilities. The sense of vulnerability is also very prevalent 
among those in South Korea who themselves experienced the war or the oppression by communists 
in the northern part before the war. It is the psychological or emotional aspect of this sense of 
vulnerability that makes it extremely hard for some South Koreans to accept the North as a partner 
for cooperation. On the contrary, the leftists or progressives struggle with a sense of vulnerability 
that has its origin in other historical events, that is, their experience of oppression from the past South 
Korean authoritarian regimes, mainly due to ideological difference. This sense of vulnerability has a 
strong power in that it is deeply connected to the feeling of fear, which intensifies the inner conflicts 
within South Korea, where two groups that suffer from the sense of vulnerability originated from 
different roots. 
 The second negative element of each group’s identity related to the other is the view of one’s 
self as violent and unjust. In the Israeli and Palestinian case, it is the image of occupiers, oppressors 
and even racists for Israelis, while it is the image of violent, uncivilized terrorists for Palestinians. It 
is the extremely violent nature of the conflict that makes both parties face views of the self which 
are unacceptable for themselves, but it is impossible to entirely avoid them because these views 
reflect the way in which other nations see them through the conflictual situation. Unlike these views 
from outside, they tend to see and present themselves as not victimizers but the victims, arguing that 
taking violent measures is their last resort only when deprived of all other options. In this narrative, 
blames are placed on the other who forces them to take the role of aggressor. Nevertheless, the 
presence of the other constantly reminds them that they are engaged in violent actions that cast doubt 
on their decent and peace-loving self-images (ibid., p. 594-95). This narrative of victimization is also 
found in the Korean case between both Koreas as well as conflicting groups within South Korea. 
South Korea blames the North for the division of the nation and the eruption of the war through the 
sudden invasion. Also, the nuclear weapons program of the North reminds of the fact that it has never 
abandoned its ultimate goal of removing the South Korean regime from the peninsula, intensifying 
the feeling of fear as victims of the past war. On the other hand, the North blames the South for 
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making the Korean nation another colony of American imperialism, portraying the Korean nation as 
victims sacrificed by the US and internal betrayers who have collaborated with it. Within South 
Korea, progressives are blamed by conservatives for supporting the evil regime of North Korea, 
while the traditional ruling conservative elites are criticized by progressives for the division of the 
nation only for the sake of their own interests under the influence of the US, thus betraying the one 
Korean nation. In the rhetoric of conflict, each party claims the status of victim and each denies the 
role of victimizer. 
 It is noteworthy that negative self images are, ironically, often brought to the fore during the 
process of conflict resolution. This is because, for ultimate reconciliation to be achieved, it is 
necessary to confront them rather than suppress and deny them. Agreeing to a compromise 
necessarily means accepting the reality of one’s own weakness, and acknowledging the other’s rights 
and legitimacy leads to admitting one’s own past wrongdoings. More importantly, to achieve conflict 
resolution, which aims to reach a transformation of the relationship and ultimate reconciliation, it is 
essential to have some revision of each party’s self identity by accepting its own negative aspects 
and the other’s positive features. In case of South Korea, there exist some who see that the country 
is still in a state of conflict and at high risk of war considering that the North now has the nuclear 
power, while others believe that the two Koreas are out of an intractable conflict and the North is 
willing to transform itself and hence the South should abandon its hostile attitude toward it. It is not 
surprising to see multiple narratives regarding the self and the significant others in a democratized 
society, but what matters in South Korea is that two radically conflicting views constantly compete 
without an open and inclusive dialogical space. As a result, people tend to share their opinions only 
with those who have the same view and consequently their certainty that their view is right is only 
consolidated, which deepens the division of South Korean society. 
 
2.2.2 Narrative Identity in Intractable Conflicts 
  
 Intractable conflicts greatly affect many aspects of national identity, such as its nature, 
contents and functioning. First of all, under intractable conflictual circumstances, society members’ 
sense of identification with and attachment to the nation tends to be intensified to meet their 
psychological needs of belonging and security. Second, collective identity in times of intractable 
conflict offers strength for society members to sustain themselves, even in times of danger, as their 
sense of belonging increases. Third, this enhanced social identity becomes the basis for unity, 
solidarity, and coordination so that the society can cope with the conflict conditions. It is strong social 
identity in intractable conflicts that makes society members ready, even for extreme sacrifices (Bar-
Tal 2007, p. 1443). This is because psychological mechanisms become active to stop new information 
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contradicting existing beliefs and affecting their faith. In normal situations, when the society is not 
in conflict, people are open to learning and integrating information from the outside and adjusting to 
it. People are able to and willing to tolerate some uncertainty about their preexisting beliefs, accepting 
that beliefs they hold may change after reflecting on new experiences and information within the 
environment, and consequently acknowledging that those beliefs may have even been wrong from 
the beginning (Chhabra 2016, p. 253). In the context of conflict, however, people that have reached 
the limits of their tolerance when they experience new information contradictory to existing beliefs 
begin to psychologically disintegrate. At these times, a psychological process to protect the self is 
activated to shut down the learning channels. This psychological shut-down works as a filter against 
any dramatic change, shutting down the capacity to take in any new information about others and the 
world, as well as that of their existing beliefs about the self, others, and the world. As a result of this 
psychological process, beliefs are frozen and people become resistant to change. Rigid certainty 
about their assessment of what is right is only intensified. Not only feelings of ambivalence about 
what they know, but also the capacity to accommodate and assimilate new information is lost. 
Transforming those beliefs that have provided a sense of stability is regarded as a threat to their being. 
Historical events of collective violence between groups and the collective memory of these events 
further shape and intensify the beliefs about the self and others. With these beliefs comes a degree of 
non-reflective certainty about them, thus they resist any new information contradictory to their 
beliefs (ibid.). 
 In addition, intractable conflicts clearly include severe negative experiences and emotions 
such as threat, stress, pain, exhaustion, grief, trauma, and have costs in both human and material 
terms (Bar-Tal 2007, p.1434). Hence, as the intractable conflicts are prolonged, the collective 
psychological state permeates institutions and the communication channels and gradually shapes the 
socio-psychological infrastructure of the society (ibid.). This infrastructure has three pillars that 
constitute the cognitive-emotional basis for the long-term psychological state: collective memory of 
conflict; societal beliefs that comprise an ethos of conflict; and collective emotional sentiments that 
serve as foundations of the developed culture of conflict (Bar-Tal 2007, p. 1435; Bar-Tal & Halperin 
2013, p. 936). Collective memories in the context of intractable conflict are developed to present the 
history of conflict to members of the society. Their goal is not to provide an objective truth of the 
past but to tell a story about the past to create a socially constructed narrative which is based on 
actual facts of past events, but is biased and selective to meet the society’s present needs (Bar-Tal 
2007, p. 1436; 2009, p. 369), thus providing a black and white narrative which enables “parsimonious, 
fast, unequivocal, and simple understanding of the history of conflict” (Bar-Tal 2007, p. 1436.). It 
should be noted that the competition for the dominance of the collective memory creates another 
confrontational field where, during or after the conflict, each society tries to instill its own version 
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of collective memory to its members and then to justify its collective memory as right and true to 
other societies in the world (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013, p. 937). Secondly, as Bar-Tal suggests, under 
prolonged intractable conflict societies are likely to develop an “ethos of conflict,” which refers to 
“the configuration of central societal beliefs that provide dominant characterization to the society 
and gives it a particular orientation” (Bar-Tal 2000, p. xiv). This is of significance given that it 
provides the shared mental basis for society members, unites them, offers a meaning to social life, 
justifies the social order and creates the framework through which society’s present and past concerns, 
as well as its future goals, can be understood (Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013, p. 937). An ethos of conflict 
is said to be a relatively stable worldview that allows humans to organize and comprehend the 
prolonged context of conflict. Therefore, it can be seen as a type of ideology (ibid., p. 938). As an 
ideology, it provides a coherent and systematic knowledge base that helps society members to have 
the coordinated behavior and society’s leaders to direct the decision making, the development of the 
societal system and its functioning (ibid.). Thirdly, while conflict escalates, the societies involved 
develop a set of collective emotional sentiments that is dominated primarily by negative feelings like 
hatred, despair and fear (Bar-tal 2007, p. 1439; Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013, p. 939). Among such 
feelings, hatred and fear are of importance since, while hatred provides the emotional basis to view 
the opponent in the conflict, the sense of fear maintains the vicious cycle of violence. Due to recurring 
experiences of threat and danger resulting from the conflict, society members may become 
oversensitized to anything that signals danger. This oversensitization to fear prevents society 
members from taking risks, thinking creatively about the conflict, or breaking the cycle of violence 
(Bar-Tal & Halperin 2013, p. 939). It is essential to note that the socio-psychological infrastructure 
eventually becomes the foundation of the evolved culture of conflict, which becomes hegemonic, 
and provides a dominant interpretation of the present reality and past and future goals, and an outline 
of acceptable practice. More importantly, once intractable conflicts become solidified and 
institutionalized within the culture of conflict, they are likely to remain over a long period, despite 
fluctuating in their intensity. As a result, the same psychological repertoire that helps society 
members cope with the challenges raised by the conflict, now prevents them from identifying and 
taking advantage of opportunities for peace. Furthermore, in the context of intractable conflict, the 
evolved socio-psychological infrastructure which dominates the society through the period of the 
conflict, eventually shapes or transforms the nature of national identity (Bar-Tal 2007, p. 1443). That 
is, societal beliefs about the ethos of conflict and collective memory offer contents that invest social 
identity with meaning. These contents are expressed in various cultural products like language, 
societal ceremonies, symbols, myths, commemorations, texts, and so on. They are institutionalized 




 While intractable conflicts are often cited as competing for material resources and political 
or territorial control (Kreisberg 1993), those conflicts also greatly affect the construction of stories 
that encourage intergroup antagonism at the collective level (Hammack 2008; Liu & Hilton 2005). 
Narratives are meaningful in that they provide social representations of collective history that 
contribute to positively differentiating one group from others (Liu & Hilton 2005). They are 
embodiments of collective memory (Wertsch 2008), realized in an internalized psychological and 
societal speech (Vygotsky 1978) that provides both individual psychological and societal functions. 
These social representations are utilized, referenced, exploited, and consequently politicized by those 
in power to serve the wider political interests of a nation (Liu & Hilton 2005; Wertsch 2008). Stories 
are, thus, inherently political and provide a driving force for collectives (not) to act or (de)mobilize 
(Hammack 2010, p. 179). For example, post-conflict societies, such as Rwanda or Northern Ireland, 
struggle with how to represent historical narrative in educational settings. South Korea has been also 
struggling with representations of the past since the advent of its nation building, and it is how to 
interpret its past that is at the core of constructing national identity and is still one of the most 
controversial and politicized topics. Thus, the construction of South Korean national identity is in 
progress or in the process of transformation. 
 Narrative can be problematic when it serves to maintain or exacerbate intractable conflict, 
but it can also play a role in conflict reduction precisely because of its conceptual salience in such 
conflictual settings. Kelman (1999) argues that the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
requires the development of a transcendent narrative in which each group recognizes its positive 
interdependence on the other. In theory, just as narrative can divide groups, it can help to unite those 
involved in conflict by making collective claims explicit, particularly through the sharing of personal 
narratives (Hammack 2010, p. 179-180). The resistance of societies in the context of intractable 
conflicts to peaceful resolution lies in an intense socio-psychological infrastructure that plays an 
important role in the conflicts’ eruption and perpetuation. The infrastructure leads to a one-sided 
orientation towards the conflict, eventually leading to the conflict’s continuation and inhibiting its 
de-escalation and peaceful resolution (Nets-Zehngut & Bar-Tal 2013, p. 68). Nevertheless, with time, 
some of the intractable conflicts de-escalate and even embark on the process of peacemaking. This 
process is usually preceded, accompanied, or followed by a transformation in the socio-psychological 
infrastructure, such as changes in conflict goals, and shifts toward less de-legitimization of the other 







2.3 History in Post-Conflict Societies 
 
2.3.1 Collective Memory and Conflicts 
 
 As mentioned, narratives operate at the level of collective psychology as well as at the 
individual level, and the collective narratives provide a sense of group meaning, which derives from 
a direct engagement with stories that convey collective memory (Hammack & Pilecki 2012, p. 84). 
Collective memory is generally defined as a set of representations about the past that are collectively 
adopted (Kansteiner 2002; Wertsch 2008). These representations are assembled in narratives that 
recall the past events on a certain topic. Collective memory is a general category that includes various 
kinds of memories as subcategories, among which two such subcategories are of importance: popular 
memory and official memory (Nets-Zehngut & Bar-Tal 2013, p. 69). The former comprises the 
narratives held by society members, commonly manifested via public opinion surveys. This memory 
significantly influences the psychological reactions of the people holding it, and is therefore regarded 
as greatly important. On the other hand, official memory comprises the narratives adopted by a 
society’s formal institutions, mostly state institutions. Official memory is expressed through official 
media such as publications by state institutions, programs on state controlled television channels, 
and history textbooks in countries with centralized educational systems. The narratives held by the 
official memory may be adopted, at least, by parts of society, and then penetrate into the popular 
memory. Official memory has its own importance considering that it is conveyed to society members 
continuously, has great impacts on formal decision making, and is presented in the international arena 
as the national narrative (ibid.). Collective memory is often influenced by formal/analytical history 
such as the way historians view events of the past. History, typically more accurate in objectively 
portraying the past than collective memory, may challenge the hegemonic narratives of collective 
memory. 
 The collective memory formed in an intractable conflict creates the narrative held by a party 
involved in conflict, describing its beginning, its process, and its major events. Typically, it aims to 
tell a narrative relevant to the society’s present situation and future aspirations, thus being functional 
and being biased, rather than providing an objective history of the past. A biased memory of conflicts 
is functionally utilized, in particular, during the climax of the conflicts, since it provides each party 
with the socio-psychological basis that is necessary to meet the enormous challenges that such a 
conflict produces, and to support the country’s international image. It is this typical function of 
collective memory of conflict that often results in the construction of such emotions as mistrust, 
hostility and hatred toward the other party in conflict, all of which contribute to continuation of the 
conflict, rather than to its resolution. However, what should be noted is that transformation of this 
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memory into a less distorted and biased narrative can promote peaceful resolution of the conflict. 
This transformation accelerates the emergence of beliefs, attitudes and emotions that change the 
views of the other so that the other can be recognized in a more legitimized, humanized, personalized, 
and differentiated way. Therefore, understanding the characteristics of such a transformation is of 
great importance in the promotion of conflict resolution. 
 Liu and Hilton (2005) emphasize the crucial role of social representations of history in the 
development of group identity. At the national level, social representations of history serve as 
narratives that inform members about who they are, where they come from, and where they are going. 
History helps construct the essence of a national identity, how it relates to other groups, and provides 
a nation with information on what options they have for facing present challenges. A group’s 
representation of its history conditions its sense of what it was, is, can and should be, so it is central 
to the construction of its identity, norms, and values. Nations’ representations of their history have a 
significant political meaning because through them we understand how and why countries will react 
differently to a challenge where their common interests are seemingly the same (Liu & Hilton 2005, 
p. 537). Narrative study linking psychological and political phenomena is concerned with how stories 
serve to construct collective identity through the transmission of collective memory and the creation 
of myths that support that memory. In this frame, the social memory is institutionalized into narrative, 
a coherent story that serves to maintain the political status quo, justify the ruling regime or provide 
legitimacy for resistance. Thus, for example, the narrative of Jewish victimization in the Holocaust 
well serves to legitimize the military occupation of Palestine territory and to influence the beliefs 
about security considered as a top priority to Israeli national psychology (Hammack & Pilecki 2012, 
p. 85). 
  
2.3.2 History Education and Identity 
  
 Collective memory is key to the politics of nation-building and history education plays a 
central role in the formation of national identity. For example, Bar-Tal (1998) points out that Israeli 
history textbooks’ emphasis is placed on Jewish victimization, unity, and security, while providing a 
positive depiction of Jewish Israelis and a negative depiction of Arabs. While such narratives within 
institutional education have strengthened Jewish Israeli identity in the midst of conflict, they may 
actually contribute to perpetuating conflict (Hammack & Pilecki 2012, p. 85). Research on the role 
of historical narrative in educational materials in Israel suggests that stories of collective memories 
serve particular political interests for constructing and maintaining identity. There has been other 
empirical research done to examine this process in other nations. One such important study is 
Buckley-Zistel’s (2009) analysis of history education after the Rwanda genocide. She analyzes the 
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government discourses about history teaching to argue that the state is seeking to write a new 
narrative of ethnic history to transcend past divisions. Not only does history education provide 
information about the collective past, it also develops the meanings of current situations and affairs. 
It is a common occurrence that textbook content on conflicts is written to strengthen the self identity 
in relation to the identity of the significant others. Events of extreme violence and conflict are 
narrated in such a way as to mythicize the self and demonize the other (Chhabra 2016, p. 243). The 
content of history in school curricula usually supports the legitimacy of regimes and the power of 
ruling parties, and it articulates their respective points of view, ideology, and position. Moreover, 
school history curricula promote basic values and beliefs of a nation and support a society’s specific 
view of the history of conflicts and violence. History education serves this function in a context, in 
particular, where the past is not easily reconstructed (Korostelina 2008, p. 25), through influencing 
public discourses, reshaping loyalties to certain groups or to a nation, and developing a perception 
of a shared past. And history textbooks provide the most articulated and widely accepted ideas of 
citizenship and a nation’s past (Hein and Selden 1998). 
 The role of history as an important player in identity formation has been emphasized also in 
several theories of social psychology. Social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) defines that 
social groups are communities of people who share common characteristics, experiences, and 
behaviors. In this context, social identity is a result of the processes of identification with other group 
members. Group members typically share similar social identities, such as values, beliefs, and 
attitudes. Social identity is constructed through the process of social categorization and intergroup 
comparison, including knowledge about group history and historical relations with others. This 
cognitive component has an emotional dimension, which reflects feelings about belonging to an in-
group or relating to an out-group. In the construction of social identity, not only the perception of 
similarities but also of difference is of great significance, as pointed out earlier. In order to create and 
maintain group identity, it is necessary to have strong historical components that illustrate the main 
content of group identity and specific intergroup relations with significant others. 
 The meaning of social identity usually contains several components such as traditions and 
values, language, members’ general characteristics, history, ideology, relations with others, the image 
of others and “reverberated identity”, which refers to a group’s identity that results from comparisons 
with others (Korostelina 2008, p. 34). When one or more of these components are more dominant 
than others, a different mode of identity meaning is formed. A “depictive mode of identity meaning” 
is created if components like traditions and values, members’ characteristics, and reverberated 
identity prevail. “Ideological modes of identity meaning” are formed by the prevalence of an 
ideology of the group and relations with others. If the history of the group and its relations with 
others becomes most important, a “historical mode of identity meaning” is constructed. Lastly, the 
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dominance of a reverberated identity is defined as a “relative mode of identity” (ibid. pp. 34-35). 
What is important to note is that except for a depictive mode, other modes of identity meaning can 
provoke violence based on different motives. Ideological modes of identity meaning can lead to 
conflict based on ideological differences, historical modes can create conflicts based on chosen 
traumas and history of intergroup violence, and relative modes can provoke conflicts based on 
intergroup prejudice and biases. 
 The conflicts between the two Koreas are thought to have been provoked largely because of 
their ideological differences. Therefore, history education has been used as an instrument of 
ideological warfare between them. History curricula in both countries have traditionally seen their 
own state as superior and have been believed to represent the traditions and the true nature of the 
Korean nation. The description of one’s own country as superior in value and ideology leads to the 
formation of loyalty to the state and a strong national identity. Consequently, the ideological mode 
of national identity is widely adopted in both Koreas to develop loyalty to the ruling party or regime. 
In the ideological mode of national identity, ideology takes a position and role of national identity, 
replacing the history and culture of the people, and history education significantly influences any 
ideological war with a rival. This well explains what has happened in South Korea since the division, 
in particular, under the authoritarian regimes, during which the ideology of anti-communism was a 
surrogate for the national identity of South Korea, dominating all related discourses. History 
education served as a tool to promote anti-communistic ideology. However, since the two progressive 
administrations took office from 1998 to 2008, the narrative of history textbooks has changed 
significantly, and is now based on strong ethnic nationalism that sees the North as part of one Korean 
nation. Opponents of those regimes have strongly resisted history textbook revisions since then, 
arguing that this narrative change in history textbooks does serious harm to South Korean national 
identity and its legitimacy. Thus, social and political conflicts within South Korea that are provoked 
based on the mixture of different ideological preferences, contending interpretations of history, and 
intergroup biases against each other (between political leftists and rightists) have intensified. History 
textbook narrative transformation led by progressives thus contributed to intensifying conflicts, 
rather than conflict resolution in South Korea, and this will be closely elaborated in the latter part of 
the dissertation. 
 In history textbooks both Koreas, their common ancestry and history, as well as the ethnic 
cultural heritage, are accepted as an objective truth regardless of the ideological division. This is well 
illustrated in the myth of Tan’gun, the legendary founder of the Korean nation, who is declared and 
believed to be the common ancestor in both Koreas. However, in the South the issue gets more 
complicated because although the formation of national identity in South Korea is constructed around 
the concept of the monoethnic and monolingual, the long-term division has led to an increase in the 
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civic notion of national identity. Based on this, some South Koreans see only those who agree with 
its founding values, such as liberal democracy and a free economic system, as accepted citizens, 
while others still view ethnicity as central in defining the notion of self. This discrepancy among 
South Koreans over how the Korean nation in the context of division should be defined is a 
significant factor that causes serious identity conflicts within South Korea. 
 
2.3.3 History Education in the Post-Conflict Societies 
  
 History education has been at the center of contested, political, curricular, and pedagogical 
debates throughout the world, in particular, regarding teaching past conflicts or violent events, and 
the special focus of these controversies is mostly placed on the content of history textbooks (Chhabra 
2016). One of the many challenges societies emerging from violent conflict face relates to the 
question of how to deal with the divisive past of violence in ways that contribute to conflict 
transformation and ultimately peace and reconciliation. A history of collective violence often results 
in conflicting memories around the historical truth. It thus often initiates controversies on what 
should be taught to younger generations about the past for the sake of a better future of the nation. 
Schools, as one of the key instruments of socialization, have inevitably been affected by societal 
dynamics and tensions, in particular during conflict or in the aftermath of conflicts, including power 
struggles and related “memory wars” or “history wars.” As a result, school education becomes a 
crucial arena in contestations for political legitimacy. Especially, the history taught in schools, as an 
important site of official identity and memory, is the object of great political and societal contention. 
As such, extensive textbook research has underlined the salient role of history textbooks, describing 
them as powerful cultural artefacts that have traditionally been utilized as conveyors of official 
knowledge (Apple 1993; Smith 1991). They are functional in that they serve as central instruments 
of nation-building and citizenship formation, and as important sites for the construction and 
transmission of national identities and memories. Hence, history textbooks are often politicized, 
becoming a significant battlefield in struggles and conflicts over identity and power. Critical textbook 
studies have shown that, as a result of these struggles, their content is produced to serve the specific 
aim of legitimizing the beliefs, values and norms of dominant groups in society, thus being political 
rather than being neutral (Bentraovato 2017, p. 39). History textbooks, therefore, have great potential 
for creating and intensifying conflict. The glorification of the self and marginalization and exclusion 
of others in narratives of history textbooks are a frequently used tactic to promote loyalty to a 
particular nation. The greater role of history textbooks comes into play especially in the aftermath of 
violent conflict in their conveying and solidifying of prejudice, stereotypes and enemy images 
through their dissemination of somewhat mythical narratives that describe identities of the self and 
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others as primordial, monolithic and antagonistic. They often justify intergroup hatred and in-group 
natural superiority, victimhood and historical entitlement to territory, while emphasizing negative 
aspects of the other. In doing so, history textbooks are utilized as an efficient tool to reinforce 
antagonistic perceptions and inequalities which the conflict transformation literature have pointed 
out as characteristics of protracted identity-based conflict in deeply divided societies. 
 In this light, history textbook revision is an inherently contested and selective process 
conducted and effected by those with real interests and political power. It includes negotiations and 
deliberations, which may provoke tensions. History textbook revision in post-conflict societies faces 
particular challenges. Competing group narratives may be divided concerning various issues from 
the causes and processes of conflict, to identity of the victims, actors’ roles and responsibilities, and 
the motivations, legitimacy and implications of their actions. In addition, the terminology to define 
and describe violent events can be chosen differently with each presenting different meanings and 
implications. The same event can be interpreted in conflicting ways, ranging from liberation to 
aggression and invasion or occupation. As Bar-Tal (2007) suggests, in post-conflict society each 
party involved in conflict tends to selectively shape its collective memories of the conflict (p.78). 
While blaming the other for the outbreak and continuation of the conflict and its violence and 
atrocities, they can choose to focus on their own self-justification and victimization, which eventually 
prevents the society from stepping toward ultimate reconciliation. Efforts aimed at confronting and 
teaching the violent past and its various controversies are often disregarded for fear of any possible 
destabilizing of the fragile peace that tends to characterize post-conflict societies (Bentrovato 2017, 
p. 42). In reality, post-conflict societies have taken various measures, reacting to the demands and 
challenges related to teaching younger generations about the violent past through textbooks. The 
variety of approaches and strategies adopted includes shorter-term stopgap measures often promoting 
narrative strategies such as silence, evasion or elision, through the establishment of moratoria and 
the banning or the emergency revision of existing textbooks. In the longer-term, such teaching 
supports different concepts and methods, including single narrative or multi-narrative and multi-
perspective approaches (ibid.). 
 On the other hand, history education in schools has also increasingly been seen as a 
significant element with great potential for the peacebuilding and transitional justice processes aimed 
at ultimate reconciliation between parties involved in conflict (Bentrovato 2016, p. 211). As a result, 
a growing body of research has examined the distinct role of history education in conflict and peace, 
inspiring lively debates on how to teach history after conflict. In opposition to the generally accepted 
idea that history textbook revision poses challenges for societies emerging from recent violent 
conflict, often serving as a battlefield for competing narratives and interests, it is emphasized in 
recent literature of peace studies that history textbook revision also offers opportunities for potential 
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means of conflict transformation (Bentrovato 2017, p. 39). In order to drive history education in post-
conflict societies toward conflict transformation, the socio-psychological view on conflict introduced 
by Kelman (2008; 2010a; 2010b) should be taken into consideration. The concept posits that 
protracted international conflicts, like those between Israel and Palestine or India and Pakistan, are 
driven not only by structural issues but also by the collective needs and fears of their populations. 
These needs are not limited to the material necessities of food, shelter, and safety but also include 
such psychological needs as identity, security and the removal of fears, which can be provoked by 
several factors like the collective memory of events of historical trauma, decisions and policies 
pursued by political leaders, and the media. To meet these needs, beliefs that legitimize the self and 
delegitimize the other are typically formed and utilized in politics. Societal norms are constructed 
based on these beliefs. In an effort to maintain coherence, society members tend to resist any 
information contradicting or challenging these beliefs and norms (Chhabra 2016, p. 244). The 
interactive, problem-solving approach that conceptually draws on the socio-psychological analysis 
of conflict, however, argues that an understanding of the societal needs and fears, as well as the 
resulting beliefs, can provide opportunities and openings for building a sustainable peace between 
conflicting groups. According to the socio-psychological analysis of conflicts, collective identities 
of post-conflict societies that are formed with strong beliefs about self and others come to have a 
certain degree of non-reflective certainty about those beliefs. In a positive way, this non-reflective 
certainty creates a sense of inner coherence as well as providing a set of expectations about the world 
(ibid., p. 253). Non-reflectivity refers to the fact that human beings, who are open to learning and 
integrating information from the outside and adjusting it in a normal situation, begin to operate a 
process of automatic and psychological shut down, which stops any new information contradictory 
to existing beliefs from affecting the learning channels. Consequently, the capacity to take in new 
information about self, others and the world becomes “frozen,” with only rigid certainty formed. This 
rigid certainty, created as a result of psychological mechanisms in society members’ mindsets, must 
be taken into consideration during the process of conflict transformation aimed at ultimate 
reconciliation. For instance, in South Korea, many extreme rightists who have the firm conviction 
that South Korea is still technically at war with the hostile enemy, the North, may have this 
psychological mechanism that screens out any new information about the North that contradicts 
existing beliefs. Without considering this rigid certainty about their assessment of what is “right” that 
those rightists hold, any policies toward peace and conflict resolution on the Korean peninsula will 






2.3.4 Monumental History versus Critical History 
  
 In societies with a recent history of violence, the past is of great significance because it gives 
meaning to present events and policies, impacts how notions of justice and equality are perceived in 
society, constitutes intergroup relations and perceptions, and determines the ways in which people 
envision the future of their nation. The past is expressed through different forms, from the memories 
of those who have lived through violence, to stories and traumas passed on to young people, to 
representations in the mass media and official narratives. As explained in the earlier section, history 
education is one mechanism that deals with the past, providing the most systematic account of the 
nation’s past and establishing beliefs about relations between groups within a given society. As 
societies recover from violence, history education is influenced by the complex process of changing 
political and societal systems and redefining national identity. As an instrument of nation-building 
and citizenship formation, history education highly depends on the views of political elites 
concerning the nature of the nation itself, the implications ascribed to the past, and the power 
structures and connotations of identity promoted by existing political regimes (Korostelina 2016, p. 
289). 
 One of the typical dilemmas post-conflict societies face is making a choice between critical 
history and monumental history, both of which refer to the most important functions of history in 
society. In this section, based on Korostelina’s (2016) analysis regarding dilemmas of history 
education, two types of history that function in society, monumental and critical history, will be 
introduced and will be used as an analytical framework for historical narratives of South Korea. 
Monumental history refers to the functions of history to legitimize the ruling regime and develop 
loyalty among the younger generation. The intention of monumental history is, thus, not to provide 
an understanding of what happened in reality, but to promote a process of selective remembering and 
forgetting particular narratives based on explicit judgments about the importance of specific events 
in the history of a nation. These judgments are heavily affected by the ideology of a ruling regime 
that prefers some events to others because they are deemed significant and essential for the regime’s 
values and goals. In this light, monumental history has mythical functions. Mythic narratives function 
to define and recreate the particular implication of national identity and legitimize the power of the 
in-group. The in-group is portrayed as a vital foundation of the nation with exclusive rights to define 
national identity, being progressive, honorable, and signifying the shared vision of a constructive 
future. The out-group is described as an illegitimate agent of nation-building, alien to the nation, 
regressive, with narrow goals. Mythic narratives validate the actions, authority, and domination of 
the in-group as representing the whole nation, signifying “rightness” in a nation, and having 
exclusive rights to nation-building. The master narrative of South Korea that had been promoted by 
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the state and was dominant before the democratization in the late 1980s was clearly monumental in 
that it was typically used to justify legitimacy of the ruling regimes and to encourage loyalty to the 
state, while portraying the North as the hostile out-group that has no right to claim legitimacy as a 
political entity on the Korean peninsula. 
 On the other hand, post-conflict societies can choose critical history over monumental. 
Critical history holds all perpetrators accountable and shows the complex roots of violence without 
promoting loyalty to one particular side. History is, thus, no longer restricted by a regime or powerful 
group but rather becomes open to constant criticism and reinterpretation. In critical history narratives 
can be reconstructed through the process of confronting and considering alternative narratives. 
During this process, stories of different groups and communities within the nation are put together, 
allowing multiple interpretations and analyses of the roots and causes of violence, as well as 
reconfiguration of dominant narratives. Progressive intellectuals and politicians in South Korea have 
tried to see the past events through different perspectives to bring multiple narratives into the 
representation of history. These attempts, however, have been undermined by several factors. Among 
those, the most crucial is the politicization of history so narratives of two competing political strains 
have not been put together, but have merely been constantly competing. In addition, the ethnic 
nationalism narrative of progressives, itself, still shows some features of monumental history, thus 
intensifying conflicts between the two narratives. In the following section the detailed characteristics 
of monumental and critical history will be introduced. 
 In monumental history, mythic narratives support the dominance of a particular group 
through the following mechanisms: 1) impediment by out-group; 2) condemnation of imposition; 3) 
positive in-group predisposition; 4) validation of rights; and 5) enlightenment (Korostelina 2016, p. 
291). 
 
Table 1. Five justification mechanisms adopted in monumental history 




- assumes the right of the in-group to exclusively define the meaning of national 
identity and to delegitimize the out-group as an illegitimate agent of nation-
building. 




- justifies the assertion that the in-group is inclusive and embodies the interests 
of all groups in the nation, while the out-group is exclusively promoting its own 
specific values, policies, interests, and ideology. 
- assigns the essential representation of the whole nation to the in-group and 





- portrays the in-group as having more abilities and competencies, which can 
incorporate innovative skills, democratic and humanitarian values, than the out-
group. 
- describes the out-group by its simplistic culture, backward mentality and non-
progressive ideas. 
Validation of rights - defines the in-group as having the correct vision of national development and 
thus possessing an entitlement to develop the nation. 
- rights are rooted in a more authentic culture, connection to territory, birthright, 
and acknowledgement by international society. 
Enlightenment - highlights the readiness of all people in a nation to pursue a specific aim, such 
as the promotion of liberalism or an ethnic state. 
- emphasizes the in-group’s better ability to distinguish shared ideals and 
enlighten others for the successful achievement of goals. 
- more prominent in the foundation myths. 
(Source adapted from Korostelina 2016, pp. 291-93) 
 
 The first justification mechanism, impediment by out-group, emphasizes a conflict between 
two groups with the premise that only the in-group embodies the positive values of the nation. The 
out-group is depicted as the one that prevents the goals of the in-group by promoting conflict, 
instituting specific policies, endorsing an erroneous ideology, and oppressing and discriminating 
against in-group members. Thus, the duality between “good” and “bad” group is justified through 
the portrayal of the correct activities of the in-group and the wrong activities of the out-group. This 
mechanism postulates the right of the in-group to exclusively define the meaning of national identity 
and to exclude the out-group as an illegitimate agent of nation-building. The second justification 
mechanism, condemnation of imposition, justifies the claim that the in-group is inclusive and 
embodies the interests of all groups in the nation, while the out-group is exclusively promoting its 
own specific values, policies, interests, and ideology based on traditions of its ethnic or regional 
culture and language. The third justification mechanism, positive in-group predisposition, portrays 
the in-group as having more abilities and competencies than the out-group. These can incorporate 
innovative ability and skills, democratic and humanitarian values, and tolerance. In contrast to the 
in-group, the out-group is characterized by its simplistic culture, backward mentality and non-
progressive ideas. This mechanism is employed to justify the necessity of the in-group to fight with 
a backward out-group, and defend progressive national development. The fourth justification 
mechanism, validation of rights, defines the in-group as having a correct and right vision of national 
development, and thus possessing an entitlement to develop the nation. These rights are rooted in its 
more authentic culture, connection to the native land, birthright, and acknowledgement by 
international society. In case of exclusion, the out-group is denied its rights, and its members are 
treated as alien or hostile. This mechanism justifies the power of the in-group as rooted in the 
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authenticity of its history and connection to the land. The last justification mechanism, enlightenment, 
highlights the readiness of all people in a nation to pursue a specific aim, for example the 
development of civic society or the promotion of liberalism or an ethnic state. At the same time, it 
stresses that some people have limited abilities to achieve these described outcomes because of their 
persistent, outdated mentality, and a reliance on populist leadership. The in-group is portrayed as 
having a better ability to distinguish shared ideals and enlighten others for the successful achievement 
of these goals. This mechanism justifies the power of the in-group, being more enlightened and 
progressive than other groups. Through these five mechanisms of justification, mythic narratives are 
constructed to define and recreate the particular connotation of national identity and legitimize the 
power of the in-group. 
 The dilemma societies recovering from recent violence face lies in making a choice between 
monumental and critical history, and is connected to the concept of “collective axiology,” which 
defines boundaries and relations among groups and sets criteria between in-group and out-group 
(ibid., p. 294). A collective axiology is a common system of values that suggests moral guidelines to 
in-group members on how to perceive and treat members of in-groups and out-groups, and how to 
maintain or change relations between them. Two variables characterize the dynamics of collective 
axiology: the degree of collective generality and the degree of axiological balance (ibid., p. 295). 
Post-violent societies face the desire to promote national unity and the temptation to maintain an 
exclusive national narrative that denies the rights of specific other groups or suppress the possibility 
of alternative narratives. However, what should be noted is that the positive presentation of the self 
might limit its ability to critically address historical injustices done by the self. The approaches to 
the dilemma of monumental versus critical history can vary within a specific country. 
 
























 The degree of collective generality “refers to the ways in which in-group members categorize 
the Other, how they simplify, or not, their defining (essential) character” (Rothbart & Korostelina 
2006, p. 45). Collective generality includes four main attributed characteristics: homogeneity of out-
group members’ perceptions and behaviors; long-term stability of their beliefs, attitudes, and actions; 
their resistance to change; and the scope or range of the out-group category (Korostelina 2016, p. 
295). A high level of collective generality is connected with the view that regards an out-group as 
consistent, homogeneous, demonstrating fixed patterns of behavior, committed to durable, rigid 
beliefs and values, and thus being reluctant to accept changes. A low degree of collective generality 
reflects the perception of the out-group as differentiated, exhibiting a variety of behaviors and 
readiness for transformation. The degree of collective generality varies significantly between 
monumental and critical history. In monumental history, an enemy is typically described as a single 
entity with uniform beliefs and attitudes. The image of an out-group is thus regarded as rigid, fixed, 
and homogeneous. In critical history, the diversity within an in-group and out-group are emphasized 
and their cultural and political structures are portrayed as more complex and at times conflictual. 
 Axiological balance refers to “a kind of parallelism of virtues and vices attributed to groups” 
(Rothbart & Korostelina 2006, p. 46). Balanced axiology includes the recognition of positive aspects 
as well as negative features among both the in- and out-groups. A historical narrative with a high 
degree of axiological balance acknowledges one’s own moral faults and failings, while one with a 
low degree of axiological balance perceives the in-group as morally pure and superior and the out-
group as evil and vicious (Korostelina 2016, p. 296). Monumental and critical histories show sharp 
contrast in their presentation of axiological balance. In monumental history with a low degree of 
axiological balance, intergroup relations are presented based on the dichotomy between in-group 
victimization and out-group aggression. Such presentations are vital in denying in-group 
responsibility for aggressive and violent actions. The biases and prejudice are transformed into deep 
beliefs about the out-group as an essential arch enemy, thus decreasing any possibility of mutual 
understanding. In critical history with a high degree of axiological balance, education presents not 
only positive but also negative actions of the in-group, providing critical analysis of political and 
social foundations, and consequences of negative events. 
 The “state-centered nationalism” narrative of rightists can be clearly categorized as 
monumental history with a high degree of collective generality toward the out-group, that is, North 
Korea, which is thus portrayed as a political entity with a homogeneously evil ideology and fixed 
patterns of behavior. The state-sanctioned narrative during the authoritarian era highlights the 
positive achievements of South Korea, while ignoring injustice and wrongs conducted by ruling 
regimes. Hence, it was clearly monumental with a low level of axiological balance. This has 
gradually changed in the state-centered nationalism narrative of current conservatives in that it 
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acknowledges the negative aspects of the past regimes, such as dictatorship and human rights abuses. 
On the other hand, the ethnic nationalism narrative of leftists displays many features of critical 
history in that it includes some formerly forgotten memories in the official history in particular, with 
respect to the wrong-doings of past authoritarian regimes, such as human rights violations and 
undemocratic actions. In addition, it includes positive portrayals of North Korea. However, what 
should be pointed out here is the fact that the narrative of progressives is also still partly monumental. 
In the ethnic nationalism narrative, the Korean nation and the masses [minjok] are defined as the 
absolute and pure self, while constructing the out-groups within the nation, so-called, the group of 
anti-nationalists like pro-Japanese or pro-American collaborators as hostile, blaming them for almost 
all the past wrong-doings and injustice in South Korea. Consequently, it creates another dichotomy 
of good and evil, that is, nationalists versus anti-nationalists, and fails to provide explanation for the 
complex roots of violence and division of the nation, which will be elaborated in detail throughout 
the dissertation. 
 South Korea is not the only country that faces a dilemma. For instance, in Ghana between 
1987 and 2010, two versions of monumental history were presented in history textbooks, depending 
on the political party in power (Sefa-Nyarko 2016). Changes in political power resulted in changes 
to history curricula. Each change provided opposite and contentious interpretations of Kwame 
Nkrumah’s 1950 Positive Action and his legacy. The monumental history promoted after 1987 
stressed his positive impact on social development, while post-2001 textbooks emphasized the 
negative aspects, such as the numerous human rights abuses and destabilizing effect of Nkrumah’s 
actions, which resulted in nationwide chaos. Both versions promote a very unbalanced axiology, in 
which the past actions of the party in power are presented as important for social development and 
progress, while the actions of the opposition are depicted as destructive and promoting violence. The 
case of Ghana has many implications for South Korea, as it resembles quite closely what happens in 
South Korea regarding high school history textbook revision whenever the regime is changed, in that 
the assessment of the past regimes and the birth of South Korea are interpreted in a radically different 
way. This will be closely elaborated in the later part of the dissertation. The monumental history of 
Ghana employs the “impediment by out-group” mechanism to describe the fight between two 
political parties, in which the one party signifies positive values of the nation. The opposition is 
presented as creating conflict, establishing erroneous policies, promoting the wrong ideology, unfair 
treatment, oppression, and use of violence. This mechanism helps to promote one party’s 
exclusiveness in defining national policies and representing the nation. It also uses the mechanism 
of “condemning imposition”, which rationalizes the claim that the in-group represents the interests 
of every group in the nation while the out-group is imposing its own narrow ideology, interests, and 
policies over everyone and wrongly claims to symbolize the nation. However, the latest editions of 
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Ghanaian social studies textbooks (2008) began to include critical history. Instead of the simplistic 
praising or criticizing of specific personalities of the other, they present an analysis of the functions 
of social institutions, examining individual contributions within the institutions and structures of the 
state. It is argued that this step toward critical history became possible because of dialogue that has 
been developing between different political parties and growing political stability since the 1980s, 
creating a “dialogical space”. Initiated by both political parties, this exchange has involved citizen 
representations from a variety of social groups and different political affiliations that comprise Ghana. 
As mentioned, this progress toward creating a critical historical narrative through creating dialogue 
between competing groups has great significance for the case of Korea. 
 In Croatia, another example for South Korea, history education uses both critical and 
monumental history (Maric 2016). Most topics, even when sensitive and controversial, are presented 
from multiple perspectives, which has helped to promote critical thinking. However, in some 
textbooks, topics of “national importance” such as the Homeland War are presented in a form of 
monumental history that do not allow for varied interpretations. In the presentation of the war, 
military history dominates the historical narrative, depicting the Croatian Army as liberators and 
Serbian nationalism and Serbian paramilitary units as instigators of the war. Thus, this monumental 
history is based on an unbalanced collective axiology. The description of the actions of Croats omits 
any discussion of Croatian nationalism, Croatian involvement in the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and the suffering of Serbs, while Serbs are uniformly depicted as the aggressor. The level of collective 
generality is also very high, which means students are taught to identify the collective victims and 
the collective aggressors, disregarding any individual contexts. South Korea’s history education is a 
case in which students are forced to think based on a dichotomy between aggressors and victims or 




2.4 Identity Politics 
  
 Everyday knowledge about history does not result only from transforming scientific fact into 
common knowledge and delivering it to the public, but rather is a result of political and social 
processes through which the accounts of the past attain hegemonic status, being accepted as “true” 
and “right.” It is not surprising but natural that there are multiple versions of accounts and 
interpretations about past events in democratized societies, depending on varying perspectives and 
interests of the social or political groups implicated in the storytelling, that is, narratives. As a result, 
there is constitutive tension between hegemonic narratives and counter-narratives. This is of 
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significance in that historical narratives influence how groups define the present, for instance in how 
they identify their rights and duties, legitimize their political agreements, and make claims on the 
rightness or wrongness of their actions. Any account of the past thus has a political dimension, based 
on which a nation can make a decision on how to react to the social and political issues it faces and 
how to envision its future. 
 
2.4.1 Power Struggles for the Dominance of Knowledge and Truth 
  
 As clarified in the introduction, identities in this dissertation imply not only symbolic 
constructions but also institutional practices and everyday interactions, through which identities are 
produced, reproduced and transformed. Thus, the term, discourse, will be used in the broader sense 
of Foucault, as “systems of meaning, including all types of social and political practice, as well as 
institutions and organizations” (Howarth 1995), rather than in a narrow sense of texts. Identity is not 
only constructed in relation to textual meanings but also within institutionalized relations of power, 
which means that discourses on national identity operate in the context of the institutional support 
and practices that they rely on (Mottier 1997). Since Foucault’s discourse analysis examines how 
specific discourses reproduce or transform relations of power as well as relations of meaning, 
discourse in this study concerns the macro-level of structural orders of discourse, that is, broad 
historical systems of meaning which are relatively stable. Discourses are reproduced and transformed 
by specific individual and collective narratives, which refers to a limited sense of “stories” and 
“story-telling” in this study.  Narratives are one of the possible forms of discourse. Hence, while 
discourses include narratives, they cannot be reduced to narratives. Narratives of the nation over the 
common past are understood as important components of broader discourses of national identity. 
Different narrative forms such as historical accounts, myths, and metaphors contribute to discourses 
of national identity. 
 The focus in this research regarding narrative analysis is placed on the social and political 
role of narratives in constructing national identity and national identities are defined as narratives 
which are concerned with the drawing of boundaries between “us” and “them”, which is inherently 
related with political processes. Mechanisms of othering, that is, constructing specific groups of 
people as others, are politically important aspects of identity narratives. As seen in the theory section 
about intractable conflict, at times of war mechanisms of othering toward the enemy become 
particularly intense and significant, often taking the form of presenting the other as non-human or 
evil. War has also played a crucial role in the formation of the national identity of the two Koreas, 
making them identify each other with great hatred as arch enemies. However, with democratization 
in South Korea, a group of people, commonly categorized as progressives, liberals or leftists, have 
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found the cause of the war and the division in those Koreans who served the imperial powers of 
Japan and the US, pursued the establishment of a separate nation, allegedly for their own political 
interests, and later emerged as a new political power in South Korea. With the rise of progressives in 
institutional politics in the South, their narrative, in which not the North but internal betrayals of anti-
nationalists should be blamed for tragedies and injustice of the nation, started to attain dominance in 
the society and to be institutionalized in many areas from foreign to domestic policies. The new idea 
of reconciliation toward the former enemy state and the new narrative on the birth and developments 
of South Korea consequently and ironically generated severe political confrontation over South 
Korea’s self identity and relational identity toward the North and the US. 
 As mentioned at the beginning of the dissertation, the aim of the research is not to claim, 
support, or prove which version of narrative is more “true” than the others, but rather to expose the 
political motives and contexts behind the creation and promotion of particular narratives in the South 
Korean context by examining the inner-conflict over national identity. The aim of the study is 
ultimately to contribute to finding a way in which competing narratives over national identity can be 
transformed into a direction that leads to conflict transformation within South Korean society as well 
as ultimate reconciliation between the two Koreas. 
 Foucault in his theory relies on Nietzsche’s (1974) notion that knowledge is always a fragile 
compromise, produced by the clash and negotiation of conflicting interests. In line with Nietzsche, 
Foucault argues that knowledge is the outcome of a battle between political and social groups 
(Foucault 2000). In this notion, truth and power are interlinked. They are generating and maintaining 
each other, consequently producing a specific “regime of truth” which varies from society to society 
(Foucault 2002, p. 132). It is this regime that defines which discourses are allowed and accepted as 
true, and provides the mechanisms to make ethical claims by distinguishing between right and wrong. 
Foucault (2002) also claims that “there is a battle ‘for truth,’ or at least ‘around truth’” (p. 132). The 
political battle is fought with the use of the discursive weapons of knowledge and power which 
determine the formation of a context-specific truth (Foucault 2004, p. 190). This battle is about the 
status of being accepted as truth with all its economic and political implications, not about the truth 
itself. Conflicting versions of “truth” and “right” which function as tactical weapons are created by 
dynamics of power and knowledge. 
 In Foucault’s (2004) thinking, war is not only constantly dividing societies, it is rather the 
foundation of all institutions of power just as military institutions are at the center of all political 
institutions. This can be well observed in the case of South Korea, where after liberation from Japan, 
many former police and military officials who served for the colonial government occupied key 
positions in the newly established South Korea’s public and private sectors with strong support from 
the US military government. In post-liberation South Korea, it can be thus argued in line with 
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Foucault (2004) that “politics is the continuation of war by other means” (p. 13). The authoritarian 
regimes of South Korea in the post-war era put much effort into keeping the image of the very enemy, 
the North and its communist ideology, alive through the creation of fear, through the perpetuation of 
a state of exception, through propaganda and censorship, through selective commemoration or 
through narrative formation of collective innocence and victimhood. Hence, the governments’ 
policies worked like a military strategy to strengthen their own position against a common enemy. 
In this sense, knowledge is nothing but a weapon, a tactical deployment in that war (Foucault 2004). 
This is true in the case of South Korea. It was because of regime change to two successive progressive 
regimes from 1998 to 2008 that the narrative identity of South Korea was partly transformed through 
changes in various policies such as history textbook revision and foreign policies toward the North 
and the US, and this is elaborated in the rest of the dissertation. These attempts were in part successful 
in transforming the official knowledge and the master narrative in South Korea with their newly 
attained political and social power, but have failed to persuade those, mostly rightists, who had the 
radically opposing narrative, and ultimately to yield a transcendent narrative on which conflicting 
groups within the South Korean society can reach agreement, thus promoting reconciliation. 
 
  
2.5 Narrative Strategies in Post-Conflict Societies for Conflict Transformation 
  
 Given the changing nature of contemporary conflict toward more frequent internal conflicts 
and civil wars within one political entity than international conflicts, the primary challenge societies 
emerging from violent conflicts face is to find a way to not only exist together peacefully with the 
former enemy, but even at times cooperate and share power. However, despite this change, 
representations of the past and history teaching still remain as weapons for these collective struggles. 
 Although South Korea is not an exceptional case as a society that has experienced recent 
violence in war and is currently neighbor with the former enemy, it is a unique case in that the former 
enemy is its own half of one ethnic nation. Thus, South Korea currently faces two important conflicts: 
one, with the North that has been successful in developing nuclear weapons; and the other, internal 
divisions over how to identify itself and its significant others, North Korea and the US. At the time 
of writing, the historical summit between the US and the North, as well as inter-Korean summits, are 
ongoing to find a way to avoid the danger of nuclear war on the peninsula. Even if the peace 
agreement or political declaration is made through summits and consequently the North agrees to 
denuclearization, the sources of tension always exist on the peninsula as there are possibilities the 
North can always resume the nuclear program unless the hostile relationship is fully transformed into 
relations of mutual trust between both Koreas, as well as between the North and the US. Furthermore, 
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even if the end of war is declared through a series of summits, there is still a high possibility that 
internal divisions within South Korea will stay strong for a while because it is another challenging 
task to transform the identity conception of those who see the North as an existential threat to South 
Korea and prioritize the strong alliance with the US for its security. As elaborated earlier, the identity 
shaped in the context of intractable conflicts is consolidated as beliefs in the firm duality between 
good self and evil enemy, being resistant to change. For the delicate conflict transformation process, 
it is, therefore, challenging but essential to replace the identity of the former enemy with that of a 
political partner for peaceful coexistence. 
 There has been a recent shift in peace and conflict studies from “conflict resolution” towards 
“conflict transformation”, which refers to the process of reaching a durable and mutually acceptable 
solution between former enemies (Psaltis et al. 2017, p. 2). Conflict transformation is more concerned 
with the transformation of structures, systems, and relationships that initially cause violence and 
injustice, focusing on a constant end goal of the settlement of peace and the end of structural injustice 
(ibid.). 
 In the following section, the narrative strategies that are usually adopted by post-conflict 
societies are explained. Then a “transformative model of post-conflict textbook work” is introduced 
as a suggestion to achieve ultimate conflict transformation through narrative transformation, from 
conflicting and contentious toward inclusive and transcendent. This proposed model has implications 
for the peace project led by the progressive South Korean governments, given that it highlights the 
necessity of procedural cooperation with those have conflicting ideas, values and ideologies in the 
process of peacemaking between the two Koreas. Even if all agree with the ideal of peaceful 
coexistence or unification of the two Koreas, it cannot be achieved without creating consensus and 
cooperation in the processes of policy decision making, and its installment between conflicting and 
competing groups in South Korea. 
 
2.5.1 Short-term Approach: Silence, Evasion, or Elision 
 
 As elaborated before, post-conflict societies take various measures in responding to the 
demands and challenges related to teaching younger generations about the history of the violent past 
through textbooks. One of the commonly adopted approaches is a shorter-term stopgap measure that 
often promotes narrative silence, evasion or elision, notably through the establishment of moratoria 
and the banning or the emergency revision of existing textbooks. It also includes longer-term 
textbook development work, allowing multi-concepts and methods. This includes single- or multi-
narrative and multi-perspective approaches (Bentrovato 2017, p. 42). 
 McCully (2012) points out that after conflict, “dealing with the recent past is especially 
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problematic because the situation is still heavily disputed, raw, and characterized by personal trauma, 
anger, and grief” (p. 154). In this light, a commonly adopted strategy in the immediate aftermath of 
violent conflict is the establishment of moratoria, which means “the temporary suspension of history 
education or its recent history segment, including its textbooks” (De Baets 2015, p. 6). Also, a 
“rhetoric of silence” (Ondek 1993) is often adopted, based on a belief or a political pretext that the 
society can benefit from the passing of time. Bentrovato (2017) argues that this option is justified by 
at least four arguments: first, a time of silence is necessary for national healing and reconciliation, 
while allowing time for society to come to terms with the past; second, there exist political obstacles 
to the possibility of objectively and safely confronting the past when parties, in particular perpetrators 
who were involved in the conflict, still hold powerful positions; third, sufficient time is needed for 
scientific and legal investigation, and for documentation to reveal the truth and to reach consensus 
about the past; and fourth, from a more practical point of view, in the short term post-war countries 
commonly face so many different challenges, including insecurity, poverty and institutional 
weakness, that a governing entity has no capability to deal with history textbook revision as a priority. 
Behind such arguments, without doubt, there often exist vested interests of political actors concerned 
with delaying all confrontation with the past in order to secure their political power and legitimacy 
(ibid., p. 44). 
 Evasive approaches to history textbook work in post-conflict societies are often criticized 
because silence on victims’ suffering in textbooks may bring victims into renewed injustice, while 
buying time for political powers to manipulate grievances for their vested interests. Hence, critics 
argue a short-term strategy of silence about the painful pasts leads to the perpetuation of conflict. As 
many observers in peace and conflict studies have pointed out, confrontation and redress of historical 
injustice is mandatory for ultimate intergroup reconciliation. 
 In South Korea under the authoritarian governments, the strategies of narrative silence, 
evasion, and elision were often adopted. For instance, the issues relating to pro-Japanese 
collaboration remained silent and under-investigated until recently, partly because many of the 
collaborators or their descendants have hold powerful positions in the new state of South Korea. In 
addition, the issue of violence inflicted by a state power, such as mass killings of civilians in war 
time, was erased from the master narrative as well as from history textbooks, with regimes claiming 
that immediate challenges the state faced, such as threats from the North and economic development, 
must be prioritized. 
 
2.5.2 Longer-term Approach: Single- and Multi-Narrative Approaches 
  
 As societies emerging from recent violence develop their political systems toward 
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democratization, calls for a democratic process of post-conflict history textbook writing are growing. 
This process may include the development of materials jointly authored by representatives from 
across historical conflict lines (Bentrovato 2017, p. 47). In the case of South Korea, it was also with 
democratization that history textbook pluralization was adopted in school education. However, there 
have been no jointly developed resources between conflicting groups, but instead the dominant state-
sanctioned narrative was gradually replaced with an alternative narrative, a move which has 
consequently elicited strong criticism from people who have constructed their narrative identity 
based on the predominant state-sanctioned one. 
 Empirically, in collaborative textbook projects implemented by international organizations, 
two main alternative narrative approaches have been adopted: a traditional single-narrative approach, 
presenting a mutually agreed and accepted “compromise narrative” that combines a common 
understanding of history; and a pluralistic multi-narrative and multi-perspective approach which 
presents contentious narratives for critical interpretation, refraining from supplying an authoritative 
narrative (ibid., p. 49). The single-narrative approach to history textbooks includes collaborative 
construction of a narrative based on mutual agreement through the processes of negotiation and 
compromise, which harmonizes the perspectives of conflicting parties. For this consensus-based 
model that is ideal for settling peace, it is necessary to include joint efforts in the negotiation for a 
common narrative, whereby special focus is made both on eliminating enemy images, bias and 
stereotypes, and emphasizing historical elements possibly conducive to reconciliation, such as 
positive interactions between conflicting groups throughout the relevant history (Pingel 2008). In 
post-conflict countries, the conventional single-narrative approach has, however, often been taken as 
a strategy to foster unity and social cohesion by political powers. First of all, this approach contradicts 
current historiographical trends that promote a critical way of thinking about the past. In addition, in 
divided societies in the aftermath of violent conflict where the appeal of the construction of one 
dominant historical narrative is very strong, there exists a risk that a new state-sanctioned and 
uncontested master-narrative or official truth may emerge, which is top-down and selective, 
excluding or disregarding alternative memories and narratives. In this state-sanctioned narrative, 
difference and diversity are often described as a threat to the unity of the nation. Furthermore, the 
single narrative is likely to reproduce existing power relations by endorsing the beliefs, values, norms 
and identity of dominant groups, in particular the ruling regime, thus possibly creating new or 
renewed injustice. 
 Given those negative aspects of the single-narrative approach, the “enquiry-based multi-
narrative and multi-perspective approach” is the most preferred in recent historiography. The 
emphasis of this approach is placed on an interpretive and evidence-based process of historical 
enquiry, which regards all narratives as “provisional and open to question” (McCully 2012, p. 148). 
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In this approach, students are taught plural and multiple narratives regarding the past, which is 
deemed to be more democratic and better able to create opportunities for open discussions and 
rapprochement by encouraging students to think critically of irreconcilable group narratives and 
presumed truths (Bentrovato 2017, p. 53). On the other hand, this approach might face problems in 
its implementation if historical narratives given to students are highly contested and conflictual. For 
example, the methodology of permanent questioning in this approach may only lead to producing 
uncertainty and further destabilizing the nation, rather than supplying a definite or clear and positive 
narrative of the past. Also, the challenge in this approach lies in the fact that the processes of 
questioning and critical thinking are very complicated and need time and patience from both teachers 
and students. If they are not effectively equipped with the tools and dispositions of the historical 
profession, this approach, by focusing on differences and controversies, may further consolidate 
polarization rather than helping communities transcend competing narratives and encouraging 
reconciliation (ibid.). 
 
2.5.3 Transformative Model for Narrative Transformation 
 
 Various examples of recent empirical research in post-conflict textbook writing emphasize 
the attitudinal change that can be achieved by collaborative initiatives bringing together opposing 
conflict parties to produce textbooks or guidelines based on the transcendent narrative that is 
mutually agreed and accepted, called “a transformative model of post-conflict textbook work” 
(Bentrovato 2017, p. 54). This model highlights that the possibility of the conciliatory role that 
textbooks play relies partly on whether collaborative textbook development can encourage a process 
of “narrative transformation” of the competing accounts that initially create conflict. Depending on 
social constructionism, the framework of the transformative model puts its emphasis on the reframing 
of conflict narratives and related history throughout the conflict transformation processes that aim to 
provoke changes in intergroup perceptions and attitudes that are considered key to ultimate 
reconciliation. It regards narrative re-examination and reconfiguration as a critical step towards 
transforming conflict-relationships between opposing parties (ibid.). 
 Specifically, textbook writing work can provide a golden opportunity to create a “dialogical 
space” (Hermann 2004) in which participants engaged in conflict can be involved in reassessing and 
redefining their narratives and their underlying antagonistic perceptions and belief systems. In doing 
so, it is necessary to have textbook projects involve and facilitate sustained cooperative interaction, 
and critical and constructive confrontation with the painful past. By engaging former enemies in such 
processes of social learning, textbook work may act as a catalyst for narrative transformation. It can, 
in other words, contribute to broadening the narrow and limited narratives based on the simplistic 
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dichotomy between good self and evil others, and to creating more complex and nuanced narratives 
over the complicated roots of the past violence and conflict. The processes involved in this 
transformative model of textbook work may ultimately allow a transition from competing narratives 
that are mutually recognized as irreconcilable and incompatible, toward more inclusive, pluralistic 
and balanced narratives (Bentrovato 2017, p. 55). 
 It is necessary to bear in mind that the transformative model of post-conflict textbook work 
requires a number of key procedural principles and prerequisites. First, an inclusive, symmetrical, 
and democratic collaborative approach to textbook revision and development must be adopted. This 
is critical to both initiating and signaling a crucial shift from a conventional method, in which 
knowledge is determined by dominant groups, toward more democratic practices, where history is 
co-narrated by representatives of different groups, guaranteeing diverse voices in society being 
equally represented and heard in the textbooks. Second, it is necessary to shift from a common 
strategy of silence about conflict, controversies and diversity toward acknowledging and openly 
confronting differences. The parties must acknowledge that it is natural to have multiple and diverse 
perspectives and narratives on history, which can lead to a meaningful and constructive dialogue on 
the shared but divisive past. The parties then need to be engaged in each other’s narrative by 
questioning assumptions and preconceptions that may inhibit rational and constructive intergroup 
dialogue on the shared history. In conflict situations, it is commonly said that “awareness of the 
enemy’s similar humanity is easily lost from view” (Nussbaum 1992, p. 282), keeping groups trapped 
in dichotomous victim/perpetrator discourses that perpetuate vicious cycles of violence and prevent 
rapprochement (Bentrovato 2017, p. 57). These transformative processes are undoubtedly 
challenging to implement and can only be achieved by long-term efforts. They require extensive 
groundwork to build mutual recognition and mutual trust, especially at the beginning of the project 
considering that the parties involved in conflict may still hold rigid defensive and offensive attitudes. 
However, the potential of this transformative model of post-conflict textbook is considerable to build 
and empower a cooperative community by providing a space for constructive intergroup engagement 
and collaboration. More importantly, this model has implications for peace initiatives led by the 
South Korean government in that it highlights the importance of a dialogical space during the process 
of policy implementation. Choi Jang-jip (2017) points out that in order to have the ultimate peace 
settlement the peace initiatives aim at, it is necessary to include those who have different perspectives, 
values, and ideologies in the process of policy decision making and its enactment, which is the lesson 
learned from the former progressive regimes’ attempt to transform the policy toward the North from 





3. First Juncture: Democratization and Narrative Transformation 
 
 This chapter aims to closely examine the “ethnic nationalism” narrative of progressives, one 
of two contentious master narratives, which has become dominant since the 2000s when the 
progressives emerged as a political power in the institutional politics of South Korea. Hence, the 
focus of this chapter is concerned with the first historical juncture, the democratization in the late 
1980s and the financial crisis in the late 1990s, which provided the progressive and leftist politicians 
and intellectuals with opportunities to raise their voices and offer their perspectives on the various 
social and political issues. Before taking a close look at the outcomes of the first juncture, the social 
and political contexts in the period before the democratization that heavily influenced the birth of the 
ethnic nationalism narrative will be first introduced in the following section. Subsequently, the 
process through which the ethnic nationalism narrative has gained its dominant status, and social and 
political contexts that made possible the rise of the ethnic nationalism narrative will be elaborated. 
Lastly, key concepts of the ethnic nationalism narrative will be analyzed. 
 
 
3.1 The National Identity Formation in the Process of Nation-Building 
 
 Societies coming out of foreign occupation are left with the task of rebuilding themselves, 
which includes not only material and economic reconstruction, but also political restoration, national 
reconciliation, and the reinvention of national identity. Although the tasks are concerned with the 
future of the nation, these can only be achieved when the legacy of foreign occupation and the violent 
past are dealt with. In particular, it is essential that the nation’s shameful past be overcome so as to 
reestablish national self-esteem and national identity. This process of building national self-
consciousness often has a strategy with two aspects: a group of scapegoats is selected and blamed 
for the nation’s shameful past; and selective events and memories are chosen and glorified, through 
which postwar national unity can be promoted (De Ceuster 2002, p. 215). With the former strategy 
of singling out a group of perpetrators, the majority of the people can be categorized as a majority 
group of victims of foreign occupation, relieved of the sense of guilt, while the latter strategy of the 
mythicized narrative makes it possible for a shameful period of foreign occupation and war to be 
integrated into a nation’s history. 
 The popular memory that a majority of social groups in a country share sometimes collides 
with the collective memory, which is elevated to the national myth, most often in the master narrative. 
However, what should be noted is that different memories and narratives always remain alive in 
society along with the mythicized master narrative, and are shared by members of various social 
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groups. The master narrative might prevail for a long period of time but different voices eventually 
emerge, questioning the hegemonic narrative and challenging the interpretation of the nation’s history. 
According to Wertsch (2008), memory is distributed in two ways: 1) socially in small group 
interactions; and 2) instrumentally (p. 121). The latter, instrumental distribution, is performed by 
agents acting individually or collectively, and employs cultural tools, such as the internet or 
narratives. An important transformation of memory in human cognition occurs when various forms 
of cultural tools that offer external symbolic storage have emerged (ibid.). Hence, the rise of new 
forms of external symbolic storage, for instance, written texts on/from the internet, leads to 
fundamental change in our remembering. This was the case in South Korea. With extensive volumes 
of progressive intellectuals’ publications published in the 1980s and 1990s, together with a political 
open space for public debates provided with the democratization, the state-sanctioned narrative on 
how to identify the nation and how to remember past injustices and wrongdoings was faced with 
great challenges, and consequently alternative narratives emerged. 
 As elaborated in the theoretical chapter, one of many challenges post-conflict societies face 
is related to how to deal with the divisive and violent past, which often leads to conflicting memories. 
Within nations, the imminent task of creating and mobilizing collective identity often leads to the 
oppression of other identities. In particular, the imperatives of nationalism can repress alternative 
concepts of collective identity. In this light, national identity is thus a totalizing idea, forcing 
alternative identities such as class, gender or region to be subordinated in the realm of politics 
(Robinson 2008, p. 54). At the level of a nation-state, the state constructs and maintains a master 
narrative of nation which acts as an official story of the nation. This master narrative functions to 
legitimate the existence of the state and nation internally and to unify people. On the other hand, it 
is projected externally, for a nation to be acknowledged in world politics. 
 What is essential in the process of new nation-building is to draw a line between us and those 
who do not belong to us, which bounds a nation culturally, politically and territorially. Narratives of 
nation, therefore, are influential in setting standards for inclusiveness or exclusiveness. It is historians 
who create, transform, and maintain narratives, and give a nation the character of individuated beings 
which are given a narrative that is supposed to be adequately suited to the world (ibid., p. 53). In a 
nation-state where the master narrative is highly contested, academic analysis conducted by 
historians or intellectuals becomes of great significance, often utilized as a political weapon. 
Resources provided by those intellectuals, with which the master narrative can be deconstructed or 
reconstructed, are often regarded as threats to the master narrative propagated by the state authorities 
and the socio-political formation upon which the nation builds. In modern Korea where there have 
existed highly contested and emotional discourses about the legitimacy of two separate states, 
historical narratives have been often adopted as a political instrument. Koreans living today in both 
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Koreas hardly have a memory of a Korean state that is both sovereign and undivided, and the division 
has greatly affected Korean identity. In this context, the process of othering in South Korea has been 
one of the most integral components in the formation of national identity. It is not unusual for South 
Koreans to negatively represent the North as a state that is uncivilized, backward and totalitarian, 
and is oppressing its own people. On the other hand, in other discourses, the people in the North 
appear more positively because they are less westernized, being closer to the pure Korean nation 
before the fall of the South into the evils of imperialism. The former, negative representation of the 
North, can be easily found in conservatives’ narrative, and the latter in progressives’, which is based 
on a strong belief in ethnic nationalism. However, both narratives have common ground in that 
“North Korea becomes a strong component and defining characteristic of South Koreans’ 
representations of themselves” (Grinker 1998, p. 8). Representation constitutes the ways in which 
people individually and collectively depict something or someone verbally, visually, or through other 
expressive means, such as music (ibid., p. 6). In this light, science, poetry, and religion are all forms 
of representation, each of which is a subjective lens of interpretation, both for a person who makes 
the representation and for those who perceive it. Representations provide symbolic resources with 
which the event or object to be represented can “speak.” In addition, social representations of history 
can explain how a society has come to be the way it is now and justify its responses to current 
challenges (Liu and Hiton 2005, p. 538). They have multi-voices, given that the meanings of a 
representation can be wide-ranging. At times, some meanings are salient in some contexts but not 
others, depending on their social use. For example, the national flag of South Korea used to signify 
patriotism for the nation and partly still does. However, it is now more a sign of conservatism, largely 
due to its use in the “Taegukgi (South Korean national flag) rally” that is the pro-Park street protest 
mobilized to criticize the impeachment of former President Park Geun-hye, in which most 
participants are rightists. The power of representation also depends on the power of the agents who 
construct them. These aspects of representation inform us that the meanings of historical objects and 
events are revealed and conveyed through specific practices, such as speeches, rituals, or other social 
representations. 
 South Korea is filled with different kinds of representations of North Korea, which is of 
significance in that they tell us about the extent to which South Koreans establish their own identity 
as the opposite of or in relation to the North. Democratization in South Korea that increased 
possibilities of open discussion and debate has also contributed to remarkable ambivalence about 
how to identify with the North as a South Korean. The conventional historical master narrative, that 
is, the state-sanctioned narrative under authoritarian regimes, blamed the leaders of the North, the 
late Kim Il Sung and his two successors, for the tragedy of the nation. In this regard, North Korea is 
not represented as a group of people but as an illegitimate entity illegally occupying the northern 
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territory that originally belonged to the South, the true representation of the Korean nation. The 
progressive regimes that took office from 1998 for the following ten years, however, see it from an 
opposite perspective; for them, the North is perceived as a group of people who ethnically belong to 
the same Korean nation, and the North as a state is treated as a legitimate political entity. These 
conflicting representations are well represented in the contentious narratives of progressives and 
conservatives, which are the source of societal and political conflicts in contemporary South Korea. 
 In the following section, the early process of national identity building in a newly born South 
Korea will first be introduced, before closely examining the ethnic nationalism narrative of 
progressives which emerged in the 2000s as a dominant narrative with two successive progressive 
administrations. 
 
3.1.1 From Legal to Historical Justice 
  
 With its liberation from Japan in 1945, Korea struggled with political and ideological chaos, 
facing dramatically changing circumstances in domestic and global contexts, which unfortunately 
led to Korea’s division into two states. Each Korea was initially controlled by the military 
governments of the Soviet Union and the US, respectively, after liberation. Korean political leaders 
in both areas had to face the task of national recovery. The legacy of foreign occupation needed to 
be overcome through national cohesion but this was not the case for South Korea because liberation 
and subsequent control by the US military government came about in a process of extreme political 
tension and chaos. Under the US military government, those serving in Japan’s colonial regime were 
not punished despite the public’s anger and hatred, calling them “betrayers of the nation.” This was 
because the US military that arrived in Korea without having much knowledge about the nation 
recruited experienced Korean officials who had experience of governing the nation under the 
Japanese colonial government. Those individuals remained in positions after liberation without any 
process of legal judgment for their activities during the colonial period. Hence, it was the public’s 
morality, not a legal assessment, which played a significant role in judging pro-Japanese 
collaboration in the post-liberation era. Reflecting public sentiment, the Special Act on Punishing 
Anti-National Conducts was passed in the Korean National Assembly in September 1948. The first 
President of the South, Rhee Syngman, was forced to create the Special Investigation Committee 
(SIC) to investigate and prosecute Japanese collaborators, which did not, however, last long. Rhee 
believed that the fight against communists within the South was a priority for the newly established 
state over the issue of collaboration. Even though it agreed to establish the institution, the Rhee 
government was passive in supporting the SIC’s activities, arguing that the SIC was heavily 
influenced by its communist-influenced leadership (Kim Dong-choon 2010, p. 530). As a result, the 
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SIC ended its activities within a year, without producing much of an outcome. This absence of legal 
justice for acts of collaboration has greatly influenced contemporary South Korean politics, which 
will be explained in detail in the rest of the chapter. 
 The geographical partition reminds many South Koreans, especially progressives, of failure 
to achieve national unity and has been a source of constant challenges to the authority of the South 
Korean ruling elites that were blamed for having pursued the establishment of a separate state for the 
sake of their own interests (De Ceuster 2002, p. 216). Each Korean state has integrated its own 
interpretations of the ancient and modern history into a master narrative which aims to justify its 
claim to legitimacy. In both cases the state has implemented considerable means to repress counter-
narratives, to police the writing of history and shape public opinion around a common understanding 
of why its polity should be recognized as the true expression of Korean collective identity. In North 
Korea, there is virtually no visible dissent, and in the South during the authoritarian era, any 
challenges to the master narrative were highly suppressed. The Rhee government was overturned by 
the wave of student-led protests in April 1960. The collapse of the Rhee regime provided another 
opportunity for the struggle of legal justice in South Korea. The bereaved families organized 
demonstrations to demand a full investigation into the mass killings by the state power and 
established the National Association of the Bereaved Families of the Korean War Victims, thus 
challenging the state-sanctioned official narrative of the war, in which the Korean war is only 
described as an anti-communist battle against a communist invasion (Kim Dong-choon 2010, p. 532). 
However, uncovering the mass killing incidents of civilians by the state forces around the time of the 
war posed a great threat to this monumental narrative of the war. In response to the anger of bereaved 
families, the ruling Liberal Party that led the National Assembly organized the special committee on 
the Fact-finding of Massacres in May 1960. The intention of the Liberal Party that had been a strong 
supporter of President Rhee was, however, only to alleviate the anger of victims’ families and the 
public, as seen in the committee’s short life that only lasted eleven days. It is argued, in particular by 
the progressive and leftist camps, that the failures to clean up the past wrongdoings in the early years 
of South Korea have led it down a path of injustice. Collaborators were not only able to avoid any 
legal punishment but have also enjoyed privileges by keeping their social positions and wealth in the 
South Korean society. 
 However, democratization and the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern 
Europe in the late 1980s opened the debates over the dominant master narrative of authoritarian rule, 
which, however, still endures with strong support from its followers (Robinson 2006, p. 56). Any 
attempts to acknowledge the North, which is the issue so sensitive and so deeply related to regime 
legitimization of the South, were viewed as almost treasonous before democratization. In such a 
climate, it was historians working under the strict monitoring of the government who had to begin 
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the process of defining a civic perspective of national identity to accompany the preexisting ethnic 
nationalist consciousness that had developed during the colonial period. In societies emerging from 
recent violence, the politicization of history is not unusual. Protracted conflicts are driven not only 
by structural issues but also by collective needs, including not only the material but also 
psychological demands such as identity and security. In order to meet these needs, beliefs that 
legitimize the self and delegitimize the other are formed. In doing so, post-conflict societies tend to 
choose monumental history that serves to meet those psychological demands through developing 
self-esteem or loyalty among the people, as well as serving to legitimize the ruling regime. While the 
politicization of history is very common in post-conflict societies, as mentioned, history has more 
significant meaning in the Korean context, where strong ethnic homogeneity is believed to be an 
objective truth. The politicization of history in South Korea was mainly a product of the contested 
origins of the two Koreas being widely believed as one ethnic nation (Robinson 2006, p. 60). 
 On the other hand, in South Korea, the politicization of history has been further intensified 
largely due to the failure of its legal system to bring justice to pro-Japanese collaborators, a point 
that many scholars argue (Kim Dong-choon 2010; de Ceuster 2002; Em 2013). Despite 
overwhelming public support for some form of retribution right after the liberation, hesitation from 
the executive party had stopped legal justice from being applied to collaborators, most of whom 
already had taken the important positions in politics and society in the South after liberation or at 
least had some relations with political elites. In addition, the first administration of Rhee Syngman 
put the priority on the task of national reconstruction in the wake of the devastating war. With legal 
justice aborted, historians took on the task of revealing and removing the legacies of Japanese 
colonization. However, historical justice was not able to be realized until several decades had passed, 
because political circumstances before democratization prevented historians from openly venturing 
into the political issue of collaboration. 
 This failure to provide legal justice reemerged in the 1980s when zeal for democracy was 
high among political dissenters and students. When a process of democratization was embarked on 
in the late 1980s, it was not only about looking to the future but also coming to deal with the legacies 
of a shameful past. In this context, publications on the collaboration issue flourished. The 
collaboration issue used to be treated by scholars with great anger and even expressed as the “original 
sin,” corroding the spirit of the Korean nation. As one of the historians puts it: 
  
 Collaboration is the original sin of Korean society. If this issue remains unresolved, not 
 only can Korean society not develop, but even utter survival will be a major problem. 
 Collaboration is the wellspring of both the division and economic dependence of the 
 Korean nation. Military dictatorship was collaboration’s bastard child and social  upheaval 
 its result. No matter what problem arises in Korean society, it is never unrelated to the 
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 question of collaboration (Kim Pongu 1997, cited in De Ceuster 2002, p. 207). 
  
 This statement, almost hysterical, well reveals a theory of postliberation Korean national 
history, which most collaboration publications relied on. This theory maintains that the Korean 
nation’s history was stolen by a group of traitors to the nation, which refers to pro-Japanese 
collaborators at the time of liberation and later pro-US collaborators. Under the protection of the 
United States Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK), a compromised colonial elite remained 
in power. Through alliance with Rhee Syngman, they were able to protect themselves from the 
challenge posed by the investigations of the Anti-Traitors Investigation Committee. Having thus 
secured their positions in state power it is argued, according to the argument made by liberal 
dissenters and historians, that they cost the unity of the nation for the sake of their own interests. 
With the beginning of Kim Dae-jung’s presidency in 1998, the political resistance movement to 
uproot remnants of Japanese colonialism seems to have weakened because the issue was now 
discussed in an open space for sound historiography, making possible a less emotional and more 
rational approach to it. 
  
3.1.2 Nation-Building and the State-Sanctioned Narrative in South Korea 
 
 Patriotism as a set of allegiances, loyalties, the emotion of national pride and a sense of 
shared national identity (Nussbaum 1996) and emotional attachment to a country is well harmonized 
with the efforts of state actors who aim to maintain and legitimize the distinction between us and the 
other. Sovereign states make extensive use of history to promote those historical narratives that suit 
their political goals and interests. Hence, political power tends to continuously monopolize the 
historiographies of the new independent states engaging in the nation-building process of a new 
sovereign state (Zadora 2017, p. 258). On the other hand, in a transitional period, for instance, from 
authoritarian regimes to democracy, governments are also prone to using history education to 
promote a new sense of nationhood through transformation of official narratives on history and 
national identity (Hajjat 2012, cited in Zadora 2017, p. 259). In this regard, school history textbooks 
as the most efficient instrument of ideological transmission and nation-building are closely 
monitored by the state (Schissler 2005). 
 Following violent conflicts, a key objective of a new government is to narrate a history in a 
way that helps unify the divided society. This, for instance, can be done by creating a national identity, 
in particular via the notion of an all-inclusive political identity like citizenship, which can serve as a 
vehicle for overcoming the divisions that were critical to the conflict. In such a case, nation-building 
turns into a project of national reconciliation and it is predominantly achieved by reforming the 
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identity through narratives about a past and accordingly envisioning a future. Collective identities 
are produced not only through memory discourses, since remembrance has a coercive force which 
creates a sense of belonging (Nora 1993, p. 11), but also through forgetting (Renan 1990). Post-
conflict societies may choose to forget “uncomfortable knowledge” and shameful pasts, and 
transform them into an “open secret” or taboo, “known by all, but knowingly not known” (Cohen 
1995, p. 138). In this light, Cohen (1995) introduces the term, “social amnesia,” which refers to a 
mode of forgetting by which a society separates itself from the less glamorous past (ibid.). It might 
take place at an organized and official level, in such ways as the deliberate cover-up and the rewriting 
of history, or through the type of cultural dysfunction that occurs when information is missing. This 
dissertation is primarily concerned with the former. 
 In terms of the politics of narrating national history and memory, Hobsbawm is 
predominantly concerned with how authorities invent traditions and their seeming continuity with 
the past in order to maintain authority, promote social unity, and create a common culture 
(Hobsbawm & Ranger 1983). Hobsbawm’s approach resonates with Anderson’s (1983) view of a 
nation as imagined. The significance of both concepts lies in their explanation of how political power 
influences the choice of narratives about what is remembered and what is forgotten, and how this 
constitutes collective identities in the present. In this light, “memory is a struggle over power and 
who gets to decide the future” (De Brito et al.1997, p. 38). History-telling and remembrance are thus 
profoundly political since the outcome is central to present-day preferences for forms of the state, its 
social relations, and subjectivity (Ashplant et al. 2004, p. 6). The political aspect of history-telling is 
rooted in practices which bind rituals of national identification in order to produce a collective 
identity (Balibar 1996). This takes place at the level of (re)writing and teaching history (Buckley-
Zistel 2009, p.33). 
 In South Korea in the aftermath of the Korean War, a group of ruling elites who took the lead 
to build a new state disseminated a version of history with the intent to legitimize the establishment 
of South Korea and their possession of power in it. Based on anti-communism, history was used to 
instill resentment against communism and to emphasize South Korea’s continued struggles to defend 
democracy against communists within South Korean society as well as in the North. The difficulty 
in building national identity in South Korea lay in the discrepancy between an ideal, the one unified 
ethnic nation, and the reality, the division of the nation. For South Koreans in the post-war era, the 
category of the North Korean state and Korean communists had to change from the “us” to the “other.” 
Relying on this clear division between self and the enemy, during the authoritarian regimes all 
contacts with North Korea or communists were harshly suppressed and even described in terms of 
betrayal to South Korea, a true realization of the Korean nation. Hence, for the South, North Korea 
became the convenient enemy to which all problems and all failures it faced were attributed. 
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 This national identity conception of a new state of South Korea based on strong anti-
communist ideology is frequently discovered in the first President Rhee Syngman’s official 
statements. In the public rhetoric at the beginning of his presidency, key themes to establish national 
identity were anti-colonization and civilization. 
 
 Our nation has been respected as the country of courteous people in the East because we 
 have been civilized by following the three fundamental principles and the five moral 
 disciplines in human relations [samgangoryun] (Rhee Syngman November 18, 1957). 
 [emphasis by the author] 
 
 It was proved to what extent the people in our country are civilized through the past 
 election. …I am asking you that we do better so that we can be respected by people 
 in the world (Rhee Syngman March 25, 1958). 
 
 By emphasizing that the Korean nation has been civilized throughout its history, following 
rules and respecting moral principles, his narrative seeks to establish historical continuity of South 
Korea as a true representation of the whole Korean nation, while delegitimizing the North since it is 
uncivilized. In Rhee’s statements the Korean nation is portrayed as civilized but lacks strength in the 
economy and military. However, rather than describing the lack of its economic and military 
capability negatively, it is suggested in Rhee’s rhetoric as a practical aim to be achieved. 
 
 After Japan signed the commercial treaty with the US, western countries like the US, 
 the UK and France asked us to open trade with them. … if at that time, our ruling elites 
 had been clever enough to open trade and foreign relations with them, we would have 
 established economic and military strength without experiencing oppression. By  taking 
 lessons from history, we should find the right way for our future (Rhee  Syngman August 
 10, 1949). 
 
 For Rhee, communism is also a matter pertaining to levels of civilization, as seen in many 
his statements, in which it is treated as an uncivilized ideology which disregards the traditional moral 
principles like “Three Bonds and Five Relationships in Confucianism [samgangoryun].” In this 
regard, the anti-communism of Rhee can be understood in the context of civilization theory. 
  
 We have several moral principles like Three Bonds and Five Relationships that we have 
 learned and practiced for a long time. If we make a society, where there are no 
 distinctions between elders and children, or between higher and lower people, it is 
 returning to a four-thousand-year-old uncivilized society. … The way communists follow 
 is to make all people equal by disregarding social hierarchy, and this ideology of  equality 
 by social revolution destroys the universal order. We do not believe that  this way of 




 In Rhee’s rhetoric, the Korean nation was civilized, respecting a long tradition of social order 
and practice, only it lacked economic and military capabilities, while the West was understood as 
both civilized and rich in those capabilities. Also this civilization theory is adopted as an instrument 
to effectively exclude North Korea and its ideology, arguing that its ideology is uncivilized so 
civilized Koreans should not follow it. 
  Another authoritarian president, Park Chung-hee’s idea that the ultimate goal of 
modernization can be achieved through development, is frequently revealed in his official statements. 
For instance, he stated that “focusing on security and development of military and economic 
capabilities is the only way not only to protect our state and nation as well as proceeding to peace 
and prosperity but also to bring unification forward” (Park Chung-hee 1979, p. 305). Anti-
communism was also at the core of his political ideology. In his statement on August 15, 1969, to 
celebrate National Liberation Day, he clearly declared “communists” as the enemy of the state, 
saying that “in order to have liberation, freedom and peace, the most urgent thing to do is to prevent 
invasions of communists” (Park Chung-hee 1969). In his statement at the press conference of the 
beginning of the year, on January 15, 1976, he criticized North Korea’s request to release the political 
dissenters in the South, allegedly communists, saying that “those who may be regarded as patriots 
for the North Korean communists are traitors to us. How could I release those who cooperated with 
agents of North Korea and communists?” (Park Chung-hee 1979, p. 23-34). He declared that 
communism can invade society through poverty. Based on this argument, he prioritized economic 
development as a way to establish an anti-communistic society (Park Chung-hee 1962, p. 35). 
Unification can also be achieved, in his view, through economic development and modernization, as 
reflected in his policy “Unification after Development”. 
 Importantly, the statements of Rhee and Park reveal three common strategies: first, the 
establishment of an ideal state, which is for Rhee a civilized nation with military and economic 
capabilities, and for Park a modernized nation with capabilities; second the emphasis on the presence 
of an enemy for South Korea, that is, communists and North Korea; and third, alertness for internal 
betrayers, naturally pro-North sympathizers and communists living in the South. The master 
narratives that were developed later have also been constructed around these key strategies but from 
different angles. As mentioned, and it should be reiterated once more, that the objective in this 
research is not to evaluate and criticize those narratives, but to draw out their different strands. 
 Before democratization, the authoritarian regimes of Rhee and Park attempted to use the 
highly centralized education system to (re)construct a coherent national identity according to the 
goals they set, justify the legitimacy of the government, defend its state, and rebuild the economy, 
ultimately hoping to unify the two sides as a single nation-state under its own political system. 
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History was seen as a crucial component for transmitting ideological goals and has been inextricably 
tied to the development of South Korean national identity. Using history both as a source of 
identification with an ethnic nation and as a means to promote the civic values and legitimacy of the 
ruling regime, as well as to delegitimize the North, resulted in ambivalence about what kind of 
identity should be promoted for the nation’s future (Edward & Alisa 2005, p. 189). Thus, the state-
sanctioned nationalism aimed to legitimize the Southern regime vis-à-vis the communist North 
through praising the political system and democracy of the South and acclaiming its economic 
policies and its fast industrial development. This would provide South Koreans with reasons to be 
loyal and grateful to their state and its ruling regime. Education played a central role in this project 
and in particular, history education was to offer the undoubted evidence that would demonstrate the 
legitimacy of the regime and the political system. Most importantly, it could inspire the feelings of 
love for and pride in their nation among students, providing them with allegedly “true” and official 
knowledge of their glorious traditions. In this light, the history of South Korea in the aftermath of 
war incontrovertibly displays features of monumental history. In the 1963 Korean History textbook, 
anti-communism was promoted without mentioning North Korea, except in only one section, the 
conclusion of the second edition, in which the North is only mentioned with regard to unification 
(Edward and Alisa 2005, p. 190). The most important theme in these early history textbooks was 
victimization of the Korean nation, emphasizing the hardships Korea had suffered at the hands of 
imperial power, namely Japan. Denouncing Japanese imperialism well suited its ideology of anti-
colonialism and served to increase patriotism and the desire to defend the nation. 
 President Park Chung-hee’s intention to implement development education is well marked 
in the third major curriculum revision in 1973, aimed at economic growth. This orientation in 
education policy had begun under Rhee’s presidency, but it was consolidated under Park and the 
curriculum was revised accordingly. As in the past, anti-communism remained an important element 
of the history curriculum in the third revision (ibid.). The North was only discussed within the parts 
where the processes causing the Korean War and the war itself were explained. Excluding 
information about the North from textbooks is part of South Korea’s attempts to reduce its 
importance and influence in the minds of students, and effectively to deny its existence. Yet, at the 
same time by downplaying the existence of North Korea, the textbooks encouraged students to look 
forward to the issue of national unification, not to focus on the division. This well illustrates a 
paradox in the state-sanctioned narrative under authoritarian regimes to generate patriotism towards 
South Korea on the one hand, while emphasizing the homogeneity of and the pride in the Korean 
nation that must include the North in the narrative. Thus, textbooks under authoritarian regimes 
highlighted that North Korea would not abandon the possibility of using force to achieve unification 
in order to communize the South. This served to reinforce the notion of the North and communism 
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as barbarous and hostile, and to confirm the self-image of the South as civilized and peace loving. 
 Due to President Park’s long-standing military dictatorship, Koreans experienced severe 
political conflicts and confusion in the late 1970s when the pro-democracy movement, that aimed to 
dismantle the military dictatorship and the corresponding oppressive measures of the military 
government, was very active. In this context, the government emphasized anti-communist education 
and the “Korean naturalized democracy” as part of its national ideological training (So Kyunghee et 
al. 2012, p.799). The state-sanctioned Korean identity that was formed through this national 
ideological training was, however, in direct contradiction with the alternative narrative of national 
identity that had been created on the foundation of ethnic nationalism and had been popular among, 
in particular, political dissenters at the time. The military government wished to invent a narrative of 
national identity based on the anti-communistic ideology that put priority on economic development 
over democratization and unification as a tool to fight against communism, which political dissenters 
were strongly against. The invented narrative by the state was repeatedly injected through school 
education, and it became the dominant narrative of Korean society until the 1990s. The master 
narrative, as formulated under the military regime, explicitly linked the post-liberation establishment 
of the ROK to the continuous resistance movements of the Korean people against Japanese colonial 
rule. By doing so, the history of the colonial period was explained, focusing on an enumeration of 
different opposition movements while being isolated from the wider historical context with the 
exclusion of all ideological conflicts among the different resistance movements. In particular, the 
armed resistance of socialist and communist groups, which was evidently highlighted in the North 
Korean textbooks (Robinson 2006, p. 56), was erased. As a result, South Korea has become a nation 
where nearly all aspects of economic, political, and cultural identity are defined in opposition to 
North Korea, and where despite being an ultimate goal, unification is paradoxically a threat to South 
Korean identity, the construction of which is based on anti-communism (Grinker 1998, p. 8). 
 In terms of history of the colonial period, the collaboration issue is minimized in the state-
sanctioned narrative and acts of collaboration are attributed only to a small number of national traitors. 
Through this, a clear distinction between the core tradition of the resisting Korean nation and the 
corrupted minority of collaborators is formed. Furthermore, by banning discourses related to 
collaboration from the mainstream of the nation’s historiography, there is no more need for detailed 
explanation in the public sphere regarding the post-liberation failure to bring legal justice to 
collaborators. A tactic of blaming a small number of collaborators allowed the majority of the 
population to be free from any sense of responsibility or guilt. The purpose of this master narrative 
clearly fits into the political project of rebuilding national unity in the wake of liberation. More 
importantly, this state-sanctioned narrative attempted to find the legitimacy of the regime in its 
commitment to the independence movement by linking the establishment of South Korea with 
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resistance movements. However, collaboration publications that began to critically unfold the master 
narrative in the 1980s challenged the claim of the government about the political ancestry of the 
South Korean regime in the independence movement, while not greatly questioning the national myth 
of the resisting nation as a whole (De Ceuster 2002, p. 218). In doing so, these publications 
effectively challenged the regime’s justification for its legitimacy and exposed the fact that the 
nation’s “correct” history was distorted by a compromised group of elites. 
 On the other hand, the “industrialization first policy” for economic development of Park’s 
administration was also deeply connected to its anti-communistic ideology. Having experienced 
colonial exploitation, poverty, and the destruction of the Korean War, the industrialization-first policy 
was determined to pursue economic development at all cost. In the name of efficiency, productivity, 
and national security, human rights and democratic procedures were disregarded. Also, the policy 
that prioritized the economy was justified by the claim that it was the fastest way to achieve the 
ultimate goal of unification and the best way to prevent another invasion from the communists. In 
this light, the industrialization-first policy was staunchly anti-communistic. Traditional conservatives 
who strongly supported the authoritarian regimes and industrialization-first policy regarded the US 
as South Korea’s “savior” as well as its closest ally, insisting on the continued presence of US troops 
on its soil. Although the alliance between the US and the ROK was strained at times, it was never 
questioned, at least, by the South before the democratization, and neither the South nor the US 
doubted that North Korea was the common enemy (Hahm Chaibong 2005, p. 59) 
 According to the state-sanctioned master narrative under the authoritarian regimes, the 
Korean nation-state came into being in 1948, three years after liberation from Japanese colonial rule. 
Due to the rejection of the Soviet Union, a UN-sponsored presidential election was held, limited to 
the southern area under the US military rule, which legitimated a new democratic republic of South 
Korea. The focus of the state-sanctioned narrative is put on the idea that it was the communist puppet 
state in the North that precipitated a war of aggression against the legitimate, democratic South, and 
consequently the externally imposed national division remained and South Koreans had to build the 
nation isolated from their northern brethren. Subsequently, the story of successful economic 
development further legitimated South Korea as the true representation of the Korean nation because 
it successfully guided the Korean people onto the world stage and brought prosperity to the majority 
of its people. The key elements in this narrative are that the South Korean state managed to defend 
the nation against an international communist invasion and successfully developed its liberal 
democratic political system and free market economic system, as opposed to its Northern enemy who 
put its people through continuous sufferings through its failed political and economic system. 
 On the other hand, North Korea constructs an opposite understanding of its birth from that 
of the South. Its master narrative values its anti-Japanese partisan guerrilla leadership along with a 
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successful anti-imperialist struggle against Japan which played a crucial role in awakening and 
directing the revolutionary power of the Korean laboring masses. It highlights that the North 
organized a democratic people’s republic, successfully purged pro-Japanese elements, initiated self-
reliant economic development and set up the nation on a truly democratic and autonomous basis. In 
this narrative, in sharp contrast to the state-sanctioned narrative of South Korea, Western imperialism 
continues to support its puppet state, the South, while North Korea has successfully constructed an 
autonomous socialist state representative of the true historical Korean nation and the masses. The 
key elements in the North’s narrative are its successful struggle against colonial and imperial powers, 
the mass base of its politics, its autonomous economic and political development, portraying itself 
as a victim of the intrusion of Western imperialism (Robinson 2006, p. 56-57). Thus, the most 
important ideological development of North Korea is the theory of juche (chuch’e), which by the end 
of the 1960s became the basic ideology, replacing Marxism-Leninism. Juche, meaning self-reliance 
or self-determination, remains the official ideology of North Korea until today. Nationalism in North 
Korea, which is well disclosed in its juche ideology, is built against Japanese colonialism and 
American imperialism (Shin Gi-wook 2005, p. 80). It claims that Koreans must manage all political, 
economic, and military affairs without relying on foreign intervention or assistance. As in other states 
in the world, education in North Korea was to be the main method of instilling the juche ideology in 
the nation’s youth and history was at the very core in this endeavor. 
 Master narratives in both Koreas after liberation are clearly monumental, forgetting much, 
remembering selectively, and carefully repressing alternative interpretations of the past. They also 
function as an efficient instrument to legitimate the state’s politics and unite its people. Continuing 
tension between the two narratives of both Koreas was ensured through the fierce hostility toward 
each other, the militarized nature of each regime, the lack of an institutional setting for peace 
settlement, the presence of US troops under the UN flag in the South, differential recognition from 
the outside world, and the memory of violent conflicts (Robinson 2006, p. 57). 
 In South Korea, as seen in its state-sanctioned master narrative, anti-communism and 
economic development worked to mobilize national unity through the 1970s but it was, ironically, 
the very success of anti-communism and capitalist development that has created contradictions 
within South Korean society. These contradictions are particularly obvious regarding national 
identity and interpretations of history. During the authoritarian era, the idea that narratives which 
contradict the legitimizing master narrative are dangerous for national security effectively prevented 
historians in South Korea from open enquiry. In this light, it was considered dangerous to 
acknowledge any contribution of leftists, let alone communists, to the anti-Japanese struggle, and the 
Korean War was regarded as an outcome of the international conflict imposed on the peninsula rather 
than a civil war. Historical silence over a number of other past events was also enforced by the state 
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power which wanted to protect its dominance of the South Korean master narrative. Choi Jang-jip 
(1993) wrote immediately following national division that Korean nationalism “became transformed 
into a statism that privileged anti-communism over unification” (cited in Grinker 1998, p.23). 
National Security Law in South Korea has continued to inhibit freedom of speech about the North. 
The South Korean governments before democratization had long bolstered their power by promoting 
a Cold War discourse that depicted the North as the enemy and had justified a strong authoritarian 
state that censored the flow of information to its citizens. Song Du-yul (1995) suggests that the 
continuing conflict between North and South was, indeed, framed as anti-communism, which later 
transformed into more of an anti-North ideology with the collapse of communism in the world. The 
principles of communism are no longer South Korea’s main enemy, but instead the relational 
principles between North and South have taken center stage. South Korea, according to this view, 
wants to destroy its northern enemy and is using anti-communism as an ideological weapon to justify 
and achieve its goal. Grinker (1998) adds that Song Du-yul (1995)’s claim points out that South 
Korean intolerance of a variety of different political views is determined ultimately not by the 
National Security Law, but by the widespread sentiments that fear the threat from the North and thus 
support the continued existence and exercise of the law (p. 24). This signifies that South Korean 
identity is heavily dependent on the existence of its enemy. The national identity of South Korea that 
was inherently constructed with extreme polarization from the birth of the nation focuses on the 
notion of either for us or against us, allowing little room for debate, contest, or a middle ground. 
 An additional problem of national identity construction in South Korea has to do with the 
potentially ambivalent relation between people and state (Grinker 1988, pp. 23-32). The split 
between the people and the state has made it possible for South Koreans to develop a discourse in 
which North Korea attributes agency and power only to the state, more precisely, only to the Kim 
family. In the state-sanctioned narrative in South Korea, it is thus emphasized that in the North the 
state power neither constructs, nor is constructed by its people. As a result, for a long period, the 
North Korean people were only described as hostages or victims kidnapped and oppressed by 
totalitarian dictator, Kim. However, what should be noted is that this master narrative in which the 
people of North Korea were virtually absent has lost its hegemonic narrative power with the rise of 
progressives in Korean politics. In the late 1980s, South Korea began making a dramatic transition 
to democracy. In 1987 the country held its first free and direct presidential election. During the period 
of transition, the military establishment, as well as the collusive ties between government and 
business forged by the authoritarian governments of the past, became the targets of reform (Hahm 
Chaibong 2005, p. 60). 
 In the following section, the transformation that occurred in the society and politics of South 
Korea with its democratization and rise of progressives in institutional politics will be introduced. A 
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close examination of the narrative identity of progressives will then follow. 
 
 
3.2 The Rise of Progressives and Their Narrative Identity 
  
 Though a dominant narrative enjoys a hegemonic status, it does not mean that no counter 
narratives exist. The master narrative that is acknowledged as official and true in society always 
coexists with alternative memories and narratives that are deviant from or conflicting with the 
hegemonic one. The possibility of narrative transformation thus exists all the time but it can take 
place only if these counter narratives successfully challenge the status of the hegemonic narrative. 
While individual and group memories were handed down from generation to generation, in the case 
of South Korea, the postwar myth and master narrative propagated by the authorities were eventually 
deconstructed by historians, mostly progressive or leftist, who thought it was their task to deconstruct 
national myths and propose a critical view of the collective memory these myths created. With 
democratization in South Korean politics in the late 1980s and the 1990s, the state-sanctioned 
narrative of authoritarian regimes was gradually replaced with an alternative narrative claiming to 
correct a “false” history that had contributed to consolidating the power of the past regimes and 
justifying their violence toward the masses in such examples as human rights violations of laborers. 
The propagation of “true history” and “clearing up past wrongdoings and injustice” under 
progressive regimes in the 2000s constituted an integral part of a bold attempt to transform narrative 
identity of South Korea through policy changes. The narrative of progressives recounts a history of 
the ethnic unity of the Korean nation, blaming the authoritarian regimes of the South for the division 
of the nation in the pursuit of their own political interests with strong support from the US. The 
narrative transformation in politics and society in South Korea originated from that of historiography. 
In the following section, the efforts of intellectuals to transform historical narrative will be examined, 
and then the rise of progressive politicians in South Korean politics as one influential factor that led 
to the official master narrative transformation will be discussed. 
 
3.2.1 Challenge to the State-Sanctioned Narrative 
  
 In South Korea, democratization provided the domestic context that opened the public sphere 
for free debates and as a result facilitated the rethinking of national identity (Shin Gi-wook 2012). 
During the years of authoritarian rule from the late 1940s to the early 1990s, the state explicitly 
advocated the anti-communist conception of national identity based on the state-sanctioned master 
narrative and suppressed any alternative in the name of national security. In the process of 
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democratization, however, civil society and intellectuals, mostly progressives and leftists, challenged 
the authoritarian notion of identity, opening debate over the proper form of Korean identity. 
Liberalization of the intellectual and academic climate, together with a change in the anachronism of 
the Cold War view, challenged the post-war master narrative. 
 As mentioned in the earlier section, in South Korea, where the legal justice for pro-Japanese 
collaborators was aborted during the nation-building process, it is by historians and intellectuals that 
the state-sanctioned myth was demythicized. The first major challenge to the hegemony of the 
official narrative in relation to post-liberation history actually came from an American historian, 
Bruce Cumings. Although it was essentially meant to challenge established US scholarship 
concerning the origins of the Korean War, his first volume of The Origins of the Korean War (1981) 
undermined South Korea’s myth about its foundation by providing a detailed analysis of how the 
Republic of Korea was born. In the South, censorship and monitoring of authoritarian governments 
in academic production had discouraged historians from engaging in authentic academic research in 
the field of modern and contemporary history. The history of the colonial period had focused only 
on the history of the non-communist resistance movements and thus, was limited in time to the late 
1920s since the growing importance of the communist or socialist movement in the Korean 
independence movement of the 1930s and 1940s had made the latter period of the Japanese 
occupation politically too sensitive to handle. It was in the 1980s when the process of 
democratization got firmly underway that the open challenge to the master narrative by Korean 
historians gained momentum (de Ceuster 2002, p. 218). 
 Challenges led by liberal historians emerged in opposition to the military regime that 
prohibited scholarly research over certain topics such as collaboration, as well as its industrialization-
first policy. Liberal historians and politicians who sought to transform the state-sanctioned narrative, 
focused on two factors: collaborators’ unacceptable behaviors and the sacrifice of minjung [the 
masses] in the name of industrialization. In particular, the collaboration issue was one of the most 
embarrassing topics for the ruling elites who found their legitimacy in their deep involvement in the 
moderate independent movements under colonial rule, which is highlighted in the state-sanctioned 
narrative as heroic resistance against Japan. The evidence, raised by historians, of collaboration by 
leading members of those movements effectively eroded the legitimacy of the South Korean regime 
(de Ceuster 2002, p. 219). Seen from this perspective, the collaboration issue has a significant 
political implication and is, indeed, much more related to the post-liberation development of a South 
Korean state than to the colonial period. The focus of historical research regarding collaboration acts 
is placed on the fact that the timid attempt at legal justice had failed, allowing compromised elites to 
hold on to power and leave the country with an unresolved past. The clear argument of a new 
historical approach to collaboration is that this failure of legal justice has led to an impaired moral 
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foundation of the ROK. The political implications of such a negative assessment of the morality and 
birth of South Korea are the essence of the collaboration studies, in which collaboration is not treated 
as a closed chapter in the nation’s history, but as an issue of crucial importance to Korea’s present 
and future. In the words of Im Chong-guk (1991), a leading scholar of collaboration studies: “The 
autonomy of a Korean nation that is not able to remove the remnants of Japanese imperialism is 
meaningless, just as the unification of such a nation is nothing but a daydream” (p. 20). In this light, 
clearing up the legacy of collaboration is thought of as a necessary condition to achieve an ultimate 
goal of unification. 
 Likewise, South Korean progressive intellectuals have been actively engaged in the 
explosion of critical studies in a wider range of disciplines, the more active ones being history and 
the social sciences. Much of the emphasis has been put on debating the cause of the national partition 
and the impact of continuing foreign domination, which, in their views, has nurtured immorality and 
injustice in the politics and society of South Korea. This has led to a gradual shift in the master 
narrative from the state-sanctioned one to one of ethnic nationalism. While the national literature 
debate paved the way for this critical thinking in the 1970s, the immediate catalyst for this intellectual 
movement was the publication of the first volume of Korean History before and after Liberation 
[HaebangChŏnhusaŭiinsik] in 1979, which was later to become a six-volume series. 1979 was the 
year when the nation saw the sudden ending of the nearly twenty-year old Park Chung-hee regime 
(1961-1979) with his assassination. Furthermore, the 1980 massacre of the citizens of Kwangju, who 
rallied in the street to express their anger against the subsequent military coup, was a watershed event. 
Because it was mandatory to have the approval of the US army commander in order for the supreme 
command of the South Korean armed forces to order a military action such as the one that took place 
in Kwangju, South Koreans began to question the role of the US in the massacre and in other issues. 
It became clear for the Korean public that the US’s military interests in South Korea lay beyond 
humanitarian concerns. This was one of many factors that led to many South Koreans’ reassessment 
of the relationship between South Korea and the US (Choi Chungmoo 1993, p. 89). As mentioned, 
at this juncture of historical upheaval, Bruce Cumings’s monumental work, The Origins of the 
Korean War, first published in 1981, offered a fresh shock for South Korean intellectuals, who had 
been searching for a term to define Korea’s deferred postcoloniality, and opened a new door to the 
critical discourse of decolonization (De Ceuster 2002; Choi Chungmoo 1993; Em 2013; 1993). In 
his book, Cumings challenged the dominant discourse over the Korean War and declared that Korea 
had been denied its liberation by America, who regarded the removal of Japanese rule from Korea as 
an insignificant event. This consequently paved the way for the American domination of Korea (Choi 
Chungmoo 1993, p. 89). 
 Throughout the 1980s, critical studies, many of which adopted Marxist or Neo-Marxist 
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methodologies, reassessed the role of South Korea in the totalitarian spread of capitalism in the world 
and its complicated domestic manifestations. Social scientists were highly critical about Korean 
scholarship’s emphasis of modernization theory. Critical sociologists argued that the American-
dependence in social sciences was attributed to the South Korean military government’s 
implementation of its aggressive modernization policy, in the form of state capitalism, at the cost of 
enormous social problems, including the widening class gaps and furthering the proletarization of 
the underprivileged class. However, the sudden rise of Marxist analyses failed to seep into the terrain 
of anti-communistic ideology in South Korea. This may be attributable to their own faults, that is, 
the uncritical and indiscriminate application of classic Marxism (ibid., p. 90). 
 Hahm Chaibong (2005) finds the roots of progressives in leftist nationalism that has been 
shaped through their own interpretation of history (p. 62). In their view, being a true nationalist means 
being not only anti-Japanese, but also anti-capitalist, considering the capitalistic nature of the 
Japanese empire. For them, leftist nationalism should have been Korea’s guiding ideology after 
liberation in 1945 but this failed to emerge largely due to the US imposition of military rule in South 
Korea and its support for the establishment of a capitalist regime in 1948. As a result, Cold War anti-
communism as a national identity began to overwhelm nationalism in the South. Unlike the earlier 
generation of South Korean dissidents that focused on the undemocratic nature as well as injustice 
of the authoritarian regimes, the progressives have focused more on its anti-nationalistic character 
(ibid.). They have regarded industrialization as a capitalist-imperialist imposition to exploit South 
Korea’s oppressed minjung and liberal democracy as a political system to sustain bourgeois class 
interests that had succeeded in dominating South Korea with US backing. In this context, it is not 
very surprising to find pro-North Korean attitudes in the narrative of progressives. It is argued in the 
narrative of progressives that North Korea, unlike the South, thoroughly purged the Japanese 
collaborators, many of whom then fled to the South. It adopted a foreign policy which was 
independent from China and Russia during the Cold War and stood against the only remaining 
superpower, the US, after the collapse of world communism. For many progressives, North Korea 
stood firm for all the significant values of nationalism, anti-capitalism, and anti-imperialism, which 
they have cherished and the South Korean government seems to have disregarded. 
 Intellectual developments also evolved in line with a popular movement, known as the 
Minjung [the people, the masses] movement, which began in the wake of the popular April 19 
Revolution in 1960 and developed into an anti-colonial national unification movement by the end of 
the 1980s (Choi Chungmoo 1993, p. 90). Its proponents found the origin of the movement in Korea’s 
long tradition of popular nationalist movement, from the 1984 Tonghak Peasant War and the 1919 
March First Independence Movement to the April 19 Revolution which overthrew the Rhee Syngman 
regime (1948-1960) that enjoyed strong backing from the US. Also, it was the people’s uprising 
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Kwanju in 1980 and the mass killing perpetrated by South Korean military forces that broke the state-
led ideological hegemony (Em 2013, p. 16). Drawing on the historical narrative of liberal and leftist 
historians revealed in the book, Korean History before and after Liberation, the Minjung movement 
covered a broad range of social activities, including the anti-authoritarian democracy movement, the 
labor movement, and the national unification movement, aiming to constitute the minjung as a 
national subject.  Although its leaders included various political dissenters from all levels of society, 
it is students that were at the center as the most active agents. The South Korean government 
repressed any sign of the leftists, and labeled any organized protest as an act of communist infiltration. 
Nevertheless, the Minjung movement worked a site of collective resistance movement against the 
politics of terror. It is critical to note that the Minjung movement has contributed to a radical 
reinterpretation of histories, crossing over the boundaries between politics and culture, and between 
the present and collective memories of the past, in order to suggest an alternative future, while 
inspiring a popular sentiment for resistance. Choi Chungmoo (1993) regards the Minjung movement 
based on the theory of decolonization as the emancipatory struggle from a colonial past and a 
neocolonial present of the South which distorts the Korean identity (p.91). The minjung discourse in 
South Korea has its meaning as the major contending voice against the dominant narrative imposed 
by the state. The Minjung movement has effectively adopted a counter-hegemonic historical narrative, 
which reforms the “silenced history of the people” (ibid.). 
 Foucault (1977) has suggested that the silent and erased memory would contest the validity 
of the official memory. The people of South Korea, deprived of their voice in the official narrative 
under the authoritarian rule, carefully kept their memories alive, in the form of personal narratives, 
which were often found in the novels and short stories that started to be published in the late 1980s. 
This process of re-memorization has also contributed to South Koreans’ reconstruction of their 
history. With this new trend, the main focus of the Korean historiography has shifted from the 
domestic issues discussed within the boundaries of the anti-communist ideology toward a national 
unification which could finally transcend ideological differences. In this light, some observers have 
focused on this narrative shift derived from competing concepts of nationalism in historiography, 
politics and society of South Korea (Em 2013; Shin Gi-wook 2006; Yun Hae-dong 2011; 2012). 
  
3.2.2. The Rise of Progressives in Institutional Politics 
 
 Until the mid-1990s, the counter narrative was confined to the radical fringe of South 
Korea’s intellectual and political spectrum. However, the democratization that was embarked on in 
the late 1980s opened its doors for different voices to be accepted in politics and academia (De 
Ceuster 2002; Shin Gi-wook 2012; Em 2013; Hahm Chaibong 2005). Since then, nationalist 
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historiography in South Korea has been interwoven with leftist and progressive politics (Em 2013, 
p. 16). It sought not only to look to the future but also to deal with the legacies of a shameful past. 
Furthermore, the financial crisis that badly damaged the South Korean economy in 1997 provided a 
golden opportunity for the progressives and their ideology to enter South Korea’s political 
mainstream (Hahm Chaibong 2005, p. 62). The crisis exposed the problems of the old system. The 
progressives had always argued that South Korea’s political and economic system was illegitimate 
and morally corrupt. The financial crisis revealed that the structure of South Korea’s economic 
system that was widely praised as an example of great success was, indeed, inefficient and 
problematic. One of the most direct political consequences of the financial crisis was the election of 
Kim Dae-jung to the presidency in 1997 (ibid.), who had been a longtime dissident and opposition 
leader. This was because the financial crisis had created widespread anger among the population at 
the ruling conservatives’ corruption and their mismanagement of the economy, eventually providing 
the opportunity for Kim Dae-jung. Progressives who were encouraged by the fact that the presidency 
passed to an opposition leader, Kim, for the first time in South Korean history, began to join the 
mainstream political process. Their experience in civic organization, propaganda, and political 
mobilization, along with skills finely developed during their resistance movements against the 
authoritarian governments, helped their successful transition to electoral politics. Kim Dae-jung, who 
needed to build a new political coalition to push through his seemingly “radical” or “left-leaning” 
policies in the eyes of conservatives, welcomed and actively supported attempts of former activists 
in student movements or in other civic movements to join the institutional politics. Many South 
Koreans, even those who disagreed with the progressives’ worldview, also welcomed this flow of 
new leaders into a political system which had been dominated for a long time by corrupt ruling elites 
from the authoritarian years. The ruling coalition led by Kim Dae-jung and former radical student 
leaders began introducing South Korea to many ideas and policies that were once considered too 
leftist, and hence were banned. Many of those new ideas and policies caused inherent inner conflicts 
within South Korean society to surface in the 2000s, commonly known as the “South South Conflict 
[namnamkaldŭng]”, which is elaborated in chapter four. 
 Roh Moo-hyun’s election in 2002 marked the rise of the progressives in South Korean 
politics. The progressives in a South Korean context constitute a broad spectrum, including those 
politicians, intellectuals, and activists who led the student movement and formed a coalition against 
military dictatorship during the 1980s. Yet their view is quite different from that of the earlier 
generation of pro-democracy movement leaders who were filled with the zeal for liberal democracy. 
It was the contradiction of capitalism created by South Korea’s rapid industrialization during the 
1960s and the 1970s that made the progressives take action in the late 1990s and 2000s. Due to their 
experiences with laborers who were working under inhuman conditions, this new group of 
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progressives came to regard capitalism as a dehumanizing system (ibid., p.61). Through the process 
of searching for a deeper structural cause of injustice in South Korea, what progressives discovered 
was the US’s strong backing for dictators in South Korea for its own “imperial” and “hegemonic” 
interests on the peninsula. They also believed that they could trace the source of current maladies 
and inequality in South Korea far back to the Japanese colonial period when Korea underwent 
coerced modernization, which is the backbone of the counter-narrative of progressives that 
challenged the state-sanctioned master narrative. For progressives, colonial industrialization not only 
distorted the industrial structure of Korea as an economy dependent on the imperial powers, Japan 
in the past and the US in recent times, but also created a Korean bourgeois class that have enjoyed 
prosperity through collaborating with those imperial powers. In this narrative, leftism and 
nationalism are closely linked and combined (ibid.). Because of the capitalist nature of the Japanese 
empire, for progressives being a true nationalist meant being both anti-Japanese and anti-capitalist. 
Unlike some rightists or bourgeois nationalists who claimed a possible link between nationalist and 
capitalist, the leftists who believed they were the only true nationalists hoped to remove the legacy 
of Japanese colonial rule, the capitalist system. From the perspective of the progressives, then, leftist 
nationalism should have been Korea’s guiding ideology after liberation, which failed to emerge due 
to the US military rule in South Korea during 1945-1947 and its support for the establishment of a 
capitalist regime in 1948. With this failure, anti-communism as a national ideology began to 
overwhelm nationalism. Most pro-Japanese collaborators remained in their positions in the 
government or the public institutions like police and military without any legal punishment, because 
the newly installed government needed their help in fighting the communists and in setting up a pro-
US regime in South Korea. What should be noted here is that the leftist nationalism that most 
progressives subscribe to is based on the strong sentiment of anti-imperialism (anti-Japan and anti-
US) and anti-capitalism. Furthermore, it is believed that the political system became even more 
reactionary under the government of Park Chung-hee, a former Japanese Imperial Army officer, who 
seized power through a military coup in 1961. Park rushed to establish formal diplomatic relations 
with Japan in 1965, only 20 years after liberation. Many viewed this too hasty normalization of 
relations as a sellout, even though Japan provided as reparations an aid package totaling $800 million, 
money that the Park regime invested in strategic industries that later became the mainstay of the 
country’s economic capability. Further, Park’s decision to send troops to the Vietnam War to support 
the US created strong criticism. Although those policies of Park proved pivotal for South Korea’s 
economic growth as well as for upgrades to its military capability, it was a clear indicator for 
progressives to illustrate South Korea’s reliance on the US. Later, the fact that the US stood by 
another authoritarian regime of Chun Doo-hwan, who took power in the political vacuum during the 
aftermath of Park’s assassination provided firm confirmation for the progressives that the imperial 
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US manipulated and sponsored South Korea in order to make it a militarist, capitalist, imperialist 
state (Hahm Chaibong 2005, p. 61-62). 
 This leftist nationalism supported by progressives clearly conflicts with the predominant 
state-sanctioned master narrative. Thus, when the progressive regimes of KimDae-jung and 
RohMoo-hyun attempted to change various policies based on their perspective, conflicts between the 
two contradictory narratives came to be inevitable. It is closely elaborated in chapter 4 how 
progressive governments institutionalized their views on national identity into policies, and 
consequently how societal conflicts that had been inherent in South Korean society from its birth 
came to the fore in the 2000s. Before proceeding to this, the transformation in historiography that 
greatly influenced the formation of the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives will be 
introduced in the following section. A detailed analysis of the ethnic nationalism narrative and its 
limits then follows. 
 
 
3.3 Historiography after Liberation 
 
 With the absence of legal justice after liberation, it was historians who took on the task of 
eliminating the legacies of Japanese colonization. Although the state power stopped historians from 
delving into this forbidden research field of colonization, historians brought the silent and erased 
memories back to the open sphere of debate with democratization. In order to have a better 
understanding of the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives that is now generally accepted as 
the official narrative of South Korea, it is necessary to trace the process through which the historical 
views of South Korea have transformed into their current form. 
 By 1948 when two separate governments were officially established on the peninsula, many 
leftist intellectuals had crossed the 38th parallel toward the North, due not only to anti-communist 
repression in the southern part, but also to offers of employment and opportunities to take part in the 
newly installed DPRK. At the same time, intellectuals and politicians who had struggled to achieve 
a Left-Right coalition, in particular those who had strongly opposed the UN-sponsored election in 
1948 which consequently created South Korea, were subjected to repression and terror from the 
South Korean police and right-wing groups. In this context, along with American backing, historians 
who had sought “non-political” historiography during the colonial period seized nearly all the major 
academic positions in the South (Em 2013, p. 150). Soon after the establishment of the separate state 
in 1948, Marxist intellectuals in South Korea had no options other than either fleeing to the North or 
going underground. 
 Although the student revolution of April 19, 1960, which overthrew the first South Korean 
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administration of Rhee Syngman, was crushed by a military coup in 1961, its democratic opening 
provided an opportunity for a younger generation of historians to narrate history in new ways. In 
Kuksasillon [A New History of Korea], published in 1961 and written as a history textbook, Yi Ki-
baek presented the narrative of modernization. In adopting modernization theory promoted by 
American academics and advisors, Kuksasillon created a non-Marxist postcolonial narrative that was 
anti-Japanese but uncritical of American intervention (ibid.). On the other hand, Marxist 
historiography of the 1930s was revitalized as nationalist historiography in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Through their empirical studies about the latter half of the Chosun dynasty that explored the internal 
dynamic underlying Korea’s historical development, the two historians, Kim Yong-sŏp and Kang 
Man-gil, highlighted class struggle in the Chosun dynasty, based on their anti-colonial and 
oppositional nationalism. In their research, their view of modernization in the Chosun era is very 
critical. It is argued that modernization efforts from the late nineteenth century were an instrument 
only to reflect the narrow interests of the westernized elites who had roots in the landed class of 
Chosun, which led to dependency on foreign powers. According to this narrative, this modernization 
of the late Chosun resulted in all the tragedies of Korea such as Korea’s colonization, national 
division, the war, and the corrupt political and economic system of South Korea (ibid., p. 152). 
 This revisionist historical narrative is well represented in the publication of 1979, Korean 
History Before and After Liberation[Haebangchŏnhusaŭiinsik] (Em 2013; Choi Chungmoo 1993; 
Pak Tae-gyun 2007), edited by intellectual and journalist Song Kŏn-ho. This book argues that 
liberation which should have started a new history of Korea failed to make the oppressed people 
[minjung] become the sovereign subject [juche, chuch’e] of history. Furthermore, the territorial 
partition of Korea along the 38th parallel right after liberation provided former collaborators and those 
who served the new occupying powers, the Soviet Union and the United States, with chances to 
divert history from its true path, which well explains the consequent struggle for the Korean people. 
Song’s essay primarily targets Rhee Syngman, the first president and the arch anti-communist (ibid.). 
Rhee was criticized largely because of his passive attitude towards legal punishments of collaborators, 
including former Korean police officials who had tortured and killed independence activists. 
Criticism regarding Rhee Syngman is one of the key components in the book, Korean History Before 
and After Liberation. He was also blamed for distorting the real meaning of liberation with such acts 
as: delaying land reform; interrupting the work of the US-Soviet Joint Commission, consequently 
preventing the formation of a unified nation; and adopting the anti-communist ideology in order to 
establish a separate state in the South, perpetuating the 38th parallel division (De Ceuster 2001). 
While Korean History Before and After Liberation focused on a critique of Rhee, it consequently 
created an influential dichotomy which is vividly alive in the current progressives’ discourses: 
between true nationalists and anti-communists who were indeed anti-nationalists because they 
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betrayed the nation by using anti-communist ideology to pursue their own interests; and between 
people [minjung]-based true democracy and the mere form of democracy (Lee Namhee 2007). 
 In the following section, the key concepts of the nationalist narrative that are of critical 
importance in the current progressives’ understanding of national identity will be elaborated in detail 
 
3.3.1 Collaboration Discourse 
  
 The state-sanctioned narrative promoted by the authoritarian regimes explicitly finds the 
legitimacy of the ruling elites of South Korea in its deep involvement in the independent movement 
against Japanese colonial rule. Collaboration in this narrative is minimized and attributed only to a 
small number of traitors in order to fit the political goal of rebuilding national cohesion in the wake 
of liberation. Only when a more liberal atmosphere for open debates was created in South Korea, did 
historians begin to venture into this controversial issue. 
 It was independent scholars like Im Chong-guk that ignited a movement to break the political 
silence regarding the sensitive collaboration issue (De Ceuster 2002, p. 219). It was at the time of 
the signing of the normalization treaty with Japan in 1965 that Im published a book, Study on pro-
Japanese Literature [Ch’inilMunhak-ron] (1966). Contrary to the state-sanctioned narrative, which 
only celebrates the glorious aspects of the nation’s past, he believed that the dark and shameful pasts 
of a nation had to be reflected in history. A private research institute, the Institute for Research in 
Antinationalist Activities [PanminjokMunjeYŏn’guso], was founded in 1991 and followed Im, who 
had been the lone voice in narrating this controversial topic. Later, the collaboration discourse had 
been taken on by young historians who saw researching collaboration as an extension of their 
political activism (ibid., p.220). In contrast, mainstream academics generally remained silent. 
 What should be noted here is the fact that political convictions had underlain many of the 
collaboration works even though most of the publications in the early 2000s seemed to develop 
beyond the earlier ideological leaning (ibid., p. 222). For instance, in the case of Im Chong-guk, a 
pioneer of collaboration study, despite his outstanding archival work, his historical understanding 
was too simplistic and deterministic (Yun Hae-dong 2015a; Kim Chong-in 2014; de Ceuster 2002, 
p.225). This becomes all the more problematic when he consequently classifies all those Korean 
reformers who ever had any contact with Japan under colonial rule into the single category of pro-
Japanese collaborators. As a result of such an approach, in collaboration discourses national 
autonomy becomes the supreme historical principle. This theme of autonomy is further elaborated 
by Kim Pon-gu, director of the Institute for Research in Antinationalist Activities, in the introduction 
to a three-volume publication of 1994, History that is undigested [Ch’ongsan haji mot’an yŏksa], in 
which he links pro-Japanese collaboration with acts of betrayal to the nation (de Ceuster 2002, p. 
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224). For him, a key to national survival is autonomous development in the economy by opposing 
market liberation, and in politics through reevaluation of the defense alliance with the US. Along 
with the dichotomy between nationalists and anti-nationalists, which refers to the imperialists who 
collaborated with Japan in the past and with the US in the present, autonomy is another key theme 
in this revisionist historical view. In order to achieve a nation’s ultimate goal of its autonomy and 
consequent unification, anti-nationalists, that is the traditional ruling elites of South Korea, have to 
be removed and the united people regain their control over the nation’s future. These are the most 
critical concepts in current progressives’ rhetoric. 
 Another crucial component of the ethnic nationalism narrative is the link between the 
struggle for democracy and the goal of reunification, which is found in Kang Man-gil’s argument 
that the era of division could not be properly understood without taking the colonial period into 
consideration. According to him, it is necessary to have a proper grasp of the colonial period to 
objectively analyze the relations between foreign intervention and various domestic political forces 
(Em 1993, p. 464; de Ceuster 2002, p. 224). Kang’s focus was placed on the critique of colonial 
policies, as in other literature of collaboration, in particular for raising anti-national elites that took 
control over the political fate of the South. Hence, in the narrative of ethnic nationalism, it is the 
primary argument that only with a clear understanding of the root cause of the divisions within South 
Korea as well as between the two Koreas, that is the legacy of collaboration, can unification be made 
feasible. 
 Furthermore, the legacy of collaboration is closely linked to the wider social resistance 
against authoritarian rule. In this regard, the collaboration issue also deeply pertains to the minjung 
discourse on history, in which the people’s will was disregarded for the sake of the political elites, 
most of whom collaborated with Japan during the colonial period. Although the term minjung lost its 
popularity in scholarly discourses with democratization, its ideas remained in other related terms. 
For instance, Kim Pon-gu talks in his texts in the 1990s more about minjok [nation] and sahoe 
[society] as opposed to the anti-national forces, [panminjokseryŏk], rather than minjung (de Ceuster 
2002, p. 224). By replacing the term minjung with minjok as a category to define self, Kim Pon-gu 
expresses his assertion that the authoritarian regimes are constructed as oppositional forces of minjok 
who have no right to rule the nation. In this way of enlarging the scope of minjung to the nation, the 
ruling elites are effectively excluded from the nation due to their anti-national acts of collaboration. 
It is noteworthy that this narrative leads to the conclusion that not only did the authoritarian and the 
successive conservative South Korean regimes lack legitimacy but that, ultimately, the Republic of 
Korea as a state was established against the people’s will, and was therefore ill-founded from its 
beginning. 
 It is worth paying attention to De Ceuster’s (2002) strong assertion that the collaboration 
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issue was “exorcised” in two contending narratives with two different purposes (p. 230). Firstly, in 
the case of the authoritarian regimes’ narrative, called “the state-sanctioned narrative” in this study, 
it was exorcism of silence, attributing collaboration only to a small group of those politicians who 
were directly responsible for the annexation of Korea in 1910. This aimed to restore the Korean 
national spirit and self-esteem in the nation’s future. The silence about collaboration also served to 
justify the South Korean regime’s claim to ancestry in the resistance movement under colonial rule. 
Contrastingly, the narrative of ethnic nationalism promoted by liberals, progressives, and dissent 
groups, enlarged the group of collaborators to all those who at some point had been in touch with 
Japan, particularly targeting the upper strata of Korean society (ibid., p. 231). Hence, the main focus 
of the ethnic nationalism narrative on the collaboration issue is to question the political legitimacy 
of the South Korean authoritarian and conservative regimes. As a result, its collaboration discourses 
have become highly political beyond the boundary of academic research, which has led to inevitable 
conflicts with those traditional ruling elites. 
 
3.3.2 Anti-imperialism (Anti-Japan and Anti-America) 
 
 Despite its highly critical historical and political consciousness, the collaboration issue was 
accepted by the public as relatively familiar through rhetoric of national spirit and anti-Japanese 
nationalism in the 1990s. The damage to the national spirit was one of the most common types of 
rhetoric in nationalist discourses to account for the origin of all kinds of social evils in post-liberation 
Korea. Not exclusively limited to the collaboration issue, the term, ch’inil [pro-Japanese], was 
broadly utilized to describe the colonial legacies and their lasting influences in contemporary South 
Korean society. Particularly in the 1990s, the collaboration discourses were more closely connected 
with the rhetoric of national spirit. Yi Hŏn-jong (1990) argues that the failure to purge collaborators 
essentially damaged the national spirit of the Korean nation. This was attributed to the South Korean 
regime that officially prioritized the interests of a group of collaborators at the cost of national 
morality and legitimacy. According to Yi, the consequent suspect morality of the South Korean 
regime has allowed it to be more susceptible to such historical wrongdoings as military coups, 
dictatorships, and corruption. This understanding of the relationship between historical development 
and national spirit was deeply entrenched within the early collaboration discourses. Hence, reforming 
the collaboration narrative was treated as the most imminent and important task to restore national 
self-esteem, morality and spirit, and historical legitimacy. 
 Early collaboration discourse was represented through anti-Japanese sentiment. One of the 
underlying messages in collaboration discourse was anti-imperialism, which, in the perspectives of 
progressives and leftists, implicates both Japan and the US. Kim Sam-ung (2008), who clearly 
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displayed anti-Japanese sentiment in his books in the 1990s, asserts that Japan has never given up 
the intention to re-invade Korea with its growing economic and military power. This dubious tone 
over Japan is widely found in the prevailing anti-Japanese discourses in the 1980s, in which pro-
Japanese collaborators are depicted as those who promoted Korea’s economic subordination to Japan 
after the Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty. 
 Anti-Americanism, which had not yet been observed in public in the 1990s, later became a 
crucial part of collaboration discourse in the 2000s. Although not being as strong as anti-Japanese 
sentiment, anti-US sentiment is of significance given that it has contributed to reaffirming the 
collaboration discourse as a historical reality, not just as a historical past. In the 1980s and 1990s, the 
expression of anti-Americanism was considered almost a social taboo, being limited to the radical 
realms of student activists, labor movement activists, and leftists or social activists. In the 2000s, 
with regime change to the progressive strain of institutional politics, Korean society witnessed the 
prevalence of anti-US sentiment (Shin Gi-wook 2012, p. 289). A very tragic incident in which two 
schoolgirls were killed by a US armored vehicle in June 2002 later drew great public attention when 
the US military court determined that the two US soldiers involved in the incident were innocent. In 
November and December 2002 Koreans held a series of nation-wide candlelight vigils to 
memorialize the two young girls. Around the same time, the US request for the Korean military to 
participate in the Iraq War fanned the flames of growing anti-US sentiment. The spread of anti-US 
sentiment contributed to reassessment of the US’ role in South Korea, as well as in inter-Korean 
relations and unification. The strong alliance with the US, one of the most significant others for South 
Korea, had never been questioned before democratization but now became one of the intense 
controversies within the South. By analyzing South Korean media reports over the period of 1992-
2003, Shin Gi-wook (2012) points out that democratization and progressive regimes’ attempts to 
redefine the South’s important relationship with the North and the US greatly affected the growing 
anti-Americanism in South Korean society. 
 In the early 2000s, Korean society saw an upsurge of anti-US sentiment, and public opinion 
was also not particularly conducive to the friendly attitude of Korean right wing conservatives toward 
the US. Further to that, the arrogance of the conservative majority Hanara Party [Great National 
Party, GNP] in the National Assembly made it easy for Koreans to accept the dogmatized historical 
narrative of pro-Japanese collaborators as a reality and truth: pro-Japanese collaborators became 
strong pro-US authoritarian regime supporters, many of whom represent Korean conservatives such 
as GNP, conservative media, and reactionary/conservative groups. This kind of overtly simplified 
classification was widely adopted and circulated in public spheres like media and internet websites. 
This was the point at which history and political activism were firmly intertwined. The collaboration 
discourses have significant political meaning because in discourses it is believed that the pro-
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Japanese collaborators turned into pro-Americans in the post-liberation era of South Korea and 
became strong supporters or the ruling elites themselves of the authoritarian regimes. Through these 
discourses, the collaboration discourse effectively delegitimizes the ruling elites, mostly 
conservatives. The public acceptance of anti-Americanism in the 2000s eventually allowed the 
progressives to voice their critical opinions on the US policies on the Korean peninsula. That also 
functioned to exacerbate division and tension between the right/conservatives and the 
left/progressives. 
 
3.3.3 Division of the Nation 
 
 Following democratization, the division of the Korean peninsula has become another major 
focus in the discourses of political activists. The issue of division is not a matter of the past but of 
the present, just as the collaboration issue was discussed within the context of the post-liberation 
establishment of a South Korean government and state, especially focusing on the fact that pro-
Japanese collaborators cooperated with the American Military Government with the aim of 
maintaining their control over Korean society. The importance of pro-Japanese collaboration 
discourse is placed in its great implications for contemporary South Korean politics and is also 
connected the issue of national division. The main argument of collaboration discourse is that former 
pro-Japanese collaborators, who later became pro-American, effectively prevented a unification of 
the Korean peninsula for the sake of their own political interests to secure their power. The 
publications regarding collaboration thus reconstruct the entire history of the Republic of Korea from 
the very beginning of the nation, focusing on the absence of legal punishment and the consequent 
failure to uproot former collaborators from the society, which brought the division of the nation. In 
this light, the control of military and authoritarian regimes over the nation is regarded as an inevitable 
outcome resulting from morally corrupt political alliance from the beginning of the existence of 
South Korea. The implication of these publications is thus that South Korea was born with its original 
sin through failure to uproot collaborators, and that as a result the whole nation’s history is destroyed 
and distorted by the ruling elites who are descendants of those collaborators and have no legitimacy 
to govern the nation. Thus, restoring the “true” and “correct” history of the nation is the imminent 
task to pave the way for the unification and true autonomy of the reunified nation (de Ceuster 2002, 
p. 231). In order to do so, historical truth over pro-Japanese collaborators must be revealed and all 
the legacy of collaboration be removed from the society. 
 Political developments in Korea, and in particular the deepening of democracy with the 
coming to power of Kim Dae-jung, have added strength to the ethnic nationalism narrative. After all, 
President Kim launched a second nation-building [che-yikon’guk] campaign on the fiftieth 
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anniversary of the Republic of Korea in 1998 (Sŏng Han-yong 1998), thereby implicitly supporting 
the claim that the preceding regimes were lacking in legitimacy. More importantly, the collaboration 
issue has been integrated into the mainstream of Korean historiography under the progressive 
regimes. This led to the transformation of the official narrative from the state-sanctioned narrative of 
the authoritarian regimes to the ethnic nationalism narrative through institutionalization, including 




3.4 The Formation of the Other in the Ethnic Nationalism Narrative 
 
 The state-sanctioned narrative that dominated the country under the authoritarian regimes 
puts its emphasis on loyalty to South Korea as the only legitimate political entity on the peninsula. 
What should be noted is that it excludes any North Korean sympathizers in the South as well as the 
communist North Korean regime from the category of the “true” Korean nation. The rhetoric of 
exclusion based on a clear dichotomy between self and others according to the strong anti-
communistic ideology has been at the core of political conservative narratives of South Korea. In 
exclusionary discourses, language as well as other symbolic systems is used to define similarities 
and differences, and to draw clear boundaries between us and them. The most common strategy 
adopted in doing so is the construction of alleged dangers and threats to “us” (Wodak 2015, p. 89). 
In the state-sanctioned narrative, not only did the relational identity of the North serve to draw a clear 
line between the self and the hostile other of Korean communists, but also the very presence of the 
North is constructed as a threat to South Korea’s existence, which enabled the authoritarian regimes 
to adopt the politics of fear where national security is a top priority. On the other hand, the ethnic 
nationalism narrative supported by progressives has constructed its own boundary between self and 
others: the ethnic Korean nation and its people as self; anti-nationalists, that is, pro-Japanese or pro-
American collaborators, implicitly point to the upper strata of South Korean society within the 
boundary of the nation, as hostile others who betrayed the nation and caused the partition. Although 
its demarcation between self and others is different from that of the state-sanctioned narrative of 
rightists, the ethnic nationalism narrative also creates new enemies within the nation, and forces 
loyalty to the ethnic Korean nation and hatred toward a group of alleged anti-nationalists, thus being 
monumental history. As a result, it fails to provide complex roots of the violent history of South 
Korea and contributes to intensifying conflicts between competing groups of people who have 
constructed their national identity based on contentious narratives. 
 In the following section, discourses of progressives reflected in history textbooks, a literature 
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from a far-leftist historian, Seo Joong-seok, and other political discourses will be analyzed to 
examine the way in which national identity of self and the other is constructed in the ethnic 
nationalism narrative. In doing so, it is aimed to show that the ethnic nationalism narrative presents 
some features of monumental history, creating a dichotomy of self and other, failing to provide 
comprehensive explanations about the past and, as a result, provide another source of conflict in the 
society.  
 
3.4.1 Rhetoric of Exclusion: Political Meaning of Pro-Japanese Collaborators 
 
 In the book Identity/Difference Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, Connolly 
(1991) argues that politics pervades the relation of identity to difference. He calls the “relation of 
identity to difference….the site of two problems of evil” (preface p.4). At the political level, the first 
problem of evil appears in attempts to protect the purity and certainty of a hegemonic identity by 
declaring as independent sites of evil those differences that pose the greatest threat to the certainty 
of the hegemonic identity. The second problem of evil is found in diverse political discourses and 
tactics through which questions about the hegemonic self-identity are raised and resolved by the 
construction of an other against which that identity may define itself. In Connolly’s view, identity is 
relational and collective. The identity of an individual is defined through the “collective 
constituencies with which he or she identifies or is identified by others and it is further specified by 
comparison to a variety of things he or she is not” (ibid.). Identity, then, always pertains to a set of 
differences that help it to be and define what it is. An individual needs identity to act and there exists 
a desire to reduce difference to complete oneself in the pursuit of identity. This is where a paradoxical 
element in the politics of identity can be found. It is a social paradox that operates in the form of 
pressure to make space to realize the fullness of self-identity for one constituency by marginalizing, 
demeaning, or excluding the others who belong to the category of differences. What Connolly calls 
“the second problem of evil” originates from this very social logic of identity/difference relations. 
This is the tendency to marginalize or demonize others to purify the self-identity. Strong anti-
communistic discourses in the state-sanctioned narrative that present communists as evil can be 
explained with this demonization of difference to complete the purity and certainty self-identity. The 
state-sanctioned narrative developed by the authoritarian regimes clearly demonstrates the features 
of monumental history, presenting out-groups of communists and North Korean followers as 
illegitimate agents of nation-building, and highlighting the glorious history and qualities of in-groups 
of anti-communists who are loyal to South Korea, the true representation of the whole nation. 
 On the other hand, the underlying and ultimate message of the collaboration discourses in 
the 1990s, which is the backbone of the ethnic nationalism narrative, is essentially critical about the 
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historical developments of 20th century Korea and it strongly singles out Korea’s leading elites from 
the nation due to their continued tendency to follow the imperialistic powers, Japan and the US. Since 
the 1990s, the term pro-Japanese collaborators [ch’inilp’a] has frequently been referred to as the 
“original sin” of the South Korean regime who pursued the establishment of a separate state and 
pointed to the conservative ruling elites, who later became pro-Americans. What lies behind these 
links is a deeply rooted negative historical consciousness among progressives. In the book, The 
Making of Minjung, Lee Namhee (2007) points out that intellectuals and college students shared the 
widespread perception of Korea’s post-colonial history up to the 1980s as a failure towards modernity 
(pp. 2-8). In this regard, the issue of collaborators is considered to be the very element that created 
such continuous failures as dictatorships, delays of democratization, human rights violations and 
perpetuating the division of the nation. These interpretations that progressive intellectuals and leftists 
made in the early and mid-1980s came to be manifested in the narrative of collaborators in the 1980s 
and early 1990s. 
 The common claim of many progressive/leftist intellectuals in the early 1990s is that pro-
Japanese collaboration is the fundamental problematic element in the structure of South Korea that 
has caused the division of the peninsula and an undemocratic political system in the South. For 
example, Im Hŏn-yong (2000) contends that post-liberation South Korean politics can be defined by 
applying the same dualistic framework of collaboration and resistance under colonial rule as the 
framework of capitalism/anti-imperialism, pro-Americanism/anti-Americanism, pro-regime/anti-
regime and patriotism/anti-state (Im Hŏn-yong cited in Song Yeun-ji 2013, p. 63). Seo Joon-seok, 
one of the leading historians on post-liberation Korean history, emphasizes the evil role of pro-
Japanese collaborators in the ultra-right wing dictatorship, claiming that they have strongly supported 
dictatorship and have constituted an anti-democratic and anti-reunification group in society. As 
mentioned, in the discourses of collaboration, pro-Japanese collaborators are essentially equivalent 
to pro-Americans in postcolonial South Korea. Kim Pon-gu (1994), director of the Institute for 
Research in Antinationalist Activities[PanminjokMunjeYŏn’guso], conceives collaborators as a 
firmly entrenched dominant element of the social structure that has promoted undemocratic elements 
in society and heavy reliance on foreign powers. For this reason, Kim states that gaining autonomous 
development both politically and economically is critical to pave the way for unification. In doing 
so, the imminent task is to be united against the ruling elite and consequently to dispose of those 
anti-national forces. The narrative that regards pro-Japanese collaborators as the source of all the 
societal problems, such as inequality and undemocratic factors, the South has faced is evidently 
found in the progressive regimes’ political rhetoric as well as in various policies. For example, the 
issue of collaboration is still at the core of the current progressive Moon government’s campaign, 
“Cleaning of Accumulated Evils,” which aims to clean out the past wrongs of collaboration and 
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corruption. A conservative historian, Lee Inho (2018), argues that Moon’s “clearing of accumulated 
evils” policy openly targets conservative and rightist ruling elites and intellectuals as figures to be 
punished. 
 One of the characteristics of Korean society of the 2000’s was sharpened ideological and 
political confrontation between the right/conservative and the left/progressive. This full-scale 
competition was unprecedented in South Korean history. The two camps in politics, the media, and 
civil society created constant opposition and antagonism. On the other hand, nationalism based on 
anti-imperial sentiment, mostly anti-American by this time, combined with new types of civic 
movements, such as anti-US candlelight vigils. Moreover, it was also in the 2000s that a socio-
political practice, the “clearing of collaborators [ch’inilp’ach’onsan]” movement, emerged as a 
policy of the progressive regimes. At least by the mid-2000s, the collaboration discourse, mingled 
with ongoing political battles, was reproduced as heavily politicized everyday discourses. More 
importantly, the movement of clearing up the past wrongdoings, including collaboration, took place 
on a nationwide scale, rising to become a dominant socio-political phenomenon and giving the ethnic 
nationalism narrative a hegemonic status. 
 In March 2004, President Roh Moo-hyun was impeached in the National Assembly on 
allegations of violating the election law. This unprecedented incident was viewed by many as an 
unjustifiable display of arrogance by the majority opposition parties of the conservatives, stirring 
anger among the people and causing them to take to the streets against the impeachment. On March 
15th, three days after the impeachment, thirty-six writers announced in The Hangyeoreh (2004), a 
progressive media outlet: “the impeachment reminded us of the assassination of Kim Gu and the 
May 16 Military Coup. [We] witnessed that the ghost of ch’inilp’a, a remnant of twisted history, has 
not disappeared. … in order to complete the last page of the 1987 Great Democratic Movement with 
the Korean people, we will cooperate with the cooperation of every living soul” (March 15, cited in 
Song Yeun-ji 2013, p. 83-84). In this statement, what is clearly evident is the identification of the 
current political wrong-doers, specifically conservative parties and conservative media in this context, 
with pro-Japanese collaborators. In the same vein, historians such as Seo Joong-seok (2007) accused 
the collaborators of the historical foundation of the right wing, which passed the impeachment of 
President Roh in the national assembly. According to him, it was Korean reactionaries, collaborators 
in the colonial era, supporters for Park Chung-hee’s dictatorship and also strong opponents to the 
Ch’inilp’a Investigation Law that proposed the impeachment motion (p. 89-106). 
 The growing influence of collaboration discourse was deeply related to the successive 
elections of two progressive presidents for the first time in Korean history. President Kim’s 
reconciliatory policy toward North Korea, the first of its kind in South Korean history, made the 
conservative camp very uncomfortable. In addition, at the beginning of his term, President Roh 
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clearly declared that his political enemy is the reactionary conservative right wing. Regarding his 
strategy, it is noted that “by picking up on the specific controversial issues and forming a war front, 
(Roh) attempts to increase political tension and eventually to make his supporters be mobilized and 
solidified” (Park Chang-sik 2004). 
 As in the realm of institutional politics and media, signs of polarization in civil society have 
gradually become evident since the late 1990s. It was on the 8.15 Independence Day of 2003 that the 
escalation of confrontation between the two camps in civil society was clearly demonstrated. For the 
first time since the establishment of South Korea, conservative and progressive camps held separate 
Independence Day celebrations at various different locations. On the conservative side, the People’s 
Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Kim Jeong-il Alliance (NoNuclear) [Panhaek, PanKim (Jeong-il) 
kukminhyŏbŭihoe], an organization of more than one hundred conservative groups, held a rally which 
denounced North Korea’s nuclear policy and progressive groups opposing the Korea-US military 
alliance. On the other hand, leftist and progressive organizations held multiple protests with the key 
themes of anti-(Iraq) War, anti-US military, and peaceful unification without the US’s intervention 
campaigns. This public rally competition lasted until the following March First Movement 
celebration in the following year of 2004. Each camp organized several meetings under contrasting 
catchphrases: the coalition of two conservative groups, NoNuclear and the Christian Council of 
Korea (CCK) [Han’gukKidokkyoch’ongyŏnhap], called for opposition to the withdrawal of the US 
forces in Korea while condemning anti-US and pro-North groups including the Roh administration. 
These street rallies are marked as the beginning of political activism of conservative civic groups in 
which Protestant groups started playing a key role. On the other hand, the progressive/leftist groups 
rallied for peace on the peninsula, cooperation between two Koreas, and anti-(Iraq) war. In 2004, the 
competition of the two camps on the street was further magnified over such issues as dispatching 
Korean troops to Iraq. 
 What is noteworthy is that the collaboration discourse was completely (re)contextualized in 
the context of ongoing political situations in the Kim and Roh governments. At this time, one’s 
position toward the collaboration issue came to be an indicator of political and ideological inclination, 
which means that the interpretation of history became highly politicized. President Roh, returning 
back to office in May 14th after the incident of impeachment, announced his plan of four reform 
policies: abrogation of the National Security Law; legislation of media reform laws; legislation of 
special laws for readdressing past wrongs; and revision of private school laws. Particularly with 
regard to clearing up past wrongdoings, Roh suggested carrying out comprehensive investigations 
through special committees set up in the National Assembly. This announcement provided the very 
opportunity for the issues of “clearing up the past wrongdoings [kwagŏch’ŏnsan]” along with the 
collaboration to come to the fore as major on the political agenda in 2004 and 2005. The media 
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frequently termed the political situation of this period as “the politics of past wrongs 
[kwagŏsachŏngguk],” which means that the past issues functioned as the most urgent tasks, both in 
politics and civil society, and also shaped other social and political concerns. The politicization of 
the past indicates that the politically hyper-sensitive collaboration issue is inseparable from political 
interests and the political context of the present. During the period of the Roh administration, the 
issues of collaboration and past wrongdoings were institutionalized through the legislation process 
in the National Assembly as well as through the installation and activities of the Presidential 
Committee Inspection of Collaborations for Japanese Imperialism (PCIC) to deal with investigating 
former collaborators and their wrong behavior. Throughout the process, the claim of “clearing up the 
collaborators [Ch’inilp’ach’ŏngsan]”, once limited only to dissent discourse in the 1980s, 
transformed into the dominant historical view of the state. The detailed process of institutionalization 
of those issues will be further examined in the following chapter. 
 In sum, as opposed to the state-sanctioned narrative that attempts to confine the opprobrium 
of collaboration only to those politicians who were directly responsible for the annexation of Korea 
in 1910, the ethnic nationalism narrative attributes collaboration acts to all those who at some point 
had been in touch with Japan. Particularly targeted were the upper strata of Korean society in the 
latter years of the occupation. Indeed, in this narrative, hardly any public figure in the Korean 
peninsula could escape implication in some form of collaboration in that all aspects of collusion with 
the Japanese authorities were condemned in the most absolute terms. The underlying political 
intention of enlarging the field of collaboration has been to undermine the legitimacy of the post-
liberation South Korean regime, which politically relied heavily on the landholding and 
entrepreneurial strata of Korean society as well as on the US (de Ceuster 2002, p. 230). 
  
3.4.2 Another Group of Others: Korean Protestants 
 
 The news report of Hankyoreh, one of progressive media outlets in South Korea, focused on 
the close relation between the far-rightists and Christian groups, claiming that one of the Protestant 
missionary organizations, Esther Prayer Meeting, was the source of fake news against the current 
progressive/leftist regime of Moon Jae-in (Kim Wan et al. 2018). Historically, the South Korean 
conservative Protestants were actively engaged in political activities right from the process of nation-
building of South Korea. Many of the early Protestants, who lived in the northern part of the Korean 
peninsula where Christianity enjoyed the first revival under colonial rule, escaped to the South before 
or during the war when the Korean communists started to exert strong influence in communities of 
the northern area. Having experienced oppression from communists toward Christianity while living 
in the North, they have constructed their identity with hatred and fear toward communists, which 
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excludes communists from the category of self, despite the fact that they are ethnically Koreans. That 
is, they have developed their own concept of the true Korean nation, where communists cannot exist. 
This narrative of the early Protestants is perfectly in line with that of conservatives in that both 
exclude communists from the nation. Chŏng Sŏng-han (2015) calls as a “rejection of co-existence 
with communists” (p. 24) this specific character of identity that early Korean Christians developed. 
He claims that this “rejection of co-existence with communists” is the very essence of anti-
communism and national identity which Korean Protestantism has developed since the division of 
the nation. This element of identity is also at the core in political conservatives’ state-sanctioned 
narrative. Therefore, the political ideology of anti-communism is prioritized over ethnicity as the 
core element that constitutes their narrative identity. This is one of the reasons why the two 
contentious narratives that are dominating contemporary South Korean society find it difficult to 
reach a compromise. In the ethnic nationalism narrative, the ethnic concept of the nation is the most 
important and irreconcilable value, while in the state-sanctioned narrative ideology takes priority 
over the ethnic notion of the nation and thus refuses to include any Korean communists as self, 
regardless of their ethnicity. 
 This section aims to explain that the ethnic nationalism narrative has created another hostile 
other, that is, a group of conservative Protestants, by analyzing the book Korean Nationalism 
Betrayed (2007), written by Seo Joong-seok, a leading progressive historian and the chairman of the 
board in the Institute of Korean Historical Studies, who has been very critical of conservatives’ 
interpretation of history. His book has been chosen given that Seo is one of the most known scholars 
in Korean history and the connection between the conservative strain of Korean Protestant churches 
and political rightists is closely examined in his book from a critical point of view of progressives. 
Thus, through an analysis of the book it will be explained how the ethnic nationalism narrative has 
constructed conservative Protestants as another hostile other within the boundary of the nation, 
associating them with collaborators. 
 Seo (2007) asserts that “the pro-Japanese collaborators are generally also pro-US” (p.91), 
pointing out the fact that both of them, more importantly, were heavily influenced by a West-centered 
Christian worldview. In the era prior to 1905, the official US policy on Korea and the role of 
American missionaries, on whom pro-American forces in Korea heavily relied for support and 
guidance, were not necessarily irreconcilable with the Japanese policy of imperialist aggression in 
Korea. In this view, the two imperial powers of Japan and the US forged a complementary 
relationship; the US missionaries presided over the spiritual domain, while the Japanese governed 
the secular aspects of the lives of the Korean people. The US and Japan enjoyed mutual independence 
with regard to their strategies and policies in Korea (ibid., p. 91-92). Seo also argues that another 
common ground between pro-Japanese and pro-US collaborators was that they were mostly the 
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privileged class and educated overseas, thus generally influenced by a West-centered Christian 
worldview. He emphasizes that along with the pro-Japanese collaborators, US-educated Korean 
elites and Christians took part in large numbers in Japan’s policy to eradicate the Korean nation, 
through such campaigns as the forced change of Korean names into Japanese ones, the ban on the 
use of the Korean language, and the mandatory worship at Shinto shrines. In his view, it is very ironic 
that Westernized Koreans agreed on those policies of fascist Japan. This is because, according to him, 
Christians possessed a spirit that was primarily suited to a fascist ruling structure or absolute 
monarchical rule like many Christians in the West. As revealed in his seemingly rather extreme 
assertion, it is not very surprising for him that Christians showed affinity for Japan at the time when 
it seriously threatened the annihilation of the Korean nation (ibid., p. 102). By arguing the close 
connection of Christians with imperialism in history as well as in nature, it is implicitly indicated 
that the ruling regimes of South Korea after liberation are connected to groups of pro-Japanese 
collaborators and Westernized Protestants, associating them with anti-nationalists and traitors to the 
nation. As is well represented in Seo’s writing, the progressive narrative identity openly assumes the 
close link between pro-Japanese collaborators and Westernized Koreans, that is mostly pro-US 
Christians, who more importantly, took the privileged positions in South Korea. 
 In this light, what is critical to note is that the ethnic nationalism narrative also draws a clear 
line between self and others: the nation and nationalists versus anti-nationalists and traitors to the 
nation, which includes groups of pro-Japanese, pro-US collaborators, including Westernized 
Christians and the privileged class of South Korea. This dichotomy is justified by the assertion that 
the nation is the most important component available for the construction of Korean national identity. 
The nation is the only pure and absolute value for all Koreans in the ethnic nationalism narrative. 
According to this narrative, Christians, the majority of whom belong to the conservative strain of 
churches in South Korea, are categorized as the out-group, which is prone to leaning toward pro-
Americanism and thus is easily anti-national. This well explains the highly critical perspective of the 
progressive media and experts toward conservative churches, Christian leaders, and civic 
organizations. 
 According to Chŏng Sŏng-han (2015), after liberation, early Korean Protestants realized that 
they were facing two immediate assignments: first, the re-establishment of the nation and second, 
the re-establishment of churches (p. 17). However, in the northern part of the peninsula, the Christian 
communities were under the monitoring of the Soviet military and Korean communist groups. In 
contrast, in the southern area Christian groups that showed any left-leaning signs were under the 
oppression of the US military government. This clearly indicates that in both areas of the peninsula, 
Christian groups were regarded as political entities. This historical context hints that this would be a 
prelude to South and North Koreas’ Protestant leaders becoming deeply engaged in ideological 
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battles between the two Koreas and secular politics. 
 As elaborated earlier, in the 2000s progressive governments started to institutionalize their 
national identity concept into various policy areas and this institutionalizing process inevitably 
created strong opposition from conservative politicians and civil societies, among which Christian 
organizations were one of the most actively mobilized groups in social movements against 
progressive policy changes. It is this which will be elaborated in the following chapter. The fact that 
Hankyoreh, the media outlet known as the best in representing voices of progressives, claimed that 
Protestant rightists were the key players in producing fake news against the current Moon 
government (Kim Wan et al. 2018) evidently demonstrates that the progressives pay close attention 
to conservative Protestants’ political activism and its significant influence in right wing movements 
in South Korea. Conservative Protestant civic groups that have been very active in participating or 
organizing street protests since the 2000s, are now more active than at any other time in history in 
political rightist resistant movements to the progressive regime’s various policies, such as the 
revision of the constitution. 
 
 
3.5 The Limits of the Ethnic Nationalism Narrative 
 
The ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives has greatly contributed to directing South 
Korean society out of authoritarian and dogmatic narratives on national identity by providing 
alternative interpretations of history. This is critical, given that it reveals many erased events and 
silenced voices of the people. It is, however, important to note that the ethnic nationalism of 
progressives also follows the similar strategy of exclusion that the state-sanctioned narrative took 
through too simplistic categorization of pro-Japanese collaborators as traitors to the nation, who, it 
is argued in the ethnic nationalism narrative, later became pro-Americans and ruling elites in South 
Korean society. In this narrative, failure to administer legal punishment to those traitors in the process 
of state-building is the original sin of South Korean authoritarian and conservative governments. 
Those traitors who still enjoy the benefits in the society as the ruling elite are blamed for all the 
troubles South Korea has faced, including perpetuating the division of the nation. This interpretation 
of history, thus, fails to function as critical history by presenting all pro-Japanese collaborators as a 
single entity with uniform beliefs and attitudes. In critical history, the diversity and competing 
priorities as well as positive and negative aspects between an in-group and out-group are equally 
presented. In the ethnic nationalism narrative, nationalists and the nation are considered morally pure 
and superior, ignoring the in-group’s (nationalists) own moral faults and failings, while out-groups 
(pro-Japanese collaborators) are depicted as inherently evil and vicious without considering 
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historical and social contexts. Therefore, intergroup relations are presented in terms of in-group 
victimization and out-group aggression, which is typically found in the monumental historical 
narrative in post-conflict societies. The biases and prejudice are transformed into deep beliefs about 
the out-group as an essential enemy, thus decreasing any possibility of mutual understanding. In 
critical history, history education presents not only positive but also negative actions of the in-group, 
providing critical analysis of political and social foundations and consequences of negative events. 
Thus, the ethnic nationalism narrative also follows the narrative strategy of monumental history, with 
clear dichotomy between pro-Japanese collaborators and anti-Japanese (or anti-imperialist) 
nationalists as well as the political agenda to delegitimize the conservative ruling elites (Yun Hae-
dong 2015) and previous authoritarian regimes of South Korea who have a strong possibility of 
having ancestors from the educated and privileged class, and thus probably pro-Japanese 
collaborators. 
 In 2015 when controversies over history textbook revision under the conservative Park 
Geun-hye administration were heated, Moon Jae-in, the current president of South Korea and at the 
time the representative of the progressive The New Politics Alliance for Democracy (NPAD), 
commented that the conservative Saenuri Party’s support for the state-issued history textbook self-
proved that conservative politicians in the Saenuri Party are the descendants of pro-Japanese 
collaborators and thus, responsible for the past shameful history of collaboration. They support the 
single state-issued history textbook in order to justify their collaboration with Japan and dictatorship 
through its very centralized state-sanctioned narrative (Nam So-hyun 2015). His comment 
conversely proves that the progressive politicians’ interpretation of South Korean modern history is 
in concert with the ethnic nationalism narrative which emphasizes the close link between political 
elites of conservatives/rightists and the pro-Japanese collaborators, that is, traitors of the nation. 
Moon Jae-in (2017) also criticizes in his book Daehanmingugi mununda [South Korea asks] the so-
called South Korean conservatives as fake given that they actually pursue their own interests based 
on imperialism (pro-Japanese collaboration), anti-communism and industrialization, not the 
principles and values of conservatism. Han Hong-gu, a professor in Hanshin University, argues that 
because there was no process of legal punishment over collaboration in the post-liberation period the 
pro-Japanese collaborators have been always one of the mainstream and privileged groups in South 
Korean society and their dominant power was only challenged for a short period during the Kim 
Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, but now they are back in power (Sim Hae-ri 2015). In 
this rhetoric, it seems evident that progressives associate conservative politicians with pro-Japanese 
collaborators. It is also clearly displayed in the statement of President Moon Jae-in on August 15, 
2018, National Liberation Day, where he emphasized that “the history of collaboration was not our 
mainstream history” and “We, Koreans, struggled to achieve our independence and to establish our 
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own nation with our own power centered around Provisional Government of Republic of Korea in 
Shanghai” (Kang Tae-hwa 2018). It was the first time that President Moon had openly and publicly 
mentioned that the mainstream, who should have been removed, were pro-Japanese collaborators, 
pointing to conservative ruling elites. By explicitly defining the conservative ruling elites as 
descendants of the pro-Japanese collaborators, thus being replaced, it is revealed that progressives’ 
interpretation of history clearly has political meaning. After a newspaper article analyzed comments 
of readers on the series of special reports, entitled Collapse of Conservatives [Posuŭi molak], it is 
argued that in readers’ comments conservatives are often uniformly framed as pro-Japanese 
collaborators just in exactly the same way as progressives are framed as “pro-North” or “the commies 
[PPalgaengi]” (Paek Chi-su et al. 2017). 
 This well supports the argument of this dissertation that the ethnic nationalism narrative also 
uses a history narrative for its political purpose to exclude others, for them, collaborators who became 
ruling elites of South Korea, just in the same way that conservatives exclude communists from the 
category of the nation. Consequently, the two contending narratives in South Korean society intensify 
their own legitimacy through rhetoric of exclusion and demonization of the hostile others, that is 
communists in the state-sponsored narrative, and the pro-imperialists or the anti-nationalists, 
pointing to conservative ruling elites of South Korea in the ethnic nationalism. As a result, both 
narratives contribute to intensifying the conflicts and fail to provide a critical interpretation of history. 
 As elaborated in the theoretical chapter, one of the dilemmas post-conflict societies face is 
making a choice between critical and monumental history, which refer to the most important 
functions of history in society. While monumental history functions to legitimize the ruling regime 
and develop loyalty to the state among people by selectively remembering particular events and 
narratives, critical history does not provide a sense of patriotism or loyalty, but presents the complex 
roots of violence without promoting loyalty to one particular side and holds all perpetrators or 
aggressors accountable (Korostelina 2016). The dilemma societies recovering from recent violence 
face in choosing either monumental history interpretations or critical history is connected to the 
concept of “collective axiology” (Korostelina 2016, p. 294) that defines boundaries and relations 
among groups and more importantly, establishes criteria for in-group/out-group membership. That 
is, a collective axiology is a common system of values that offers moral guidance to in-group 
members on how to identify and perceive members of in-groups and out-groups, and how to maintain 
or change relations with them. 
 There are two variables which characterize the dynamics of collective axiology. The first is 
the degree of collective generality, which refers to the ways in which in-group members categorize 
the other, and how they simplify, or not, their defining character (ibid., p. 295). The high level of 
collective generality that is connected with viewing an out-group as consistent, homogenous and 
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demonstrating fixed patterns of behavior, is observed in monumental history. In monumental history, 
an enemy is simply perceived as a single entity with uniform beliefs and attitudes that supports 
common policies toward other groups. The state-centered nationalism narrative constructed under 
the authoritarian regimes displays typical characteristics of monumental history. In the state-
sanctioned narrative based on strong anti-communist ideology, the image of the out-group, 
communists (North Korean followers) in the South as well as the communist North Korean regime, 
is described as rigid, uniform, and homogeneous with their evil intentions to invade the South. It is, 
however, important to note that the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives also shows a high 
level of generality and thus has a monumental interpretation of history in that the out-group, that is, 
anti-nationalists including pro-Japanese and pro-American collaborators, as well as ruling elites of 
South Korea, is perceived as a single entity with uniform beliefs and attitudes, which justifies framing 
them as traitors to the nation. To have a critical interpretation of history, the ethnic nationalism 
narrative should perceive the out-group as differentiated and provide complex explanations 
concerning the descriptions of the actions and motivations of collaborators or ruling elites. For 
instance, the inventory of collaborators listed by a historian, Im Chong-guk (1929-1989), who defied 
the mainstream elites and contributed to breaking the political silence surrounding collaboration in 
the late 1960s, was quite indiscriminate (de Ceuster 2002, p. 225). Basically any Korean who at some 
time or another had been affiliated with the colonial authorities was listed as a collaborator. Since 
the mere fact of contact with the colonial authorities was considered enough proof of being 
categorized as collaborators, his list was full of collaborators’ names but failed to shed light on either 
the personal motivations or the historical and social contexts of those individuals’ acts. In addition, 
for many younger historians than Im, dealing with collaboration was a kind of political activism. 
Rather than explain, they were eager to judge. In their interpretation, the nation is upheld as an 
absolute category against which all individual actions are measured, irrespective of historical 
constraints or personal motivations. Another example of this style is Kim Sam-ung’s in his book 100 
Collaborators and their 100 texts [Ch’inilpa paekin paekmon] (1996). Just one line, just one sentence 
in the excerpts of the incriminating article or speech made by a different individual, is suggested to 
be sufficient evidence to be labeled a collaborator. The problem with such an approach is that the 
entire historical and personal context is taken away (Kim Do-yŏn 2015). Such an approach not only 
indicates that each individual is at all times entirely and eternally accountable for his or her deeds, 
but also isolates an individual from his or her own, as well as the nation’s, history. Thus, it asserts 
that collaboration is something of a highly individual evil act, separated from the history of the 
Korean people’s suffering and pain. In this vein, these studies on collaboration conform to the 
paradigm of monumental history that describes the others as a uniformly evil single entity as 
uniformly as the state-sanctioned narrative does. 
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 Of two variables that characterize the dynamics of collective axiology, the second is the 
axiological balance that includes both positive and negative portrayals in group identities 
(Korostelina 2016, p. 296). In a low level of axiological balance that is found in monumental history, 
one’s in-group is perceived as morally pure and superior, and the out-group as evil and vicious. In 
this light, the ethnic nationalism narrative presents a low level of axiological balance, thus being 
monumental, in which intergroup relations are uniformly illustrated in terms of in-group 
victimization and out-group aggression. These biases and prejudices are transformed into deep 
beliefs about the out-group as an essential evil enemy. 
 The ethnic nationalism narrative is in part critical in that it includes erased memories like the 
Jeju April 3 1948 incident, where innocent civilians were killed by state forces in the name of anti-
communism. Also, the critical interpretation of the ethnic nationalism narrative challenges head-on 
the state-sanctioned myth of South Korea’s political ancestry in the anti-Japanese independence 
struggle. However, rather than breaking the nationalist paradigm of Korean historiography, the 
revisionist approach of the ethnic nationalism narrative attempted to replace one national myth with 
another, glorifying the Korean nation and nationalists as pure and absolute. Many publications 
published by liberal and progressive historians upheld with equal zeal the myth of Korea as the 
resisting nation, victimized by Japanese colonialism but uncontaminated by it, remaining pure and 
authentic. This revisionist view, supported by progressives, only performed “another exorcist ritual” 
(De Ceuster 2002, p. 208), to cleanse the national soul and to be liberated from the failure to banish 
collaborators. To become critical history, historiography and history education should present not 
only positive but also negative actions of the in-group. With the notion of the pure and absolute 
nation, the ethnic nationalism narrative only presents the positive actions of nationalists while 
providing only the negative actions of anti-nationalists (pro-Japanese collaborators) without offering 
any personal or historical contexts (Kim Do-yŏn 2015). 
 By politicizing its own narrative on South Korean history primarily through the rhetoric of 
exclusion, progressives/leftists have intensified the conflicts in the society rather than using history 
as an instrument of conflict transformation and reconciliation. The master narrative based on anti-
communistic ideology had been strongly politicized as a tool to legitimize authoritarian regimes 
before the democratization, but the ethnic nationalism master narrative of progressives based on 
strong belief in ethnic nationalism also created a new concept of self, that is, the pure and absolute 
“nation [minjok]”, and a new hostile out-group of anti-nationalists (pro-Japanese and pro-American 
collaborators), who are thus traitors to the nation. More importantly, the South Korean ruling elites, 
who served for the authoritarian regimes and currently constitute the conservative strain, are 
described as innately evil and therefore should be excluded from the nation and blamed for all the 
maladies of the current society, as well as for the division of the nation. 
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 Another limit in the ethnic nationalism narrative, as mentioned above, is that it applies too 
simplistic a standard for the categorization of collaborators. A historian, Yun Hae-dong, who himself 
was once involved in research projects on collaboration at The Center for Historical Truth and Justice 
[Minchokmuncheyŏnguso] that was founded to inherit Im Chong-guk’s research in 1991, pointed out 
that the definition of collaboration in most research projects on collaboration is not academic at all 
(Kim Do-yŏn 2015). He not only emphasizes that framing of collaboration employed by progressive 
politicians as a political tool divides South Korean society but also, more importantly, points out that 
history is not a matter of morality. Another historian, Kim Chŏng-in (2014), is also very critical of 
“collaboration framing.” She argues that with the emergence of New Right historiography in the 
2000s, when the debates over history textbooks were especially heated, the ethnic nationalism 
narrative of progressives was politicized with the collaboration framing that equates collaborators 
with conservative politicians, and thus describes them as absolute evil. According to her, this strategy 
of framing is used exactly in the same way conservatives politicize the framing of Pro-North 
followers [chongbuk], which identifies progressives and leftists with North Korean sympathizers, 
and thus evil enemies to the nation. She argues that although historiography after liberation has 
emphasized nationalism as the only criterion to assess the history of Korea, there exist other criteria 
in history through which history can be explained. She further maintains that treating collaborators 
as innately evil without taking historical and personal contexts into account is ahistorical. In the 
ethnic nationalism narrative, the failure to punish pro-Japanese collaborators is the original sin and 
all the social, political, economic problems of South Korea are blamed on those collaborators. In 
describing the independent movements under Japanese rule, only the nationalist and socialist 
movements are regarded as morally right because they did not rely on foreign imperial power. In this 
regard, progressive narrative fails to provide constructive critical and plural explanations of history 
by employing the rhetoric of exclusion and the simple victimization of the self, just as conservative 
narrative did. Having plural interpretations of history is very important to develop more collective 
axiology, and thus to provide critical interpretations of violent or shameful memories. 
 Yun Hae-dong (2011) points out another problem in one historical view of progressives, 
called “division historical theory [pundansahakron]”, in which overcoming the division of the nation 
and accomplishing unification are set as the ultimate goal of the nation (p.47). Therefore, division is 
the most important and urgent problem Koreans should overcome. In this light, division historical 
theory in Korean historiography becomes a political ideology. Only with a full understanding of this 
political ideology progressives hold can one fully grasp the current Moon government’s push toward 
relieving sanctions even before the North takes concrete action for denuclearization, while other 
countries such as the US as well as the EU states express their skepticism of sanctions relief before 
meaningful steps are taken by the North (Pardo 2018). 
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 The ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives failed to provide comprehensive 
understanding of violent South Korean modern and contemporary history although it is partly critical. 
This is largely because of its dualistic identification between pure “nation” as self and traitors to the 
nation, that is collaborators, as evil enemy. In addition, the narrative has been politicized by 
politicians as a tool to delegitimize opponents. Thus, the ethnic nationalism does not contribute to 
providing a critical interpretation of history and fails to lessen prevalent conflicts in South Korean 
society and politics. It is often pointed out that it was the engagement policy toward North Korea of 
the first progressive president, Kim Dae-jung, that initiated severe conflicts between its proponents 
and opponents and eventually led to a polarization of South Korean society. However, as seen in this 
chapter, the narrative transformation in South Korean historiography led by progressive historians 
was a hidden driving force for both narrative transformation and policy changes under the two 

























4. Second Juncture: Progressive Regimes and Identity Politics 
 
 The state-sanctioned master narrative that had been constructed under the authoritarian 
regimes in the process of nation-building faced, with the onset of democratization, the challenge of 
the ethnic nationalism narrative. It was progressive intellectuals, in particular historians, that led this 
narrative transformation. The lack of legal justice after liberation made historians feel that it was 
their mission to “correct” history for the nation. This chapter focuses on the second historical juncture, 
in which the two successive progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung (1998-2003) and Roh Moo-hyun 
(2003-2008), took office. Under the progressive regimes, the ethnic nationalism narrative began to 
be institutionalized as an official narrative through policy changes from foreign and security policies 
to domestic policies such as history textbook revision (Shin 2012, p. 304). This was regarded as an 
identity crisis for the traditional conservative party and its followers as the new narrative sought to 
transform the core concepts of conservatives’ identity. As a result, the identity conflicts became more 
intense than ever in the 2000s in South Korea. Many observers explain that competition between two 
political camps largely originated from their ideological difference. That is partly true, because 
ideology is the most influential factor in national identity formation of South Korea as the nation was 
divided along ideological lines. However, this research aims to present that conflicts in South Korean 
politics and society have been more about identity competition between the two camps of 
conservatives and progressives, which does not mean that it was confrontation only between political 
parties and politicians but expanded into realms of society such as education, civil society, religion 
and so on, beyond the political arena of South Korea. 
 A turning point in the identity politics of progressives was Kim Dae-jung’s Sunshine Policy, 
the engagement policy toward the North (Shin & Burke 2008, p. 289). Motivated by progressive 
ideology and the strong ethnic nationalism narrative, President Kim instituted this engagement policy 
to assist North Korea and promote peace on the peninsula, leading to the historic inter-Korean 
summit in the summer of 2000 in Pyongyang. The summit was of great significance considering that 
it was the beginning of the transformation of many South Koreans’ views of the North from an enemy 
to a partner, despite its modest tangible outcomes. On the other hand, the Sunshine Policy provoked 
strong reaction from conservatives in the South. Conservative strains were skeptical that the North 
would change its hostile attitude and behavior to the South and they demanded greater reciprocity. 
In their view, the North Korean threat had not disappeared so the pursuit of rapprochement was 
regarded as unsettling and threatening in terms of national security. The bitter contention between 
progressives and conservatives on the North Korean issue has been often called the “South-South 
conflict” within South Korea or “a house divided” (Hahm Chaibong 2005; Shin & Burke 2007). 
 In the light of national identity, this chapter aims to elaborate on the notion that inner 
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conflicts in South Korea occur around the two most important concepts in national identity 
construction: the self, that is, how to view South Korea, whether it is a legitimate political entity 
representing the whole Korean nation or whether it is blamed for national division heavily relying 
on the imperial powers; and the significant others, how to identify North Korea and the US. As 
mentioned, the initial attempts to transform national identity occurred with the policy change toward 
its northern neighbor from containment to engagement, and then with redefining the relationship 
with the US. It is often said that North Korean issues were at the very center of changes in the ROK-
US relations in the 2000s when the incongruence in identities and interests pervaded ROK-US 
relations with two North Korean nuclear stand-offs, and the US declared the war on terror. The 
attempts to redefine the identities of two significant others are deeply connected to transformation of 
the self identity of South Korea, with domestic policies related to modern and contemporary history, 
such as “clearing up past wrongdoings” and high-school history textbook revision. This created 
severe controversies, even called a “history war,” between two camps of politicians, intellectuals and 
civic groups. One of the important underlying ideas of this history war is a question about the 
legitimacy of South Korea, that is, whether the establishment of South Korea was a lawful and 
legitimate process of nation-building, or a failure to build one united Korean nation, which well 
illustrates that conflicts over history are inherently related to the self identification of South Korea. 
Conflicts over history will be discussed more deeply in the following chapters. 
 This chapter will firstly examine the policy changes toward two significant others under the 
two progressive regimes, based on the ethnic nationalism narrative. Subsequently, domestic policy 
changes such as the installment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Republic of Korea 
(TRCK), which is deeply related to self identity, will be closely researched. 
 
 
4.1 National Identity Transformation: Policy Changes toward the Significant Others 
  
 Reconciliation with an enemy state is not an easy task in a protracted conflictual relationship, 
and often creates harsh criticism and opposition within the domestic politics of a reconciling state. 
The new idea of reconciliation is politically weak as it typically lacks solid domestic support, 
compared to the old idea of containment that enjoys habitual but robust support. Therefore, in a 
protracted conflictual relationship, the idea of reconciliation with an enemy state has often to be 
implanted in politically “barren soil” (Choi Jong Kun 2010). Since the two progressive governments 
of Kim and Roh, the national debates over how to view North Korea have been heated with intensity 
and emotion. In order to fully understand the essence of this conflict over the North Korean policy, 
it needs to be taken into consideration how these debates were related to efforts to (re)construct South 
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Korean identity, in particular in relation to identity formation of two significant others, the North and 
the US, and how the division over national identity continues to influence and shape Korean politics 
and society (Shin & Burke 2008, p. 288). 
 Suh Jae-jung (2004) claims that during the period of the two progressive governments of 
Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, the country was caught between conflicting identities: the 
“alliance identity” that sees the US as a friendly provider and the closest ally; and the “nationalist 
identity” that forms Korean identity against the US. Extreme polarization over the North Korean 
policy and the alliance with the US is not an issue that can be easily resolved because for Koreans, 
these issues pertain to the fundamental but contested question of national identity (Shin & Burke 
2008). By examining the news media data from 1992 to 2003, Shin and Burke (2008) argue that 
North Korea and inter-Korean relations have been at the center of identity transformation of South 
Korea. South Koreans, led by progressives and leftists, have sought to reshape their national identity 
in the context of changing regional and global orders of the post-Cold War era, and the North lies at 
the heart of the process. In the Korean context, identity politics involving the North is of great 
significance due to the rather peculiar circumstance of a nation with a strong sense of ethnic 
homogeneity being divided into two political entities. Since the early 2000s, the disagreement over 
the political notion of the nation within South Korea, albeit based on belief in ethnic homogeneity, 
has come to the surface. Ethnic nationalism and the bitter reality associated with in-group 
disagreement over national identity must be taken into consideration in order to have a proper 
understanding of identity politics that involves the relational identity of the North and the US within 
South Korea. 
 The North is undoubtedly an important element in South Korea’s conception of national 
identity. The late 1980s brought important structural changes in the South. Internally, it underwent 
democratization, and externally, witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union. In the post-Cold War 
context, the power of anti-communism as a unifying political ideology was naturally weakened, and 
the Korean government pursued a “Northern” policy. However, the Cold War structure and mentality 
on the peninsula firmly entrenched in the society did remain, and still a number of South Koreans 
have a negative view regarding the North (Lee Nae-young 2016). Nonetheless, in a democratizing 
South, the authoritarian state-sanctioned narrative identity based on anti-communism faced serious 
challenges from a developing civil society, which greatly contributed to diversifying discourses on a 
number of issues ranging from unification to the US-South Korea alliance. The question of national 
identity that came to the fore in this context provoked an intense and emotional confrontation 
between the authoritarian state and the civil society, which was mostly from the progressive side. 
While the implementation of the Sunshine Policy was a crucial juncture in transforming many South 
Korean views of the North from an arch enemy to a partner, it provoked strong opposition from 
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conservatives. This was because in their view, given that the North Korean threat had not disappeared, 
the pursuit of rapprochement seemed threatening to the existence of the South. Furthermore, the 
engagement policy, continued by the Roh government, has also caused clashes with the Bush 
administration’s rigid policy stance on North Korea, thus straining US-South Korea relations. 
 By researching ROK-US relations from 1992 to 2003, Shin Gi-wook (2012) claims that to 
have a proper understanding of the ways in which South Koreans approach issues related to ROK-
US relations it must be first considered that the significance of the issues is extended into a deeper 
level of national identity beyond the level of analysis of policy and domestic politics (p. 295). To 
South Korea, the US has been one of the significant others, which has greatly influenced the 
formation of national identity since the liberation. Shin further argues that the changes in South 
Korean views toward the US and the North in the 1990s and 2000s must be understood in the context 
of identity politics, which is a reflection of a larger social change, led by South Korean progressives 
and leftists, in order to reconstruct South Korea’s national identity in the fast changing post-Cold 
War and post-authoritarian era (ibid., p. 304). South Korean progressives began to identify the 
northern half as a legitimate partner state to engage with, but not as an arch enemy. In this light, the 
security alliance with the US, including the US military presence in the territory of South Korea, and 
the role of the US in inter-Korean relations were increasingly questioned. The intense debate between 
conservatives and progressives with regard to the North and the ROK-US alliance reflected the two 
sides’ contentious views of South Korean national identity. 
 
4.1.1 Engagement with North Korea 
 
 South Korea’s comprehensive engagement with the North for the ten years of the Kim Dae-
jung and Roh Moo-hyun (1998-2008) administrations not only faced fierce opposition from the 
conservative section of Korean society but also created strains in the alliance with the US under 
George W. Bush. Furthermore, it endured harsh criticism in and outside South Korea about how the 
policy was essentially spoiling and nurturing the regime in the North, and the North Korean nuclear 
development, which was unacceptable for Americans as well as South Koreans, further strengthened 
the oppositional views. South Korea’s comprehensive engagement policy required attitudinal and 
cognitive changes within South Korea’s public and security expert groups toward its main enemy, 
which meant change in South Korea’s national identity towards the unfriendly regime in the North 
and the close ally, the US. 
 The change in the state’s identity has to go through a political struggle against the established 
identity of a state (Choi Jong Kun 2010, p. 118). The process of reconstructing national identity can 
be contentious and conflict ridden. This is exactly what we have seen in the South with respect to 
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policy change toward the North, with one group firmly retaining the established identity that regards 
it as an arch enemy and another group reinterpreting its relationship with it and forging a 
transformation of identity. The two master narratives, in stark opposition, have hardened over time 
and the contestation has extended beyond foreign policy into domestic policies with particular regard 
to self identification. The fact that both groups agree on an ethnic unity of the Korean nation while 
debating the political notion of the nation ironically makes the political debate especially bitter and 
emotional, because it creates normative expectations for behavior. As explained in the theoretical 
chapter, the collective identity that is created in the context of intractable conflicts is intensified with 
strong societal beliefs on its definition of the self and others, thus, being resistant to change (Chhabra 
2016). When it comes to the matter of identity that is consolidated with emotional factors, the conflict 
does not make it easy to reach political compromise or concession because each party views its belief 
as an essential for the nation’s existence. 
 Most contentious was the issue of how Seoul should frame North Korea’s identity in relation 
to South Korea. While the comprehensive engagement policy optimistically focused on North Korea 
as presenting an opportunity for engagement, the opponents argued that North Korea was still a 
national security threat to South Korea and that the North was unpredictable and unreliable. Officially 
known as the “Policy of Reconciliation and Cooperation toward North Korea”, the Sunshine Policy 
was announced by Kim Dae-jung when campaigning for the presidency in 1997. Essentially, the 
Sunshine Policy promised to stop efforts by the ROK to undermine the regime in the North or absorb 
it, while promoting efforts to improve relations with North Korea and supporting peaceful co-
existence rather than a rapid push towards unification. The most tangible outcome of the policy was 
the Kaesung Industrial Park that was being developed as a collaborative economic development with 
the North. Stark criticisms were constantly raised by the Hanara Party (Grand National Party, GNP), 
which was the main opposition party representing the mainstream conservative forces as well as the 
majority party in the National Assembly for most of the ten years under progressive administrations. 
During this period, it constantly argued that South Korea’s financial aid to North Korea was a one-
sided concession that failed to yield any attitudinal changes from the North that the engagement 
policy anticipated, but rather, that the North was nurtured and spoiled with aid (Kim Geun-sik 2013, 
p. 45). Moreover, it denounced the engagement policy as an unbalanced policy that lacked “sticks,” 
thereby failing to deal with the contingency of North Korea’s cheating. Critics also argued that the 
engagement of the North undermined the national security of South Korea, neglecting cognitive 
preparedness for the North’s potential military provocations and national unity (ibid., p. 46).  
 Despite increasing inter-Korean exchanges, summit meetings, and high-level official talks, 
the essence of the North Korean identity remained offensive to the critics’ perspectives. For instance, 
the Korean Veterans Association [Taehanmin’gung Chaehyangguninhoe], one of the oldest and most 
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established civic groups, focused its opposition on the Kim and Roh administrations’ unidirectional 
assistance as a virtually one-sided concession to the North. These steps, they said, would only weaken 
South Korea’s opposition in dealing with North Korea (Choi Jong Kun 2010, p. 126). For the critics, 
North Korea’s acceptance of aid and willingness to talk with the progressive regimes means merely 
a tactical shift, but does not change its fundamentally aggressive goals and strategies. Throughout 
the ten years of progressive governments, Chosun ilbo, one of the most conservative media outlets, 
maintained a negative tone on the engagement policy (Shin & Burke 2008, p. 297), arguing that the 
Sunshine Policy proponents were misinterpreting the intention of North Korea, which was essentially 
to undermine South Korea’s system and abuse its goodwill of aid, as was clearly proven in the North’s 
continuation of the nuclear weapons development even with South Korea’s continuation of the 
engagement policy. Hence, the opponents of the Sunshine Policy demanded that the South Korean 
government maintain its traditional approach to the North, that is, strict reciprocity as a requirement 
for improving inter-Korean relations. The comprehensive engagement policy, they asserted, only 
created the illusion that the North Korean regime would change if the South kept handing out things 
it wanted. To the opponents of the engagement policy, the North’s identity as the enemy state 
enforced strict reciprocity, namely, a bilateral relationship of hostility, which should start with equal 
and real-time exchanges of give-and-take. Therefore, one-sided handing out to the enemy state was 
morally wrong in the views of conservatives. North Korea’s continuous provocative behavior, such 
as its nuclear program and naval skirmishes, only bolstered their view with rigid conviction that it 
was not appropriate to continue with the engagement policy, while it was only worsening the alliance 
with the US (Choi Jong Kun 2010; Kim Geun-Sik 2013).  
 The engagement policy thus provoked an ideological confrontation between its opponents 
and supporters. The new idea of reconciliation toward the enemy state ironically generated politically 
intense confrontation over South Korea’s relational identity with the North. The advocates of the 
Sunshine Policy had another burden to deal with the South Korean conservatives, who possessed 
different ideas of national and relational identity (Choi Jang-jip 2017; Choi Jong Kun 2010). From 
the traditional power politics perspective, South Korea’s appropriate rational choice was to continue 
its containment policy toward North Korea as its enemy given more than 70 years of conflict and 
national division and more importantly, the North’s development of nuclear weapons. Thus, it was 
essential for the Kim administration to suggest a different explanation for its enforcement of the 
engagement policy, in particular in the context of the worsening security environment with the 
North’s nuclear tests (Choi Jang-jip 2017). The Kim and Roh administrations, however, pursued their 
own way based on their beliefs about how their choice of comprehensive engagement could better 
guarantee peace on the Korean peninsula and the ultimate goal of unification. This should have been 
accompanied by a political process of reformation or transformation of national identity, which 
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requires much effort and time. 
 Kim Dae-jung, on his election as the first president of a progressive party, framed the national 
interest of South Korea as peaceful coexistence with North Korea, which traditionally presumed 
absorbing the North’s regime. The Kim administration believed that the Cold War power 
confrontation was to blame for Korea’s division. In order to meet the newly defined national interest, 
it was a necessary step to transform the identity of North Korea from an enemy to be contained as a 
potential partner for cooperation. Furthermore, the Kim and Roh administrations chose to think of 
North Korea’s nuclear program not as a source of threat to South Korea, but as a defensive strategy 
to cope with the US’s hardline policy toward the North (Kim Hong Nack 2006, p.52). Thus it was a 
matter for diplomacy, namely, for cooperative solutions in such multilateral settings as the Four Party 
and Six Party talks (Choi Jong Kun, p. 129). This is because identifying North Korea’s nuclear 
program as an imminent threat would lead to military measures, such as a surgical strike, and this 
was not acceptable for either administration, for which war deterrence on the Korean peninsula was 
an underlying principle of engagement with the North. 
 It was President Roh who expressed this attitudinal shift toward the North more directly and 
rigidly. Despite North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missile test, the Roh government did not 
perceive it as threatening. Thus, whereas Japan punished North Korea with unilateral economic 
sanctions, South Korea continued its engagement policy through a ministerial meeting with the North. 
Regardless of the ongoing situations in the North and the internal and external criticisms, the stance 
of both progressive governments remained firm in terms of reframing North Korea’s identity as a 
partner for cooperation. With this newly introduced identity of North Korea, comprehensive 
engagement took center stage in the South’s domestic politics and resulted in resetting a collective 
identity within South Korea. As mentioned, the Roh administration was even clearer and firmer than 
President Kim in reconstructing the North Korean identity as a partner state. Accordingly, in 2004, 
for the first time in South Korean history since the end of the Korean War, the Roh administration 
did not clarify North Korea as an enemy state in its defense white paper (ibid., p. 130), which is 
something that has generated another intense controversy between the two political camps since then. 
The reformation of North Korean identity became an inseparable part of the identity dynamics in 
South Korea’s domestic and foreign policy choice. 
 The Kim and the Roh administrations emphasized the importance of political and economic 
engagement as a tool for escaping the vicious circle of the security dilemma. Both administrations 
argued that North Korea might have been forced to choose military options once caught in spirals of 
crisis, and that engaging North Korea and directing it to cooperation with the rest of the world would 
eventually improve prospects for peace across the Korean peninsula. Therefore, South Korea’s 
engagement policy carried with it a “flexible dualism”, that is, the separation of politics and 
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economics, as opposed to previous governments’ priority toward politics and its linkage to the 
economy (Moon Chung-in 1999, p. 39). 
 In order to protect the integrity of the new idea, President Kim installed a vanguard of 
Sunshine Policy promoters throughout his government, using the National Intelligence Service for 
communicating with the North, and mobilizing the unification ministry and his ruling Democratic 
Party for dealing with the South Korean public as well as the opponents. The policy was essentially 
coordinated by the president’s closest aside, Lim Dong-won, who was twice appointed minister of 
national unification. Also, during Kim’s tenure, two scholars, Moon Chung-in and Lee Jong-seok, 
played the role of so-called “Sunshine missionaries”, conducting domestic and international 
campaigns to persuade audiences. Later, these men continued to played critical roles in the Roh 
administration, to sustain and strengthen the engagement policy (Choi Jong Kun 2010, p. 133). The 
Sunshine proponents formed a cohesive group, not only working closely with each other but also 
networking with middle-level technocrats in the government. Both administrations engaged in an 
incremental public campaign to persuade the public of the virtues of engaging with the North, which 
was a challenging task as the North Korean government was perceived by much of the public as an 
inhumane enemy that could not be trusted. Public opinion was almost equally split when the 
engagement policy had not yet been fully enforced, according to the data compiled by Choi Jong 
Kun (2010), indicating support for engagement accounting for 55 percent, while the opposition 
numbered 44 percent, in 1998. However, after the first inter-Korean summit, public support for the 
Sunshine Policy dramatically increased to 87.7 percent (p. 135-36). 
 Identity does not automatically change. For the transformation of identity, it is inevitable to 
go through a process of political collision and negotiations between old and new identities. 
Reconciliation in particular of an intractable conflictual relationship, as a new idea that requires a 
fundamental change in identity, has to persuade the public in reference to why such a policy shift can 
yield a better future than the traditional policy of containment. Promoters of a new identity must then 
be prepared for fierce discursive battles with the group that holds the traditional identity. It seems, 
therefore, unavoidable that the two progressive administrations that promoted the Sunshine Policy 
based on a new identity had to fight with conservative camps. In South Korea, which faces a nuclear 
threat from the North that is allegedly developed to fight against the South and the US, the road to 
reconciliation can be even more difficult to achieve than in any other nation. In this light, national 
identity that was constructed in relation to the North is intrinsically linked with the security of South 
Korea, which makes the relational identity transformation of the North even harder to achieve, 
consequently intensifying conflicts between groups that hold different identity conceptions toward 




4.1.2 North Korea’s Nuclear Threat and Identity Politics of the Roh Moo-hyun 
Government 
 
 The continuation of the Sunshine Policy depended on the view that providing financial aid 
and promoting inter-Korean cooperation would eventually enhance North Korean dependence on the 
outside world, create a sense of security, and thereby modify its behavior. The engagement policy 
was labeled a “Policy for Peace and Prosperity” in the Roh administration, emphasizing international 
cooperation based on Korean initiatives. However, the Roh government had to face a great challenge 
from the beginning of his term because it was not long after the outbreak of the so-called second 
North Korean nuclear crisis in October 2002 that the Roh administration was inaugurated. It was 
announced by the Bush administration that North Korea had breached the 1994 Geneva Agreement, 
developing a uranium enrichment program. Consequently, the US stopped provision of heavy oil 
shipments to North Korea. In response, North Korea lifted its nuclear freeze and declared its 
withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003. In dealing with the nuclear 
issue, the Roh government insisted on a peaceful resolution, while opposing any sanctions against 
North Korea. In November 2004, in his speech in Los Angeles, Roh criticized the Bush 
administration’s hardline stance toward Pyongyang, while expressing his view that North Korea’s 
attempt to develop nuclear weapons was understandable considering its perception of the threat from 
the US (Min Im-dong 2004). Even in May 2005, when North Korea declared its possession of nuclear 
weapons, inter-Korean economic cooperation continued without any military action or economic 
sanction taken. The Roh administration preferred stable management of the situation to strict military 
or economic responses. From a realist point of view, balancing measures that should naturally have 
been taken in the face of an obvious threat were missing in the response of President Roh. 
 There could be many possible explanations behind this series of non-responses. At least 
before the 2006 nuclear test, external factors including multilateral diplomacy options like the Six 
Party Talks seemed to be a more efficient way to solve the issue without raising dangers of military 
conflicts on the peninsula considering that intelligence assessment of the North Korean nuclear 
capability indicated that the North’s capability had yet to reach the point of possessing nuclear 
weapons in such a short time frame, thus buying more time for the international community to pursue 
a diplomatic solution to the crisis. Although intelligence assessments acknowledged that North Korea 
was increasing its nuclear materials, in order to make nuclear detonators, many tests of high-
explosives and related data were still required, which would delay the completion of the nuclear 
project. Furthermore, it was expected that it would take such a long time for North Korea to make 
nuclear weapons small enough to launch on missiles. To the surprise of the world, however, only 
three years after North Korea began reprocessing, it was discovered that it had gone ahead with its 
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first nuclear test, the detonation of a nuclear device. Critics claimed later that the Six-Party Talks 
designed for North Korea’s nuclear disarmament ironically served to delay necessary responses to 
North Korea’s nuclear threat. The Six-Party Talks accomplished some achievements, such as 
February 13 Agreement 2007, in which the North promised to shut down and seal the Yongbyon 
nuclear facility and in return five other parties were to provide emergency energy assistance to the 
North among other positive steps to increase mutual trust. However, the repeated stop-go nature of 
the talks resulted in North Korea buying time to enhance its nuclear capabilities. 
 Identity politics of the Roh government can be clearly found in its responses to the North 
Korean nuclear test in 2006, which was the most significant phase in the course of its nuclear program. 
A nuclear test is a mandatory step in becoming a nuclear state and the strategic situation is completely 
altered after a nuclear test. The Roh administration also viewed North Korea’s nuclear test as the red 
line that could not be tolerated. The following official statement after the nuclear test, stated that the 
“[South Korean] Government will resolutely respond to the situation in accordance with the principle 
that it will not tolerate North Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade 2006). It seemed inevitable to call for stringent diplomatic measures and a new round of 
wide-ranging sanctions authorized by the United Nations (UN). The most extreme demands asked 
for the invocation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which provides for mandatory sanctions or even 
as a last resort military action to ensure compliance with Security Council resolutions in the case of 
“threats to international peace and security.” At this critical juncture, the Prime Minister of South 
Korea, Han Myung-sook issued a statement that clarified that the ROK would not support any UN 
resolution containing military measures against the North in retaliation for its nuclear test, 
mentioning “there should never be war on the Korean peninsula” (The Guardian 2006). Her 
statement clearly illustrates the characteristics of the Roh administration’s policy toward the North. 
The Roh government and its proponents contended that North Korea’s nuclear weapons program was 
defensive in nature and designed to cope with America’s hostile policy toward the North. Thus, even 
if the North developed nuclear weapons or long-range ballistic missiles, they were not designed to 
be used against the South. This highly optimistic perspective of the progressive camp in the South 
over the North’s intention behind the nuclear project was well displayed in other policies of the Roh 
administration. For instance, a designation that defines the North as the “main” enemy of the ROK 
was deleted from the South Korean Defense White Paper in 2005. 
 The controversy over Roh’s non-response to the North’s nuclear project is in fact a reflection 
of the two contrasting images of North Korea, representing the complex nature of inter-Korean 
relations. Kim Sung-bae (2012) argues that debate about how to respond to North Korea’s nuclear 
test might be termed an “identity war” (p. 345), which pertains to contending perspectives in the 
South regarding how to identify the North. If we understand that progressives’ national identity 
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conception is constructed based on the ethnic nationalism narrative that prioritizes the concept of the 
one ethnic Korean nation, including the North as the most important value, the Roh government’s 
mild reaction can be understood. For instance, after the 2006 nuclear test occurred, the presidential 
website criticized Japan for overreacting to the incident instead of denouncing Pyongyang’s 
provocation (Ryu Chŏng-min 2006). Furthermore, a planned inter-Korean ministerial meeting was 
held under the Roh administration, just a week after the North’s missile test firings despite the 
opposition party’s strong demand to postpone high-level talks with the North in the aftermath of the 
missile launches (Kim Hong Nack 2006, pp. 48-49). The opposition party and some conservative 
media outlets insisted that the South had nurtured the North, pouring money into its regime, and the 
second nuclear crisis together with the disclosure of a secret payment of $ 500 million by the Kim 
administration to the North weakened domestic and international support for the engagement policy 
of President Roh. 
 However, President Roh’s staff attempted to justify his “strategic silence” on the grounds 
that the missile test-firings were actually a political ploy rather than a security threat. Also, Roh’s 
mild reaction is based on the assumption not only that the engagement policy would eventually help 
the North to open up and reform, but also that the nuclear project was defensive in nature and it was 
not designed to be used against the South. Furthermore, the former president, Kim Dae-jung argued 
that North Korea’s nuclear policy was the result of the failure of US policy toward the North, but not 
due to the failure of the Sunshine Policy toward the North (Chŏng Dae-ha 2006). These assumptions, 
based on progressives’ national identity conception, were unlikely to share common ground with 
opponents who saw the North as an arch enemy, thus causing an identity battle. 
 In the event, there were no concrete measures taken in terms of inter-Korean relations under 
President Roh as a balancing act to the North’s nuclear project. South Korea only joined in sanctions 
against the North imposed by the UN Security Council. This was because the Roh administration 
interpreted the sanctions by UN resolution 1718 as mostly unrelated to South Korea, except for the 
luxury goods embargo and some other articles. The only meaningful move in the Roh government 
after North Korea’s nuclear test was to vote for the UN human rights resolution on North Korea in 
November of the same year. However, this may have been a result of a political consideration to 
support Ban Ki-moon’s election as UN Secretary General rather than a policy shift. The Roh 
government abstained from the same resolution in the following year on the grounds that it would 
unnecessarily provoke North Korea (Kim Sung-bae 2012, p. 347). 
 How did the Roh administration define its national interests in facing North Korea’s first 
nuclear test? From a realist perspective, it was a critical security threat and proper balancing measures 
had to be taken within all possible means. However, there was only a very restricted response in 
reality. This is because, particularly in the course of South Korea’s policy toward North Korea, there 
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was a tendency to put priority on identity logic more than on rationality under President Roh. 
Therefore, the policy choice Roh made was the result of identity politics that caused heated debates 
over how to identify North Korea in South Korean society. 
 
4.1.3 Distancing from the US 
  
 More importantly, the progressive policies of the two administrations, in particular, the Roh 
administration, were not in line with those of the Bush administration, which was focused on the war 
on terror, in which the North was defined as one of the terrorist evil states, and had doubt about the 
efficiency of South Korean and Clinton administration’s engagement. While the identity of the North 
in South Korea and the policy toward the North were significantly changing, American conceptions 
of North Korea were firmly fixed, seeing it as a threat (Shin Gi-wook 2012, p. 304). The identity of 
the North is inherently related to the security of South Korea and the change in inter-Korean relations 
naturally affects US-ROK relations. With transformation in views on the North, South Koreans thus 
became engaged in intense debates over the nature of their relationship with the US, including the 
military alliance. As many experts on Korean affairs have argued, during this period South Korea 
became caught between two conflicting narratives regarding its national identity: the “state-centered 
nationalism” narrative of conservatives (as termed in this research), or “alliance” identity (Suh Jae-
jung 2004), which holds the traditional view of the US as a key ally and partner in national security; 
and the “ethnic nationalism” narrative of progressives, or “nationalist” identity (ibid.), which pits 
Korean identity against the US. This debate over the identity of the nation and the significant others 
became bitter and emotional, hindering rational discussion, largely due to the unique circumstance 
the South faces, that is, the dilemma between the strong belief in the ethnic homogeneity and the 
reality of a long-term political partition, and to the fact that the gap between these conflicting 
identities has widened. Under the two conservative governments that successively took office after 
two progressive regimes, the intensity of identity politics was not alleviated. On the contrary, the 
progressive camp in politics and civil society continued to contend with the conservative Lee Myung-
bak and Park Geun-hye governments on almost every key issue related to the US-ROK alliance as 
well as inter-Korean relations. The controversy and subsequent debates over the sinking of the South 
Korean naval ship Cheonanham, as well as the issue of launching the THAAD missile defense 
system, clearly illustrates the persistent division and confrontation between progressives and 
conservatives in South Korea. 
 In his most striking articulation of Korea’s future role in a speech on March 22, 2005, 
President Roh announced that Korea would pursue the role of a balancer, not only on the Korean 
peninsula, but throughout Northeast Asia. This new vision of Korea aimed to resolve the conflict 
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between such major states in Northeast Asia as China, Japan and Russia while maintaining a military 
alliance with the US, and drew negative responses mainly from the US and Japan. They were not 
comfortable about the idea that Korea under the Roh administration would be distancing itself from 
the security alliance with the US and Japan and moving closer to China. The engagement policy 
toward the North under President Roh can also be understood as part of a role as balancer in the 
region. For Roh, integration and normalization with North Korea and resolution of the North Korean 
nuclear crisis are the foundations for a more assertive and constructive role for Korea throughout 
Asia. Roh’s plan came to a standstill repeatedly under virulent attacks from the American Right. For 
instance, Daniel Kennelly argued that “The current government in Seoul is the most anti-American 
in the short history of the Republic of Korea. It is a left-wing administration that has fanned public 
sentiment against US troops,” in the American Enterprise Magazine entitled “Time for an Amicable 
Divorce with South Korea” (cited in Pastreich 2005, p. 11). The Roh administration was consistently 
portrayed as an unreliable ally which undermined American security concerns, regardless of the real 
intention of President Roh, that is, whether he in fact aimed to distance himself from the US or not. 
Even the commitment of South Korea to the invasion of Iraq, made in spite of the public opinion that 
opposed it, did not receive much recognition from the Bush administration. 
 Anti-American sentiments and slogans swept South Korea during its 2002 presidential 
campaign. While these movements were not new for the country, they had a more important meaning 
than at other times, considering that, for the first time, they had a crucial impact on its alliance with 
the United States. When the second North Korean nuclear crisis had just occurred, presidential 
candidate Roh Moo-hyun declared to make the engagement policy with the North a success, which 
was clearly incongruent with the George W. Bush administration’s desire to isolate and sanction 
Pyongyang. In the past, such a threat from the North would have made the South rely on its alliance 
with the US for national security. In addition, just before the 2002 election, a massive wave of anti-
American sentiment had swept the South in response to the handling of a US military vehicle accident 
that killed two Korean schoolgirls. As progressives and nationalists that emerged as a new political 
power sought to reassess the US role in inter-Korean relations and unification, the strong alliance 
with the US was being questioned and became a subject of intense debate within the South. This is 
closely related to the new narrative of progressives, in which they perceive the US as one of the 
imperial powers that pursue their own interests on the peninsula, while the North is treated as a poor 
sibling in need of assistance and a partner to engage with based on the strong notion of ethnic 
nationalism.  
 The alliance between South Korea and the US was formed in the 1950s in the context of the 
Cold War to counterbalance the power superiority of the North over the South. In the post-Cold War 
era, the alliance still remains alive and to many in South Korea, it looks like the natural order of 
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things. However, South Korea in the 2000s under the Roh administration became highly critical of, 
in particular, the US military presence in the territory of South Korea. Just around the presidential 
election in 2002, hundreds of thousands of its citizens took to the streets to protest the acquittal of 
two American soldiers. Former human rights lawyer Roh Moo-hyun, who had advocated the 
withdrawal of US troops, won the presidential election in the wave of anti-Americanism. The 
combination of the rise of anti-American protests with the election of an allegedly anti-American 
president produced the perception that South Korea had been distancing itself from America. This 
raised the assumption that the strong ROK-US alliance was falling apart and a national narrative 
identity transformation was happening in South Korea. Nevertheless, during his presidency, Roh was 
actually not able to say “no” to America in many cases. For instance, when the US demanded the 
South to send troops to Iraq, Roh accepted this despite strong domestic opposition to it, even from 
his strong supporters as well as from his opponents. 
 South Korea’s relations with two significant others, North Korea and the US, are intrinsically 
linked to each other as well as the issue of security. That is, South Korea’s changing view on North 
Korea is related to ROK-US relations, in which the military alliance is the most important part. Thus, 
the growing anti-American sentiment in the 2000s is inseparable from the increasing pro-North 
sentiment in South Korea. Progressives who define national identity through ethnic nationalism 
naturally have a tendency to be pro-North and anti-America. In contrast, it is natural that 
conservatives who prioritize the founding values of South Korea, such as liberal democracy and a 
free economic system, to the ethnic notion of nation become prone to being anti-North and pro-
America (Kim Keun-sik 2013, p. 48). 
 In the past, the North Korean threats were securitized by authoritarian regimes to solidify 
their authority and to raise people’s loyalty to the state, South Korea. They were later framed as 
competition between “security through strong alliance with the US” vs “absence of security” by the 
conservative camp in the age of progressive regimes. On the other hand, the progressive strain 
utilized the frame of “nationalists” vs “anti-nationalists” related to the North Korean threats. In this 
context, the so-called “South-South conflict” has been further intensified (ibid., p. 53). The 
successive progressive regimes of Kim and Roh in the 2000s tried to officially change the view on 
the North from the enemy to a partner for cooperation, which raised strong criticism from 
conservatives who maintained the traditional view on the North. For instance, conflicts over how to 
define the North are well presented in the controversy related to the term “chuchŏk [the main enemy]” 
in the guide to military education of the Korean Ministry of National Defense. The controversy 
started in 2000 under the first progressive regime of Kim Dae-jung, and then, during the period from 
2001 to 2004, the guide was not issued at all. However, in 2004 the Roh government decided to 
delete the term, the main enemy, which had been used from 1995. Instead, the expression was toned 
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down to “existing military threat of North Korea” and “direct and serious threat of North Korea,” in 
the 2006 guide. Once again, under the conservative government of Lee Myung-bak, who took office 
after President Roh, the term was changed to “the enemy of South Korea” in the 2010 guide (Lee 
Yong-su 2017). The term chuchŏk has thus been used as a yardstick to identify a candidate’s 
ideological leaning in presidential elections. 
 In order to adequately understand the ways in which South Korea approaches issues related 
to US-ROK as well as inter-Korean relations, the deeper questions of national identity that extends 
beyond foreign policy and domestic politics must be taken into consideration. Accordingly, the anti-
American sentiment in South Korean society since the 2000s must be explained in the context of 
identity politics. The US has been a significant other, shaping South Korea’s national identity in the 
post-liberation era. Shin Gi-wook (2012) argues that through analysis of US and Korean media 
coverage, the evolution of South Korean views on US-ROK relations from 1992 to 2003 reflected a 
larger societal shift led by progressives, to redefine relational South Korean national identity related 
to the US and the North. 
 The progressive regimes that attempted views on the significant others also tended to 
transform the self-identity. This has resulted in intense controversy over South Korea’s past, even 
called a “history war”, which will be elaborated in the following section. 
 
 
4.2 National Identity Transformation: Reconstruction of the Self 
  
 The progressive regime of Roh Moo-hyun not only attempted to establish new relations with 
the significant others of North Korea and the US, but also paid much attention to its innovation to 
rebuild the meaning of the self, the most important component, in the construction of national identity. 
This intrinsically pertains to the interpretation of South Korea’s past, that is, how to justify the 
process of nation-building after liberation and how to deal with wrongdoings of the past regimes, 
including failure to bring legal justice over pro-Japanese collaborators. The resettlement of the past 
history, in particular relating to the colonial rule by Japan and the military government, was pursued 
right after the inauguration of the Roh administration. This was part of the movement to strike at 
those people with vested interests who formed the ruling class under the military dictatorship and to 
advance reform. The issue concerning pro-Japanese collaborators was at the core among other issues 
related to the redefinition of history. 
 History Committees that were established under President Roh within the National 
Intelligence Service, police, and military, etc., investigated the histories of their departments. On 
May 3, 2005, the bill for “the Basic Law for Truth and Reconciliation”, the so-called “History Law”, 
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was passed by the National Assembly. This was one of the four reform bills submitted by the ruling 
Uri Party to the National Assembly in 2004. The History Law extensively covered major incidents 
during the past 100-year period from the conclusion of the Eulsa Treaty of 1905, the Japan-Korea 
protectorate treaty, until the incidents in the 1990s. The incidents to be investigated under the law 
included those involving death, injury, or disappearance caused by the unjustified exercise of state 
authority and human rights violations. The original bill was prepared on the initiative of the Uri Party, 
and the Grand National Party (GNP), the opposition party, opposed the bill during the National 
Assembly session, held in autumn 2004. Although some members of the Uri party rebelled against 
the bill, it was eventually passed with the consensus of the GNP members after several revisions 
were applied to the proposal according to the GNP’s request (Cho Se-yŏl 2004, p. 196). The reason 
for the rebellion by some members of the Uri party and the GNP’s shift to approval was that not only 
the military government, but also the left wing was included as a target of the investigation. 
 On May 31, 2004, the “Committee for Investigating the Conduct of Pro-Japan Collaborators 
during the Colonial Period” was established for the purpose of reinvestigating pro-Japan 
collaborators during the colonial period. The investigation covered the period from the start of the 
Russo-Japanese War in 1904, an event which led to colonization, to Japan’s defeat in WWII and 
liberation from Japan in 1945. Killing or abusing the anti-Japan and pro-independence activists and 
actively collaborating with Japan in the war of aggression as a second lieutenant or higher rank in 
the Japanese troops were considered pro-Japanese activities. According to this definition, the late, 
former president Park Chung-hee, the former lieutenant of the Japanese troops and father of 
Chairwoman Park Geun-hye of the GNP at that time and later the president from 2013 to 2017, was 
also categorized as a collaborator (Pak Hae-kyŏng 2004). 
 While the ideological conflicts of the Cold War impeded Koreans’ efforts to uncover the 
truth about their past, South Korea, with democratization and the progressive regimes, began 
addressing the intentionally erased memories. This effort reached a milestone in 2005 when the South 
Korean government enacted a special law, the Framework Act, which established the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea (TRCK) (Kim Dong-choon 2010, p. 526). This was, 
however, not the first attempt made by the South Korean government to pursue historical justice. The 
Special Investigation Committee (SIC), which had been established in September 1948 by the 
Special Act on Punishing Anti-National Conduct, was South Korea’s first attempt to bring former 
Japanese collaborators to justice but was annulled by the Rhee Syngman regime in 1951. After this 
first try, South Korea made several attempts to rectify history. For instance, there was a trial of police 
officials who were suspected of ordering the shooting of demonstrators in April 1960 when President 
Rhee’s twenty-year-old dictatorship encountered strong student resistance. Kim Dong-choon (2010) 
argues that “the TCRK can be considered a crystallization of Korea’s unwavering efforts to confront 
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the injustices in its past” (p. 526). 
 During his presidency, President Roh Moo-hyun was plagued by the difficulty of drawing 
support from the establishment in general and the bureaucracy in particular. This was, in part, a result 
of his aggressive tackling of such sensitive topics as collaboration under Japanese occupation and 
human rights violations under authoritarian regimes. No official acknowledgement had been made 
for decades regarding the mass killing of civilians, called the Jeju April 3 incident, in which South 
Korean state forces massacred more than 20,000 residents of Jeju in response to an uprising by 
communist insurgents on 3 April, 1948. It was President Roh, who visited Jeju on October 21, 2003, 
who first officially acknowledged and announced “As the head of state, I sincerely apologize for the 
wrongdoings of the past state authority” (Hwang Ch’un-hwa 2018). This, as the first official 
statement by an incumbent, was only the beginning of Roh’s campaign for truth. The search for the 
truth of history extended to the bitterly contested and deeply painful colonial period. Collaboration, 
as in any colonial society, ran deep, especially among the elites. Hence, tremendous controversy was 
evoked with the establishment of the commission. The search for truth was not limited to the colonial 
period but it tried to cover all past injustice and wrongdoings from colonial to authoritarian regimes. 
Among new regulations and institutions regarding the issue that were installed under the Roh 
government, of importance was the TRCK, which will be discussed in the following section. A 
variety of policies to clear up historical injustice can be understood as part of progressives’ efforts to 
transform the master narrative on national identity, in particular, regarding modern and contemporary 
South Korean history according to their perspective. 
  
4.2.1 Clearing up Past Wrongdoings and Truth Commissions 
 
 The existence of communist North Korea and the perpetuating state of confrontation with it 
have had a great impact on South Korean politics. South Koreans before democratization were 
indoctrinated with anti-communist ideology by the state. In doing so, the state installed legal means 
such as the National Security Law to protect the state from the communists’ ideological invasion. 
The threat of communism was often exploited to justify human rights violations by the state power. 
Although this Cold-War politics has been profoundly weakened in the post-democratization era, it is 
still alive in South Korea, as seen in the presence of the National Security Law and conservatives’ 
and rightists’ strong support for it. Considering this context, it was quite surprising that TRCK was 
installed to redress the past wrongdoings, such as pro-Japanese collaboration and human rights abuse 
by the authoritarian regimes, in the face of strong opposition from the conservative camp. In the 
general election of 2004, the progressive Uri Party gained a majority of seats in the National 
Assembly and the political environment in 2004 marked a critical juncture in South Korea’s history 
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of dealing with unresolved past issues. The policy of clearing up the past wrongs and injustices had 
already begun under the Kim Dae-jung administration when it passed a law to establish the 
Presidential Truth Commission on Suspicious Deaths of the Republic of Korea (PTCSD) in 2000. 
The establishment of the Commission was a stepping stone toward truth and reconciliation under 
two progressive regimes. 
 The name “Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Republic of Korea” was taken from South 
Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). A truth commission is an official government 
body temporarily installed to investigate a past history of human rights violations. Established 
according to “the Framework Act on Clearing Up Past Incidents for Truth and Reconciliation,” the 
main task of TRCK was to deal with a history burdened with colonial legacies, mass killings, 
unresolved political incidents, and human rights abuse that had occurred since 1945. What should be 
noted here is the fact that the Framework Act did not aim to pursue legal punishment in the course 
of the settlement process but to emphasize truth-confirmation, identity transformation of victims and 
reconciliation between victims and perpetrators (Kim Dong-choon, p. 544). In South Korea, even 
until the 2000s, the state allowed only one kind of war-related memory and narrative, based on the 
Manichean Cold-War scheme of good South Korea and its allies, and evil North Korea and its allies. 
Political democratization provided a grand opening to reveal the truth of silenced past events as 
proclaimed in the Framework Act, particularly related to specific issues of collaboration, mass 
killings around the Korean War, and the suspicious deaths of the 1980s (ibid., p. 543). 
 Before the establishment of TRCK in 2005, the Jeju Commission under Kim Dae-jung was 
established in 2000 to investigate the Jeju April 3 incident and restore the dignity of victims and their 
family members. Between 1948 and 1954, a communist-led uprising on Jeju Island in Korea and the 
subsequent counter-insurgency campaign by the new anti-communist government of Rhee resulted 
in an estimated 15,000 deaths (Jeju Commission 2003, p. 369). After investigation, the commission 
offered seven recommendations: 1) the issuance of an apology; 2) the declaration of a memorial day; 
3) the use of the report to educate students and the public; 4) the establishment of a memorial park; 
5) the provision of essential living expenses to bereaved families; 6) support for excavations of mass 
graves; and 7) continuous support for further investigation and commemoration projects (Kim Hun 
Joon 2013). As of 2013, the government started to implement all of these recommendations. 
Immediately after the release of the report in 2003, President Roh Moo-hyun made an apology to the 
victims and families. This is of profound significance in that it marked the first apology issued by a 
head of state in South Korea regarding human rights abuse by state forces. In addition, it is 
noteworthy that since then the narrative of the incident in government documents and history 
textbooks has completely changed. The outcomes of the truth commission have initiated 
transformation of the official narrative. Most textbooks that had described the event as a communist 
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rebellion now began to provide a more detailed explanation of human rights violations in the incident. 
Also, a minimum level of subsidy was also selectively given to the victims and their families who 
had suffered from economic hardship and physical and mental illness. Both victims and activists who 
saw the limitations of the projects, however, pushed for a major revision of the law in 2007 to include 
further commemoration activities, specifically through establishment of a permanent foundation. As 
a result, the Jeju Foundation was created to further promote peace and human rights by maintaining 
the museum and memorial park, and conducting additional investigations. The commission also 
launched a long-term excavation project in 2006 to discover mass graves and find the remains of 
victims. By 2013, eight out of 151 mass murder sites had been discovered, and the remains of over 
400 victims had been found (ibid.). The activities of the Jeju commission are generally assessed as a 
success. 
 In case of the TRCK, within the first four months, it received more than two thousand 
investigation applications, 80 percent of which were related to civilian massacre cases before and 
during the Korean War (Jeon Seung-Hee 2010, p. 626). The TRCK also made recommendations for 
individual cases. Overall implementation of these recommendations has been reported to be quite 
successful given that according to the TRCK’s final report (2010), 361 out of 855 recommendations 
(42 %) were implemented. However, when it comes to the quality of the implementation, it should 
be noted that almost half of the implemented recommendations involved measures that required very 
little effort, such as placing the TRCK’s report in government offices (177 cases), or supporting and 
participating in memorial services (55 cases). The TRCK also proposed that the government 
apologize for 179 individual cases and by 2013 only 52 apologies had been issued (Kim Hun Joon 
2013). Such apologies that were mostly issued by local police chiefs and low-profile military 
commanders were, in fact, difficult to be acknowledged as apologies in a strict sense, because they 
were the mere expression of officials’ regrets or condolences while delivering a public speech at a 
memorial service. 
 Although the establishment of the TRCK has paved a way toward truth and justice in the 
erased past incidents in South Korea, it has exposed limitations, largely because it was installed as a 
result of the political compromises between conservatives and progressives and thus essentially had 
structural restrictions, which will be elaborated in the last part of this chapter. 
  
4.2.2 Conflicting Narratives over History of the War and Colonial Period 
 
 Before heading toward discussions over the limits of the TRCK, I will examine in this section 
another contribution that the policy of clearing up the past has brought to the society, specifically in 
providing alternative narratives of the controversial past of South Korea, thus eventually leading 
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toward gradual narrative identity transformation. The establishment of the TRCK in 2005, despite its 
limits, marks a turning point in the history of South Korean efforts to reinterpret the truth of issues 
like collaboration, the Korean war, and human rights violations that had been selectively remembered 
and forgotten. Among those issues, how the hegemonic narrative over the war and related violence 
exerted by the state forces has been challenged with the changing political context in South Korea 
will be closely discussed here, since debates over pro-Japanese collaborators were already introduced 
in chapter 3. 
 The authoritarian regimes of South Korea shaped the official narrative on the war through 
such legal measures as the Anticommunism Law, the National Security Law, and the Emergence 
Measures. As it is stated in the purpose of the TCRK, the Commission was indeed mandated, 
targeting those past regimes in order to “foster national legitimacy and reconcile the past for the sake 
of the national unity by honoring those who had participated in anti-Japanese movements and 
exposing the truth through investigation of incidents regarding human rights abuses, violence, and 
massacre occurring since Japanese rule to the present time, specifically during the nation’s 
authoritarian regimes” (National Archives of Korea 2008). Hence, the TCRK opened a crucial space 
for the nation’s forgotten pasts, presenting us with the challenge to understand the complexity of 
colonialities, postcolonialities, and the US intervention that all intertwined in Korea. One of the 
historical significances of TRCK lies in its success in bringing back to the surface the silenced voices 
that complicate the hegemonic memory of the Korean War such as the “June 25 war [yugio]”, which 
refers to the official starting date of the war, 25 June in 1950. 
 Em (1993) categorizes the major historiographic positions in South Korea in relation to the 
interpretations of the Korean War and division into five groups: 1) the orthodox-international view; 
2) the liberal-international view; 3) the critical-domestic view; 4) critical-interactive view; 5) the 
heterodox-international view. The first view is the official narrative, in which the Korean War is only 
blamed on Kim Il Sung and his colleagues, who were the mere Soviet puppets and thus, the division 
is to be a Soviet product. The second, the liberal-international view, suggests that although the 
division was caused by international forces in the context of the Cold War, both the US and Soviet 
Union were responsible for the division. In the third view, the critical-domestic view, the Korean 
people are partly responsible for the war and division, while continuing to criticize the superpowers 
that took advantage of Korea’s internal conflicts between rightists and leftists. As Em argues, 
although domestic problems such as class conflict and political differences within South Korea are 
acknowledged in this narrative, the Korean people must be described as victims when it comes to the 
issue of the war and division. This view is very well in line with student protestors in the 
democratization movement. The fourth, the critical-interactive view that corresponds to pokhapron 
in Korean, explains that the Korean War was a civil war with a complex constellation of actors for 
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which both the international powers and Koreans should be blamed. Cumings (1981), whose 
argument strongly supports the view of pokhapron, maintains that the Korean War was a civil and 
revolutionary act that emerged from conflicts inherent in the complicated mixture of class, politics, 
and ideology in post-liberation Korea. This view enjoyed strong support from scholars as opposed 
to its lesser popularity among politicians. Finally, the fifth view, what Em terms the heterodox 
international view, refers to what is most commonly known as chuch’eron in Korean historiography. 
In chuch’eron, the Korean War as a civil war is denied but all the responsibilities for the division and 
the war are laid on America. In this perspective, the division would never have taken place without 
American support of right-wing nationalists, many of whom have been labeled pro-Japanese, or 
Japanese collaborators. This perspective was a favorite view among student organizations. 
 In South Korea, the Korean War is commonly called yugio, which literally refers to the date 
25 June [1950] when the war officially began. In the term yugio the official narrative over the war, 
that is, the first orthodox international view in Em’s categorization, is well revealed. Through the 
term yugio the nature of the Korean War is simplified out of a complex history, and thus the war is 
placed in the boundary of the state-sanctioned narrative and much more conducive to policing by 
anti-communist patriotism (Suh Jae-jung 2010, p. 504). The hegemonic narrative of the war in South 
Korea has been constructed around the officially sanctioned date of the war’s beginning, yugio. 
Therefore, in South Korea, the war is understood within the framing of the yugio, which has served 
to highlight South Korea’s state-sanctioned meaning of the war. This framing, in which North Korea 
is understood as the aggressor and the South as the victim, constructs the dualistic perception, as 
monumental history frequently does. This date of June 25 remains firmly fixed in the South Korean 
national narrative. In the official memory, North Korea is represented as the violator who broke the 
peace on the peninsula and the perpetrator who exerted extreme violence against Koreans. This 
official story is further combined with a memory of the US as a self-sacrificing savior who rescued 
South Korea from a communist invasion. On the other hand, South Korea is typically described as 
having been caught up in the war, without knowing about and preparing for the well-planned attack 
by the North Korean communist military with the support of the Soviet Union. The South Korean 
state is thus represented as an innocent and helpless victim in the yugio narrative (ibid., p. 507). The 
yugio narrative ignores the social context and political factors of the war, only to emphasize the 
timing and the North’s action on the day of 25 June, 1950, as the most salient feature that defines the 
whole nature of the war. It thus deprives the war of the meanings and domestic historical context of 
postcoloniality, division, and national liberation, as well as an international Cold War context. The 
war is, as a result, reduced to nothing but the beginning of the evil communists’ violent actions on 
the Korean peninsula. The central storyline of the yugio narrative is that the victim South Korea is 
saved from the evil North’s aggression by bringing in the US as the leader of UN efforts. As a result, 
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the yugio narrative is well-combined with these three themes of the South as a victim, the North as 
the aggressor, and the US as a savior into an epic battle between good and evil. Likewise, in the yugio 
narrative, various memories of the war are erased and alternative understandings are discouraged. In 
the 2000s, however, the yugio narrative has also faced direct challenge. It is now in violent 
confrontation with counter-hegemonic alternative discourses that narrate the war from different 
perspectives. For instance, in alternative discourses, the Korean War is depicted as a civil war that 
began as soon as, or even before, the division in 1945, or as a postcolonial conflict. More importantly, 
those discourses have attempted to view the US role in the war and the South Korean society after 
liberation from different perspectives. 
 South Korea, like other states, and particularly before political democratization, produced an 
official narrative that is uniform and homogenizing, hoping to raise loyalty to the state and unity of 
the people. The voices of individuals and groups whose experiences that diverge from the sanctioned 
master narrative of the Korean War, thereby jeopardizing the hegemonic status of the official memory, 
have been silenced because they could harm the integrity of the official memory. However, the 
contesting accounts of the war gradually emerged throughout the process of democratization and this 
new beginning coincided with the establishment of TRCK. For instance, the mass killings related to 
the National Guidance Alliance (NGA) [Kungminbodo yŏnmaeng] that had been little known now 
came to be widely accepted as true and tragic history to the public. The state power detained tens of 
thousands of civilians and killed many of them in provinces such as Chungcheong and North 
Gyeongsang and on Jeju Island before the North’s attack. In 1949, former communists and their 
sympathizers were forced to join the NGA so that they could be monitored by the state. By the end 
of the year, its membership had grown to about 300,000, many of whom were former political 
prisoners (Suh Jae-Jung 2010, p. 509). It is now a well-known fact that among members of NGA, 
there were innocent civilians who were signed up under threat and others who joined in response to 
offers of food because local officials were under pressure to meet their quotas (Choi Tae Yook 2014, 
pp. 250-52). The military and the police killed as many as 2993 members of NGA before the war as 
a preventative measure to protect South Korea from the ideological invasion of communism without 
considering whether they were genuinely communists or not. The so-called Jeju April 3 incident was 
one of this kind. In April 1948, a mass uprising began on Jeju Island, with hundreds of partisan forces 
active in the mountain areas, opposing the general election that they viewed as intended to legitimize 
Korea’s division (ibid., p. 191). Korean military, police, and para-military forces mobilized to subdue 
the rebellion, and an estimated 15,000 of the 150,000 inhabitants were killed on the island alone (Jeju 
Commission 2003). Another tragedy, commonly called the Yŏsun (Yeosun) incident, happened in 
Yeosu and Suncheon in October 1948 where some units of the rebellion revolted and more than 3,200 
civilians were confirmed to have been killed (Choi Tae Yook 2014, 155). Another happened in 
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November of the same year when the military executed a suppression campaign in South 
Gyeongsang province. The TRCK’s report verified that a total of 12 incidents broke out at this time 
in South Jeolla, South and North Gyeongsang provinces, resulting in 1,090 deaths (TRCK 2010), but 
some argue the number of deaths could have been higher than 2,480 (Sun Jae-jung 2010, p. 510). 
These incidents spread throughout the South, especially in mountain areas where the opposition to 
the South Korean government turned to the hands of guerrillas, many of whom were persecuted by 
the Korean Army before the beginning of the war (Kim Dong-choon 2010, p. 541). 
 One of the primary reasons why the dominant yugio narrative came to be challenged is that 
the victims of state violence and their families have persistently told their stories (ibid., p. 531). In 
the case where a single narrative favored by the state suppresses all alternative voices, the presence 
of individuals who survived violent events or witnessed them is regarded as an existential threat to 
the hegemonic narrative. Thus, the very fact that these individuals survived massive civilian killings 
provides a high possibility of a potent counter narrative. Although the authoritarian regimes 
attempted to oppress the public sphere with legal measures and its security apparatus, survivors and 
their families, who managed to find unexpected forms and places for their stories to stay alive and 
be heard, have helped to construct counter discourses that eventually give rise to alternative 
understandings of the past and the present. The counter-public spheres grew rapidly in the 1980s and 
1990s together with Korea’s democratization in South Korea and the rise of progressive and leftist 
politicians. This forced the state to begin to accept the presence of the alternative narratives. The 
establishment of TRCK was a culmination of the process of democratizing the discourses regarding 
the war (Suh Jae-Jung 2010, p. 511). 
 The Korean War was not only about the competition between the two Koreas for the 
legitimacy to govern the whole nation, but also about a violent confrontation of conflicting ideas 
regarding how to interpret the colonial pasts and how to rebuild the postcolonial Korea. Hence, it is 
significant to notice that controversy over the Korean War is a battle in regard to how to remember 
the colonial past. When Korea was liberated from Japan, it was unclear what kind of new order 
should be pursued in an independent Korea. Competing projects of politicians and activists who had 
wished for Korea’s independence ranged from socialist and communist to nationalist, republican and 
more. In addition, in rebuilding the Korean nation such domestic circumstances were interwoven 
with the two emerging superpowers of the US and the Soviet Union, which complicated the whole 
nation-building process of post-liberation Korea. 
 In this light, alternative perspectives on the war and the division have emerged as seen in 
Em’s analysis of various views. These views do not exactly correspond to any specific time frame. 
For instance, the official narrative, the orthodox view in Em’s terms, which was popular in the 1950s 
has persisted to this day. The critical-interactive view, commonly known as pokhapron in Korea, 
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emerged in the 1980s and has coexisted with other narratives. The rise of more liberal views such as 
the liberal-international view and the heterodox-international view, called chuch’eron, paralleled the 
rise of the student movement in the 1980s. Each of these historiographic positions clearly needs far 
more detailed explanation than can be undertaken here, and the boundaries between the perspectives 
are not as clear as Em’s classification suggests. However, this categorization of historiography helps 
us to realize multiple narratives over the war and the division. More importantly, the diversifying 
historical narratives have helped eventually (re)construct the official narrative of the nation, as it is 
professional historians who write history books, which in turn, significantly affect social and political 
construction of historical narrative. The state official narrative of the war, which prescribes that the 
North should be blamed for the war and division, has been changed in the history textbooks in South 
Korea with political democratization and subsequent open debates and discourses, which will be 
closely studied in chapter 6. 
 
4.2.3 Limits of Truth and Reconciliation Committee, Republic of Korea (TRCK) 
 
 The TRCK was born with such inherent limitations because the Framework Act itself was 
created as a result of political compromise between conservatives and progressives in the National 
Assembly in May 2005. The TRCK defined “its goal as reconciliation through truth” (Jeon Seung-
Hee 2010, p. 627), but from the very beginning its ability to achieve this goal was called into question. 
On one side, the traditional political powers in South Korea attacked the TRCK project as a politically 
motivated tool of revenge, while on the other side, survivors and families of victims expressed doubts 
about its ability to reach its goal. 
 The work of the TRCK, however, has its meaning in that it raised fundamental questions 
about who is the holder of the truth in South Korean society. Although the state power exerted its 
violence on the civilians and perpetrated mass killings, the families of victims have, in reality, no 
choice but to appeal to the same state for grievance settlement. Thus, appealing to the state for 
settlement has ironically often resulted in strengthening the power of a state as the governor of the 
truth and the distributor of apologies and restoration. This is further complicated by the process of 
the Commission in order to confirm truth. Because the final decision within the Commission was 
made by a majority vote, the members of the Commission, the political tendency of the government, 
and the nature of the state have profound influence on the nature of the Commission’s determination 
(Kim Dong-choon 2010, p. 548). Many of the TRCK’s recommendations and accomplishments were 
reversed and the TRCK itself was terminated in 2010 by the conservative government of Lee Myung-
bak, which reveals the vulnerability of the Commission and its fundamental conception, that is, 
speaking truth to the power of the state. The TCRK’s instability also reveals the structural dilemma 
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that the redress movement faced when the commission needed to deal with wrongdoings committed 
by the state. In the case of South Korea especially, considering that most of the alleged past 
wrongdoings were committed by authoritarian regimes or conservative ruling elites, the policy of 
clearing up past wrongdoings under progressive regimes has been regarded as a political threat to 
conservatives and thus resulted in strong opposition from conservative politicians and civic 
organizations, reducing its original and fundamental objectives into something political with a hidden 
agenda to harm the legitimacy of conservatives. This consequently leads us to the deeper question of 
whether the conservative regimes can investigate their own past wrongdoings and punish themselves. 
Hence, one of the challenges the TRCK faced was to keep a balance between functioning as a neutral 
entity, established by the state to pursue an objective truth independent of any demands by civil 
society, and being part of a larger redress movement, led by victims and their families and designed 
to challenge the status quo (Suh Jae-jung 2010, p. 522).  
 Furthermore, its challenge was complicated by its essential binary framework of “victims 
versus perpetrators”, within which it carried out its tasks. The TRCK was given power to prove 
whether the claims of injury and damage filed by victims was true and valid, and it focused on 
investigating whether the self-declared victims did in fact sustain the injury and damage from the 
perpetrators of violence. According to its binary framework, two groups of people’s positions were 
completely overturned: one group of people from security threats to victims; the other from 
protectors and fighters of national values to perpetrators (ibid.). At the same time, in this framework, 
the complicated positions of victims and the nature of the contestation between the two groups were 
essentially simplified or erased. Hence, nationalists, liberals, socialists, and communists were all 
categorized into one group of victims while the personal contexts of their aspirations and motives, 
such as personal revenge or recovering property, were not taken into consideration in determining 
anyone’s status as a victim. Thus, the task of the TRCK essentially included the danger of deleting 
the historical and personal contexts of victims from history. 
 The limitation of TRCK also stems from the fact that the TRCK’s work was fundamentally 
dependent on the changing political context. The TRCK started its work under the progressive Roh 
Moo-hyun administration which fully supported the commission’s activities. However, it was to see 
its hasty ending under the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration that essentially disagreed with 
the commission’s core values (Kim Dong-choon 2012, pp. 202-04). This became evident when state 
officials under the Lee government became uncooperative with TRCK requests along with its 
significant budget cut. Eventually, although the TRCK had the right to request an extension of its 
mandate for up to two more years, its new president appointed by President Lee Myung-bak 
requested only a two-month extension and hurriedly closed down the project of the commission (Kim 
Hun Joon 2013). 
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 It is also pointed out that there were two fundamental limits of the TRCK’s activities, one 
internal and the other external (ibid.). Firstly, the internal limit is placed in the fact that while truth 
commissions are created to investigate the truth, there are different notions of truth: factual or 
forensic; personal or narrative; social or dialogue; and healing or restorative truth. The TRCK aimed 
to focus on the factual or forensic truth of individual cases, unlike the Jeju Commission that 
attempted to create a comprehensive and historical truth in addition to the individual truths of 
particular cases. The Jeju Commission’s final report thus had constructed a single historical narrative 
to tell to society, while in the TRCK report on individual cases, the master narrative was missing. 
For the TRCK, every truth existed as a set of individual facts, failing to form a comprehensive 
narrative that could link the individual cases. The external factor that limited the TRCK’s work could 
be found once again in comparison with the Jeju case, in which local advocacy networks and civil 
society participation were the most important factors in the process of facilitating favorable domestic 
and international conditions. The two and a half years that was given to the Jeju commission was not 
a sufficient amount of time to investigate the half-century old incident where an estimated 15,000 to 
30,000 civilians were killed, but this was made possible with strong local support. Efforts of local 
activists, as well as victims themselves and their families, remained strong not only before and during 
the investigation process of the truth commission process but also even after the release of the 
commission’s final report. This struggle and support empowered local activists and politicians to 
further demand the effective implementation of the commission’s recommendations. This external 
support from local communities and activists was absent in the case of the TRCK (ibid.). 
 The last limitation pointed out in some articles (Suh Jae-jung 2010; Jeon Seung-hee 2010) 
is whether the TRCK’s work can result in reconciliation when, in particular, the policy of clearing 
up the past is highly politicized. This limit is closely related to the vulnerability of the ethnic 
nationalism narrative of progressives that is explained in chapter 3, that is, whether the master 
narrative of progressives can contribute to conflict transformation and reconciliation. The TRCK’s 
binary framework of victims versus perpetrators or truth versus cover-ups, which is also at the core 
of the ethnic nationalism narrative, has empowered the victims to be the bearers of the truth, while 
dividing society and separating victims from perpetrators. As a result, the binary framework of the 
TRCK might unintentionally promote the intensification of conflict, only providing different 
definitions of victims and perpetrators from that of the authoritarian regimes, but still dividing the 








5. Third Juncture: Emergence of the New Right and History War 
 
 The ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives started to be institutionalized under the two 
progressive regimes, initially in foreign policies toward the significant others of the North and the 
US, and later in domestic policies in relation to the concept of self identity, that is, how to interpret 
South Korea’s birth and development. The policy changes in foreign policy mean that the two 
progressive Korean governments of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun attempted to set new relations 
with those significant others based on their own interpretation of Korean identity. Such revitalized 
thinking about national identity necessarily included reevaluation of South Korea’s important 
relationships with North Korea and the US. Consequently, identity plays an increasingly important 
role in shaping Korea’s relations with these nations and policies regarding them. Furthermore, 
progressive regimes sought to “correct” history through such policies as “clearing up the past 
wrongdoings” and the consequent establishment of truth commissions. This chapter deals with the 
second historical juncture of the emergence of the New Right movement from the conservative camp 
that emerged around 2004, with the feeling of crisis raised by progressives’ policy and narrative 
transformation. Strong opposition of the New Right supporters toward the narrative transformation 
and policy change ignited intense debates, the so-called “history war,” in South Korea concerning 
how to view the country’s modern and contemporary history. 
 In the context of constructivists, collective identity has significance in international politics, 
since it informs not only what states do and should be, but also how states interpret other states’ 
intentions and actions. The collective identity of states is, therefore, closely linked to foreign and 
security policies. According to Schweller (2004), cited by Sjöstedt (2013), transforming an issue into 
a threat image “is a subjective one that is only partly determined by objective acts” (p.144) and this 
is clearly in line with the claims of securitization theory, where security is regarded as a speech act. 
That is, securitization needs to be understood as an inter-subjective process: threat perceptions cannot 
be objectively measured. This becomes clear if we look at different attitudes between conservatives 
and progressives toward the North Korean nuclear threat: the former, who see the North as the enemy, 
argue for taking into consideration harder measures like sanctions or military options; the latter, who 
identify North Korea as a partner for co-existence, prefer to have open dialogues and cooperation 
with it. Likewise, narratives on national identity become socially constructed and serve as a source 
of ontological security for a national collective (Son Sarah 2015, p. 48). 
 The great shift in world politics, the end of the Cold War, along with the domestic zeal for 
democratization, greatly disrupted the political landscape in Korea, wherein the legitimacy of 
traditional ruling conservatives was significantly undermined as left-wing and progressive forces 
began to exercise a political voice greater than ever imagined before. As elaborated in the former 
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chapter, with two progressive administrations’ adoption of new policies, the conservative strain and 
its supporters felt threatened by inter-Korean dialogues and cooperation, the historical reevaluation 
of the US, and, more importantly, the reassessment of the birth of South Korea, all of which led to 
casting doubts on the legitimacy of South Korea as a “true” representation of the whole Korean 
nation that authoritarian regimes had claimed beforehand. In this regard, the political activism of 
conservative civil groups that emerged in the 2000s was a kind of reactionary movement in the face 
of social and political challenges threatening the long-standing conservative hegemony in Korean 
society (Kang Chŏng-in 2008; Ryu Dae-young 2004; Eom Han-jin 2004). One of the important 
features of conservatives’ political activism in the 2000s is that it was the civic organizations, not 
formal political institutions, which came to the forefront (Kang Chŏng-in 2008, p. 12). Politically 
conservative civic groups, who had not needed to be politically active before because they had 
enjoyed privileges under the protection of authoritarian regimes, came out to take to the streets to 
raise their voices and to protect their own interests and identity. Conservatism that experienced the 
loss of its hegemonic status in institutional politics under the first progressive regime of Kim Dae-
jung in the late 1990s was now forced to become a resistance ideology in the 2000s. This political 
reversal has made conservatives go through self-reflective reforms in line with the democratic 
political context (Kang Chŏng-in 2008, p.11). Thus, the political activism of conservatives can be 
read as a sign of conservatives’ fear and unease (Lee Nami 2002, p. 37), with the collapse of their 
core identity based on anti-communism. 
 Another point to be noted is that some conservative Protestant organizations have taken an 
active role in conservatives’ political activism since the 2000s. During the ideological chaos after the 
liberation, most Korean Christians found that Christianity and Marxism could not coexist. Then the 
Korean War greatly intensified the anti-communist and pro-American sentiment of the Korean 
Christians. Since then, the pro-American, anti-communist sentiment has been generally shared by 
the entire Korean church. Under the authoritarian regimes, South Korean conservative churches were 
in general apolitical or submissive to power. Ryu Dae-young (2004) argues that the reason some 
evangelical right groups came to the forefront of rightist upsurges in the 2000s is that its leaders 
found a “power vacuum” in Korean society, which was created by the tug-of-war between the cold-
war-period hegemonic conservative groups and the new, reform-oriented progressive camps. This 
active involvement of Protestants in conservative political activism is also deeply related to the anti-
Protestant nature of the ethnic nationalism narrative that views conservative Protestants as pro-US 
and anti-nationalist (Seo Joong-seok 2007). 
 Amid such political and societal shifts, the so-called “New Right” emerged. Briefly defined, 
the New Right was a conservative political movement motivated by the necessity to reinvent 
conservatism for a democratic context. The locus of this movement’s political platform was the free 
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market, that is, neoliberal economic policy. It was when traditional conservatism faced crisis that 
scholars who led the movement of the New Right began to reinterpret Korea’s past (Macrae 2016, p. 
329-30). With the emergence of the New Right movement and its effort to turn South Korean history 
away from the allegedly left-leaning narrative of progressives, the state-sanctioned master narrative 
which had dominated the society before democratization now has evolved into the state-centered 
nationalism narrative, whose ideological foundation is based on neoliberalism (Macrae 2016) and 
South Korea-centered nationalism (Yun Hae-dong 2012), which is similar to patriotism toward South 
Korea as a political entity while based on the ethnic notion of the nation. 
 In the following section, two important factors in the right wing movement in the 2000s will 
be introduced: firstly 1) conservative Protestants who played a leading role in the political activism 
of conservatives/rightists; and then 2) the New Right movement that explosively emerged around 
2004. The role of evangelical rightists in those activities has profound impacts on rightists’ political 
activism. The New Right movement strived to respond to the collapse of their identity based on anti-
communism, which urged conservatives to present a rational, more appealing image in accordance 
with democratic values. In order to accomplish this task, the New Right began by presenting fresh 
conceptions of modern Korean history as well as pursuing neoliberalism as its core principle. Finally, 
the features and limits of the state-centered nationalism narrative that was reshaped with the 
emergence of conservative civic groups’ political activism in the 2000s, as a reaction to the 
progressives’ identity transformation, will be closely examined. 
 
 
5.1 Resistance of Conservatives 
  
 Policy changes under the progressive regimes as seen in the former chapter made proponents 
of conservatism realize the urgent threat to their interests and identity. It was conservative civic 
groups that were actively engaged in political activities such as street protests in the 2000s and in 
particular, among those groups, conservative Protestant organizations took the central position in the 
new conservatives’ political activism of the 2000s (Kang Chŏng-in 2008; Kang In-chŏl 2006; Ryu 
Dae-young 2004; Eom Han-jin 2004). Kang In-cheol (2006) argues that active engagement of 
evangelical churches in political activities encouraged and inspired political conservatives who were 
struggling with their crisis, caused by failing to win the two successive elections in 1997 and 2002 
(pp. 26-32). 
 The political activism of conservatives in the 2000s was a kind of reactionary movement to 
resist policy changes under the progressive regimes, and related to the key concepts of their national 
identity formation: self identity, that is, how to view the birth and development of South Korea; and 
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the two significant others, which means reformation of relations with North Korea and the US. Also, 
it was a reaction to a new form of street protest, candlelight vigil, which has been frequently 
employed since the 2000s by progressive civic groups and civilians where the anti-American and 
anti-conservative sentiments prevailed. As a result, the rightist and conservative civic groups also 
started to actively mobilize their supporters to street protests to express their political opinions in the 
face of a threat to their identity. It is noteworthy that civic organizations took active roles in these, 
rather than formal political institutions. Among those civic groups, it was the evangelical Protestants 
that revitalized conservative civic groups’ political engagement. In the following section, the 
significant role of street protest in South Korean politics will be first introduced. Then the political 
activism of conservative civic groups to resist to reforms led by progressives and the role of 
Protestants in conservative political activism will be researched. A close examination of the New 
Right movement that focused on the controversy over interpretations of South Korean history will 
then follow. Lastly, the characteristics and limits of the state-centered nationalism that derived from 
the pre-existing state-sanctioned narrative will be elaborated on. 
 
5.1.1 Street Protests in South Korea 
 
 South Korea is a special case when it comes to street protest. It was political protest that had 
always propelled South Korea’s democratization. Through the mass uprising in April 1960, South 
Koreans ended the autocratic rule of Rhee Syngman. In June 1987, another mass mobilization 
eventually forced the authoritarian rulers to concede democratic reforms. On the other hand, street 
protest became the new norm in the democratic space of South Korea. The strategies of street protests 
in South Korea were developed over decades, in often painful and dangerous circumstances. In the 
l980s, such harsh countermeasures as tear gas and torture were employed by the state forces. Political 
activists and student movement leaders expressed their dissent to the state authority through protests 
over a wide range of causes, from press freedom, trade policies, farmers’ and laborers’ rights, and 
toward the US military presence. However, it is lay people, civic organizations and even opposition 
political parties and lawmakers who have taken to the streets since the 2000s in a nonviolent and 
peaceful way in protest at government policies. Observing the pervasiveness of protest in South 
Korea in 2008, an Al Jazeera reporter came to the conclusion that “protest has become part of [South 
Korean] culture” (cited in Kim Sun-chul 2017). Through analysis of the causes that prompted the 
mobilization for street protests during the 1990s and 2000s against US military bases in the South, it 
is argued that “the protest movement actually became quite powerful” in South Korea (Lahiri 2017). 
Those experiences of street protests shaped the recent massive candlelight protests over the issue of 
President Park’s impeachment in 2016 and 2017. 
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 The advent of the candlelight vigil as a new form of protest in 2002 signified important 
changes distinct from earlier forms of protest. In the past, a protest scene in South Korea was filled 
with violent clashes and the exchange of tear gas between protesters and riot police. Violent protests 
persisted into the 1990s, well after South Korea’s democratic transition, but the emergence of the 
candlelight protest offered a new platform that enabled protesters to express their seriousness of 
intent through peaceful means. Specifically, the 2016-17 candlelight protests to impeach President 
Park Geun-hye were remarkable in their absence of violence, despite the high political tension and 
massive number of protesters gathered. On the one hand, this had to do with greater tolerance on the 
part of the police and favorable court rulings that opened up new marching routes previously 
unavailable to the protesters. But it also had much to do with the adept handling of the rallies and 
marches by the organizers. Combined with unprecedented levels of frustration and anger among 
South Koreans, the outcome was explosive. Week after week, the coalition of more than 1500 civic 
organizations successfully mobilized millions of South Koreans on the streets in dozens of cities and 
channeled their anger into a powerful political message. Eventually, the candlelight protests pushed 
initially reluctant lawmakers to cast their vote for the impeachment of the president in the National 
Assembly, marking one of the most significant events in South Korea’s political history. 
 While the success of the anti-Park candlelight protest illuminates the growth and maturity of 
civil society in South Korea, it brings attention to the weakness of its party system and institutional 
politics as a mechanism for political mediation. In South Korea, a typical party is built around a 
single leader at the center, without a strong party base grounded in grassroots demands or interests. 
Political scientists call Korea’s parties “cadre parties,” meaning elite driven rather than mass-oriented, 
“electoral-professional parties,” focused on winning office rather than enacting platforms, and 
“catchall parties,” not reflecting the interests of any particular class or group (Shin & Moon 2017, p. 
120). In this context, it is civil society organizations that do the work of aggregating interests and 
addressing demands, which are typically the roles of parties in countries where parties are stronger. 
In the absence of stable political parties with which to communicate political agendas and develop a 
shared identity, civil society organizations often bypass the mediation of political parties when it 
comes to promoting new agendas or resisting policies. Consequently, direct action such as street 
protest is frequently used as a tool to mobilize the public and to attract the decision makers’ attention. 
There are some signs that other democratic processes are developing alongside protest tactics, such 
as a campaign to set up a website to help lay people contact elected officials. But for the most part, 
South Koreans, distrust their leaders and institutions, which explains the reason why they rely so 
heavily on protest above all other forms of democratic action. South Korean political parties have 
been characterized by their extreme fluidity, which involves frequent splits, mergers and name 
changes. As Katherine Moon concludes, “If governance structures were working properly then 
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citizens normally would be channeling their concerns through institutional processes such as 
reaching out to their elected leaders, and going to the courts. Spilling out into the street is a sign of 
political dysfunction” (Lahiri 2017). Furthermore, street protest culture means that civic groups and 
social activists play a key role in South Korean politics through constructing public discourses and 
mobilizing the people to action. 
 In this regard, conservative civic groups came to the fore of conservatives’ political activism 
in the 2000s and since then have utilized street protest as a tool to resist policy changes and the 
narrative transformation of progressives. It is interesting that street protest was a favored instrument 
of progressives/leftists who were against the authoritarian regimes before the democratization. Now, 
it has been adopted as an instrument to express the resistance of conservatives who have lost their 
dominance in politics and society. 
  
5.1.2 Political Activism of Conservative Civil Society 
 
 Rye Dae-young (2004) points out that political activism of conservative civic groups came 
to fore in the context of the end of the Cold War and the democratization of South Korea, which 
resulted from weakening anti-communism and strengthening anti-Americanism, which were 
regarded as threats to core values of conservative national identity. Therefore, conservatives who felt 
insecure with the engagement policy with the North and the reevaluation of relations with the US 
under the two progressive regimes of Kim and Roh could not but resist these progressives’ attempts 
to reshape the national identity. After democratization, political activities of progressive civil society 
were explosively intensified, especially in such cases as candlelight protests, which ironically ignited 
conservative civic groups’ political engagement. In this light, the political activism of conservatives 
was a reactionary movement as well as an imitation of progressives’ political activism. 
 The use of candlelight as a specific form of street protest in South Korea can be traced back 
to 2002 when two teenage girls were killed by US armored vehicles on military training maneuvers. 
Thousands gathered in Gwanghwamun Square to commemorate the victims. The candlelight protest 
was then picked up by activist groups and turned into a symbol of the movement against the perceived 
injustice. Ever since 2002, mass demonstrations in South Korea have taken the form of candlelight 
vigil and there have been three more cases of mass candlelight protests: 2004 against the 
impeachment of President Roh Moo-hyun; 2008 ignited by the sudden resumption of the importation 
of US beef products; 2016-17 to call for Park’s impeachment. 
 What this research points out is that although it had been largely ignored until thousands of 
people gathered in the counter-candlelight, so-called ‘Taegukgi’, protests of 2016 and 2017 to support 
President Park, there have existed reactionary protests organized by conservative Protestant 
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organizations together with rightist civic groups whenever candlelight protests happen, and these 
have occurred since the first candlelight vigils in 2002. The 2002 candlelight protests called for the 
revision of an agreement between South Korea and the US, commonly called the Status of Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), concerning the treatment of US forces in South Korea, punishment of the US 
soldiers responsible and the official apology from the US government, none of which have ever been 
realized. It was the upsurge of anti-American sentiment and discourses in the candlelight vigil in 
2002 that ignited a kind of reactionary movement, the counter-candlelight protests. The strong 
alliance with the US along with anti-communism has been at the core of national identity of most 
conservatives, and anti-Americanism expressed through candlelight vigils made them feel a sense of 
their own national identity crisis. As a reaction to this, rightist groups with strong support from 
Protestants successfully held street protests, such as the “Anti-Nuclear, Anti-Kim (Jong Il) and 
Unification 3.1 National Convention for Unification (Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Kim),” on March 1, 2003, 
the “Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Kim 6.25 National Convention for Strong Alliance with the US” on June 
21, 2003 and “The 55th anniversary of National Foundation Day, Anti-Nuclear and Anti-Kim 8.15 
National Convention” on August 15, 2003. What ignited this series of mass gatherings of rightists 
was the “Peace Prayer Meeting for Our State and Nation” on January 11 and 19, 2003, organized by 
the Christian Council of Korea (CCK) and the Korea Christian Leaders Association where Korean 
and American National flags were being waved to signify strong ties between the two (Kang Chŏng-
in 2008, p. 13). In a rightist monthly magazine, Wŏlgan Chosun, it was reported that mega churches 
provided financial support for the “Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Kim” protest, as well as mobilizing church 
members to the event (Cho Gab-je 2003). Cho Gab-je (2003) claims in his article, issued right after 
the “Anti-Nuclear/Anti-Kim” street protest, that current conflicts in South Korea are a matter of 
whether you are on the side of South Korea or Kim Jong-il in the North, freedom or dictatorship, and 
patriots or turncoats, rather than a matter of whether you are one of the conservatives or progressives, 
and rightists or leftists. Cho Gab-je (2017) also maintains that Taegukgi protests stem from the “Anti-
Nuclear and Anti-Kim (Jong Il) Unification 3.1 National Convention for Unification (Anti-
Nuclear/Anti-Kim)” protest in 2003. Protestant leaders and organizations emerged as key players in 
organizing street protests of conservatives through this series of mass gatherings in 2003, when the 
political conservatives lost their mobilizing power with the failure of presidential elections in 1997 
and 2002, which will be further discussed in a later section. Political activism of conservatives did 
not emerge overnight. A series of conservatives’ mass gatherings in 2003 was a reaction to a series 
of policy changes that happened under the Kim Dae-jung government, such as in relations with North 
Korea and the US. Those conservatives who came out to the streets in 2003 were those who strongly 
felt the need to protect their core values of anti-communism and pro-Americanism (Ryu Dae-young 
2004, p. 60). 
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 This political activism of conservatives was further intensified under another progressive 
regime of Roh Moo-hyun. On March 12, 2004, the National Assembly voted to impeach President 
Roh Moo-hyun for breaching an election law, and he was forced into two months of political limbo. 
The impeachment came about because the conservative opposition, which at the time dominated 
South Korea’s parliament, argued the president had contravened the country’s voting rules by openly 
supporting the Uri party in the run-up to assembly elections. This drove thousands of people onto 
the streets in protest. Some 170 people, mainly from “Nosamo”, the official Roh Moo-hyun camp 
support group, gathered to urge South Korean lawmakers to nullify the impeachment discussion, five 
days before the motion of impeachment was to be put to a vote. On the day the impeachment motion 
was passed, about 12,000 people protested near the National Assembly, declaring that Roh’s 
impeachment was invalid. The number of people who gathered to rally reached 70,000 on the 
following day (Kim Mi-young 2004). Weekly rallies reached their peak on March 20, when at least 
200,000 people took to the streets in over 50 cities across the country, according to the rally organizer 
(Kim Da-sol 2016). In a survey by the Yonhap News agency, of 1,018 South Koreans on March 12, 
7 out of 10 said they felt the vote to impeach was improper. About a month later, voters punished 
conservative parliamentary candidates with a victory for the Uri party in the general elections on 
April 15, 2004 (Joongang Ilbo 2004). The Uri party won control of the National Assembly, tripling 
their seats to 152 to take a majority, thanks to voters’ fury against the impeachment. In May, the 
Constitutional Court overturned the verdict, saying Roh had violated the law, but not gravely enough 
to warrant his removal from the presidency. There was a series of counter-candlelight protests 
organized by 369 conservative civic groups, supporting the impeachment and accusing the media of 
manipulating the public survey (Yonhap News 2004). While conservative Christian organizations did 
not actively participate in counter-candlelight over the issue of the Roh’s impeachment, the CCK 
together with over 300 other rightist civic groups actively convened protests or mass prayer meetings 
whenever necessary to oppose policies of the Roh government. For instance, a mass street protest 
was held at the Seoul City Hall square on October 4, 2004, called “10.4 National Convention to 
protect National Security Law”, where more than 100,000 people were mobilized (Cho Ho-jin & 
Kim Ji-eŭn 2004). Korean national flags along with American National flags were waved and 
prominent Protestant ministers participated. For conservatives, the presence of National Security 
Law has its importance to protect their ideology and identity from the threats of communists and 
North Korea. A minister of Kŭmran church, one of megachurches in Seoul, Kim Hong-do, claimed 
in the protest that the current society of South Korea was full of secret agents for North Korea and 
that Protestant churches should take a leading role in driving out those followers of North Korea and 
communists from South Korean society (Baek Chan-hong 2009). As seen in these cases, Protestant 
churches have actively raised their voices regarding the issue related to the core value of national 
１５５ 
	  
identity they hold. 
 Not only do Protestant churches take to the streets to protest against progressive regimes 
over the issues related to anti-communism or pro-Americanism, but they have also actively organized 
mass street protests over issues related to their interests. When the Roh administration pursued the 
revision of the Private School Act in 2004, conservative churches together with conservative 
politicians strongly expressed their opposition to the revision through street protests as well as 
lobbying. This was because around 80 percent of private schools in South Korea are run by Christian 
organizations. The already bad relations between Protestant churches and President Roh Moo-hyun 
worsened with the issue of the Private School Act revision. It was even argued later that Korean 
Protestant churches were the main political enemy of progressive President Roh Moo-hyun (ibid.). 
 In the summer of 2008, once again, a series of candlelight protests took place in major South 
Korean cities in response to the Lee Myung-bak government’s decision to resume US beef 
importation. The ban on US beef imports had been placed in 2003 after the discovery of mad cow 
disease in the United States. The new deal by the Lee government included the removal of the 
regulation that limited imports of beef from cattle under 30 months old, which were believed to 
increase the risk of mad cow disease. Triggered by this public health concern, the candlelight protests 
continued for more than 3 months. The number of protest participants reached 120,000 on 5 June, 
200,000 on 6 June, and the rally held on 10 June climaxed with one million people (Lee Keehyeung 
2017). Despite the known risks, the Korean government justified its decision by claiming that 
resumption of the US beef market was the country’s best path to economic growth. Korea’s approval 
of beef imports was, indeed, given for the purpose of an expanded trade agreement with the US. 
Korea’s desire for the Republic of Korea and the United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) was 
accompanied by US insistence on resuming the beef imports. Tension mounted between the 
candlelight protesters’ value of health safety and the government’s value of economic growth. Lee’s 
government was paralyzed by protesters’ outpourings of anti-regime sentiment. Once again, it was 
conservative Protestants that started to hold a series of mass prayer meetings as a reaction to the 2008 
candlelight protests.  Conservative Protestants felt a strong sense of crisis largely due to anti-
(conservative) regime/anti-American sentiments and discourses which prevailed in the protests. In 
the “Special Prayer Meeting for Unity of the Nation” organized by the CCK, the retired minister, 
David Yonngi Cho (Cho Yong-ki) of the world’s largest Yoido Full Gospel Church, had the main 
speech, making accusations of false rumors about mad cow disease as an evil plot by Satan (Cho 
Hye-jin 2008). Furthermore, he argued that false rumors that caused people to have “mad-cow 
disease phobia” were also an attempt to drive a wedge between South Korea and the US. The 
Protestant groups organized more mass prayer meetings in August and expressed appreciation for 
Bush’s visit to Korea, saying that we should be thankful to God who sends us America in the time of 
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a crisis (Lee So-hŭn 2008). The US president George W. Bush mentioned as a response that Korean 
churches had always prayed for the nation whenever it faced a crisis. There were other smaller prayer 
meetings held in several megachurches in Seoul. Likewise, Protestant churches utilized mass prayer 
meetings as a chance to fight against candlelight protests in 2008 which raised critical voices against 
America. As seen in counter-candlelight protests in 2002 and 2008, anti-US sentiment shown in 
candlelight protests intensified conservatives’ and Protestant churches’ strong reactions and feelings 
of crisis. 
 The 2016-17 candlelight protest over the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye was 
distinctive in many ways. Beginning in October 2016, South Koreans began gathering weekly to 
protest against President Park Geun-hye after the news reports that she had been unduly influenced 
by a close confidante. In December 2016, days after a massive gathering in the capital’s 
Gwanhwamun Square, the South Korean National Assembly voted to impeach Park. Specifically, the 
candlelight protests in 2016 and 2017 were remarkable in the absence of violence considering the 
massive number of people who gathered. The weekly candlelight protests were organized by 
“Emergency Action for Park’s Resignation”, a coalition of more than 1500 civic organizations. In 
the past, the work of large coalitions was often disrupted by fierce infighting among competing 
groups. To avoid discord, the anti-Park coalition set rules for decision-making based on the lowest 
common denominator among participant organizations. Combined with unprecedented levels of 
frustration and anger among South Koreans, the outcome was explosive. Week after week, the 
coalition successfully mobilized millions of South Koreans on the streets of dozens of cities and 
channeled their anger into a powerful political message. Eventually, the candlelight protests pushed 
reluctant lawmakers to cast their vote to impeach the president in the National Assembly, marking 
one of the most significant events in South Korea’s political history. 
 On the other hand, the bigger the anti-Park candlelight protests grew, the more people also 
gathered in pro-Park protests, commonly called “Taegukgi [the South Korean national flag] rallies”. 
Waving the national flags along with the US stars and stripes, and shouting military-style slogans, 
tens of thousands of supporters of the arrested former president Park rallied. Gathering in streets near 
Seoul City Hall, Park’s supporters, many of them in their 60s or older, shouted for the release of 
President Park and the dismissal of the National Assembly, and roared in approval when organizers 
of Taegukgi rallies accused Park’s political rivals of being leftist North Korea sympathizers and 
turncoats. The beginning of the 2016-17 Taegukgi protest as a counter-candlelight movement also 
took the form of a Protestant mass prayer meeting. Yang Dong-an, a right-wing journalist and 
researcher, explains that the beginning of the Taegukgi protests in 2016 was the “Mizpah National 
Prayer Meeting” on 6 November, organized by a Christian coalition group, “National Prayer 
Association”, whose actual leader was Lee Yong-hee, the leader of the Esther Prayer Movement 
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(Chinchŏng Bangsong 2017). Soon after that, a Protestant new-right organization, called the “New 
Korea Movement” led by a minister, Seo Kyung-seok, first held pro-Park protests on November 10, 
2016. These two separate counter-candlelight mass protests organized by conservative Christian 
groups sparked so-called Taegukgi rallies, which were organized by political rightist groups 
including “Parksamo”, Park’s supporters’ group, together with Christian groups, having the first 
Taegukgi rallies on 19 November. Since then, Christian groups have joined the Taegukgi protests 
while they also have organized their own separate counter-candlelight protests in the form of mass 
prayer meetings. 
 Political activism of conservatives ignited as a reaction to the strong political activism of 
progressives, such as candlelight protests. This led to the emergence of the “New Right” movement, 
under which conservative intellectuals, religious leaders and civic organizations were actively united. 
 
5.1.3 Protestant Churches in Conservative Political Activism 
  
 Although some media as well as religious studies started to emphasize the political activism 
of conservative civil society since the 2000s, as well as the role of the Protestants in right-wing 
movements, it has not received much attention from political science compared to candlelight protest. 
However, more critical analysis should be paid to emerging conservative political activism because 
even though the traditional conservative political party has lost its hegemony in formal politics, there 
are still many who ascribe to conservative ideology and identity through which they see all societal 
and political issues. For instance, at the time of writing the expectation of peaceful coexistence of 
the two Koreas on the peninsula is higher than ever, with inter-Korean summits along with the 
historical encounters of American and North Korean leaders at the DPRK-US summits. However, 
some of the public still hold a pessimistic view over the idea that the North will abandon their nuclear 
program for a peaceful aim, and are skeptical about the current Moon administration’s effort to lift 
sanctions even before the denuclearization processes are initiated by the North. According to a survey 
in 2017 about North Korean policy to relieve inter-Korean tension, 60% of conservatives prioritize 
the sanctions, while about 80 % of progressive Democratic party supporters prefer diplomatic options 
(Yu Chŏng-in 2017). Also, regarding the question of who is the most important partner for the South 
in the case of the security crisis on the peninsula, among those who identified as progressives, slightly 
fewer than half (48.4%) chose Donald Trump while 20% regarded Kim Chung-Un as the most 
important. This is in sharp contrast with the outcome that among conservatives, 8 out of 10 (77.8 %) 
chose Trump as the most important partner to discuss the security concerns, and only 5.2%, chose 
Kim. As can be seen, regarding the two significant others of the North and the US, as well as security 
concerns, Korean society is extremely divided based on different understandings of national identity. 
１５８ 
	  
Therefore, the understanding of political activism of conservative civic organizations has its 
important meaning in order to fully grasp the divided nature of South Korean society over the 
national identity conception. 
 As elaborated in the previous chapter, in the 2000s progressive governments started to 
institutionalize their national identity concept into various policy areas. This created strong 
opposition from conservative politicians and civil societies, among which Christian groups were one 
of the most active players. Hankyoreh, the progressive media outlet, recently claimed that Protestant 
rightists were at the center of producing fake news against the current Moon government, which well 
illustrates that the progressives pay sharp attention to conservative Protestants as a key player in the 
right-wing movement (Kim wan et al. 2018). The Christian civic groups who have been very active 
in participating or organizing street protests such as the counter-candlelight protest since the 2000s, 
are now taking the more significant role in political rightist resistance to the progressive regimes’ 
various policies, such as the change of constitution. Thus, in the following section the growing 
importance of the role of evangelical conservatives in conservative political activism will be 
discussed in more depth. 
 Since 9/11 in 2001, religion has acquired or perhaps reacquired a new salience in 
International Politics that it lacked before. According to Inboden (2008), religion was a major factor 
in the early Cold War in America (p.ix). American churches helped define America’s understanding 
of itself and its place in the world. That is, Christianity affected the formation of American national 
identity (ibid., p.1). And this was also true for many South Korean elites who tried to shape the 
national identity of a newly built state in the context of the Cold War under the great influence of the 
US. Many American political leaders believed that their nation had a divine calling to oppose the 
Soviet Union during the Cold War, and to reshape the world according to the divine design (ibid., p. 
4). This mission arose in general because they perceived communism to be inherently evil, and 
particularly because of communism’s dogmatic atheism. Americans found it even more ominous that 
not only were communists attempting to remove religious faith in their own state, but also they were 
seeking to spread their atheistic materialism around the world. This was, for many Americans, cause 
to fight. In addition, religion functioned as an instrument in America’s Cold War effort. The American 
government tried to use religion as a tool for both internally strengthening anti-communism at home 
and externally undermining communism abroad. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower, along with 
many other political and religious leaders, constantly reminded Americans of the centrality of 
religious faith in their national heritage, of the connection between faith in God and human rights 
and freedoms, of the special responsibility to which God had called America, and of communism’s 
atheism and hostility to religion. Woodrow Wilson, who claimed that sometimes peace would have 
to be pushed aside to protect and promote freedom, made his famous statement to “make the world 
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safe for democracy” at the Congress on April 2, 1917, calling the nation to war (ibid., p. 12). His 
message also sought to bring together the principles of peace and freedom: “We shall fight for … a 
universal dominion of right by such a concert of free peoples as shall bring peace and safety to all 
nations and make the world at last free” (ibid.). George Kennan, an American diplomat, developed 
the strategic doctrine of “containment”, which defined American foreign policy throughout the Cold 
War. For Kennan and many other American leaders, religious faith served as a stark dividing line 
between the spiritual United States and the atheist USSR, and helped draw the very clear boundary 
between self and the other who should be contained (ibid., p. 17-18). American Protestantism itself 
during the Cold War era experienced profound debates to define its own identity, asking questions 
like who they were, who spoke for them, what they stood for and what they stood against. During 
this process of self identification, American Protestantism found itself in need of transformation in 
response to changes within domestic American culture, in which pluralism was gaining hegemony, 
as well as in the world, where the evil enemy of communism threatened religious faith. This 
transformation of American Protestantism in the context of the Cold War severely affected the 
mindset of early Korean Christian elites as well as political elites, particularly those who had been 
educated in the west at that time. They sought to establish South Korea as a liberal democratic state 
following the model of the US. As Inboden argues, without the theological context the Cold War 
cannot be understood (ibid., p. 19). 
 South Korea is a secular state as stipulated in its constitution. Although it has witnessed the 
revitalization of conservative churches’ political activism since the 2000s, Protestants’ political 
engagement is actually nothing new in Korea. Whether they be conservative or progressive strains, 
Christian groups have been regarded as political and social entities from the very beginning. Bae 
Dŏk-man asserts that Korean Protestant churches have never been separated from politics in its 
history (cited in Cho Hae-jin 2016). Also, the critical role of Protestants in South Korean politics and 
society is highlighted by Korean scholars (Kim Dong-choon 2015; Kang In-Cheol 1993; Yun Chŏng-
ran 2015). Kim Dong-choon asserts that South Korea is a country established by wŏlnamcha [North 
Korean defectors] (cited in Lee Dae-hee 2015), those who escaped from the north to the south 
between 1945 and 1953. Particularly, many of those early defectors were Christian elites that faced 
oppression from communists in the north after liberation. It is, furthermore, claimed that the 
conflicting structure of South Korean society was framed by battles between Protestantism and 
communism (Kim Dong-choon 2015). After the Korean War, the ideological conflicts between 
rightists and leftists permeated all levels of Korean society and these conflicts have been well 
discovered in recent protests over the former conservative president Park’s impeachment: candlelight 
protests that began to call for her to step down, and the Taegukgi rally to support Park, where a large 
crowd of Park’s supporters denounced Park’s political rivals as leftist North Korean sympathizers. 
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The conservative narrative, which simply categorizes political opponents as communists and defines 
them as threats to South Korean security, is based on the clear distinction between “good self” and 
“evil communist.” However, as argued in the chapter 3, the ethnic nationalism narrative of 
progressives is also based on the clear dichotomy between nationalists as good self and anti-
nationalists (pro-Japanese and pro-American collaborators, including most of the current Christian 
and ruling elites) as evil others. Based on this formation of self and other, it assumes that current 
conservatives who have enjoyed privileges since the establishment of South Korea are descendants 
of those pro-Japanese collaborators, and so they are anti-nationalists and traitors to the nation and 
have no legitimate right to enjoy those political and social powers in Korean society. Kyunghyang 
Sinmun analyzes that the reason why conservatives stick to the idea that South Korea was established 
in 1948, when there was the UN-monitored first election on the Korean peninsula, is to erase the 
history of their past wrong-doings as pro-Japanese collaborators by focusing on South Korea’s 
history only after 1948 (Song Hyŏn-sook 2015). The fact that both narratives are based on the 
dualism between “good self” and “evil enemy”, although the definitions of self and others are very 
different, is well illustrated in the argument of Kim Yong-sam (2015) that the history textbook is the 
battlefield between two frames: the North Korean follower [chongbuk] frame of rightists and the pro-
Japanese collaborator [ch’inilpa] frame of leftists. 
 The close relations between the conservative strain of Protestant churches and political 
conservatives have been often criticized by progressive intellectuals and politicians. For instance, 
Seo Joong-seok (2007), a leading progressive historian, maintains that “the pro-Japanese 
collaborators are generally also pro-US” (p.91), heavily influenced by a west-centered Christian 
worldview. As seen in chapter 3, the progressive narrative identity assumes pro-Japanese 
collaborators and Westernized Koreans (mostly pro-US and Christian) were strongly connected. It is 
important to note that by arguing for the connection of those people in history, Seo emphasizes that 
the current conservative ruling elites are closely related to those pro-Japanese collaborators and 
Westernized Koreans, describing them as anti-nationalists and traitors to the nation. This perspective 
clearly shows the fact that the ethnic nationalism narrative constructed by progressive/leftist 
historians is also based on the clear dichotomy between the nation and nationalists as the self, and 
pro-Japanese, pro-US collaborators (including Christians) and the privileged class as anti-nationalists, 
traitors and therefore, the hostile other. This dichotomy is justified by asserting that the nation is the 
only value available for all Koreans which is true and absolute. According to this narrative, it seems 
evident that Christians, the majority of whom belong to the conservative strain of churches in South 
Korea, are categorized as those who are highly likely to be pro-American, and thus anti-national. 
 




 To fully understand how the Protestants have emerged as a strong political force in current 
South Korea, the history of Korean Protestant churches that shaped Korean churches’ distinctive 
features should be taken into consideration. 
 Early Korean churches clearly showed an intellectual and nationalist tendency, and were a 
progressive element of the time. Anti-communism, however, started to be strengthened among early 
evangelicals with the influx of socialism and communism in the 1920s, which was fundamentally 
anti-religious, and thus an anti-Christian movement in Korea. Chŏng Sŏng-han (2015) argues that 
after liberation, early Korean Protestants realized that they were facing two urgent assignments: first, 
the re-establishment of the nation, and second, of the church (p. 17). In the northern part of the 
peninsula, the Christian communities were under the monitoring force of the Soviet military and 
oppression from communists. In the southern area, Christian groups that showed any signs of left-
leaning tendency or activities were oppressed by the US military government. This historical context 
signifies that in both areas of the peninsula, Protestant groups were treated as political entities. South 
and North Koreas’ Protestant leaders have, indeed, become deeply engaged in ideological battles as 
well as secular politics in the two Koreas. Anti-communism among Christians was further intensified 
by experiencing direct encounters and conflicts with communists after liberation and during the 
Korean War. Particularly, in the northern area of the peninsula, called Sŏbuk [north west] that refers 
to most of the area of the current North Korean territory of Pyongan, Hwanhae, Hamkyong provinces, 
and where Christianity was strongest on the Korean peninsula at the time (Yun Chŏng-ran 2015, 
p.15), churches experienced violent conflicts with socialists and communists who started dominating 
the area right after liberation. Thus, many Christian leaders and elites in northern provinces had to 
flee to the south. In the south, they were actively involved in anti-communist activities and also 
enthusiastically supported the US military government and Rhee Syngman’s idea to build the Korean 
nation as a liberal anti-communist state (ibid., pp. 217-240). 
 After the liberation from Japan in 1945, church growth accelerated. This was achieved in a 
pro-Western and pro-Christian atmosphere created by secular political forces. Following the Korean 
War, along with rapid economic growth and urbanization in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, the churches 
continued to grow in numbers and in influence. As Pak Chŏng-sin (2003) argues, the growth of 
Protestantism in Korea has been a historical phenomenon greatly affected by the church’s 
involvement, whether positively or negatively, in a series of changes and developments in society 
and in the politics of South Korea (p. 200). Indeed, religion cannot be isolated from social and 
political trends in society. The Protestants are also a living, breathing organism consisting of 
individuals who live in history and experience everyday events. Martin Marty, a theologian and 
church historian, argued as early in 1930 that Korea “was well on its way to being the most 
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Christianized nation in Asia” (cited in ibid., p.3). As predicted, South Korea, indeed, saw the 
incredible growth of the Protestant church with its political and economic developments in the post-
war era. 
 The relationship between the Protestant church community and Korean politics has often 
been studied from the perspective of the former’s theological and doctrinal orientation. However, 
Pak Chŏng-shin (2003) claims that although theology has influenced the Korean church’s political 
behavior, theology has primarily functioned rather to justify and reinforce Protestant Christians’ 
political positions and activities (p. 201). The church’s growth indicated the explosively growth in 
the number of its followers as well as enlargement of its influence in Korea. In the process of its 
growth, the Protestant church became institutionalized and a church hierarchy and a leadership were 
formed and institutionalized. This religious leadership with its immense material and human 
resources came to exercise a vast influence beyond the Protestant church society. Protestantism in 
Korea developed from being an unaccepted Western religion one century ago to now being an 
accepted and further flourishing one. The more Protestant denominations became institutionalized 
and the more influence church leaders exerted in society and politics, the more factions and groupings 
within the religious community emerged and the more division, conflict, and rivalry were observed. 
As church members, particularly clerical and lay leaders, secured their positions socially and 
economically, the church lost its character of resistance against established society and power, while 
conforming to the authorities and the status quo. Korean Protestant Christianity went through a 
dramatic transformation, from being a revolutionary religion, seeking to replace Confucianism and 
opposing early Japanese colonial rule, to an established religion in line with the status quo in late 
colonial Korea, and obviously later in South Korea. The first converts to the new religion from the 
West were, in general, the poor and oppressed or business owners who were socially discriminated 
against in the Confucian society, along with some young ruling elites [yangban] who had difficulty 
in taking positions in central politics (Yun Chŏng-ran 2015, pp. 32-35). At the beginning, therefore, 
the outlook of this small group of Christians was one of resistance toward the Confucian 
establishment. The early Protestant church was indeed the leading force for social and political 
reforms in Korea. During the early Japanese colonial period, the religion grew rapidly to become the 
largest organized community for colonized Koreans, as many frustrated Koreans joined seeking 
spiritual solace or an organizational base for nationalist activity. During this period the church 
functioned as a social and political community of Koreans, and the Japanese colonial government 
considered the religious community a center for anti-Japanese activities. In short, the more the 
colonial government suppressed the Protestant church, the more Koreans joined it, and the more 




 During the period between its introduction and the outbreak of the March First Movement 
in 1919, the Protestant church’s position was unique in Korean society. It had been the largest center 
of progressive reform activities in late Confucian Korea. And the religious community was the only 
institution allowed to function even when all other political and social organizations and activities 
were banned, and thus served as a forum for political discussion, a political training ground, and a 
place to exchange political information in early colonial Korea (Pak Chŏng-sin 2003, p. 4-5). The 
Protestant communities that Koreans utilized for the purpose of their social and political activities 
naturally became the center of Korean social and political independent movements, including the 
March First Movement. Church leaders also eagerly supported nationalists who used the religious 
community as a base for their activities. However, Protestants’ involvement in resistance movements 
turned into more individual and moderate forms during the late colonial period, although individual 
Protestants continued to participate in a variety of nationalist activities to bring about the end of 
Japanese rule. This shift occurred in the organizational and ideological relationship between the 
Protestant church and Korean nationalists after the March First Movement of 1919 (ibid., p. 5). Right 
after the March First Movement of 1919, the Japanese colonial government adopted a more 
conciliatory approach. During the period of this so-called “cultural rule,” Koreans formed thousands 
of small social and political organizations outside the religious communities. Naturally, the church’s 
role as the center of nationalist activity was greatly diminished, and the church was no longer the 
sole center of nationalist endeavors. 
 Another interesting historical phenomenon is that Christians came to assume leadership 
positions in politics and society immediately after the 1945 liberation from Japan. Yŏ Un-hyŏng, 
Kim Ku, Kim Kyu-sik, Hŏ Hŏn, Rhee Syngman, and other prominent leaders in the South, and Cho 
Man-sik, Hyŏn Chun-hyŏk, Kang Yang-uk, Yun Ha-yŏng, and others in the North were church 
leaders who emerged as national leaders (ibid., p. 202). Liberation and division brought a great 
change to Protestantism in South Korea. Protestant Christianity now became a religion approved of 
and shared by the United States and the government of Rhee Syngman, who himself was a Christian. 
In terms of Christians’ influence in the newly built South Korean society and politics, it is noteworthy 
that Christians accounted for some 40 % of political leadership positions, which is significant 
considering that Christians only constituted about 0.5 % of the South Korean population at the time 
of post-liberation (Kang In-cheol 2009, p. 176). Christian ceremonies were widely adopted in public 
functions, Christmas became a national holiday, and a chaplain system was established in the military 
(ibid., p. 178). Thus, many historians believe that all the signs in post-liberation South Korea pointed 
to the beginning of “a Christian era” (Pak Chŏng-sin 2003, p. 6). 
 At his inauguration as the first president of the Republic of Korea on August 15, 1948, Rhee 
Syngman took an oath of office with his hand on the Bible, unprecedented in Korean history. At the 
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opening ceremony of the National Assembly, Rhee asked the audience to rise and had Assemblyman 
Yi Yun-yŏng, a Christian minister, lead a prayer of thanks. This was also unprecedented, and not 
even part of the printed program (ibid., p. 173-74). Christian ministers and lay members assumed 
influential positions in politics and society in the Rhee era. For instance, President Rhee was a church 
elder, and Vice-President Han T’ae-yŏng and Yi Yung-yŏng, acting prime minister during the early 
years of the republic, were ministers. Christian ministers and lay leaders accounted for 21 % of the 
first National Assembly, 25% of the second, and around 20% of the third and the fourth under the 
Rhee administration (Kang In-cheol 2009, p. 177). 
 Although such circumstances as the US occupation and the emergence of Rhee Syngman 
helped Christians to consolidate their leadership position in society, Christians had already become 
a dominant political force in Korea by the time of the liberation from Japan. Christianity was the 
most organized religion and the most powerful social force although the number of followers was 
still low compared to the whole population in that there was simply no other group comparable in 
organization and number to the Christian church immediately after the liberation (Kang In-cheol 
1992). All other groups, such as those of businessmen, bureaucrats, policemen, soldiers, and even 
politicians, had been disorganized under the colonial rule or in the process of regrouping after 
liberation. Church leaders had better education, more experience in politics and administration, and 
nationwide organizational networks at the time. There were 5,497 churches on the peninsula with 
congregations totaling 450,000 in 1944 (Pak Chŏng-sin 2003, p. 176). These assets gave the 
Christians a formidable potential for political activity and mobilization, especially during the early 
years in the post-liberation era. 
 The formation of two separate regimes in 1948 and the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 
provided churches in the south with opportunities to strengthen their social and political power, and 
helped them develop a symbiotic relationship with the Rhee Syngman regime. The persecution of 
Christians in the north was turned to the Rhee regime’s advantage, creating in the south an 
atmosphere in which anti-communism was upheld as a patriotic ideology. This atmosphere was 
strengthened by the numerous refugees from the north, most of whom were Christians, and some of 
whom were converted after settling down in the south. These North Korean Christian refugees helped 
Rhee eliminate leftist elements and leftists from the society (Pak Chŏng-sin 2003; Kim Dong-choon 
2015; Kang In-cheol 1992; Yun Chŏng-ran 2015). 
 The Protestant church therefore supported Rhee’s effort to establish an anti-communist 
ideology (Kang In-cheol 2005). In Rhee’s address before a conference of Presbyterian churches in 
the US in 1948, he warned American church leaders that the Soviet-trained Red Army would destroy 
both the spiritual and intellectual enlightenment that Americans had achieved in Korea. This was a 
time when anti-communist hysteria was sweeping the US, which was immediately reflected in South 
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Korea. The Korean Protestant church, because of its long connection with the US and the tremendous 
amount of relief money and goods obtained therefrom, performed a valuable service for Rhee by 
enhancing the cause of anti-communism to the point of equating it with the Christian mission. By 
appointing many Christians who had escaped from the north, for example, as mentioned, Christian 
minister Yi Yun-yŏng appointed as Rhee’s first prime minister, Rhee not only obtained the church’s 
support but also used it to consolidate his anti-communist policy (Pak Chŏng-sin 2003, p. 177). 
 Church-government cooperation was not limited only to the development of an anti-
communist ideology. During the twelve-year rule of Syngman Rhee, the Protestant community also 
mobilized its resources for his regime, particularly during elections. In the presidential election of 
1952, the Korean Protestant church, including all denominations and affiliated organizations, formed 
the Korean Church Committee for Election [Han’guk Kidokkyo sŏn’gŏ taech’aek wiwŏnhoe], which 
campaigned for Rhee and his followers (Kang In-cheol 2009, p. 183). The churches’ support had a 
significant meaning at a time when it was almost the only grassroots political movement for the 
presidential election. In contrast to the political parties, the religious community, which had been the 
center of social, educational, religious, cultural, and even political activities under colonial rule, was 
able to bring tremendous political strength for Rhee and his followers. Defining the election as a 
religious battle of “Christian versus anti-Christians,” church leaders led all Christians not only to 
vote for Rhee but also to campaign actively for him as if it were a religious mission God had given 
them (Kidok Kongbo 1952). On August 3, 1952, just two days before the election, some 3,500 
churches across the country simultaneously held special prayer meetings for the election (Pak 
Chŏng-sin 2003, p. 179). To Christians, the election was religious as well as political and the 
Protestant community gave its full support to Rhee. During the years of church-government 
cooperation, the religious community gained many new converts and affiliates, particularly among 
the upper strata of society such as professionals, businessmen, and politicians. Many of these people 
joined the church with secular considerations rather than religious. Many ministers had already 
started to play a role as social and political leaders and became part of the upper stratum of society. 
The church and its upper class tended to prefer the social and political status quo and thus to conform 
with and support the government. The Protestant church offered its undivided support to Rhee by 
justifying his government and its stand on communism as given by God. The church in turn enjoyed 
particular favors and benefits (ibid., p. 179-80). 
 Under President Park Chung-hee, while some Christians leaders, mostly from liberal 
churches, were brave enough to raise their voices against the dictatorial government, the majority of 
Christians followed the easy way of supporting the regime or being apolitical. The political stance 
of the majority of church members was one of political inaction during Park’s rule. The church also 
continued to make a case for anti-communism. The communists were the real enemy of Christ, and 
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so to uphold a government that combated communism was to do the will of God (Kang In-cheol 
2005, p. 48-50). The political inaction of the majority of Korean Christians was actually a political 
position that, actively or passively, supported the regime, of which a very small group of liberal 
Christians was highly critical (Pak Chŏng-sin 2003, p. 184). 
 Theology performed a critical role in Korea during the church’s growth from a very small 
group to a large community, and from an outcast and alienated group to a community of socially and 
economically established individuals. Fundamentalist theology functioned politically and positively 
for the Korean reform movement in the late nineteenth century, for it was adopted by those Koreans 
who wished to change the existing Confucian social order. Under colonial rule, the fundamentalist 
theology worked as a political theology inspiring those Korean Christians who wished to break out 
from Japanese colonial rule. As mentioned earlier, after liberation, Christians however, ceased to 
criticize social and political injustice at the hands of South Korean governments. They even justified 
the authoritarian regimes with the theology of the separation of the church from secular politics. 
Fundamentalist church leaders taught that Christians should devote themselves exclusively to the 
work of evangelism, saving souls, and not politics, which is a matter of this world. They first called 
for the separation of the church from the state, but later they further argued that Christians should 
obey the secular powers as all authorities were ordained by God. In particular, Christians who had 
migrated from the north tended to justify the anti-communist regimes in the south as religious 
missions, arguing that communism oppresses Christianity and hence that fighting communism is a 
mission all Christians should accomplish. The Korean Protestant church thus became an anti-
communist one (Kang In-cheol 2005, p. 48-49). The apolitical “pure faith movement” in late colonial 
Korea and later in South Korea, according to Pak Chŏng-sin (2003), was not a purely religious 
movement based on an evangelical theological and doctrinal orientation, but a religious justification 
for the transformed social position and accompanying class interests of certain Protestants (p. 204). 
 A Korean social theorist, Pak Yŏng-sin (1987), describes religious and intellectual 
professionals in the Protestant church as “those who climbed up the social ladder” (cited in Pak Ch 
ŏng-sin 2003, p. 205) by joining the ever-growing church, receiving modern education and new 
political training offered by the church, and participating in social and political activity. He also 
points out that once Protestants climbed to the top of the social hierarchy, they formed “a group of 
authoritarian and hierarchical leaders.” The Protestant church, which used to be a community of 
“eccentric Christians [yesu chaeng’i]”, who sought to redesign the social order, now became a group 
of “ordinary people” who had lost energy for social and political reforms under the leadership of 
economically and socially well-established religious and intellectual professionals (ibid.). 
 With change in the church’s social composition and its institutionalization, however, a liberal 
strain in churches emerged as an important social force to promote human rights, democratization, 
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and social justice in the mid-1960s, and their activism became significant in the 1970s and 1980s 
(Kang In-cheol 2009, p. 188). The development of liberal Christian activism was a significant change 
in a Christian community that otherwise remained pro-government or apolitical. Liberal church 
leaders raised a voice against the government for the first time since liberation. They began to gain 
strength within the church as young Christians joined them, and consolidated their position by 
absorbing political forces outside the church that were critical of the authoritarian regimes. Anti-
regime activists, made up of university students, intellectuals, laborers, and farmers who needed a 
leadership and organizational foundations, gathered around liberal Christian leaders and 
organizations. Churches provided some protection for those activists and helped them continue their 
political activity against the government by using the church’s organization. As a result, Christian 
political activism emerged as one of the core anti-government forces by the 1970s. The whole Korean 
church community did not, however, support this activism. Because church members, especially 
clerical and lay leaders, were well established in society, they were not happy about liberal political 
activism against the government, which they saw as having the potential to destroy social and 
political stability. In addition, the growth of Protestantism and resultant internal structural change 
influenced the church’s political behavior. In the process of growth in numbers and in influence, there 
naturally appeared factions and groupings within the church, resulting in more than one hundred 
denominations and groupings. Hence, the Korean Protestant church could not produce unified social 
and political action, and liberal political activists in the 1970s and 1980s not only failed to receive 
unified support from the religious community, but also faced a negative reaction from rival 
denominations and the majority of conservative Christians. 
 Even after democratization in South Korea, the proportion of high profile Protestant 
government officials was higher than any in other religion. And in the 18th national assembly from 
2008 to 2012, Protestant lawmakers accounted for about 40 % and in the 20th from 2016, 31% (Pan 
Do-hŏn 2011). A high proportion of Protestant government officials and lawmakers does not 
necessarily lead to the strong influence of Protestant churches in politics. Kang In-cheol (2009), 
however, points out that although a high proportion of Protestant politicians in administrational or 
legal institutions does not essentially guarantee the great influence of churches in society, it is true 
that the higher the number of Protestant politicians in important societal and political positions, the 
higher the possibility of churches’ strong impact on political society, considering that there are many 
religious subgroups within the governments and the National Assembly, and that those subgroups 
have represented the interests of religious groups, and that Protestant subgroups are the largest among 
other religions (p. 181). Furthermore, the electoral system that has had increasing importance after 
democratization makes politicians more dependent on religious institutions, which have a great 
mobilizing force (ibid., p. 185). Also, the voting and campaign strategy that was favored by church 
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leaders under the Rhee government reemerged in the elections of 1992 and 2007 when the two 
candidates who were elders of megachurches in Seoul represented the conservative party. The 
conservative churches publicly supported the candidate Lee Myung-bak under the catchphrase of 
“making the elder president” (ibid.) in the election of 2007. Accordingly, in reality, Korean Protestant 
churches have never been separated from politics. More importantly, since the late 1990s, the social 
visibility of conservative churches’ political activism has significantly increased, while progressive 
churches have shown a weakening influence in politics with democratization, which will be 
examined in the following section. 
 
B. Evangelical Right’s Political Activism since the 2000s 
 
 Kang In-cheol (2009) defines four strategies of political participation by the Korean 
Protestant Churches: (1) political party strategy, which means that religious leaders are involved in 
political society by organizing their own parties; (2) strategy of securing influence on political society, 
that is, church leaders exert influence on policies through Christian politicians; (3) voting and 
campaign strategy; and (4) social movement strategy, such as street protests, which belongs to a 
broad concept of politics (p.165). Securing influence on political society strategy has long been the 
churches’ most favored political choice. Voting and campaign strategy was also preferred by the 
Protestant leaders during the period of the 1940s and 1950s. In the 1970s and 1980s, some liberal 
Protestants focused on social movement strategy and their significant contribution to the 
democratization movement is a well-known fact in South Korea. Responding to electoral politics 
with democratization since the late 1980s, Korean churches’ activities concerning election campaigns 
were remarkably revitalized. Since the 1990s, conservative Protestant groups, who had been reluctant 
to engage in overt political participation, began to plunge into the political arena. Conservative 
Protestant groups, represented by the Christian Council of Korea (CCK), adopted a social movement 
strategy in the 1990s and they have developed very active political activism in the 2000s, including 
political party strategy (ibid., pp.165-166). 
 As seen in Kang’s analysis, Korean Protestant churches, either progressive or conservative, 
have been engaged in politics in various ways since the establishment of South Korea. It is, however, 
the conservative strain that has been politically very active since the 2000s. The presence of 
Protestant civic groups has been frequently observed in street protests by political conservatives. The 
political activism of the conservative Protestant church that remained either apolitical or in support 
of the authoritarian regimes before democratization, has reemerged in society since the 2000s. 
Conservatives and rightists started to clamor for their political opinions against the policy changes 
in the latter part of Kim Dae-jung administration. They must have felt uncomfortable and threatened 
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by the developments exemplified by inter-Korean dialogues and the historical reevaluation of the US. 
Christian conservatism, commonly identified with “evangelicalism,” embraces a wide variety of 
theological convictions ranging from fundamentalism to the evangelical left. Here, what is called the 
evangelical right is a particularly conservative segment of Korean evangelicalism. Also, Korean 
evangelical rights see America as a chosen nation to fight against communists, which is in line with 
the idea of the Religious Right in the US (Ryu Dae-young 2004, p. 70-71). Evangelical rightists who 
hold anti-communism and pro-Americanism at the core of their collective identity came to realize 
that South Korean society was heading in a direction against their identity. When evangelicals realize 
society is taking a wrong turn they feel obliged to change its direction to the right way on their own 
terms. But, as Ryu Dae-young (2004) points out, people are not actively engaged in political activism 
due only to a sense of crisis (p. 73). It was always influential leaders that encouraged and motivated 
people to take action, mostly reactionary action to protect their hegemony and identity in the society. 
He further analyzes that the emergence of evangelical rightists’ political activism in the 2000s was 
because there existed a “power vacuum” that was created in the context of reformative progressives 
taking office but who could not yet exert an influence strong enough to transform the whole society 
because traditional reactionary conservatives still held control over politics, bureaucracy, media and 
capital (ibid.). 
 Eom (2003) tries to understand conservative civic organizations’ active engagement in 
politics and the crucial role played by Protestant churches in the context of a broader global trend, 
that is, the return of the extreme right-wing since the 1980s. In this light, he argues that the revival 
of the extreme right is a new social phenomenon in South Korea, but still at the very early stage of 
development, not yet reaching the status of a meaningful political actor. The conservative civic 
groups’ political activism retains an element of system-conserving efforts in the face of social 
challenges threatening long-standing right-wing hegemony in Korean society. The politicization of 
conservative civic organizations in the 2000s was closely connected to the multiple crises Protestant 
churches faced. Firstly, they were losing their followers as well as suffering from the weakening of 
public trust within South Korean society (Kang In-cheol 2009, pp. 194-95). In addition, under the 
two progressive regimes, along with democratization, they also witnessed the weakening anti-
communism and strengthening anti-Americanism that threatened the core values of national identity 
they hold. These crises led to the strong political activism of conservative churches. Klandermans 
(2004) identified three fundamental motives for participating in social movements more generally: 
1) instrumentality, a desire to change something in society or politics; 2) identity, that is, a desire to 
engage with others of a similar view or belong to a community; and 3) ideology that refers to a desire 
to express support for a particular political, cultural or religious point of view (cited in Richards 2017, 
p. 99). This analysis can well explain the motives that generate strong political activism of Korean 
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evangelical conservatives. When they experienced political and societal changes under the 
progressive regimes, they believed that South Korean society was heading in the wrong direction, as 
well as in the exact opposite direction from the ideology and identity they espouse. This feeling of 
crisis intensified their desires to change this political direction and to express their opposition to the 
progressives’ ethnic nationalist identity and ideology, as well as strong support for the conservative 
narrative. Furthermore, the desire to be united with others who share a similar view was strengthened 
in the face of crisis among evangelical and political conservatives. 
 
 
5.2 The New Right Movement and the State-Centered Nationalism Narrative 
  
 Progressive politicians emerged as a dominating political force in South Korean formal 
politics in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. This environment fostered a more participatory 
democracy, manifested by the strengthened voice of non-governmental organizations. Under the 
progressive regime of Roh Moo-hyun, some conservatives, who were also dissatisfied with the 
traditional conservative party that was associated with many political corruptions during the 
authoritarian rule as well as with economic failure in the late 1990s, formed an alternative 
conservative option, the so-called “New Right” movement. The New Right is a political movement 
created out of the bitter division among conservatives, urging conservatives to present a rational, 
more appealing image in accordance with democratic values. Mostly middle-aged intellectuals, the 
members of the New Right formed non-governmental organizations in order to increase their voice 
in society and balance Korea’s increasingly left-leaning ideology. 
 The New Right movement emerged from several factors. First, as the traditional Cold War 
regime came under threat, there were inner conflicts among conservatives who were struggling to 
adapt to a rapidly shifting political landscape, the emergence of leftists and progressives in political 
power, and the dissolving battle lines of the Cold War, as well as progressive reforms advanced after 
democratization (Macrae 2016, p.354). The New Right rose with the aim of presenting conservatives 
with a rational image more in line with the demands of a democratic political environment. The 
character of this political movement was distinctive from that of Cold War conservatism given that 
it was led by intellectuals. The movement challenged left-leaning historiography that is highly critical 
of the birth of South Korea, the former dictatorship and the significant influence of America on the 
Korean peninsula (ibid.). As opposed to the historical view of leftist nationalists, the historiography 
of the New Right thus highlights the development of capitalism under colonial rule, and celebrates 
the fast economic development made possible by President Park Chung-hee. This manner of 
historiography was reflective of the neoliberal idea equating capitalism and civilization, and it is in 
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this context that the New Right also focuses on the positive legacy of Rhee Syngman. 
 
5.2.1 Ideological Foundation of the New Right 
 
 The basic ideology of the New Right consists of both its opposition to the progressive party 
and innovative departure from the traditional conservative party’s stance. The most meaningful 
differences from the latter are pointed out as the New Right’s emphasis on civil liberties and 
flexibility concerning humanitarian aid to North Korea (Han Yuna 2007; Kang Chŏng-in 2008; 
Macrae 2016). The ideological foundation of the New Right is not democracy but neoliberalism, the 
promotion of individual freedom in both the civil and economic sectors of society (Macrae 2016). 
Also, the New Right began by presenting fresh interpretations of modern Korean history, including 
positive reappraisals of Rhee Syngman. Macrae (2016) argues that portrayals of Rhee as “Korea’s 
founding father” are related to the impact of the end of the Cold War on historical scholarship (p. 
328). The end of the Cold War is thought of as the “victory of capitalism.” The principles and 
institutions of capitalism have thus been disseminated around the world without restraint in the post-
Cold War era and, inevitably, this has affected the way many view the past. 
 The New Right movement started with the foundation of the Liberty Union [Chayujuŭi 
yŏndae] on November 23, 2004. In its statement of foundation which clearly elaborates the 
ideological foundation of the New Right movement, it is declared that “the ideological values of 
liberal democracy and free market economy system and the legitimacy of the establishment of South 
Korea has been put in danger and the national identity has been damaged since the progressive 
regimes started to doubt and question them” (Kang Chŏng-in 2008, p. 18). Also, this statement 
suggests 10 reformative strategies, among which what needs to be focused on is the second clause, 
in which it is argued that the market driven economy must be pursued in South Korea, and the seventh 
and eighth clauses, where a new perspective for North Korean human rights issues is suggested (ibid., 
p. 19). The New Right recognizes the North as a separate country while maintaining a vocal 
opposition to North Korea’s totalitarian regime and gross violations of human rights (Han Yuna 2007, 
p.9). Another key organization of the New Right movement is the Text Forum [Kyokwasŏ Forum]’ 
that was founded in January 2005, which was followed by the foundations of other organizations 
such as the National Association of the New Right [New Right Chŏnguk yŏnhap](ibid.). Many other 
conservative organizations including evangelical groups have also joined the movement. 
 Kang Chŏng-in (2008) points out three factors that ignited the New Right movement: 1) the 
feeling of crisis raised by losing two presidential elections in 1997 and 2002; 2) the dissatisfaction 
over the traditional conservative party, the Grand National Party (GNP), which failed to react to 
policy changes under the progressive president, Roh Moo-hyun; and 3) the low approval rate for 
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progressive President Roh at the time, which was perceived as a golden opportunity to reunite 
conservatives (ibid., pp. 20-21). The New Right movement is based on three key ideological concepts: 
first neoliberalism that pursues a big market, small government approach (Kang Chŏng-in 2008; 
Macrae 2016); second, a different approach to North Korean human rights from the traditional 
conservatism (Han Yuna 2007); and lastly, reappraisals of South Korea’s history (Macrae 2016; Yun 
Hae-dong 2012), which was a reaction to Roh’s policy of “clearing of past wrong-doings”, such as 
the establishment of truth commissions. 
 Key figures of the Liberty Union were not traditional conservatives but mostly converts from 
leftists to rightists (Kang Chŏng-in 2008, p. 22). They harshly criticized the Roh government as “pro-
North leftist.” Pro-North refers to the engagement policy that prioritizes cooperation with a dictator, 
Kim Jong-il, while remaining silent over human rights violations in the North. At the same time, their 
criticism aimed to target many of the high officials in the Roh government who used to be North 
Korea’s “Juche ideology followers [jusapa]” during the democratization movement period (ibid.). 
Calling the Roh regime leftist is partly due to its economy policy that emphasizes distribution and 
welfare (ibid., pp. 22-23). The New Right share the belief that the leftist Roh government’s anti-US 
policies are damaging to national security. It, however, draws a fine line between old and new right 
by claiming to have a more open and rational approach. This means that the New Right opposed the 
government market regulations, which is preferred by “old rightists” (Kang Chŏng-in 2008; Macrae 
2016). Also, these new conservatives’ emphasis on human rights has prompted them to turn away 
from the hard line stance of the traditional conservative party regarding North Korea when it comes 
to the humanitarian aid toward the North (Kang Chŏng-in 2008, p. 24). While traditional 
conservatives refuse to recognize North Korea and hope for the collapse of the North Korean regime, 
new conservatives argue that they want to see change in the North and hope that it becomes a normal 
state, improving human rights conditions. 
  
5.2.2. Reassessment of History 
 
 The foundation of the New Right organization, Text Forum, in 2005, marked the beginning 
of New Right’s historiography. One of the distinctive features of the Text Forum is that it was initiated 
with the critical mind of the left-leaning narrative in history textbooks, and thus aimed to “correct” 
the historical view in “school textbooks”. It is significant to note that the emphasis of the Text Forum 
activities has been solely placed on narrative transformation of school textbooks, which indicates 
that not only did it recognize the power that the narrative in history textbooks held and its profound 
influence on society, but also that it would promote social activities to gain back narrative power 
through revisions of school textbooks (Yun Hae-dong 2012, p. 230). The New Right movement’s 
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perception of history has gone through many critical stages since its foundation: the first stage, which 
pertains to the period leading up to the publication of the Alternative Textbook, Korean Modern 
History, in 2008; the second, which has to do with the establishment of the Association for 
Contemporary Korean History in 2011 (ibid., p. 227); the third, in which the private publishing 
company Kyohak Textbook, which contains the New Right’s perspective on history, was authorized 
by the government; the fourth, which is related to the conservative Park Geun-hye administration’s 
policy change toward the single state-issued textbook; and the last, in which the current progressive 
Moon Jae-in government decided to abolish the state-issued textbook policy in 2017 and issued the 
new guidelines for history textbooks that raised strong opposition from conservatives in 2018. During 
the first stage, the New Right movement focused its efforts on criticizing the historical perception of 
existing academia and privately published and government authorized history textbooks as uniformly 
left-leaning. Since the second stage, the focus has shifted toward publishing supplementary 
curriculum materials and being involved in political activism to promote the revision of the standard 
history curriculum, which has resulted in publishing right-leaning textbooks in the third and fourth 
stages. 
 The historical view of the Alternative Textbook issued by the Text Forum relies on three pairs 
of corresponding ideas: modernization as the backbone of colonial modernity; South Korea-centrism 
based on the ethnic notion of the nation; and exclusionism of the North based on civilization theory 
(ibid., p. 237). These ideas are well observed in the narratives of two rightist textbooks that were 
published later: the Kyohak textbook, and the state-issued [kukchŏng] textbook under President Park. 
With the publication of the rightist textbooks, there have been sharp conflicts in South Korean 
historiography over how to understand South Korea’s past and its core values like liberal democracy. 
The conflict ultimately comes down to the issue of how to define the national identity of South Korea 
(ibid., p. 228). 
 Because a revisionist historical narrative, the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives, 
has been associated with leftist politics and gained currency since the 1980s, conservative historians 
have become increasingly annoyed by this trend of historiography that gives nationalist credentials 
to North Korea and attempts to delegitimize the legitimacy to South Korea (Em 2013, p. 155). The 
New Right accepted scholarship that was based on postcolonial theory because it refuses to describe 
the colonial period as a dualistic battle between a colonizing Japan that was racist and exploitative 
and a resisting and enduring Korean people, or nation [minjung or minjok]. With this perspective, the 
New Right has become critical about nationalism in general, and nationalist historiography of the 
1980s in particular, which harshly attacks the legitimacy of South Korea (ibid., 156). 
 In line with the effort made by the Text Forum, the book, Reconstruction of Korean History 
Before and After Liberation [Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi chaeinsik], edited by four historians, was 
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published in February 2006. Its title reminds us of the book, Korean History Before and After 
Liberation [Haebang chŏnhusa ŭi insik], in which leftist-nationalist historiography is clearly 
elaborated and which achieved near hegemonic status in politics and among the public in the post-
democratization era. As we can guess from the title, the leftist understanding of history is clearly the 
target of Reconstruction of Korean History Before and After Liberation (Pak T’ae-gun 2007, p. 287), 
including a number of essays that presented evidence as well as compelling narratives on a range of 
issues from a rightist historical perspective. Criticism of Reconstruction of Korean History Before 
and After Liberation over the leftist-nationalist historiography focuses largely on two ideas: 
nationalism during the colonial era; and communism in the post-liberation period under the US 
military government (ibid., p. 288). Some essays challenged the book Korean History Before and 
After Liberation and its leftist-nationalist historiography much more directly. Regarding land reform 
about which leftist historians are very critical, for example, Chang Si-won argues that South Korea’s 
land reform succeeded in transforming peasants into independent farmers and so helped put an end 
to categorization of social status. On one of the most important issues regarding the national identity 
of South Korea, the creation of separate states, Yi Chong-sik’s article, originally published in 1998, 
presented evidence that it was the Soviet Union that was committed to establishing a separate state 
as early as October 1945 (Em 2013, p. 156-57). 
 In addition, it is claimed in Reconstruction of Korean History Before and After Liberation 
that during the Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun administrations, with the shift of political discourse, 
historians who questioned leftist-nationalist narratives experienced a backlash, just as in the past 
when the anti-communist authoritarian regimes conducted a witch-hunt against their dissenters (Pak 
Tae-gun 2007, p. 289; Em 2013, p. 157), referring to the policy of “clearing up the past”, which led 
to the establishment of the twenty or so Truth Commissions since the year 2000. For conservatives 
and rightists, these investigations into the past were conducted in order to consolidate leftist 
hegemony and undermine South Korea’s legitimacy through a one-sided attack on anti-communist 
conservatives in South Korea because conservatives were much more likely to have had family 
members who had collaborated with Japanese imperialists as well as close personal ties to 
authoritarian regimes of the past (Em 2013, p. 157). 
 An Pyong-chik (2006) summarizes the core ideas of the New Right as follows: first, the anti-
North-Koreanism, which was a modified form of anti-communism, arguing that it is a self-
destructive way to follow the North’s self-reliance [juche] ideology and that South Korea should 
promote cooperation with other democratic states, eventually to achieve freedom and prosperity; and 
secondly, modernization along with a liberal market economy. On the other hand, Yun Hae-dong 
(2012) claims the historical narrative of the New Right can be called “ahistorical history,” 
considering that it aimed to achieve a pure form of modernity by making a clean separation from 
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tradition and barbarism (p. 228). Harsh criticism has arisen against the historical perspective of the 
New Right from many scholars in history studies and progressive civil society, which will be 
introduced in the last section of this chapter. 
  
5.2.3 The New Right’s Historical View and Alternative Textbook 
 
 The self-assigned mission of the New Right was to present a “correct” representation of the 
past, with the aim of eliminating the “reactionary” image associated with conservatives and 
organizing a political counterattack against the emerging left. This effort resulted in the publication 
of the so-called Alternative Textbook by the Text Forum, which is a condensation of the historical 
view of the New Right. In order to accomplish the goals of the New Right, the most important and 
urgent consideration was the need to present the legitimacy of the ROK itself in the face of left-wing 
revisionist historical scholarship criticizing the process by which South Korea had come to be 
established. A view of leftist-nationalist historiography has gained in popularity to challenge the one-
sided, anti-communist historical perspective that had constituted the dominant narrative of the Cold 
War period. Thus, among the tasks presented to conservatives by the era of democratization, the 
establishment of a new discourse on modern Korean history was the most imminent and significant 
mission. It was in this context that narratives that reassessed the achievements of Park Chung-hee, 
the legitimacy of the two Koreas, and the legacy of Japanese rule began to emerge. It was also in this 
context that reappraisals of Rhee Syngman as a founding father gained popularity and importance 
among the New Right supporters. 
 Right after its foundation, the Text Forum focused on criticizing the descriptions of modern 
and contemporary history in privately published and government-authorized high school textbooks. 
Above all, it argues that most problematic in those history textbooks is that they deny the legitimate 
birth of South Korea (Son Ho-chŏl 2006, p. 218), while intentionally ignoring the systematic 
problems of the North Korean regime, which should be blamed for the division of the nation. In 
addition, it is claimed that those textbooks highlight only the negative aspects of economic 
development and industrialization of South Korea. In the New Right’s eyes, the narratives of those 
textbooks intentionally overstate the degree of dictatorship of past authoritarian regimes and ignore 
the fact that those regimes were in an institutional and developmental process toward democracy 
(Yun Hae-dong 2012, p. 235). The New Right’s effort to redirect the narratives of history textbooks 
had come to see its outcome, the “Alternative Textbook: Korean Modern and Contemporary History 
(Alternative Textbook),” which was published in 2008 by the Text Forum. In its preface, it is stated 
that the textbook is based on four principles; positivism; universal civilization; respect for 
international rules; and South Korea-centralism, in which liberal democracy and free market system 
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are the fundamental principles. Yun Hae-dong (2012), however, points out that positivism as a 
historical term refers to the narration of history based on facts without historians’ subjective 
intervention, and positivism as the first-mentioned principle in the preface of the New Right’s 
textbook already collides with three other principles that inherently include the subjective value 
system of historians. That is, the basis of positivism, that history must be described in accordance 
with facts without a person’s subjective interpretation, is already violated (ibid., 236-37). 
 The New Right movement failed to evolve into an institutional political entity. Even though 
key figures of the New Right movement tried to start up new parties, they failed to gain support from 
the public in the elections. However, the New Right has significance largely because of its effort to 
re-establish an ideological foundation and to provide legitimacy for conservatives through reshaping 
the historical narrative. This has profound impacts on political activism of conservative civic groups 
and individual activists, which will be further discussed in the chapter 7, based on the in-depth 
interviews I conducted in 2017 and 2018. 
 
5.2.4 The State-centered Nationalism Narrative 
  
 Despite strong criticism, the Alternative Textbook and the New Right’s historical view 
contributed to reforming the state-sanctioned narrative dominant during the Cold War era and 
resulted in the construction of “the state-centered nationalism narrative”, which I term thus in this 
research largely due to its emphasis on South Korea-centralism. This revitalized and revised narrative 
of conservatives hopes to separate themselves from the “old right” and to transform the reactionary 
image of conservatism toward being more rational and reasonable in the democratized social 
environment. In the following section, the key concepts of the state-centered nationalism narrative 
will be briefly introduced and a more in-depth analysis will be provided in the following sixth chapter 




 In the state-centered nationalism narrative over modern and contemporary South Korean 
history, modernization and civilization are seen as the backbone of colonial modernity. This view 
overemphasizes economic development and modernization during colonial rule. It is possible 
because the colonial period is assessed through the lens of the market system in this narrative. In the 
same vein, it also overstates economic development in the post-liberation era and celebrates the 
modernization process of South Korea. This colonial modernization theory regards colonial 
modernity as the foundation of South Korea’s development because it rendered possible the 
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explosive economic growth during the Park Chung-hee era, which, on the contrary, has been the 
target of criticism by progressive and leftist intellectuals. Modernization theory was initially 
developed with its clear political aim of supporting the foreign policy and ideology of America after 
WWII (Yun Hae-dong 2012, p. 247). According to the theory, strong political leadership is necessary 
for the third world to have a settled political environment and military security. In addition, 
modernization theory places its emphasis on colonial modernity as the positive aspect of civilization 
(ibid., p. 248). In the New Right’s historical perspective, the uppermost goal of the nation is set to 
establish a modernized (or civilized) state, and the free market system is treated as an instrument to 
achieve the ultimate goal of modernization (Pak Tae-guk 2007, pp. 290-91). In this regard, the notion 
of modernization in the state-centered nationalism narrative is essentially in line with the New 
Right’s ideological principles underlying it, that is, neoliberalism, which was disseminated around 
the world in the post-Cold War period (Macrae 2016, p. 347). 
 
B. South Korea Centralism 
  
 Another distinctive feature of the New Right’s historical perspective was “South Korea 
centralism” (Yun Hae-dong 2012, p. 239), which is the most crucial principle of the state-centered 
nationalism narrative. According to the universal standard of civilization, one of the important values 
of the rightist historical views is that the North is considered uncivilized and is thus excluded from 
the boundary of the “true” Korean nation. South Korea is naturally placed at the center of civilization 
of the Korean nation. This South-Korea centralism leads to conservatives’ distinctive understanding 
of nationalism. For them, the national history and nationalism of Korea is purified and completed by 
excluding uncivilized North Korea from the category of the nation. In this regard, it can be argued 
that the conservative narrative identity is also based on nationalism, which does however, collide 
with the concept of ethnic nationalism that the progressives’ narrative is based on. Nationalism of 
the New Right is, therefore, paradoxical in two ways: 1) it excludes the North Korean regime from 
the nation as it is unable to be civilized, but it includes North Korean people as fellow brothers who 
need to be saved from the oppression of the illegitimate and uncivilized Kim family’s dictatorship; 
and 2) nationalism of rightists defines as self only those Koreans who follow the founding values of 
South Korea, such as liberal democracy and the free market system, while still relying on the ethnic 
notion of the nation. Pak Tae-gun (2007) points out that one of the key principles of the New Right’s 
historical perspective is its strong emphasis on loyalty to the state of South Korea, not to the Korean 
nation. He criticizes that it is very ironic that the New Right puts great emphasis on the modern state 
while disregarding the ethnic notion of the nation as a pre-modern way of thinking, which is actually 
deemed as one of the most significant components of a modern state (pp. 292-93). 
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 In the state-centered nationalism narrative, the South Korean government is naturally the 
only lawful and legitimate political entity on the peninsula, rejecting the idea that two separate states, 
both legal, were established in 1948. This is closely connected to reappraisals of Rhee Syngman as 
a founding father of South Korea, the only lawful Korean nation. There was overall emphasis on the 
need to reassess Rhee’s actions vis-à-vis the end of the Cold War among rightists. As Bang Sang-hun 
(1995) wrote, “today, considering our history in light of the collapse of communism in establishing 
a liberal state, in overcoming the hardships of war and in protecting the nation, Rhee’s foresight is 
all the more significant” (cited in Macre 2016, p. 332). This narrative sets out to claim that currently 
the North is a failed state, while the South has been successful, so legitimacy must be placed on the 
South only. According to this logic, the Park Chung-hee regime is also praised largely due to its 
successful outcome regarding modernization and economic development. This approach, however, 
overestimates the positive sides of those regimes and is too simplified a history, disregarding negative 
aspects such as human rights violations. More importantly, it is pointed out that the New Right’s 
historical view neglects the historical legitimacy of the North based on the present outcome of past 
events in order to emphasize the legitimacy of the South (Son Ho-chol 2006, p. 219; Yun Hae-dong 
2012, p. 253). That is, it distorts the past events to overcome the political crisis conservatives face at 
present, thus history is being politicized. In this light, Yun Hae-dong (2012) calls the historical 
perspective of the New Right “ahistorical history” (p. 253). In addition, the New Right seeks to find 
the legitimacy of South Korea as a modern, civilized and legitimate state by severing its history from 
uncivilized traditional pre-modern Korea. This narrative can serve the aim of justifying its exclusion 
of the North, a state but not people, from Korean modern and contemporary history as the North 
Korean regime and Korean communists are an uncivilized and unlawful group of people that have 
illegally occupied part of Korean territory and kidnapped innocent fellow Korean people. 
 
C. Rhetoric of Exclusion: “Anti-South” 
  
 As mentioned, the state-centered nationalism of conservatives has been developed with the 
New Right’s effort to build a new kind of conservatism with a strong and reasonable ideological 
foundation in the context of democratized society within South Korea, as well as weakening anti-
communism in the world in the post-Cold War era. Hence, it intrinsically has a great political 
meaning and role. As Song Du-yul (1995) suggests, conflicts between the North and South, framed 
as a fight between communism and anti-communism, later emerged as an “anti-North” frame in line 
with South Korea centralism of the New Right’s narrative. While classifying dissidents within the 
South as pro-North that was a common strategy under authoritarian regimes is still quite easily found 
in discourses of conservative politicians and their supporters, a new rhetoric of exclusion, which 
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takes a frame of being “anti-South,” has emerged in the New Right discourses. Anti-South generally 
refers to those who deny the legitimacy of the South Korean government as the only lawful political 
entity on the peninsula, while sympathizing with the North. The term anti-South was first used in the 
book, Pandaesei ŭi pimil, kŭ ilgŭrŏchin ch’osang [The secret of anti-South, its distorted portrait], 
published in 2009 under the conservative Lee Myung-bak administration with the support of the 
National Intelligence Service (O Dong-sŏk 2017). It is argued in the book that leftists seek to damage 
the rightist regime through such acts as mobilizing anti-government and anti-American candlelight 
protests, and in doing so they attempt to unite anti-conservative forces and ultimately aim to establish 
a leftist regime in the South (Hyundae Sasang yŏnguhŏi 2009, p. 187). In this narrative, those anti-
conservative forces are identified with anti-South groups who refuse to acknowledge the legitimacy 
of South Korea. This shows that the issue of legitimacy took the central position in the historical 
narrative of the New Right, as commonly found in discourses of South Korea centralism. The former 
spokesman of the Blue House, Yun Chang-jung, recently called the three progressive presidents, Kim 
Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun and the current Moon Jae-in, “anti-South” on 6 June, 2018 at the ceremony 
for Memorial Day (Chang Wŏn-yong 2018). Likewise, anti-South framing is a new rhetoric of 
othering adopted by conservatives to exclude progressives and political dissidents. 
 A conservative lawmaker, Cheon Hee-kyeong, argued that, regarding the history textbook 
controversy, history textbooks are the last bastion for anti-South forces who hope to underestimate 
the successes of the South and only overstate its past regimes’ wrongdoings in privately published 
textbooks (Lee hyŏn-ju et al. 2015). As seen in this statement, historical views of the past of South 
Korea are dependent on one’s political tendency in current Korean society, and vice versa. According 
to conservatives’ rhetoric, whoever agrees with the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives is 
now classified as anti-South forces. This anti-South rhetoric has been adopted since the New Right’s 
attempt to reassess South Korean modern history. Anti-South rhetoric also pertains to distinctive 
definition of the nation in the New Right discourses, in which the North Korean regime and its 
followers are excluded from the nation, as they are uncivilized so cannot be included in the civilized 
modern nation, that is, South Korea. Thus, the concept of the New Right’s nationalism is similar to 
patriotism toward the state of South Korea, not to the ethnic nation of Korea which progressives 









5.3 Limits of the State-centered Nationalism Narrative 
 
 Although it has received harsh criticism from progressive and leftist intellectuals and 
politicians, and although the New Right movement has failed to evolve into an institutional political 
power, the New Right’s historical view has gained popularity among conservatives who have wanted 
to renew conservatism. As the key concepts of the state-centered nationalism narrative were 
introduced in an earlier section, in the following section, its limits will be discussed despite some 
having already been mentioned. 
  
5.3.1 History for a Political Aim 
 
 Son Ho-chŏl (2006) points out the lack of facticity in the New Right’s historiography as the 
main problem in the analysis of discourses over the history of two leading scholars from both political 
strains: the conservative, Lee Inho, and the progressive, Paek Nak-chŏng. According to Son, the New 
Right argues that in the leftist-nationalist historiography of Paek, South Korea is described as a state 
that should not have been born and its establishment is a shameful history to be overcome. However, 
Son not only maintains Paek has never made such a claim, but also criticizes Lee’s arguments as a 
distorted interpretation of historical fact. For instance, Lee claims that the failure of having the 
presidential election on the whole peninsula under the UN’s monitoring in 1948 was due to the Soviet 
Union’s refusal to hold the election in the northern part of the peninsula that was controlled by the 
Soviets. He is also critical of Lee’s comment that if the Chinese Army had not joined the Korean War, 
unification would have been achieved (Son ho-chŏl 2006, p. 218). First of all, even if the election 
had happened on the whole peninsula, there would have been no guarantee that a united Korea would 
have been established as a capitalist and liberal democratic country, largely because socialism was 
the most popular ideology at the time throughout the whole nation. Also Lee’s claim that the division 
would never have happened without the Chinese Army’s involvement in the Korean War follows the 
exactly same logic of juche ideology followers (pro-North), who claim that unification would have 
been possible without the US’s engagement in the Korean War (ibid.). 
 It is claimed that this kind of interpretation, lack of facticity, was due to the feeling of crisis 
the New Right had that if they lost the game in the history war, the national identity of South Korea 
would be denied as a result (Kang Chŏng-in 2008; Son Ho-chŏl 2006; Yun Hae-dong 2012). The 
New Right attempted to gain the legitimacy of a state based on the present time, which should be 
interpreted in the context of the past. That is, the legitimacy of the North should be acknowledged 
based on the fact that in the post-liberation era the North was better at reforming the society through 
such policies as punishing collaborators and initiating land reform, and it was closer to the socialist 
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system that more of the public preferred at the time (Son Ho-chŏl 2006, p. 219-20). However, as Son 
points out, this legitimacy at the time of the foundation does not naturally guarantee the legitimacy 
of the present, because the system of the North is now failed (ibid.). The New Right assumes that 
acknowledging the legitimacy of the North at the time of its foundation means denying the legitimacy 
of current South Korea. This led to a distorted historical narrative of the New Right that wants to 
argue for the legitimacy of South Korea as a lawful political entity, relying on the fact that the South 
is now successful as a state, unlike the North. Again, it follows the same way of juche ideology 
followers [jusapa], who argue that the North is the only legitimate state on the peninsula, rather than 
the South, largely because the North was closer to the political system the masses wanted and better 
at carrying out policies such as a land reform in the past, that is, at the time of liberation. More 
significantly, the New Right tends to interpret history arbitrarily with the aim of overcoming its 
political crisis. Thus, history is utilized as a political tool by the New Right to justify its own 
arguments. 
 
5.3.2 Framing of Pro-North and Anti-South 
  
 Son Ho-chŏl (2006) in part agrees with the criticism over the duplicity of progressives who 
have been very critical about human rights violations of authoritarian regimes but have been silent 
about the North Korean human rights issue (p. 221). He, however, raises a critical voice over pro-
North followers’ framing of traditional conservatives that puts whoever is critical of South Korean 
governments into the category of pro-North. Son claims that South Korean intellectuals and 
progressives criticize the government because the South is their country, not the North. In addition, 
he explains that the reason why progressives refrain from criticism of the North is partly due to the 
high possibility that the criticism of the North is abused by South Korean regimes to justify their 
injustice and wrongdoings (p. 222). 
 Like the state-sanctioned narrative based on strong anti-communist ideology under 
authoritarian regimes, the state-centered nationalism narrative of the New Right employs the rhetoric 
of exclusion with a political aim, classifying political opponents and dissidents as too simplistic a 
category of pro-North, or recently, anti-South forces, and excluding them from its own concept of 
the nation. Thus, patriotism and nationalism of conservatives are defined primarily through vigilance 
against internal betrayal by pro-North and anti-South groups, vindicated by every aggressive move 






5.3.3 Neoliberalism in Historical Interpretation 
  
 As mentioned, the New Right historical interpretation heavily relies on modernization theory, 
which is intrinsically in line with neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is not only a term to define economic 
policy, favoring a market free from any intervention of government, but also an ideological system 
that prioritizes the market over all other values and unconditionally supports the capitalist system 
(Mudge 2008, p. 706). Hence, neoliberalism in historiography has its significant meaning in that “the 
logic of the market” is applied to all aspects of social life, not just to economic issues (Braedley and 
Luxton 2010, p. 8). This strong influence of neoliberalism is often observed in the state-centered 
nationalism narrative of conservatives in which historical events are assessed by the standard of 
economic development. The process through which neoliberalism took hold in Korean history is 
clearly portrayed in Pak Tae-gun’s (2012) statement, “succeeding the idea of enlightenment [kaehwa] 
of the 19th century, the remodeling [kaejo] of the first half of the 20th century and the modernization 
[kŭndaehwa] of the second half, globalization [segyehwa] had now come to prominence” (p. 519). 
While international environments enlarged the dissemination of neoliberalism, the political 
circumstances in Korea in the post-Cold War era were ready to accept it. The post-Cold War context 
required a new ideology appropriate to this new context and neoliberalism was to be that, allowing 
for a space in which one could emphasize freedom, appropriate to the new democratic domestic 
context. 
 Thus, in the historical view of the New Right, ideas of capitalism and civilization come to 
be combined. In this light, historical figures like Presidents Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee have 
been reassessed and praised because they led South Korean society into modernity and civilization, 
along with their contributions to economic development. For President Rhee, more focus of the New 
Right historians is put on his action that laid the foundations for economic development beginning 
in the 1960s. Lee Sang-hun (2011) states that “Rhee clearly identified liberal democracy and a market 
economy as the fundamental basis of the Republic of Korea” (p. 36). Along with this positive 
assessment of Rhee who instilled the spirit of capitalism in the South Korean people, rightist 
historians focus on Rhee’s practical contributions to economic growth, such as price stabilization, 
education reforms, and the procurement of US aid. Among those, much attention is paid to Rhee’s 
land reform, which is in sharp contrast to progressives’ and leftists’ positive evaluation of the North’s 
land reform. Yu Yŏng-ik (2006) especially praises Rhee’s land reform which resulted in the 
dissolution of the old system of land ownership dominated by the landlord class (p. 549). 
 Thus, each historical case is judged on the basis of economic development in the state-
centered nationalism narrative, while explaining the negative aspects like human rights abuse of 
laborers as part of the evolving process toward economic development, or as the inevitable sacrifice 
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for the great cause of modernization and civilization. In a historical perspective based on a neoliberal 
ideology, history is essentially assessed through the lens of the market economy. Thus, the New 
Right’s historical perspective put aside other factors like the immorality of capitalists and ruling elites, 



































6. Conflict over Self Identity: History War 
 
 The two successive progressive regimes (1998-2008) sought to transform the national 
identity, initially of the significant others, through policy changes toward North Korea and the US, 
as seen in chapter 4, which contributed to intensifying inner conflicts in the South. Under the 
progressive administrations, the engagement policy toward the North was adopted and the strong 
alliance with the US was weakened with prevailing anti-Americanism in the society. This was an 
attempt to set a different perspective over how to view those significant others, which greatly 
influenced the national identity conception of South Korea. Furthermore, the policy campaign, 
“clearing up the past wrongdoings,” was adopted and subsequently related regulations and 
institutions such as the truth commissions were installed to investigate wrongdoings and injustice in 
the past. These policies of the progressives created strong opposition and resistance from the 
conservative strain of society, which led to the emergence of the New Right movement in the 2000s, 
as elaborated in chapter 5. This chapter focuses on controversy over the birth and development of 
South Korea, currently one of the most controversial issues in South Korean politics and society, 
which pertains to how to interpret the past of South Korea. Controversy over history, the so-called 
“history war”, took place simultaneously with the third historical juncture, the emergence of the New 
Right movement, discussed in chapter 5. Considering the importance of how to perceive history of a 
state in the formation of national identity, debates over South Korean modern and contemporary 
history are separately elaborated in this chapter. 
 The ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives has been gradually adopted as an official 
narrative since 2003, with a policy change of history textbooks from the single state-issued text to 
privately published textbooks authorized by the government. With this change, the master narrative 
over national history and identity has been transformed, more in line with the ethnic nationalism 
narrative. Since 2005, when the Text Forum, the New Right organization, was founded conservative 
intellectuals and politicians who felt a threat from the prevailing progressives’, allegedly left-leaning, 
narrative adopted first in the textbooks and accepted in the society, have consistently raised criticism 
of the historical views of those textbooks. The controversy reached its peak in 2015 when the former 
conservative president Park Geun-hye sought to re-adopt the policy of the single state-issued history 
textbook to be used in all schools, which was later abolished in 2017 under the current President 
Moon Jae-in. However, debates over how to perceive South Korean history are still ongoing, 
including other issues related to modern and contemporary South Korean history, such as controversy 
over enacting National Foundation Day. 
 History in South Korea has been utilized as a key instrument to foster patriotism, national 
unity, and devotion to the cause of modernization and as a source of moral education, naturally 
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leading to the establishment of the highly centralized education system. It has also played a 
significant role in legitimizing the political system and ruling regime, and even in justifying the 
existence of the state itself, that is, the representation of South Korea in opposition to the North as 
the one true Korea. In this light, it seemed natural that the South Korean government maintained an 
absolute monopoly on history production, not only appointing government agencies under the 
Minister of Education (MOE) to write and distribute textbooks, but also establishing special 
government committees to oversee historical matters and controlling historical narratives through 
official and unofficial forms of censorship (Jones 2011, p. 209). This, however, does not necessarily 
mean that history curricula and textbooks have remained the same since liberation in South Korea. 
They have been repeatedly modified to reflect changing political, ideological, economic and social 
conditions, while state control has remained as a guideline and, at each time of reform, it was the 
MOE that took the leading role and determined the direction and degree of curricular change. 
 This began to change, like other policy areas, toward the decentralization of education or 
abandonment of the state’s monopolies on textbooks in favor of more plural, and/or commercial 
systems. As in many societies, changes in South Korea have often reactively occurred as a response 
to evolving political, economic and social circumstances, both domestically and internationally. 
South Korea has experienced rapid transformation from a poor to a wealthy state, and from 
authoritarian rule to democracy. Reform has thus been consciously decided by the authorities, 
seeking to upgrade education systems and cultivate human capital to meet the goals of continued 
economic growth, and to make its country more competitive in the international arena. At the same 
time, education reform has been deeply related to the rise of civil society, to which it has both 
contributed and of which it has, in turn, been a result. Education in South Korea has thus been 
reformed both from above and, partly, from below to reflect changing government administrations, 
political and economic systems, and relations between the state and its people. It was the seventh 
curriculum (1997), which was drafted during Kim Young Sam’s presidency and implemented from 
2000, that reconfirmed the commitment toward textbook pluralism. Against this background, three 
types of textbooks are permitted to be used in schools: type I textbooks [kukchŏng] that are produced 
by the MOE/KICE (Korean Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation); type II textbooks [kŏmchŏng] 
that are published by private publishers and authorized by the KICE; and type III texts [kŏminchŏng] 
referring to approved texts from among existing publications that the KICE regards as useful 
supplementary materials or suitable for use in case no type I or II texts already exist for a given 
subject. The high school history textbooks that have provoked controversies and tensions between 
two camps in political and civil societies belong to type II and only eight different Korean history 
textbooks authorized are currently used, among which one textbook from Kyohaksa is generally 
deemed as based on the historical view of conservatives. 
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 History textbook revision is an inherently contested and selective process conducted and 
influenced by “real people with real interests” (Apple 1993, p. 46). The revision process entails 
negotiations and deliberations, which may provoke tensions that are at the core of struggles for 
recognition and legitimacy. Especially in societies emerging from violent conflict, history textbook 
revision faces particular challenges. The contentions regarding the selection of textbook content are 
compounded by a meta-conflict that is typically evident in the existence of contested narratives of 
victimization. Parties involved in conflict may have competing narratives regarding such issues as 
the cause of conflict, the number and identity of the victims, actors’ roles and responsibilities, and 
the motivations, legitimacy and implications of their actions. Contentious narratives may also display 
sharp contrast as to the terminology they use to define violent events, each presenting implications 
and meanings. Terminology for the same event can range from “liberation” to “aggression”, 
“invasion” to “occupation”, and from “killings” and “massacre” to “genocide.” Bar-Tal (2007) 
summarizes this difficulty by suggesting that “over the years, groups involved in conflict selectively 
form collective memories about the conflict. On the one hand, they focus mainly on the other side’s 
responsibility for the outbreak and continuation of the conflict and its misdeeds, violence and 
atrocities; on the other hand, they concentrate on their own self-justification, self-righteousness, 
glorification, and victimization” (p. 78). In such contexts, the lack of consensus on the shared but 
divisive past is often deemed as an obstacle to reconciliation. Confronting and teaching the violent 
past and its various controversies are commonly feared largely due to the possibility of 
destabilization of the fragile and temporary peace that tends to characterize post-conflict societies. 
 In the following section, the development of history textbook controversies since the 2000s 
will be firstly introduced. Two high school history textbooks will then be analyzed to compare 
historical narratives adopted in these: the Kumsung history textbook (2018) that is criticized by 
rightists as the most left-leaning; and the state-issued textbook (2017) under President Park that is 
blamed by leftists for being far-right. And two other textbooks, Miraen (5th Ed., 2018) and Visang 
(5th Ed., 2018), which ranked the first and second in the market share in 2014 will be used as 
references when necessary, both of which are also considered to be generally left-leaning. In the last 
section of the chapter, the limits of those history textbooks will be discussed, focusing on the fact 
that although textbook pluralization was adopted for high school history, narratives in textbooks have 
failed to provide the complex roots of the past violent events and wrongdoings, creating another 
dichotomy between self and others and provoking intense debates over how to teach history to the 
younger generation. Lastly, based on the concept of the “transformative model of post-conflict 
textbook work” (Bentrovato 2017, p. 54), the history textbook revision process in South Korea will 




6.1 National Identity Transformation: How to Identify the Self, South Korea 
  
 Han Hong-gu (2009) argues that the policy that caused the most extreme conflict between 
President Roh Moo-hyun and conservative forces was a policy of “clearing up the past wrongdoings” 
despite the fact that other policies of Roh, such as economic policy that was in line with neoliberalism, 
were not, indeed, contradictory with those of the conservatives. This well illustrates that the reason 
why the New Right emerged out of traditional conservatives under the Roh administration is deeply 
linked to the representation of South Korean history and its connection with national identity. The 
present is constructed by the past, and the past by the present. That is, the present is shaped by how 
people remember past events and place meanings on those. Thus, defining who we are today is 
heavily dependent on what and how to remember, which becomes, in turn, a battlefield of defining 
what is the present and how to view current events. The representation of the past, furthermore, 
relates to how to plan and construct the future of a nation. Hence, history is intrinsically related to 
decision making around the policies for the nation’s present and future. The policy regarding past 
injustice and wrongdoings under the two progressive regimes made conservatives realize the 
importance of history. Since then, the representation of history has become the site of struggles where 
two contending master narratives on history of South Korea collide head-on with each other. 
 In terms of history education, there is no doubt that textbooks have transmitted the official 
historical view that different societies have of their past. One of the well-known social functions of 
history education is the production and propagation of an accurate account of the past. Indeed, every 
country has generated a number of official narratives of the past in different historical times and 
socio-political situations. Thus, the teaching of history has been a matter of great concern for every 
modern society. For instance, Tulviste and Wertsch (1994) have analyzed how the two types of 
history, “official history” and “unofficial histories,” were produced and consumed in post-Soviet 
Estonia. On the one hand, the official history has been spread through the teaching of history in 
school, textbooks being one of the most efficient tools. In contrast, unofficial histories have been 
produced by informal education, such as through oral tradition, religious institutions or underground 
literature (cited in Carretero et al. 2002, p. 653). In this dissertation, the research focus is more on 
the official narrative and its transformation but unofficial histories have also great significance as a 
critical factor that can promote the transformation of the official narrative. 
 The ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives as an official history adopted in textbooks 
with textbook pluralization has not only greatly influenced South Koreans’ change of viewpoint on 
the two significant others, North Korea and the US, but also on the self, that is, whether the birth of 
South Korea should be regarded as a legitimate and lawful process of modern nation-building, or as 
a failure to establish one united nation on the peninsula, resulting in division of the nation. The state-
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sanctioned narrative of national identity that had been dominant before democratization was 
constructed with the aim of uniting the people under the political system of South Korea during the 
process of nation building, so the focus was put on the legitimacy of South Korea as the only lawful 
political entity on the peninsula, thus regarding the North as an illegal entity. On the other hand, as 
explained in former chapters, in the ethnic nationalism narrative which emerged as a strong 
alternative, the blame for the division lies on ruling elites of South Korea who actively pursued the 
establishment of a separate state in the south only for the sake of their own interests with the strong 
backing of the US military government. For ethnic nationalists, the South Korean government and 
ruling elites are illegitimate and illegal forces that stole the chance of building one united nation that 
all the people [minjung] had hoped for. As a result, it was the people that suffered from the tragedy 
of the national division. High school history textbook revision provided a great chance for the ethnic 
nationalism narrative to be institutionalized as an official narrative. 
 In the following section, how the progressive regimes have successfully transformed the 
narrative regarding self identity will be discussed in order to see the official narrative transformation 
from the state-sanctioned to the ethnic nationalism narrative, which consequently resulted in history 
war of South Korea by examining history textbook controversies and other debates in the society 
related to how to view South Korea’s modern and contemporary history. 
 
6.1.1 History Textbook Controversy 
  
 Although most of the changes in education in South Korea have been initiated at the central 
government level and the reforms have been of a largely top-down nature, the campaign of teachers’ 
unions and other civil society groups that emerged since the mid-1980s have also played a significant 
role in motivating educational reform (Jones 2011, p. 211), along with the progressive regime’s firm 
determination for reforms in a variety of areas in society. Curriculum and textbook production, which 
had remained quite centralized started to undergo some reforms, beginning in 1981 with the fourth 
curriculum also known as the third revision, when the MOE assigned curriculum production to a 
subsidiary agency, the Korean Education Development Institute (KEDI), and tentatively drafted a 
blueprint of a system of limited textbook pluralism. It is, however, only since the sixth in 1993 and 
in particular, the seventh curriculum in 1997, that textbook pluralism has been more actively 
promoted (ibid.). The seventh curriculum, drafted during Kim Young Sam’s presidency and 
implemented from 2000, has strongly reconfirmed the commitment to adopt a policy of textbook 
pluralism. It is the Korean Institute for Curriculum and Evaluation (KICE), established in 1998, that 
administers a multilayered textbook system for the MOE. 
 In 2003, to encourage diversity in historical views, the progressive government changed the 
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policy on history textbooks from the single state-issued textbook to the authorization system. As a 
result, six privately published history textbooks for high school use were initially approved at that 
time. Ever since then, some of those textbooks have drawn criticism from conservatives, sharpening 
the larger debate in South Korea over how to appraise modern and contemporary history (Choe Sang-
hun 2008). The narrative change over specific historical events was observed in those six authorized 
textbooks (Jones 2011, pp. 213). For example, the process of democratization is particularly 
emphasized, with a glorious democratic tradition invoked from the March First Movement in 1919 
through to the present. In this light, any opponents of democracy are heavily criticized. Rhee 
Syngman, for example, who was formerly honored as the founder of the nation, and Park Chung-hee, 
who was depicted as a great leader who successfully led the country to modernization and economic 
developments, are now heavily criticized for their authoritarian rule and the suppression of 
democracy. Transformation of political circumstances resulting from rapprochement with the former 
enemy, North Korea, and tensions with close ally, the US, have also led to revisions of textbook 
content. The US, for instance, is now portrayed to have shared some responsibility for the Korean 
War and the subsequent division of the nation. Anti-communistic narrative has gradually diminished 
and the North is depicted more positively than it was in the past. 
 Though these changes were implemented completely in line with a shift in politically 
acceptable discourses and were approved by the MOE, traditional conservative historians expressed 
their strong opposition to them. Narrative transformation in history textbooks is essentially connected 
to the rise of liberal and leftist historiography since the late 1970s. The challenge to the state-
sanctioned narrative of authoritarian regimes from leftist and progressive intellectuals resulted in 
active academic publications from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, as discussed in chapter 3. In 
particular, progressive historians passionately explored the modern and contemporary history field. 
Enjoying benefits from the powerful impact of the Gwangju Democratization Movement, 
progressive historians were in a privileged position in narrating 20th century history. From the late 
1980s to the early 1990s, their publications were widely circulated and consumed, in particular, 
among college students involved in the anti-authoritarian government and democracy movement. 
Even after the official end of the democratization movement, they remained as important sources for 
the modern and contemporary history of South Korea for the public throughout the 1990s. When the 
progressive presidents, Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, took office, this historical view of liberals, 
progressives and leftists naturally came to be reflected in history textbooks. 
 Under this set of circumstances, the installation of the 7th Educational Guidelines enabled 
the progressive historical view to be adopted in history textbooks. Revised in 1997 and taking effect 
in 2000, the new guidelines brought two significant changes in teaching Korean history in high 
schools: 1) it separated introductory modern and contemporary Korean history into an optional 
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advanced course; 2) it allowed each school to choose its own modern and contemporary history 
textbook from a list of six privately published and government-authorized textbooks that became 
available from 2004 (Chŏng Kyŏng-hee 2013, pp. 105-106). It was Kwon Cheol-hyun, a GNP 
assemblyman, who brought the history textbook issue into the parliamentary examination of the 
Ministry of Education in October 2004. In particular, Kwon focused on the modern and contemporary 
history textbook published by Kumsung, which was enjoying an approximately 50% share in the 
textbook market at that time. The conservatives denounced its popularity as a conspiracy of 
politically “impure” and left-leaning teachers who were members of the Korean Teachers and 
Education Workers Union (KTE) (Chŏng Sŏng-chin 2008). The social controversy over the 
ideological leaning in high school textbooks added one more issue in an already turbulent political 
realm and civil society engaged in resettling past wrongdoings in late 2004. At the beginning of the 
following year, this sensitive reaction of the conservatives resonated in the establishment of a New-
Right civic group, the Text Forum. The Text Forum contended that six privately published history 
textbooks, all allegedly left-leaning, were misleading young Koreans ideologically and imbuing them 
with distorted ideas on the nation’s proud history. In order to correct this problem, it suggested 
publishing a new alternative history textbook by collecting scholarly and public opinions. 
 While preparing its own textbook, the Text Forum propagated its own historical perspective 
in several ways such as holding symposiums, publishing books and articles, and holding media 
interviews. With these activities, the Forum openly criticized the Kumsung Textbook while 
suggesting the blueprint of its own textbook. The most crucial problem of the Kumsung Textbook in 
the view of the Forum was that it described South Korean history as a failed history that was born 
illegitimately and resulted in a crippled state. The Forum claimed that the textbook fundamentally 
failed to implant a sense of pride as Koreans among the young generation by teaching them a 
distorted history. The Forum calls the perspective of the Kumsung Textbook a “self-tormenting” one. 
For example, An Pyŏng-jik (2008), one of the mentors of the New Right group and a prominent left-
turned-right wing historian, denounces the textbook as no more than “a history of the minjung [people] 
movement,” based on four reasons: 1) the text is predominantly structured on the development of the 
people’s movement up to the post-liberation period; 2) it either states briefly or describes negatively 
the formation of South Korea and its economic achievements; 3) it depicts only the democratization 
movement itself without explaining its socio-economic context and its process, and thus commits the 
mistake of identifying the democratization movement with democracy itself; and 4) it stresses North 
Korean history and also evaluates its socialist nation-building process positively in sharp contrast to 
its negative descriptions of South Korea’s nation-building process. The Text Forum drafted its own 
alternative textbook to counteract what the group members perceive as the naïve and overweening 
historical view of the type II history texts. 
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 The Forum’s critique on the Kumsung Textbook is in fact directed to overall progressive 
history circles and their historiography. For instance, Taking back our stolen history 
[Ppaeakinuriyŏksadŏich’atki] (Pak Hyo-jong et al., 2006), a symposium publication series of the 
Text Forum, specifically targets the major arguments of conventional progressive historiography. 
The three chapters of the book, except the first and last chapters, are dedicated to problematizing the 
major aspects of progressive historiography: 1) its emphasis on the ethnic nation and the people 
[minjok/minjung]; 2) its emphasis on colonial exploitation and deprivation in describing economic 
history under the Japanese rule; 3) its minjung-and-unification-centeredness. In this sense, the history 
movement of the Text Forum that reflects the perspective of the New Right historiography was a 
reactionary movement to the official narrative transformation reflecting historical interpretations of 
the progressives that had been built over the twenty years of the 1980s and 1990s, and was an attempt 
to take back the hegemony that the conservative historical view had enjoyed before. 
 With the election of the conservative president, Lee Myung-bak, there was a sudden demand 
for a rollback of some of the revisions that had been made during the progressive regimes of the 
previous ten years. Shortly after his election, he appointed conservative historian Chung Ok-ja to the 
head of the National Institute of Korean History, whose work included textbook production and 
oversight. More importantly, he announced it was time for the nation to stop fighting with the ugly 
past, move on, and appreciate national success (Chosun Ilbo 2008). On Oct 30, 2008 the MOE 
demanded that the authors of the Kumsung and five other textbooks used in high schools delete or 
revise 55 sections regarding such topics as the legitimacy of South Korea, the roots of the Korean 
War and the negative descriptions of the Rhee Syngman regime (Chŏng Kyŏng-hee 2013, p. 131). 
The authors rejected the requested amendments and launched legal action to prevent their text from 
being revised, claiming that critics were trying to “beautify” the country’s problematic history, 
overlooking Korean collaboration with the Japanese occupiers and postwar dictatorships. Although 
the publishers went ahead and made some revisions, a number of schools decided to discontinue 
using the controversial textbooks, particularly the Kumsung text, and controversy seemed to have 
reached an end.  
 There is evidently more than one view of Korean history alive among the public in South 
Korea, which is reflected in vigorous debate in scholarly circles and in the press. What should be 
noted here is that the dominant view of the ruling administration, whether progressive or conservative, 
is taken as the basis on which the MOE can violate, or is possibly pushed into violating, the normal 
processes of the textbook drafting and revision, and simply force changes when political pressure 
from the Blue House demands. As many historians have pointed out as a key problem related to 
history textbook revision, if such actions are tolerated, this means that completely new history 
textbooks will have to be written every time there is a regime change. 
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 In the 2009 reform of the national education curriculum, the history subject was replaced 
with “Korean History.” There was another authorization process of the Korean history textbooks in 
2013, and as a result eight privately published Korean History textbooks were authorized, which 
have been used in schools since 2014. However, right after those eight textbooks were approved, the 
criticism from conservatives grew stronger than before toward allegedly left-leaning textbooks. Since 
then, how history is told to young Koreans has been a subject of great disagreement among parents, 
professors, teachers, and school departments. In 2013, after another conservative president, Park 
Geun-hye was elected, once again the MOE asked publishers to correct left-leaning accounts. 
 In October 2015, President Park announced that all middle and high schools would be 
required to abandon the privately published history textbooks and instead, adopt the new single 
government-issued textbook with the clear intention to bring the writing of school history under its 
control. In the state-issued textbook (2017), under President Park, a preface clarifies that it aims to 
make students feel proud of the establishment of South Korea and its development. It emphasizes 
that the ROK was established by overcoming Japanese colonial rule, and since then, although it went 
through other challenges like the division of the peninsula and the Korean War, it has been able to 
keep developing. According to the plan of President Park, students would be taught history from the 
government-issued textbook as from the beginning of 2017, something which has never happened 
because of her impeachment. Park announced that the left-leaning private textbooks tainted the minds 
of young children. Her government worked with a secretly selected panel of scholars to write the 
new textbook that would instill students with a sense of patriotism. But her plan faced immediate 
protests. Critics accused Park of returning the nation’s history education to the days of her father, 
President Park Chung-hee, whose government issued textbooks that sought to justify his dictatorial 
rule. When a draft of the state-issued history textbooks was unveiled in November 2015, opposition 
parties and scholars quickly accused it of highlighting the achievements of Park Chung-hee, the 
father of Park Geun-hye, such as rapid economic growth during his rule, while giving brief portrayals 
of his human rights abuses like the torture and execution of dissidents. The newly elected President 
Moon Jae-in, after Park’s impeachment, decided in March 2017 to abolish the plan for adopting the 
single state-issued history textbook and the controversy over history textbook finally seems to have 
reached an end. However, the “history war” is still on-going with other issues related to the modern 
and contemporary history of South Korea, such as enacting the National Foundation Day. 
 It is important to note that the Ch’inilp’a discourse, one of the key themes in the ethnic 
nationalism historiography, was institutionalized as an official narrative through history textbook 
revision with the 7th Educational Guidelines, in which three urgent tasks that should have been 
accomplished after liberation were pointed out: the establishment of a unified nation, clearing up the 
legacy of colonization, and land reform. These were initially suggested in the 6th Educational 
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Guidelines (1993) by a leftist historian Seo Joong-seok but were not included in the final version of 
the guidelines at the time (Chŏng Kyŏng-hee 2013, pp. 107-108). Around 2004, along with the state 
legislation on past wrongdoings such as collaboration, the modern and contemporary high school 
history textbook controversy contributed to intensifying the so-called “history war” between the 
conservatives and the progressives. This textbook controversy has significance in that it is an 
excellent example of how the pro-Japanese collaborator [ch’inilp’a] issue can engage with the overall 
interpretation of modern and contemporary Korean history. The history textbook and the 
collaboration issue have been inseparable in the context of the “history war” since the 2000s. 
 The history textbook controversy began with the New Right’s attack on left-leaning 
textbooks, and soon afterwards progressive historians joined in the debate when a right wing civic 
group, the Text Forum, announced the compilation of a new revisionist textbook reflecting the 
historical view of the New Rights. For the following five years, the controversy played out focusing 
on the contents of the two textbooks, Modern and Contemporary History textbook (2002) published 
by Kumsung, and the Alternative textbook (2009) published by the Text Forum. During the 
controversy, these two textbooks represented the positions of the left and right wingers, and 
progressive and conservative historians. Regarding the most controversial topics of collaboration, 
the legitimacy of the South Korean government and the description of North Korea, the two 
textbooks took very distinctive positions. The Kumsung textbook was highly critical of pro-Japanese 
collaborators and their influence in post-1945 Korea. In comparison, the narrative of the right wing’s 
Alternative textbook shows a far more forgiving attitude toward those collaborators. For instance, it 
is described in the Text Forum’s Alternative textbook that the elites’ collaboration with the colonial 
regime was either inescapable or unavoidable. The debate over the two textbooks gives us an 
example of what kind of historical trajectory “clearing of pro-Japanese collaborators” advocates. 
 The criticism of history textbooks for their gradual left-leaning tendency began to be raised 
by conservatives as early as 1998, right after the presidential election of Kim Dae-jung. For instance, 
in its first two issues in 1998, Han’guk Nondan, a conservative monthly magazine, often regarded as 
extreme right, highlighted left-leaning tendencies in minjung [the people] and revisionist 
historiographies that were adopted in school textbooks. Pak Pong-kyun (1998) comments that the 
comprehensive revision of history textbooks in 1996 confused the students’ value system by denying 
the political and historical legitimacy of South Korea. He claimed these textbooks distorted South 
Korean history with evil intention while legitimizing the nation-building process and existence of 
the North Korean state. However, the influence of left-leaning views in the school classroom was 
still limited around this time. It was in the early and mid-2000s that a progressive historical 
perspective, which treats North Korea as equal to South Korea as one of the two divided nations on 
the peninsula, emerged as the powerful competitor to the formerly dominant state-sanctioned 
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historical view in modern and contemporary high school history textbooks. 
 The production and dissemination of modern Korean history that was politically and socially 
divisive was placed at the center of political and societal debates under the conservative Park Geun-
hye government when the decision to retake control of the publication of history textbooks was 
finalized by the Park administration and then ruling Saenuri Party. However, the decision was widely 
rejected in society, with those in opposition criticizing it for a variety of reasons: from the claim that 
the rollback represented the restoration of history interpretations under the father president Park 
Chung-hee’s dictatorial era, to the argument that a single state-issued textbook system was a 
backward policy, denying plural interpretations of history. At the heart of the conflict lay contentious 
and politically driven views of history, that is, two conflicting narratives: the state-centered 
nationalism narrative supported by the New Right and conservatives; and the ethnic nationalism 
narrative, constructed by progressive and leftist intellectuals and adopted by most privately published 
textbooks since the 2000s. 
 Under the current Moon Jae-in administration that decided to abolish the former president 
Park’s initiative of the state-issued history textbooks, the contents of history textbooks continue to 
change. In July 2017, the MOE declared the guidelines for publications of history textbooks for 
elementary, middle, and high schools, according to which the following are to be added, deleted, or 
changed. 
 
Table 2. Changes in Curriculum and guideline for history textbook under president Moon 
 
 Privately published 
textbooks authorized  
by the state 
under Lee Myung-bak 
(2008-2013) 
The single state-issued 
textbook 
under Park Geun-hye 
(2013-2017) 
Guidelines (draft)for 
history textbooks as of 
2020 




Liberal Democracy Liberal Democracy Democracy  
 
Foundation of the 
ROK In 1948 
The ROK government 
was established. 
ROK was established. The ROK government 
was established 
The Korean War Specify “Namch’im”  
[the North’s invasion  
to the South]’ 
Specify “Namch’im”  
[the North’s invasion  
to the South]’ 
Specify “Namch’im”  
[the North’s invasion  
to the South]’only in the 
curriculum, but not in the 
guideline 
Saemaul 
Movement of the 
former president 
Park Chung-hee 





problems such as  
rich-poor gap  
Replace the term, 
“societal problems” with 
“assignments to be 
resolved” 
Specify societal 







succession, failure of 
economic policy, human 
rights violation, and 
military provocation. 
Specify details of “third 
hereditary succession”, 
nuclear missile, and 
military provocation such 
as Cheonanham sinking 
incident 
Aim to understand the 
societal changes in North 
Korea.  
(No mention about 
hereditary succession or 
military provocation) 
(Source adapted from Sŏng Si-yun 2018) 
  
 The recent guidelines, once more, created strong criticism from conservatives. After 
collecting public opinions, the MOE decided in July 2018 to adopt all the suggested guidelines except 
two. First, for the term regarding the political system of the ROK, both “liberal democracy” and 
“democracy” are allowed to be used, which is largely because conservatives argued that replacing 
the term “liberal democracy” with “democracy” in textbooks, which is the expression clearly 
stipulated in the Constitution, is very disturbing, considering that they observe other attempts to 
change history away from the defining moment of the ROK’s creation in 1948 and efforts to 
downplay the fact that the ROK has become a successful and prosperous state with liberal democracy 
and a market economy. Second, the expression “Namch’im” that refers to the fact that the Korean 
War began with the invasion from North Korea, which was originally planned not to be specified as 
one of the guidelines, is to remain in the list of the guidelines. In terms of the foundation of the ROK, 
the expressions “Republic of Korea was established” and “Republic of Korea is the only legitimate 
government on the Korean peninsula” are to be deleted, as suggested in the new guidelines. 
 Two other themes, the “Saemaul Movement” and “negative effects of industrialization”, 
pertain to the assessment of President Park Chung-hee. In the guidelines of the Moon government, 
the Saemaul Movement, which is in general regarded by most conservatives as a successful policy 
of Park resulting in the development of rural areas in the 1970s, has been excluded, and in terms of 
its effects on industrialization in what is regarded as one of the most critical periods for the economic 
development, negative effects are to be emphasized with more detailed explanations. These changes 
have also brought criticism from rightists who suspect that there is a hidden agenda to disregard the 
success of South Korea. The changes in the guidelines have political significance because they reflect 
the historical understanding of the Moon administration. They clearly illustrate that President Moon’s 
national identity and historical view are in accordance with the ethnic nationalism narrative that 
includes North Korea as part of the self to be unified and understates the influences of former 
authoritarian regimes. So the negative descriptions of the North Korean regime’s succession and 
military provocation will not be mentioned in the revised textbooks according to the new guidelines, 
and the negative effects of former authoritarian regimes in South Korea will remain emphasized with 
detailed descriptions, as in currently used private textbooks. 
 The controversy around the revision of history textbooks recurs whenever a regime is 
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changed between conservatives and progressives. In the 2000s, when the progressive regimes took 
office for 10 years, they sought to challenge the predominant state-sanctioned narrative identity 
which had been only allowed during the past authoritarian era. As a result, history textbooks have 
become the battlefield to dominate discourses and narratives on the national identity of South Korea 
and history textbook revision is now more about politics in current South Korea, rather than about 
education. Furthermore, at the time of writing the Moon government, another progressive regime 
after the conservatives’ nine years of governing, is attempting to change several dates of national 
anniversaries related to the foundation of South Korea. Right after his presidency began in May 2017, 
President Moon Jae-in abolished the single state-issued history textbook policy, which was his first 
move to erase the legacies of his impeached predecessor, Park. President Moon gave a speech on 
August 15, 2017, on the National Liberation Day, in which he mentioned that the year of 2019 marks 
the 100th anniversary of the foundation of the ROK, evidently identifying 1919 as the foundation 
year (Jeong Eun-hye 2017). Opponents of Moon criticized him for denying the establishment of the 
ROK in 1948 through the presidential election under the UN’s monitoring, arguing that although the 
Provisional government has its meaning in that it highlights the Koreans’ efforts to bring about 
liberation even under severe oppression from Japan, it cannot be considered as the establishment of 
a modern nation-state as it had no territory, sovereignty or people. 
 The controversy regarding the National Foundation Day continues with other attempts made 
by the Moon administration. President Moon mentioned in the meeting with the Ministry of National 
Defense that the National Armed Force Day should be moved to September 17 instead of the current 
date of October 1 because October 1 does not have any historical legitimacy in August 2017 (Kim 
Kwang-su 2017). This reveals President Moon’s historical view that finds the legitimacy of South 
Korea in the Provisional government, not in the first government of Rhee Syngman in a divided state 
because the Korean Liberation Army was created under the Provisional government in September 
17, 1940, which by then had moved to Chungching, China. Conservatives, however, claim that 
October 1 was appointed as an Armed Forces Day for several reasons. First of all, in 1950 during the 
Korean War, it was the date the ROK 3rd Infantry division broke through North Korean forces and 
crossed the 38th Parallel after the forced retreat to Pusan. It was also on October 1, 1953, that the 
ROK-US Mutual Defense Treaty was signed. Furthermore, October 1 was the date that the three 
branches of military service were completed, with the formation of the ROK Air Force in October 1, 
1949 (O Tara 2018, p. 6). In line with this attempt to change the date of National Armed Forces Day, 
the ruling Minju Party introduced another bill to change the National Police Day from October 21 to 
November 5 (Choe Sŏn-wook 2017). Once again, the attempt to change this date is linked with the 
Provisional government, which created a temporary administrative law on November 5, 1919, in 
which it mentioned establishing a police bureau. President Moon made a statement on the 73th 
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anniversary of the National Police Day on October 25, 2018 that we can find the roots of the Korean 
national police in the statement of the Provisional Government of Kim Ku, who persisted in 
establishing the united government after liberation (Moon Jae-in 2018). Lee Chae-chŏng, a national 
lawmaker, asserted that changing the date to November 5 would recover the police’s historical 
legitimacy and dignity by clarifying that the beginning of the police was not during the transitional 
US Military Government, but during the Provisional Government’s police bureau (Chŏng Hŭi-wan 
2017). Likewise, there have been persistent efforts by the current Moon administration to change 
several dates related to the birth of South Korea and its main institutions. This was in accordance 
with President Moon’s historical view that dissociates South Korea’s foundation away from 1948 
toward 1919, when the Provisional Government was created. His view evidently reflects the ethnic 
nationalism narrative that finds the legitimacy of South Korea in the Provisional Government, not in 
the first Rhee Syngman government of South Korea, which is the conventional view. Hence, this 
series of attempts appears to be an effort to change the identity of what became the ROK since its 
liberation. All these controversies are linked to how South Korea should define itself and interpret 
its own history. And now through the controversies over history textbook revision and (re)assigning 
of several dates for national anniversaries, we can see that the battles between two conflicting 
narratives about identity are still ongoing. 
 
 
6.2 Narratives of History Textbooks 
 
 The Korean War began on June 25, 1950, when communists in the North invaded the South 
under the leadership of Kim Il Sung with the support of his comrade Joseph Stalin. This is an 
unquestionable truth for nearly all South Koreans who have been educated in the South Korean 
school system. The MOE under the Moon administration tried to effect some change in this dogmatic 
narrative over the war by suggesting the guideline not to specify the term “namch’im” [the North’s 
invasion of the South], which failed. The conventional historiography, in particular, regarding the 
violent war history, has been deeply embedded in the society by focusing attention almost exclusively 
on the events of that one day, June 25, rather than viewing the war as part of a complex series of 
social, economic, and political transformations. However, Korea is not a special case, and many 
societies recovering from recent violent experiences face the same dilemma of choosing either 
monumental or critical history in the process of nation-building. 
 The construction of nationhood is not only a process of remembering but also one of 
forgetting. As Grinker (1998) puts it, “it is a process of filtering, condensing and organizing the 
complexities and uncertainties of history into well-bounded and highly specific terms that constitute 
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national narratives” (p. 128). History textbooks with different ideologies and historical views are 
necessarily related to a number of issues such as textbooks as an institutional framework for 
nationhood and the potentially coercive role of education. The purpose of this chapter is to extend 
beyond merely explaining education as an instrument of power or coercion to identify historical 
representations of the significant others and the self, in order to illustrate how these representations 
of history in textbooks have been patterned in ways similar to those in the realms of South Korean 
politics. The texts are patterned along many of the same oppositional lines between state and people 
and between conservatives and progressives, which can be seen in such media as newspaper articles, 
interviews and literature. Among those, textbooks are one of the most obvious vehicles for making 
particular historical narratives into “doxa” (Bourdieu 1977), that is, narratives that become so taken 
for granted that they are seen as natural and true, as seen in the case of the “namch’im” narrative in 
South Korea. Thus, in more general terms, this chapter is concerned with the importance of education 
as an instrument for the formation and reproduction of a particular and “doxic” vision of nationhood. 
In reality, education essentially includes and transmits ideologies of the state power that are never 
neutral (Grinker 1988, p. 137), which means that there necessarily exist some people and some 
classes that enjoy more benefits from the educational system of the state than others. Bourdieu and 
Passeron (1977) see teaching in more Marxist terms as symbolic violence (p.5), propagated in the 
service of elites and the state, and rationalized in nationalist terms because it is essential to preserve 
culture. Different states or governments do not simply make different kinds of textbook and do not 
necessarily write more democratic texts as their governments become more democratic. However, to 
a certain extent, different historical and political conditions make possible different kinds of texts, 
with certain plots, metaphors, and concepts. 
 This chapter aims to demonstrate how history textbooks resonate with conflicting narrative 
identities based on the contentious concepts of nationalism: ethnic and state-centered nationalism. 
What I hope to suggest through this is that the textbooks are part of a larger process of producing a 
particular set of South Korean discourses of nationhood and national identity. Therefore, the 
controversy over history textbooks that has lasted almost for the last fifteen years has a significant 
meaning as it indicates the fact that inner conflicts of South Korea, the so-called South-South 
conflicts, are related to disagreement among South Koreans regarding how to define the self and the 
significant others. In doing so, I assume that there is a significant relationship between the materials 
included in textbooks and the way educated citizens come to think about their nations, based on the 
proposition that there is a relationship between what people read and what they think. And since a 
history textbook is a book about what South Korea thinks about itself, including the important 
relationships with the North and the US, it must also be about the ways in which South Koreans learn 
about those topics. 
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6.2.1 Narrative Analysis of History Textbooks 
  
 History textbook narratives in South Korea have been transformed from patriotic narrative, 
which puts emphasis on loyalty to South Korea, to ethnic nationalist narrative, which prioritizes the 
ethnic notion of the nation, and accordingly the unification of the two Koreas. Whenever the regime 
has changed between progressives and conservatives since the 2000s there have been controversies 
over which version of history should be taught to students among politicians, historians, and civil 
societies of teachers and parents. Among eight history textbooks currently used, published by private 
publishing companies and authorized by the government, seven textbooks tend to employ an ethnic 
nationalism narrative. However, the state-centered nationalism narrative still enjoys strong support 
from particularly conservative politicians, historians and civil societies (Zadora 2017, p. 258). In the 
following section, in order to analyze how the ethnic nationalism narrative is actually 
institutionalized in textbooks, among eight privately published textbooks close attention will be paid 
to two of these: Kumsung (2ndEd., 2018), criticized by rightists as the most left-leaning; and the state-
issued textbook (2017), published under President Park Geun-hye, claimed to be far-right. Two other 
textbooks, Miraen (5th Ed., 2018) and Visang (5th Ed., 2018), which ranked the first and second in 
the market share in 2014, as seen in Figure 1), will be used as references when necessary, both of 
which are also considered by conservatives to be generally left-leaning. 
 
 
Figure 2. Textbook Market Share in 2014 surveyed by Offices of Education 
            (Chŏng Kyŏng-hwa 2015) 
 
The figure 2. is based on the data collected from 2285 high schools across South Korea by the Office 
of Education in 17 different cities and counties (Chŏng Kyŏng-hwa 2015). Among eight textbooks, 



















account for nearly 90 % of the market share; two others, Liberschool and Jihak, considered moderate, 
account for 10%, and the other, Kyohak, claimed to be right-leaning, has been adopted by only 3 
schools (0.1%). Thus, comparing the two highest market share textbooks, Miraen and Visang, plus 
the Kumsung textbook, allegedly the most left-leaning, with the state-issued textbook of the 
conservative Park regime, allegedly far-right, can illustrate how the ethnic nationalism narrative is 
actually reflected in privately published textbooks, and how the narrative in those textbooks is 
different from the rightist textbook published by the Park administration. The comparative narrative 
analysis will be done regarding the most controversial thematic concepts: 1) the legitimacy of the 
ROK and the foundation of the DPRK; 2) assessment of the Rhee Syngman and Kim Il Sung regimes; 
3) descriptions of North Korea’s negative aspects; 4) pro-Japanese collaboration; and 5) the Korean 
War and its consequences. 
 As explained, there are two contentious narratives on national identity in South Korea. While 
both are based on strong faith in the ethnic homogeneity of Koreans, each narrative has developed 
in its own way to define who “we” are and “they” are. The state-sanctioned narrative was the official 
master narrative under authoritarian regimes, which has evolved into the “state-centered nationalism” 
narrative with the New Right historiography that emerged in the 2000s, as a reaction to the 
progressive or allegedly left-leaning historical view. The newly developed state-centered nationalism 
of conservatives emphasizes loyalty to the Republic of Korea as the only representation of the true 
Korean nation, including lay people in North Korea who are fellow people hijacked by the Kim 
family, an illegal regime. Thus, the North Korean regime and its followers, including pro-North 
sympathizers within South Korea, are considered the out-group in the state-centered nationalism 
narrative. This assumes that unification is a release of oppressed fellow people from the totalitarian 
Kim family. On the other hand, as illustrated the ethnic nationalism narrative sees all North Koreans, 
including the North Korean government, as one nation that should be united without any interference 
by imperial foreign powers. 
 
A. The Legitimacy of the ROK and the Foundation of the DPRK 
  
 Firstly, it is interesting to examine the terms on which historical events are labeled by each 
narrative. Regarding the foundation of South Korea, three privately published textbooks use the term, 
“the establishment of the government of the ROK.” For instance, the Kumsung textbook explains 
that “The president Rhee Syngman declared the establishment of the government of the Republic of 
Korea” (p. 370). What is more interesting is that regarding the foundation of North Korea, all those 
privately published textbooks use the expression, “the establishment of the DPRK,” not “the 
establishment of the government of the DPRK.” Conservatives criticize this, arguing that there is a 
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hidden agenda of left-leaning textbooks in consistently using the term “the establishment of the 
government” for South Korea, while using the expression “the establishment of the DPRK.” It aims 
to downgrade the birth of the ROK to the establishment of one of two separate governments on the 
peninsula, as opposed to the conservatives’ narrative in which the establishment of the ROK was the 
only legal and legitimate nation-building, while the birth of the DPRK is highlighted with the 
nuanced expression, “the establishment of the DPRK,” in order to acknowledge its legitimacy. 
Furthermore, all three textbooks explain that the establishment of the DPRK was declared soon after 
the establishment of the government of the ROK. For instance, the Kumsung textbook explains that 
“after the government of the ROK was established in August 2018, North Korea declared the 
establishment of the DPRK with the creation of a cabinet centered around Kim Il Sung at the 
beginning of September” (p. 371). Critics argue that the statement that the establishment of the DPRK 
was announced after the establishment of the South Korean government aims to blame South Korea 
for the division of the nation, despite the fact that the Provisional People’s Committee for North 
Korea, which in reality functioned as the government to the north of the 38th Parallel, was first 
founded in February 1946. Contrastingly, the state-issued textbook describes that “The Republic of 
Korea was founded on August 15, 1948, with the establishment of the government of the ROK, which 
inherited the Provisional Government” (p. 252), while it only briefly mentions the North with one 
sentence, “the North Korean regime was established to the north of the 38th Parallel” (p. 252). The 
terms used to describe the establishment of the two Koreas in each textbook well reflect conflicting 
narrative identities. Three privately published textbooks adopt “the establishment of the government” 
for the South, while for the North both expressions, “the establishment of the government” and “the 
establishment of the DPRK,” are used. The Kumsung textbook, allegedly the most left-leaning, 
describes the establishment of separate governments thus: “after the UN decided to hold the election 
only in the southern part of Korea under the US military government control, North Korea harshly 
criticized it, maintaining the establishment of the united government” (p. 317). Critics argue that the 
sentence clearly blames the South for the division of the nation, thus weakening the legitimacy of 
the ROK. These sharply conflicting narratives on the foundation of two Koreas well indicate that the 
roots of conflicts between progressives and conservatives are fundamentally connected to 
conceptions of national identity, between one narrative which sees the establishment of South Korea 
as a lawful and legitimate process through elections, and the other which regards it as the failure of 
the nation. 
 Additionally, the two textbooks, Kumsung and the state-issued example, display sharp 
contrast in interpreting the 3rd UN General Assembly Resolution, in which it was declared of the 
ROK, “This is the only such [lawful] government in Korea.” In the Kumsung text, it is argued that 
this sentence actually means that “this government is the only lawful one in the area where it was 
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possible to hold the UN-monitored presidential election on the peninsula” (p. 370). In contrast, it is 
explained in the state-issued textbook that the UN General Assembly authorized that “the 
government of the ROK is the only lawful one on the Korean peninsula” (p. 252). The Miraen 
textbook makes the same interpretation as the state-issued textbook regarding this matter, while the 
Visang textbook does not include the UN resolution. However, three privately published textbooks 
devote about one page to contrasting Kim Ku’s pursuit of establishing one united government by 
coalition between leftists and rightists with Rhee Syngman’s statement that establishing a separate 
government in the southern part where the election is possible should be considered in order to 
ultimately make the Soviet Union withdraw from the northern part of Korea. Especially in the 
Kumsung textbook, it is described that Rhee’s statement about the possibility of establishing a 
separate government in June 1948, the so-called “Chŏngŭp statement,” caused quite a stir (p. 367), 
as opposed to the state-issued textbook in which Rhee’s statement is not included. This difference 
derives from disagreement in one of the core values between two master narratives: the establishment 
of the united Korean nation as an ultimate goal in the ethnic nationalism narrative; and the 
establishment of a non-communist and liberal capitalist state as the representation of the true Korean 
nation in the state-centered nationalism narrative. 
 
B. Rhee Syngman and Kim Il Sung Regimes 
 
 Another sharp difference in the narratives of history textbooks is found in the description of 
the first administration of Rhee Syngman. All textbooks fundamentally agree on the dictatorship of 
Rhee. Even in the state-issued text of conservatives who think highly of Rhee as the founding father 
of South Korea, it is stated, with details of electoral fraud under Rhee, that “the value of liberal 
democracy of the ROK was damaged due to the dictatorship of President Rhee” (p. 259), under the 
title of “Anti-communism and the long term seizure of power by Rhee.” However, private textbooks 
display a tendency to highlight Rhee’s dictatorship more than that of the Kim family in the North, 
which also draws intense criticism from conservatives. The Kumsung textbook highlights the 
dictatorship of Rhee under the title “Dictatorship of the Rhee government” by setting a specified goal 
of the chapter with the words “students can list policies that prove the dictatorship of the Rhee 
Syngman government” (p. 385). On the other hand, regarding the North Korean Kim Il Sung regime 
under the title of “Characteristics of the early North Korean regime,” it states that “the North Korean 
regime was a kind of a coalition government, unifying political forces, and Kim Il Sung played the 
key role of the prime minister of the cabinet” (p. 371). Also, Miraen and Visang emphasize the 
dictatorship of Rhee, with very detailed explanations of the various methods adopted for a rigged 
presidential election (Visang p. 358; Kumsung pp. 324-25). In contrast, the state-issued textbook 
２０３ 
	  
pays more attention to the dictatorship of the North by explaining that “the North Korean regime 
intensified its dictatorship by eliminating opponents. … In the name of Juche [self-reliance], the 
dictatorship of the Kim family is further intensified” (p. 286) under the title of “The third hereditary 
succession and inter-Korean relations.” 
 Contrary to the description of Rhee’s dictatorship, the Miraen textbook, regarding the 
political system of the North, mixes the expression, “the monolithic ruling system 
[yuilchibaech’eche],” with “the dictatorship of Kim Il Sung” (p. 350). The Kumsung textbook 
mentions that “Kim Il Sung strengthened his power by eliminating opponents. … In doing so, the 
monolithic ruling system was established” (p. 407). It uses the term “the monolithic ruling system” 
for the North instead of “dictatorship”, while it emphasizes “dictatorship” for the Rhee government. 
For conservative critics this comment was regarded as proof to show the intention of ethnic 
nationalists to delegitimize the legitimacy of South Korea by emphasizing the dictatorship of 
President Rhee, while it directly adopts the North Korean regime’s justification for its totalitarian 
system as the unique monolithic ruling system. In addition, conservatives criticize the fact that the 
Kumsung textbook devotes half a page to explaining the Juche ideology, taken directly from the 
North’s propaganda that the “Juche ideology is the worldview centered on human beings and is a 
revolutionary ideology to realize the autonomy of the people” (p.407). The difference in descriptions 
of the North, as well as the terms used for the North in textbooks, well indicates the different 
perspectives toward the North in two narratives: the state-sanctioned narrative of conservatives, 
which sees the North as the enemy, thus putting emphasis on the totalitarianism of the North; and the 
ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives, which regards it as a legitimate political entity and a 
political partner for cooperation on the peninsula, thus describing the ruling system of the North as 
monolithic, in contrast with its description of the Rhee regime as a dictatorship. 
 In comparing historical views reflected in different descriptions of President Rhee, it is 
important to note that privately published texts mostly claim that the dictatorship of Rhee was due to 
his strong personal desire for a long-term seizure of power and anti-communism was used as a tool 
to strengthen its dictatorial power. In contrast, in the state-issued textbook the reason for a rigged 
election under President Rhee is not mentioned. Indeed, this is in line with the assessment of 
conservatives regarding Rhee, which will be elaborated in the following chapter through in-depth 
interviews I performed with right-wing activists, that fundamentally acknowledges the dictatorship 
of Rhee but sees it as a necessary evil to avoid social confusion which might have been caused by 
communists, many of whom still existed at the time in South Korea where democracy was not yet 
fully implanted. For conservatives, the dictatorship was necessary or unavoidable to protect a newly-
built, so still weak, democratic political system of South Korea from communist invasion. On the 
other hand, in the ethnic nationalism narrative, Rhee is portrayed as a dictator who only pursed his 
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own political interests, causing the division of the nation, and anti-communism is described only as 
an instrument to justify his pursuit of a long-term seizure of power. 
 
C. Description of North Korea’s Negative Aspects 
 
 While the state-issued textbook includes detailed explanations of negative aspects of North 
Korea, including criticism from the international world of North Korean human rights violations as 
well as the resolutions of UN Human Rights Commission, the Kumsung textbook provides only a 
short explanation with one sentence that “North Korea received strong criticism about its human 
rights violations” (p. 411). The Kumsung text, however, includes the North’s justification regarding 
the matter of human rights in the name of “North Korean style of human rights” that “we prioritize 
duties as a member of the whole community to the freedom of an individual and guaranteeing 
material benefits as one of the human rights values is regarded as more significant” (p. 411). While 
the Miraen textbook provides a small section to introduce North Korean human rights abuse (p. 351), 
Visang does not include any mention of it, focusing on the development and cooperation of inter-
Korean relations. This contrast over the North Korean human rights issue between the two narratives 
is also quite clearly observed in policy differences between past conservative and progressive 
regimes. For instance, the progressive President Roh government showed its reluctance to vote for 
the UN Human Rights Commission resolution over North Korea. It did not participate in the voting 
in 2003 and chose abstention in 2004, 2005, and 2007, but in 2006 voted for a resolution. In contrast, 
the two conservative governments of Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye voted for it from 2008 to 
2016. While conservatives have asked North Korea to meet the universal norm of human rights in 
various ways, progressives have taken very cautious attitudes to pressing North Korea regarding 
human rights, prioritizing cooperation. This attitude of progressives is also witnessed in the current 
Moon Jae-in administration in that it avoids including the human rights issue in the agenda of the 
inter-Korean summit as well as the DPRK-US summit, arguing that it will ruin the efforts to build 
trust and a peaceful relationship with the North. It is usually the progressives that take the lead in 
other human rights issues in South Korea, such as the promotion of workers’ and women’s rights. On 
the other hand, progressives point out that traditional conservatives that turned a blind eye to human 
rights violations of the past authoritarian regimes have no right to criticize the North. Thus, both 
conservatives and progressives criticize each other: the former criticizes the ambivalence of the latter 
over the issue; and the latter criticize the duality of the former. 
 What is more interesting is the fact that while the Kumsung textbook provides a four-page-
description of the development and cooperation of inter-Korean relations, it only devotes one 
sentence to military provocations of the North, stating that “the competition between the two Koreas 
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was intensified with incidents such as a sudden attack on the Blue House by armed espionage agents 
and massive infiltrations of armed agents into Uljin and Samcheok in the late 1960s” (p. 413). In 
contrast, the state-issued textbook provides thorough descriptions under the title of “North Korean 
nuclear crisis and provocations toward the South” (p. 288), including details of nuclear weapons 
development, its crossing of the Northern Limit Line (NLL), a murder of a South Korean tourist in 
Mt. Kumkang in 2008, the sinking of the South Korean corvette Cheonan in 2010, and the North’s 
shelling on Yeongpyeong Island in 2010. Although the state-issued textbook devotes more than one 
and a half pages of explanations (pp. 288-289) to the inter-Korean exchanges cooperation with the 
title of “Efforts for peaceful reunification,” it is only a brief introduction, compared to the four-page 
explanations in great detail in the Kumsung textbook. Two other privately published textbooks also 
place more focus on positive developments in inter-Korean relations: the Miraen text, with four pages 
of explanations of inter-Korean relations under the title of “Inter-Korean reconciliation and 
cooperation” (pp. 352-355); and Visang, also four pages of details (pp. 389-391). 
 In general, three privately published textbooks tend to emphasize positive aspects of inter-
Korean relations, with minor differences. For instance, the Kumsung textbook includes the most 
detailed explanations with eleven pages regarding the North (pp. 406-417), such as its political 
system, Juche ideology, economic development, and the schooling system, and also provides details 
of negative aspects of nuclear weapons and human rights violations (pp. 407-412). The focus in the 
Kumsung textbook, like other privately published textbooks, lies on cooperation between the two 
Koreas, including the “Sunshine Policy” of President Kim Dae-jung and positive expectations of 
unification (pp. 413-417). It is interesting that Miraen and Visang do not include any comment about 
military provocations while the state-issued textbook provides detailed explanations. Here, the clear 
difference between the two narratives over inter-Korean relations can be discovered: the state-
centered nationalism narrative of conservatives sees South Korea as still in intractable conflict with 
the North and naturally puts more focus on the security concerns, like military provocations and the 
North’s nuclear development project; and the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives view is 
that the two Koreas are out of a protracted conflictual situation and thus prioritizes inter-Korean 
exchanges and cooperation for peaceful coexistence and unification. 
 
D. Pro-Japanese Collaboration 
 
 All three privately published textbooks devote more than one page of detailed explanations 
to collaboration and collaborators under Japanese colonial rule, including the list of specific figures 
and their anti-nationalist acts; Mirean (pp. 252-253); Visang (p. 282); and Kumsung (p. 343). Also, 
they all strongly criticize the passive attitude of President Rhee Syngman toward the legal 
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punishment of those collaborators while he prioritized anti-communist activities for the legal process 
under the Special Investigation Commission for Anti-Nationalists that was established in 1948. In 
particular, it is mentioned that “many [of the collaborators] became high rank officials in the army, 
police and government or politicians after the liberation” (p. 252) in the Mirean textbook. Also, the 
Kumsung textbooks state that “due to the failure to legally punish collaborators after liberation, many 
of those became very actively involved in the army, police and government [of the ROK] in the name 
of anti-communism” (p. 343). The Kumsung textbook, which is generally critical of the Rhee 
government, sets the goal of the chapter “The establishment of the ROK” to be that students are able 
to explain the efforts to clear up pro-Japanese collaborators and the outcomes of their actions (p. 
368), which proves that it regards the collaboration issue as important, as opposed to the state-issued 
textbooks’ brief introduction of the theme. However, what should be noted here is how these texts of 
privately published textbooks do not contain any information about the socio-economic, political or 
personal contexts of people living in the colonial era who became pro-Japanese collaborators. Hence, 
in this narrative, collaborators are all essentially anti-nationalists and traitors to the nation without 
consideration of the historical and personal contexts in which they may have been forced or were 
otherwise willing to perform acts of collaboration. This proves that the ethnic nationalism narrative 
also shows features of monumental history with a low degree of axiological balance, in which the 
perception of the out-group is just as inherently evil and vicious, and a high level of collective 
generality, which views the out-group as homogeneous. It is vital to provide historical, socio-political 
and personal contexts of collaborators so as not to understand them in too simplistic a way as a whole 
group of people who are innately evil. 
 Contrastingly, in the state-issued textbook the collaborators under Japanese rule and the 
failure of legal justice to punish them in the first Rhee government are introduced with only brief 
accounts. Further, there is no mention at all regarding the connection between pro-Japanese 
collaborators and high rank officials and politicians of post-liberation South Korea, unlike in the 
three other textbooks. The connection between collaborators and ruling elites of the authoritarian 
governments after liberation is crucial in the ethnic nationalism narrative because many of the 
conservative ruling elites are more likely to have ancestors of those who were involved in the 
Japanese colonial government. Pro-Japanese collaboration discourse is one of the historical topics 
that is highly politicized, and which led to contrasting accounts of the issue in those textbooks 
analyzed here. 
 
E. The Korean War and its Consequences 
 
 The differences between the two contending narratives are very pronounced when it comes 
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to the descriptions of the Korean War in textbooks. While the state-issued textbook entitles the 
section simply as “The June 25 War” (p. 255), the war is described in the Kumsung textbook under 
the title of “The June 25 War and perpetuation of the division” (p. 376), highlighting the negative 
consequence of the war. Regarding the cause of the war, both texts use the term “namch’im [the 
North’s invasion to the South]” that blames the North for the outbreak of the war. However, it is 
important to note that in the Kumsung textbook  “the Acheson Line Declaration” announced by US 
Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, on January 12, 1950, in which it was declared that Korea was 
excluded from the US defense line in Asia, was considered one of the significant factors that 
stimulated Kim Il Sung and other leaders to initiate the war by providing them with a  conviction of 
victory (p. 377), although whether the Acheson Line actually led to the Korean War is still 
controversial (Ko Soo-suk 2018). The impact of the Acheson Line Declaration is also prominently 
described in other two privately published textbooks, Visang and Mirean, while there is no mention 
of the matter in the state-issued textbook. 
 Another difference regarding the war is found in illustrating the outcomes of the war. All 
textbooks agree with the idea that one of the tragedies caused by the war was the mass sacrifice of 
civilians because the front line of the war was moving up and down across the Korean peninsula. 
However, the assessment of the efforts to recover from the war, made by the Rhee administration, 
shows a sharp contrast. In the state-issued textbook it is said that the experience with communists 
during the war strengthened the anti-communistic ideology in the South and “many defectors who 
escaped from the North to seek for freedom, mostly bourgeois, merchants and Christians, contributed 
to the development of South Korea” (p. 258). Also, the considerable aid, mostly from the UN and 
the US, is described from a positive perspective, arguing that it helped to re-establish the South 
Korean economy (p. 260). In contrast, the Kumsung text focuses on one of the most negative 
consequences of the war, the perpetuation of the division, as seen in the title, saying that the war and 
mass killings of civilians left a legacy of hatred between South and North Korean people, which 
contributed a great deal to perpetuation of the division (p. 381). Furthermore, the aid from the US is 
portrayed in a negative way, maintaining that the recovery policies of the Rhee government made the 
South Korean economy heavily dependent on the US (p. 382).  Implicit, and at times explicit, 
assessments of the consequences of the war are found through narrative analysis of textbooks. On 
one hand, the privately published texts highlight the negative nature of the war, which resulted in the 
prolonged division of the nation, and that of the recovery process of the Rhee regime, which led to 
heavy the dependence of South Korea on American aid. On the other hand, the state-issued textbook 
acknowledges the positive outcomes of American aid in developing the South Korean economy, and 
the contribution of North Korean defectors to South Korea’s development. 
 Another important outcome of the Korean War is the ROK-US Mutual Defense Agreement, 
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which was signed on October 1, 1953, two months after the signing of the Korean Armistice 
Agreement on July 27, 1953. The agreement commits the two nations to providing mutual aid if 
either faces external armed attack, and allows the US to station military forces in South Korea. This 
treaty is described positively in the state-issued textbook, highlighting its contribution to the security 
of South Korea (p. 258). This reflects a tendency of conservatives, who regard the alliance with the 
US as one of the most important values for South Korea. The other texts simply mention the fact that 
the treaty was signed and the military alliance with the US was strengthened. In referring to the 
process of the war, there is a clear tendency to stress the tragedies caused by the war in three privately 
published texts, for instance, by including personal records of the war of a student soldier and an 
international reporter, and by emphasizing mass killings performed by the state forces of both Koreas 
and the reason why the state should reimburse families of those who were sacrificed in mass killings. 
 
 
6.3 Limits of History Textbook Revision 
 
 Societies with a history of violent conflict face various challenges, one of which relates to 
how to deal with its divisive and violent past in ways that promote social integration and conflict 
transformation. As McCully (2012) points out that after conflict, “dealing with the recent past is 
especially problematic because the situation is still heavily disputed, raw, and characterized by 
personal trauma, anger, and grief” (p. 154). In the context of South Korea, where the nation is still 
divided while inner conflicts within South Korea over how to define itself are intensifying, it is 
particularly challenging to deal with the painful past of colonization, the division of the nation and 
the war. The South Korean government, whether progressive or conservative, thus has a double 
assignment when dealing with the North: on the one hand, establishing peaceful relations with the 
North, free from the dangers of another war; and on the other, negotiating with domestic political 
opponents who view inter-Korean relations from a totally different perspective. As elaborated in 
earlier chapters, domestic conflicts in South Korea are closely related to conflicting narrative 
identities. Post-war South Korea has faced many different challenges, including insecurity, poverty 
and institutional weakness, and the state monopolized the historical narrative in order to keep the 
people united and loyal to the state. However, with democratization demands for clearing up past 
wrongdoings conducted by the former state forces and reinterpreting the painful past of South Korea 
were high and the policy of textbook pluralism was eventually adopted in 2004. Less prescriptive 
curricula, liberalized textbook markets, involvement of professional historians and other interested 
parties in curriculum and textbook production, and a more open and vibrant public sphere should, in 
theory, lead to a greater diversity of historical interpretations. In reality, in contrast, pluralization of 
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history textbooks has resulted in a bitter “history war” in South Korean society and politics, 
disclosing the inherently conflicting nature of the society since its foundation. This research assumes 
that inner conflicts within South Korean society, including the history textbook controversy as well 
as other debates related to its modern and contemporary history, pertain to a disagreement among 
South Korean people regarding their political preference on the very fundamental question of nation-
building, that is, how to identify South Korea. 
 Attempts made by two progressive regimes to construct an alternative narrative on national 
identity has in part contributed to narrating erased memories of the historical events, for instance, 
mass killings of civilians. This chapter, however, argues that those attempts have also contributed to 
deepening societal and political conflicts, largely due to two reasons: first, limits in the content of 
the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives, which is itself partly critical in disclosing past 
wrongdoings that had been hidden in the narrative of authoritarian regimes but, more importantly, is 
monumental in many ways, just as the state-sanctioned narrative is; and second, limits in its 
“performative dimension” (Bentrovato 2017, p. 53), which refers to limits in the process through 
which the ethnic nationalism narrative was adopted as an official narrative in history textbooks as 
well as those in the process through which other policy changes were made. That is to say, limits in 
the transformative performative dimension have led to strong resistance of conservatives and rightists, 
who view this narrative change as a threat to their in-group values and norms that are foundational 
in their national identity construction. 
 
6.3.1 Limits in the Content of Revised History Textbooks 
  
A. Homogeneity of Narratives 
 
 Whereas textbook content has been dramatically revised in some cases, including complete 
verdict reversals on certain historical events and figures, history textbook revision appears to be 
simply a case of an old master narrative being replaced with a new one. The dominant narrative in 
the authoritarian era was that of modernization and development guided by anti-communist ideology; 
then, under Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, it was one of democratization and nationalist 
movements, which is named in this dissertation the ethnic nationalism narrative. President Lee 
Myung-bak, who took office after two progressive regimes, and another conservative president, Park 
Geun-hye, together with the MOE, attempted to abolish the work of his predecessors and bring back 
their version of historical narrative. 
 Narrative homogeneity across textbooks in South Korea can be found in the combined effects 
of politics and institutional inertia as Jones (2011) explains (p. 223). The responsibility for curriculum 
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development still lies with the MOE, although it is now usually subcontracted out to education 
research professionals and scholars. Some officials in the MOE may seek to promote a view that 
legitimizes the authority of their patrons in the government and to further secure their own status. 
Another reason for homogeneity might be the matter of socialization into established understandings 
of history and the “narrative templates” (Wertsch 2000). In the case of authoritarian states having 
kept longstanding monopolies on textbooks, textbook writers may become institutionally reluctant 
or even unable to avoid reproducing the narrative template through which they understand, interpret 
and represent past events (Jones 2011, p.223). Once the ethnic nationalism narrative has gained 
hegemonic status as a narrative template through textbook revisions under progressive regimes, as 
Wertsch puts it, textbook authors are more likely to reproduce it. 
 Another important matter to note regarding the matter of the homogeneity of textbook 
content is the complicated relationship between national identity and political legitimacy (ibid., p. 
224). State powers in general aim to promote national identification and to legitimize the current 
regime or political system through the official historical narrative told in textbooks. Some of the very 
foundational stories of the nation have accordingly remained relatively unchanged, one of which, for 
South Korea, is the story of Japanese invasion and occupation, which serves as a driving force for 
national identity by invoking unity against a common enemy, Japan. The focus on narratives 
regarding Japanese colonization is, however, quite different in the two contending narratives: in 
ethnic nationalism, the blame generally falls on internal betrayals of pro-Japanese collaborators who 
later became the ruling elites of South Korea; and in the state-centered nationalism narrative, the 
focus is more on the heroic independent movements of the whole nation without paying much 
attention to any resistance movement of different ideological strains, in particular, of socialists and 
communists, and finding the conservative and authoritarian regimes’ legitimacy in their connection 
with the resistance movement. 
 In the democratic society of South Korea, it is natural that opinions are diverse and are 
regularly publicized in debates in the media and other public arenas, and scholars and private citizens 
are free to speak and write on a range of historical issues conveying multiple views. In terms of 
history education, however, the national story has been constructed in such a way as to demonstrate 
“true” accounts of the past, which inevitably leads to the “rightness” of the present moment and 
providing its justification and outlining the prospects for a better future. Hence, history education for 
a pluralist democracy may necessarily and ironically exclude diverse viewpoints from history 
textbooks, though multiple historical views are allowed or encouraged in most public spheres (ibid.). 
That is, if the goal of democracy education is to promote democracy, the only historical views that 
are allowed in the curriculum are those that can justify and promote democracy. In this light, 




 In South Korea, in the process of disseminating allegedly “correct” historical views to 
students and silencing alternative voices, the reformers are not actually so different from their own 
authoritarian predecessors (ibid., p. 225). Though the allegedly left-leaning narratives that underlie 
the new curricula may appear more acceptable than their predecessors’ if they are more in line with 
one’s own ideological leanings, reformers of historical narratives in South Korea are not much 
different in the sense of tolerating plural viewpoints. In this regard, history is merely reduced to a 
battlefield between rival ideologies and historical truth claims in South Korea. 
 
B. Monumental History 
 
 The state-centered nationalism narrative of conservatives shows many features of 
monumental history. First of all, it derives from the state-sanctioned narrative of the authoritarian 
regimes that was constructed in order to serve the function of legitimizing the ruling regime and 
develop loyalty among the people to a newly formed state, the ROK. In doing so, many past events 
were selectively remembered as well as forgotten. In the state-centered nationalism narrative that 
was revitalized by the New Right intellectuals, the in-group, which consists of people who are loyal 
to South Korea, is portrayed as a vital foundation of a nation with exclusive rights to define national 
identity, while the out-group, which consists of the North Korean regime and its followers, whether 
they are called pro-North or anti-South forces, is described as illegitimate agents that harm the true 
“Korean-ness”. Mythic narratives concerning the economic and political success of South Korea, as 
opposed to the failed state of the North, justify the attribution of positive values to the in-group. Any 
positive values of Korean communists and socialists throughout history, such as their contribution to 
the resistance movement under the colonial rule, are denied or silenced. The state-issued textbook of 
the Park Geun-hye government has improved the degree of axiological balances, acknowledging the 
in-group’s own moral faults and failings, for instance, by including negative aspects of past regimes, 
such as human rights violations, compared to a low degree of axiological balance in the state-
sanctioned narrative that only highlighted the past regimes’ positive impacts on social and economic 
development. However, descriptions of negative aspects in past regimes are still minimally 
introduced, stressing more the positive outcomes to provide the justification that their wrongdoings 
were necessary evils in order to develop the nation. Also, the state-issued textbook employs “the 
impediment by out-group” mechanism that is often adopted in monumental history, to justify the 
political legitimacy of the South Korean government, in which only the South Korean government 
defines the meaning of the whole Korean national identity. The opponents to South Korea, termed 
pro-North followers or anti-South forces, are presented as fomenting conflicts in South Korean 
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society, promoting the mistaken ideology of the North. North Korea is characterized by its unfair 
treatment, oppression, and use of violence to its own people who are regarded as part of the self to 
be saved from the evil North Korean regime. This mechanism helps to promote conservatives’ 
correctness in defining national policies, in particular, security policies. It also applies another 
mechanism of monumental history, “condemnation of imposition,” which rationalizes the claim that 
the in-group represents the interests of every group in the nation, while the out-group is imposing its 
own narrow ideology, interests and policies and wrongly claims to symbolize the nation. In the state-
centered nationalism narrative, the duality between “good” and “bad” Korean groups is politicized 
as a very useful tool to exclude the others from the self, that is, to exclude the pro-North followers 
and anti-South forces from the true Korean self. Through mechanisms of justification, mythic 
narratives of the state-centered nationalism narrative function to define and recreate the particular 
connotation of national identity and legitimize the power of the traditional ruling elite groups in 
South Korea, failing to provide much detail or critical interpretations of historical events. 
 On the other hand, the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives that emerged as a 
challenger to the monopolizing state-sanctioned narrative, is in part, critical. It deconstructs a clear 
dichotomy of the good self, South Korea, and the evil other, the North. Also, it provides different 
accounts of the roots of the Korean War and tries to recount the dominant state-sanctioned narrative 
by discovering hidden memories of injustice and negative aspects of the South Korean governments. 
 However, it is important to note that the ethnic nationalism narrative itself still displays many 
features of monumental history, thus intensifying conflicts rather than promoting conflict 
transformation and reconciliation between conflicting groups within South Korea. First of all, it also 
constructs the clear duality between good “self”, the Korean nation and the masses, and bad “others”, 
anti-nationalists, ranging from pro-Japanese and pro-American collaborators to traditional ruling 
elites who suppressed the masses with undemocratic and authoritarian rule. It is based on explicit 
judgments about the importance of specific events in the history of the ethnic Korean nation and 
these judgments are influenced by the ideology of the progressive regimes that favors some events 
over others because they are deemed a significant and essential foundation for regimes’ ideas and 
goals. In the ethnic nationalism narrative, democracy and nationalism are key ideologies that support 
the narrative so the process of democratization and the concept of self-reliance are particularly 
emphasized. As a result, those who ever violated the principles of democracy are heavily criticized. 
For instance, Rhee Syngman, formerly honored as the founder of the ROK, and Park Chung-hee, 
depicted as a great leader of economic development, are now described only as evil dictators due to 
their authoritarian rule and suppression of democracy, without acknowledging their contribution to 
establishing foundations for South Korea’s political and economic development. It thus clearly 
adopts the mechanism of “impediment by out-group”, given that it portrays only the negative 
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activities of out-group. 
 Furthermore, the ethnic nationalism narrative presents “a low degree of axiological balance” 
and “a high level of collective generality” of monumental history. The low degree of axiological 
balance refers to the fact that it perceives the in-group, the Korean nation and the masses, as morally 
pure and superior without mentioning the in-group’s own moral faults and failings, and the out-group, 
anti-nationalists (pro-Japanese and pro-American collaborators) or undemocratic ruling elites, as 
inherently evil and vicious. It, thus, uniformly describes the masses and the Korean nation as victims 
and the out-group of ruling elites and anti-national collaborators to imperial foreign powers as 
aggressors. A historical narrative with a high level of collective generality views the out-group as 
consistent, homogenous, and demonstrating fixed patterns of behavior, while a low degree of 
collective generality reflects the perception of the out-group as differentiated, exhibiting a variety of 
behaviors, and ready for transformation. The ethnic nationalism narrative describes pro-Japanese 
collaborators with a high level of collective generality, perceiving collaborators as “a single entity 
with uniform beliefs and attitudes,” and disregarding the personal and societal contexts in which they 
came to serve or were related to the Japanese colonial government. Thus, those who were once 
categorized as collaborators by historians are depicted as homogenously evil, and more significantly, 
the descendants of those collaborators also often fall into the same category of evil traitors to the 
nation who are destined to demonstrate the same fixed patterns of evil behavior. Also, strong ethnic 
nationalism in the narrative tends to perceive the Korean nation as pure and superior to any other 
principles, and thus self-reliance [juche] is regarded as the uppermost value for the nation, while any 
form of dependence on or cooperation with foreign powers is treated as an evil act. In this regard, 
those who prioritized other ways for survival of the nation under colonial rule other than self-reliance 
tend to be uniformly categorized as anti-nationalists or imperialists. In short, the ethnic nationalism 
narrative is constructed based on a deep belief about the in-group of the Korean nation as pure victims 
and the out-group of betrayers to the nation as essentially evil aggressors, thus decreasing any 
possibility of mutual understanding. 
 The ethnic nationalism narrative is now homogeneously adopted in revised history textbooks 
of South Korea. Although it is partly critical, as seen above, it is still restricted by the progressives’ 
ideology and promotes sole loyalty to the ethnic Korean nation. It also fails to hold all perpetrators, 
such as pro-Japanese collaborators, accountable, and to show the complex and multiple roots of 
violence by providing historical and socio-political contexts. Thus, although textbook content has 
been dramatically revised in some cases, it appears to be simply a case of an old master narrative 
being discarded in favor of a new one. It is significant that by failing to provide critical and multiple 
interpretations of history, the progressive regimes have lost an opportunity to promote social 
reconciliation within South Korea, which is of critical importance to settle peace on the peninsula. 
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This is largely because the narrative of progressives has failed to be accepted as a critical and neutral 
perspective on history by their political opponents and, as a result, history is now highly politicized. 
Conservatives have generally regarded the progressives’ attempt to change historical narrative as a 
political tool to exclude traditional ruling elites of conservatives and disregard the founding values 
of South Korea that conservative supporters hold as critical to their existence. Contrastingly, 
progressives have thought that traditional conservatives have utilized history to propagate their anti-
communistic ideology and to exclude the North and its followers from the nation. Such 
incompatibility between two contentious narratives in which both groups have strong faith has led to 
intensifying conflicts in South Korea. 
  
6.3.2 Limits in the Transformative Performative Dimension of the Textbook Revision Process 
  
 Research in post-conflict textbook writing, particularly regarding joint projects of groups 
engaged in past violence whether as aggressors or victims, suggests that while such initiatives have 
been, in theory, inevitably challenging and, in reality, often unsuccessful in effectively transmitting 
their outcomes into classroom practice, the processes involved provide us with valuable insights in 
themselves. One of the most crucial achievements identified in various case-studies from around the 
world is the attitudinal change induced by collaborative initiatives that brings together 
representatives from opposing parties in conflict to produce textbooks or related guidelines 
(Bentrovato 2017, pp. 53-54), which has been absent in the process of South Korean textbook 
revision. This is a fundamental starting point for reconsidering the conciliatory potential of post-
conflict textbook revision from a processual perspective. A “transformative model of post-conflict 
textbook work” (Bentrovato 2017) suggests that the conciliatory potential of textbook activities lies 
partly in the capacity of the processes of collaborative textbook development to encourage a process 
of “narrative transformation” of the competing accounts that typically accompany conflict. 
Theoretically based on social constructionism, the reframing of conflict narratives and related 
mythical stories is key in conflict transformation processes aimed at inspiring changes in intergroup 
perceptions and attitudes that are critical to achieving reconciliation. The transformative model 
regards narrative reexamination and reconfiguration as a critical step towards resolving conflictual 
relationships between opposing groups that are often trapped within a competing victimization-based 
“schematic narrative template” (Wertsch 1998) through which they make sense of reality. 
 In the ethnic nationalism narrative, the masses, including dissidents of authoritarian regimes, 
are described as victims of injustice and political and societal oppression of those regimes, and as 
heroes who successfully managed to bring democracy into South Korean society. On the other hand, 
in state-centered nationalism, those dissidents are described as anti-South forces and pro-North 
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sympathizers who seek to delegitimize the legitimacy of South Korea, and only the people who 
accept its legitimacy and have loyalty to South Korea over the ethnic nation are identified as true 
patriots. These seemingly irreconcilable narratives have been constructed and repeatedly 
reformulated since the division in the context of intractable conflicts with the North. Collective 
identity that is formed in those intractable conflicts tends to develop into a belief system with non-
reflective certainty (Chhabra 2016, p. 253), thus being extremely hard to be transformed because any 
changes in the belief system are regarded as threats to its own existence. However, what is 
noteworthy is that in the societies emerging from recent violence, textbook work also can provide 
great potential for creating a “dialogical space” (Hermann 2004) in which parties involved in former 
conflicts can reassess and redefine their narratives and their underlying antagonistic perceptions and 
belief systems, only if textbook work involves and facilitates sustained cooperative interaction and 
critical and constructive confrontation with the controversial past. The processes involved in the 
textbook revision under the progressive regimes did not include cooperative interaction with their 
opponents, that is, conservative politicians, intellectuals and civil society, who see the reality of South 
Korea through the narrative identity of conservatives. The pluralization of history textbooks was led 
by liberal and leftist historians who authored the privately published textbooks in accordance with 
their ideology and perceptions of history, which are in sharp contrast with those of conservatives. 
Thus, although textbook content has been revised in some cases, it seems to simply replace an old 
narrative with a new one favored by the progressive regimes, without any effort to create a dialogical 
space between conflicting groups where they can negotiate and reform their own narratives. 
Consequently, it fails to bring “narrative transformation” in South Korea, that is, a transition from 
competing narratives that one-sidedly emphasizes incompatible historical claims towards more 
inclusive and pluralistic narratives (Bentrovato 2017, p. 55). A significant turnaround in the content 
of textbooks written in accordance with progressives’ ideas, both in a general ideological sense and 
in the representation of specific topics and figures, has especially important implications for the 
national identity conception of conservatives, from which they perceive they have come, for the 
values and traditions from which they arose, and for their pride and security. Transformation of 
historical narratives thus represents a value-based threat to conservatives, causing strong resistance 
toward transformation. It has been essential to create the dialogical space in the process of history 
textbook revision, where conflicting groups sit together and negotiate, so that to a certain extent 
cooperation and consensus between competing groups can be achieved and ultimately narrative 
transformation and the ultimate reconciliation can be accomplished. Without creating such 
cooperative interaction with opposing conservatives, the process of textbook revision led by 
progressives in South Korea has consequently been highly politicized. For conservatives, it is viewed 
as a tool to exclude them from politics and even an attempt of pro-North followers to overturn the 
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South. This politicization of history keeps both groups trapped within dichotomous 
victim/perpetrator discourses that prevent rapprochement, only leading to deepening conflicts in all 
sectors of the society. 
 Largely due to limits in the content of the ethnic nationalism narrative and transformative 
performative dimension of textbook revision elaborated in this section, progressive regimes’ 
textbook revision and pluralization work have failed to create more inclusive and pluralistic 
narratives. Rather, attempts of progressives are perceived as threats to conservatives’ value system 
and to their very existence. Thus conservatives, feeling a sense of threat and insecurity, started to 






















7. Fourth Juncture: The Impeachment of President Park Geun-hye and 
Self-Reflective Transformation of Conservatives:  
Right-Wing Extremism or Restoration of True Conservatism? 
 
 As has been discussed in chapter 5, the conservatives, in the face of challenges from 
progressives, started to introspect their own values, principles and historical views, while resisting 
the attempts to change policies as well as the master narrative under the two progressive 
administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. As a result, the New Right movement emerged 
and political activism of its civic organizations has come to the fore since the 2000s when traditional 
conservatism experienced loss of its hegemonic power in institutional politics. Since then, 
conservatism has been forced to go through self-reflective reforms in accordance with the democratic 
political context. In this light, revitalized political activism of conservatives and rightists in civil 
society has been as a kind of reactionary movement to challenges they face. With the retaking of 
office of two conservative presidents, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, the conservatives seemed 
to successfully regain hegemonic political power but the impeachment of President Park in 2017 
totally changed the political scene in institutional politics as well as in civic political activism. 
 This chapter focuses on a new type of political activism of conservative civic groups kindled 
after the fourth historical juncture of President Park’s impeachment in the most striking scandal in 
South Korean history. Recent theories of collective identity suggest that a feeling of relative 
deprivation, strong identification with the in-group and out-group, and group efficacy are key triggers 
of collective action on behalf of the in-group (Psaltis et al. 2017, p. 14). The crisis of conservatism 
in institutional politics awoke feelings of threat and deprivation among conservative supporters who 
then started to reinvestigate values and principles of South Korean conservatism, criticizing 
conservative politicians for abandoning those norms and values for the sake of their own interests. 
This group of conservatives identifies themselves as true conservatives, most of whom have been 
strongly against Park’s impeachment, arguing that the rule of law in South Korea was damaged by 
leftist populism in the process of the impeachment. On the other hand, many of the media and 
academic intellectuals view this new trend of conservatism after the impeachment as the emergence 
of right-wing extremism in South Korea. Based on 15 in-depth interviews with right wing activists I 
conducted in 2018, this chapter aims to support the argument that was made in the former chapter, 
namely that the narrative transformation process led by progressives has failed on three counts: to 
include those who have different ideologies and values, to promote conflict transformation in South 
Korean society, and to create inclusive and multiple narratives of the past. The institutionalization of 
progressives’ ethnic nationalism narrative in policies and in the official narrative adopted in most 
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textbooks has not led to interaction and open discussion among people. Thus, strong competition 
between political and social groups to dominate the discourses over how to define South Korea and 
its significant others along ideological lines has contributed to deepening conflicts and divisions 
throughout society in South Korea. Consequently, with the critical juncture of Park’s impeachment, 
political activism of conservatives has been once again undergoing self-reflective processes, 
consolidating supporters of conservatism, rather than weakening their belief system. It is noteworthy 
that young conservatives have emerged as leaders of this revitalization of conservatism, which has 
never happened before. They learned the lessons from the New Right movement’s failure and 
progressives’ tactics to educate and mobilize supporters, hoping to revitalize true values and 
principles of conservatism, on the basis of which they believe South Korea was founded. 
 When South Korean president Park Geun-hye was impeached in 2017, her regime’s strong 
supporters, commonly categorized as extreme right-wing groups, such as the Korean Freedom 
Federation [Han’guk chayu ch’ongyŏnmaeng] and Korea Parents’ Federation [ŏbŏiyŏnhap], 
attempted unsuccessfully to obstruct the impeachment process by organizing massive rallies. Yet 
their attempts failed because South Koreans from many factions feared the loss of all the reforms 
that South Korea had achieved from the democracy movement in the 1980s, and even the moderate 
right eventually supported the impeachment although they still favor conservative approaches to such 
areas as the economy and security. In the aftermath of President Park’s impeachment, Moon Jae-in 
of the progressive Democratic Party took office without having any transitional period. The right 
side of institutional politics, being split over impeachment and other issues, was forced to 
contemplate its loss of power and its future in order to plan a course back. 
 The driving force for impeachment initially came from civil society. Oppositional party 
leaders, including Moon Jae-in, were hesitant at first. This was due to their experience in the election 
after the failed President Roh Moo-hyun impeachment. Roh was impeached by the National 
Assembly in 2004 because his opposition parties, traditional conservatives, which at that time 
enjoyed a large majority in the Assembly, accused him of having failed to ensure electoral neutrality. 
Later, the Constitutional Court overruled the attempt to impeach Roh and during the whole process 
of the impeachment, mass candlelight rallies to support Roh were held by civic organizations. Many 
legislators who voted for the impeachment lost their following election. Only after the eruption of 
the scandal of Choi, Park’s secret confidante, which infuriated the public, politicians joined civic 
protesters. Just as political activism of civic groups of leftists and progressives played a key role in 
Park’s impeachment, rightist civic organizations led pro-Park movements like Taegukgi rallies, 
which are surprisingly still ongoing, more than two years subsequent to her impeachment being 
decided in the Constitutional Court. It seems that when the impeachment was passed in the National 
Assembly, pro-Park supporters lost their trust in traditional conservative politicians and started to 
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organize their own political activities and mobilize supporters, separating themselves from traditional 
parties and politicians. This group of pro-Park supporters is frequently described as extreme rightists 
by the media. Also some observers point to the collaboration between the Protestant rightists and 
pro-Park supporters as one of the key features of Korean right wing extremism (Kim Chin-ho 2017). 
 In the following section, the general claim that political activism of pro-Park supporters 
should be considered as right wing extremism is firstly introduced. Then, based on in-depth 
interviews with right wing activists I conducted in 2018, right-wing activists’ arguments that 
conservatives are experiencing crisis with the impeachment which, however, could be seen as a 
golden opportunity for self-reflexive reforms in conservatism, are examined. In doing so, the chapter 
aims to illustrate that the ongoing struggles of rightists are occurring to take back their own narrative 
identity as the official national identity of the ROK. This also justifies the argument of the dissertation 
that inner conflicts in South Korea inherently pertain to competing narratives on national identity. 
Even though the hegemonic power of conservatism in formal politics has been lost, there are still 
many people who see the reality of South Korea through the prism that accords with conservatives’ 
ideologies, values and principles. In the recent survey research conducted in January 2019, the 
approval rating for the traditional conservative party, Liberty Korea Party [Chayuhan’gukdang] was 
31.2%, while the progressive ruling party, Democratic Party of Korea [Dŏburŏ minjudang] shows 
the slightly higher support rating 36.5% (Kim Sŏng-eŭn 2019). 
 Under the current Moon peace initiatives, there are many positive signs that the formerly 
hostile two Koreas are willing to talk to find a way of coexistence. At the same time, the degree of 
inner conflict within the South has grown even higher since the impeachment of former president 
Park, and there exist deep discords over how to approach and how to pursue cooperation with the 
North. We have seen in other post-conflict societies like Germany and Northern Ireland that a 
political declaration or peace agreement does not necessarily lead to genuine peaceful relations and 
reconciliation between the former adversaries. In this light, the narrative of rightists in South Korea 
who have constructed a national identity that still views the North as an arch enemy should be taken 
into consideration in advancing peaceful relations with the North. As seen in the case of the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU, a peace agreement or a decision of political integration that is made in high 
politics can be always dissolved by the public. The difficulty of conflict transformation lies in the 
fact that reconciliation between former enemies goes beyond conflict resolution in representing a 
transformation in each party’s identity. 
 
7.1 Extremism of Rightists 
 
 Political activism of conservative civil organizations in the 2000s has led not only to the 
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emergence of the New Right but also to division of rightist movements. One of the distinctive 
movements is the group of online rightist communities, commonly called “Net-Uik [net-rightists],” 
which started to attract the younger generation to political discourses (Park Gwŏn-il 2015). For 
instance, DoknipSinmun [Independence News], initiated by Shin Hye-sik, was one of the online 
outlets that spread provocative news stories that usually attracted extreme rightists and created the 
frame of “patriots [aegukseryŏk]” vs “traitors [maegukseryŏk]” that is still widely used in right-wing 
discourses. 
 On the other hand, there is another type of online rightist, called “Ilbe”, one of the most 
active online communities for extremists, which displays the strongest hatred discourses against 
females or Cholla province where leftists and progressives have been traditionally strong. Park 
Gwŏn-il (2014) argues that surface motivation of the Ilbe needs to be understood through the term 
“attention struggle”, which refers to the pursuit of ideology in order to attract attention (p. 52). 
Although surface motivations of each online extremism community vary, Park points out that there 
is the common mentality of “imagined exploitation” in his term, which means that extremists see 
themselves as victims of unfair exploitation and they believe that they lose necessary benefits that 
they should enjoy as a member of community due to the invasions of outsiders (Park Gwŏn-il 2015). 
This narrative of victimization is one of the common features of universal right-wing extremism. A 
scholar on right-wing extremism, Thomas Grumke, points out in an interview with Jongang Ilbo 
(Chŏng Yong-in 2014) that throughout history extremists have portrayed themselves as victims, just 
as in Nazism. Collective memories of persecution by communists in the northern area of the 
peninsula right after liberation and during the Korean War have resulted in the victimization narrative 
in which Koreans who love freedom and liberty suffered from evil communists. This is the powerful 
underlying theme in the master narrative of conservatives because it provides the rationale for a 
collective focus on securing and maintaining South Korea from evil attempts made by the North. The 
Korean War and the Cold War narratives serve as the ultimate story of South Korean victimization 
in the state-centered nationalism narrative of conservatives, and saturate the identity discourses in 
South Korean society, framing identity politics. This thematic focus on vulnerability and threat 
naturally creates a parallel thematic emphasis on security against the North and the military alliance 
with the US. Grumke explains that the victimization narratives among extremists are related to two 
factors: relative deprivation, which is universally observed in extremism; and an identity issue, which 
is inherently connected to the issue of social acknowledgement (ibid.). According to him, when it 
comes to the issue of identity, extremism functions like faith. A democratic political system does not 
offer a sense of identity and acknowledgement, and thus people who have a strong need for 
acknowledgement are prone to fall into ethnic extremism or religious fundamentalism. Grumke 
mentions that anti-communistic discourses in South Korea, in which anyone who points out negative 
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aspects of South Korea is categorized as a pro-North sympathizer, are striking in that there still exists 
such a clear cut between us and them, which is similar to the “character assassination” that was 
widespread from the 1950s to the 1970s in Germany (ibid.). Character assassination refers to the fact 
that someone was criticized for being on the side of East Germany without knowing what exactly 
was wrong with him or her, and once categorized as an East follower, regardless of what is said or 
done, one is assumed to be evil. 
Sisain, a Korean weekly journal, has analyzed online discourse data, from 24 October 2016, 
when Park’s scandal was first released in the media, to 20 March 2017, 10 days after the 
Constitutional Court upheld the impeachment, of two groups that strongly support Taegukgi rallies: 
Parksamo, which literally means People who love Park Geun-hye; and Ilbe, an online community 
for extreme rightists (Ch’ŏn Kwan-yul 2017). The article maintains that patterns of discourses in 
both groups are almost the same. In discourses of both groups, a national flag of South Korea, 
Taegukgi, signifies the protection of the nation from the communists and only participants in or 
supporters of Taegukgi rallies are categorized as patriots. The article analyzes three constituents 
which construct the patriotism discourse of these conservative groups named “the triangle of 
patriotism”: a sense of belonging, faith, and behaviors. This triangle of patriotism functions exactly 
in the same way as “Emile Durkheim’s triangle” that explains how religions work in human societies. 
According to Durkheim, a religion is not only constituted with faith in a supernatural being, but also 
works as a mechanism to produce communities in which faith with a strong sense of collective 
consciousness and actual behaviors of participants are well combined. In this sense, for Taegukgi 
rally protesters, patriotism works like a religion: South Korea is an object of faith, citizenship of 
South Korea is a collective consciousness, and the Taegukgi rally is a form of behavior to express 
their faith. According to the article, the most striking aspect is that all the discourses end with the key 
word, “liberal democracy,” which should involve abundant other values and agendas for further 
discussion. However, in the discourses of two groups, liberal democracy is an empty phrase, just 
denoting a system of protection, but participants in discourses do not present any interest in what the 
liberal democracy actually means and what kind of attributes it should contain. 
This empty discourse of the liberal democracy as a value to be protected requires “otherness” 
or a series of “differences” in order to be socially recognized. As Connolly (1991) argues, these 
differences are essential to its being. If they did not coexist as differences, it would not exist in its 
distinctness and solidity. That is, identity requires difference in order to be, and it converts difference 
into otherness in order to secure its own self-certainty (p.64). This is also found in the writing of 
Wodak et al. (1999) which claims that the discursive construction of identities, of in- and out-groups, 
necessarily implies the use of strategies of positive self-presentation and the negative presentation of 
others (p.40), which also coincides exactly with one of the features of monumental history 
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(Korostelina 2016). In discourses related to Taegukgi rallies, two key words are used for negative 
presentation of others: the media and North Korea. The mainstream media and political parties who 
do not support Park Geun-hye and people who don’t agree with Taegukgi rallies are differentiated as 
leftists, reds, and commies, who are a distinct threat to the liberal democracy of South Korea. 
Therefore, for them the value of the liberal democracy works like “civil religion” (Bellah 1967) in 
America and their behaviors display similar features of believers of certain religions. Patriotism is 
not just a rhetoric or slogans for Taegukgi protesters but it functions like a religion and becomes a 
driving force that makes possible the unity, sustainability and voluntariness of mass Taegukgi rallies, 
in which protesters have continued to gather for nearly two years after Park’s impeachment. The 
emphasis on patriotism and loyalty to South Korea in Taegukgi protestors’ discourses is innately 
related to the issue of the legitimacy, South Korea as the true and only representation of the Korean 
nation as opposed to the North Korean regime, which has been claimed since the establishment of 
the ROK by the ruling elites. It clearly indicates that for Taegukgi protesters the presence of North 
Korea is still regarded as an existential threat and a source of evil. 
 In this regard, linking the national flag of South Korea and that of America, along with pro-
Trump slogans, is a strategy of Taegukgi protestors to control the definition of patriotism and to fuse 
it with nationalism. The US flag is used as a symbol of strong alliance between two states, which is 
nothing new in rightist street protest, as discussed in chapter 5. In counter-candlelight protests that 
emerged as a kind of reactionary movement to candlelight vigils in 2002 where strong anti-
Americanism was expressed, US flags along with Taegukgi started to be waved. As the main visual 
symbol of a wartime alliance between the US and South Korea, fostered in the history of shared 
bloodshed in the Korean War, the US flag signifies vigilance against those who are pro-communist, 
pro-North or “the reds” within South Korea. It is the rightists’ general belief that without the US’ 
intervention in the Korean War, South Korea would have become a communist country and the US 
is the key partner in fights against leftists in South Korea (Lee & Brown 2018, p. 58). In particular, 
the older generation uses the US flag, indicating their trust in the US to protect South Korea and 
prevent North Korea from provoking armed conflicts. Some protesters held signs that referred to the 
US as the “savior” of the country. A big banner was put up at the Taegukgi rallies in which large 
photos of Park Geun-hye and President Trump were placed along with the sign “Make Korea with 
America Great Again!” (Lim Tae-hoon 2017), harmonizing splendidly with the catchphrase of 
“Make America Great Again” from the 2017 Trump campaign. As Horwitz (2013) points out, in 
McCarthy’s terms it was “internal betrayal” that was the reason why the US was not winning 
anymore (p. 172). The same logic often applies to discourses of conservatives who identify political 
opponents, allegedly the pro-North sympathizers, as internal betrayers, anti-South forces. Trump’s 
“America First” slogan hence, strongly appeals to those who hold collective identity based on a clear 
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dichotomy between us and them. This is in accordance with the South Korean right-wing’s own 
definition of patriotism and nationalism constructed on the idea that patriots have a mission to fight 
against internal betrayal by the pro-North followers, leftists and anti-South forces (Lee & Brown 
2018, p. 63). The critiques from the conservative strain regarding ongoing inter-Korean summits 
under President Moon Jae-in are also in line with this rhetoric, arguing that President Moon betrays 
South Korea by being loyal to the North and investing many of the resources to meet the requests of 
Kim Jong-un while disregarding South Korea’s urgent political and social issues, such as deepening 
economic recession. 
 Kim Chin-ho (2017) argues that another important thing to note regarding extrematization 
of rightists in South Korea is the close connection between extreme rightists and Protestant rightists, 
which has been frequently observed in Taegukgi protests. Some media reports raised the question of 
the reason why Israeli national flags along with Korean and American ones were frequently waved 
in Taegukgi protests. It was people who identify themselves as devout Christians that brought the 
Israeli flags with the crosses and other symbols they thought could represent their faith (Yi Whan-
woo 2017). According to Kim Chin-ho (2017), the Korean Protestant rightists, just like the American 
Religious Right, have strong faith in the idea of the “chosen nation”. They believe that Korea, like 
the US, has been spiritually chosen by God with a mission to fight against communism. Thus, it is 
natural for them to feel connected with Israel, the chosen nation in the Bible. On the one hand, the 
presence of the Israeli flags in Taeguki rallies signifies deep involvements of conservative Protestants 
in recent right-wing activism. On the other hand, it indicates the idea of exceptionalism in 
conservatives’ narrative identity, which is deeply connected to the legitimacy of South Korea. The 
idea of Korean exceptionalism owes much of its origins to strong faith in the Korean nation as chosen 
by God that early Korean Christians had. After his conversion to Christianity in prison, the first 
president of South Korea, Rhee Syngman, advocated Christianity throughout a number of writings, 
claiming that it can serve as a political bedrock in making Korea a modernized country, since he 
believed that Christianity had played an essential role in western modernization. With such a 
conviction, he asserted a necessity to Christianize the Korean populace. In his book, The Korean 
Church in Trials (1913) [Hangukkyohŏe p’ippak], he demonstrates three main plans for the nation-
state, building on the basis of Christianity: 1) to reanimate the Korean people by encouraging them 
to have faith and hope in God; 2) to promote national unity through the teachings of Jesus, especially 
on the love of the neighbor; and 3) to build up a highly civilized country based on the Christian spirit 
of freedom and equality (Chang Kyu-sik 2010). Although there is controversy among scholars over 
whether Rhee truly intended to Christianize the Korean nation or just wanted to use Christianity as 
an instrument of modernization, most Protestants regard it as God’s blessing to have the Protestant 
elder as the first president and founding father of the nation, which further supports their conviction 
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of South Korea as a nation chosen by God. The chosen nation narrative is naturally connected to the 
idea that sees America as the symbol of God’s blessing and a representative of chosen nations. Then 
why did those Christians hold American and Israeli flags in the pro-Park rallies, which seems 
unrelated to religion? Kim Chin-ho (2017) explains that for conservative Christians, those political 
forces who asked for Park’s impeachment were pro-North sympathizers and, more importantly, anti-
South forces, internal betrayers of the true nation, South Korea. Thus, it is natural to hold American 
flags along with the Israeli ones as a symbol of anti-communism, which is a mission bestowed by 
God on South Korea as a last bastion to stop the invasion of communism into the world. In this 
narrative, the fact that South Korea, which was surrounded with the strongest communist states in 
history, China and the Soviet Union, was saved and established as an anti-communistic and liberal 
democratic state with the help of the US has its significant meaning as proof that South Korea has 
also been chosen and saved by God. The narrative of the chosen people is often found in speeches of 
conservative church leaders. For instance, the pastor Kim Jun-gon, who initiated the National 
Morning Prayer in South Korea in which most congressmen as well as all the presidents of South 
Korea have attended, said in his sermon in the 3rd National Morning Prayer in 1970 that “when 
Europe declines, nations of materialism decline, and nations of affluence are corrupted, then God 
will choose Korea and make a second Jerusalem in the corner of Asia” (Kim Jun-gon 2006, p. 105). 
One of the leading mega church ministers, So Gang-seok (2017), who is also a leader of conservative 
Christian organizations, such as the Prayer Meeting for Peace and Unification [Han’gukgyohoe 
P’yŏnghwat’ogil Kidohoe] and the Korean Council for anti-LGBT [Han’gukkyohoe Pandongsŏngae 
Taech’aenk Hyŏbŭihoe], mentioned in his Sunday sermon on 6 November 2017: 
 
 I have attended the National Morning Prayer in Israel… Koreans are like the Jews. We 
 Koreans have constructed a strong national identity like the Jews. This identity is 
 connected with our security. … The Jewish people I met said that the nation of Israel is 
 explicitly the chosen nation, but Koreans are people implicitly chosen by God. 
 
The successful establishment of South Korea as an anti-communistic liberal democratic country, 
which was the backbone of the narrative identity that both early political elites and Christians of 
South Korea held, provides contemporary rightists and Protestants with a sense of exceptionalism, 
serving as a source of national pride. This sense of exceptionalism further serves to delegitimize 
North Korean identity. Anti-communistic slogans like “It is okay to kill the reds” are very easily 
observed in right-wing street protests, such as Taegukgi rallies (Kim Kyu-nam 2017). Associating 
anti-communism with the rhetoric of exclusion of political opponents in South Korea is nothing new. 
Pro-communist ideology was completely suppressed before the political democratization in South 
Korea and each South Korean authoritarian regime incorporated McCarthyite political tactics to 
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accelerate the goals of its domestic iron-fisted rule. Park Tae-gyun (2014) asserts that McCarthyite 
tactics in South Korea have been useful for the right-wing to oppress dissidents when its authority 
and vested interests have been threatened (p. 207). South Korean right-wing politicians often seek to 
evade criticism by discrediting opponents as North Korean followers, traditionally, and, more 
recently, as anti-South forces. 
 What this study points out as significant in terms of right-wing extremism in South Korea is 
that that the narrative identity of rightists was originally formed in the context of protracted conflicts 
with the North. Accordingly, contemporary rightists still recognize the North as an existential threat 
to its own being and believe that the two Koreas are still technically at war. It is this conception that 
makes conflicts between competing narratives irreconcilable because the ethnic nationalism narrative 
of progressives views the North as no longer a threat to the South and the two Koreas as out of a 
conflictual situation, which is a viewpoint fundamentally colliding with the national identity of 
conservatives. The perspective that sees conflicts as ongoing on the Korean peninsula makes it 
difficult for rightists to transform their identity. This is because for them transformation of identity 
can mean a danger to their own existence. 
 According to the socio-psychological analysis of conflicts, in the context of intractable 
conflicts, psychological mechanisms come into play when new information contradicting existing 
beliefs is introduced. In normal situations when not in conflict, people are open to learning and 
integrating information, even if it is contradictory to preexisting beliefs, and adjusting to it. People 
are able to tolerate some uncertainty about their beliefs, accepting that these beliefs may change after 
reflecting upon their experiences and given facts, and acknowledging that their beliefs may have 
even been “wrong” from the beginning (Chhabra 2016, p. 253). However, in conflict contexts an 
automatic, self-preserving process is activated and shuts down the channels of learning and reflection, 
consequently being resistant to any change. The capacity to take in new information about others and 
the world becomes frozen, as their existing beliefs about the self, others, and the world further 
consolidate. People thus come to have a rigid certainty about their assessment of what is right, and 
to lose the capacity to accommodate and assimilate new information. Because of their need for self-
protection, information that does not fit their beliefs and attitudes is filtered out. Thus, the collective 
identity of rightists who claim that the current South Korea is still in intractable conflict with the 
North is extremely difficult to transform as it has been constructed with strong certainty about the 
conviction that their assessment of the reality is “right”. Likewise, in protracted conflictual situations, 
collective identities are formed with strong beliefs about self and others. Historical events of 
collective violence between groups and collective memories of those events further consolidate 
beliefs about us and them, with which a degree of non-reflective certainty about them is formed. It 
is through those beliefs with strong certainty that a sense of inner coherence is created and a set of 
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expectations about the world is provided (Chhabra 2016, p. 253). Those rightists who have a strong 
belief about good South Korea and inherently evil North Korea with non-reflective certainty are 
likely to be actively involved in political discourses and activities when they see the crisis of their 
beliefs, making them appear extremist in the eyes of others . 
 
 
7.2 Restoration of True Conservatism 
 
 Before analyzing interviews with right wing activists, I will briefly introduce related key 
theoretical concepts related to this section. A recent study on identifying the relationship between 
master narratives and personal narratives reveals an attempt to link the idea of narrative identity at 
multiple levels (Hammack 2008). This work conceives of master narratives as dominant scripts 
which can be identified in such cultural products and discourses as media, literature and textbooks. 
These scripts contain collective storylines that range from a group’s history to notions of what it 
means to belong to a particular social category (Hammack 2010, p. 178). Narrative identity 
development is best understood as a process that is closely mediated by social experience (Hammack 
2012). That is, identity development involves a process of narrative engagement in which individuals 
confront multiple discursive options for making meaning of experience through language, and they 
undergo a process of appropriation that tells us much about the course of a conflict. In this way, 
identity is conceived of as an internalization of speech (Vygotsky 1978), and is accessible through 
the act of narration (Hammack 2008), and of using language to make individual and collective 
experience sensible (Bruner 1987). The construction of narrative identity, assessed at the individual 
level through the telling of a life story and at the collective level through historical and ethnographic 
analysis (Hammack 2008), thus provides a window into not only processes of personal psychological 
adjustment and development, but also larger processes of social reproduction or resistance. 
 Another important factor to be taken into consideration regarding the construction of South 
Korean identity is whether the two Koreas are in intractable conflict or not. All of the interviewees I 
met commonly identify with the fact that South Korea is still in armed conflict with the North and 
this perspective greatly impacts on their narrative identity. While intractable conflicts are often rooted 
in a competition of material resources and political or territorial control, they are made salient 
through the construction of stories that motivate inter-group antagonism. Scholars of conflict have 
argued that narratives of exclusive legitimacy, victimization, and the justness of one group’s goals 
fuel the flames of conflict just as much as they provide a sense of solidarity and security. For instance, 
the competition over territorial control between Israelis and Palestinians has become intensified in a 
stalemate of stories that are irreconcilable (Hammack 2010, p. 179). 
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 In particular, most of the right-wing activists I had interviews with had not been engaged in 
political activism before the incident of Park’s impeachment, which, however, provided a critical 
moment for them to realize the existential insecurity of their collective identity as South Koreans and 
motivated them towards strong right-wing activism. Hammack (2008) argues that the experience of 
identity threat, or of existential insecurity in matters of identity, most certainly influences the process 
of social regeneration. Concern over the possible loss of collective identity, which is common among 
many groups who are marginalized or disempowered within a particular social structure, likely 
motivates a strong connection between master narratives and personal narratives of identity. This 
well explains the driving force with which right-wing activists started to become engaged in social 
and political activities with the impeachment of President Park. 
 Interviews with right-wing activists were not only to understand their personal engagement 
and adjustment with collective narratives, but also to see how rightists facing the political crisis of 
the impeachment went through processes of the social reproduction of identity or resistance to 
counter national identity through consolidating narratives which they already had strong belief in. In 
doing so, it aims to illustrate that existential conflicts between two Koreas have become crystallized 
in competing narratives, which, I argue, are one of the sources that influences domestic conflicts in 
South Korea. Although the study focuses on right-wing activists who have been actively involved in 
right-wing civic groups to protect their understanding of national identity, it is expected to contribute 
to broader theoretical perspectives on the reproduction of conflict through narrative engagement. If 
one key to peace-building is the reconciliation of divergent and polarized narratives of history and 




7.3 Interviews with Right-Wing Activists 
 
7.3.1 Method of Interviews 
  
 A semi-structured interview was conducted with 10 right-wing activists and 5 active 
members of right-wing organizations including one journalist of a Christian online newspaper. 
Among these 15 in total, 13 identify themselves as devout Christians, including two Catholics. Five 
are leaders of the right-wing university student organization, “Truth Forum,” which was founded by 
students and alumni of Seoul National University (SNU) in the spring of 2017 in response to the 
impeachment of President Park Geun-hye. As of August 2018, it has over 800 members, composed 
of students and alumni from over 70 universities over South Korea. The reason why I chose to 
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interview leaders of the Truth Forums of four major universities in Seoul, including SNU, Yonsei, 
Korea, and Ehwa, was that they ably represent a new trend in the right-wing movement, which is 
distinctive in that it is run by the young generation, unlike other right-wing civic groups. Truth 
Forums of different universities now work in solidarity as the Truth Alliance. The Truth Forum 
declares on its official website (www.truthall.com) that all Truth Forums share the five fundamental 
understandings: 1) we appreciate the foundation of the ROK and its economic development; 2) we 
pursue the liberation of North Korea; 3) We advocate a strong ROK-US alliance; 4) we recognize 
the unjustness of President Park’s impeachment; and 5) we respect Judeo-Christian values and 
tradition. This statement of commitments clearly uncovers fundamental principles and values that 
these new conservatives regard as important and sufficiently in danger to be protected. It is also 
emphasized in the statement on October 12, 2018, that “the Truth Forum is committed to establishing 
an objective and balanced contemporary history of Korea, which is essential for appreciating the 
values of liberal democracy and market economy which form the backbone of our proud ROK” (Kim 
Sŏng-hun 2018). It is also declared that is to be committed to preparing for the future of the ROK, in 
which fellow people in North Korea are liberated from its tyranny to enjoy freedom and prosperity 
with South Koreans. Mirroring this collective narrative of the Forum, related to the identities of South 
and North Korea, narrative engagement of individuals will be examined through analysis of stories 
and opinions that interviewees shared.  
 And four other leaders of Protestant right-wing civic groups, including one organization 
advocating history textbook revision from a rightist historical view, were interviewed. The interviews 
began by asking the participants to explain a personal motivation to engage in political activism. 
They contained material about life experience, faith, in the case of Christians, and personal opinions 
on the politics and critical events in history. Interviews lasted from 1 to 3 hours. 
 
7.3.2 Analysis of Interviews 
  
 The thematic content of right-wing activists’ narratives reveals key points of convergence 
with the master narrative of conservatives. The theme of South Korean victimization by evil 
communists is consistently present and the need for security is internalized with the recognition of a 
continued existential threat, both physically and ideologically from the North. The exceptionalism 
of South Korea that protected the “true” “Korean-ness” from invasions of a communist ideology is 
innately connected to the delegitimization of the North Korean regime and its followers. 
 




 As shown in the declaration of the Truth Forum saying that it recognizes the unjustness of 
President Park’s impeachment, a strong sense of crisis surfaced among conservatives, as they believe 
that “anachronistic and illiberal political instigations of Juche ideology followers [jusapa] among 
the leftists dangerously undermine the very foundation of the ROK” (Kim Sŏng-hun 2018). The 
sense of crisis raised in the process of impeachment is at the core of the new trend of rightist political 
activism, which is prominently discovered in the interviews with right-wing activists and active 
members of civic groups collected for this study. Among ten leaders of right-wing civic groups, eight 
said they joined the right wing activities due to the impeachment of President Park, identifying it as 
identity threat from the leftists (anti-South forces or pro-North followers). For example, Kim, the 
leader of the Truth Forum SNU and the Truth Alliance, who first initiated this right-wing student 
movement, mentioned in the interview with an online news media, Future Korea (Paek Josep 2018): 
 
 While I was watching what was going on with the impeachment incident, I came to realize 
 the propaganda of leftists reached the limit, which can possibly lead to the crisis of the whole 
 country just as they did in candlelight protests with the issue of mad cow disease in 2008. 
 So, I started this movement with the feeling of desperation that I should not be sitting without 
 doing anything. … Among those who led the “democracy movement” in the past, there were, 
 of course, those who joined it with a pure heart for democracy, but there were others who 
 fought for “people’s democracy” which the North claims, rather than “liberal democracy”. 
 It was the so-called Jusapa who distorted the pure student movement for liberal democracy. 
 (Hereinafter, all the interviews are translated by the author.) 
 
 The narrative of the national crisis indicates that the national identity construction in South 
Korea is necessarily related to how to define North Korea. Cho, a leader of the Truth Forum and a 
PhD candidate in North Korean studies at Korea University, narrated his personal life story to explain 
why he joined right-wing activism: 
 
 While I was studying War studies in England, I had a chance to think about my national 
 identity after reading an essay from a North Korean defector. Then, I came to think about 
 my country and my national identity, which I had never thought about before. I spent my 
 student life in India and England but I came to realize I cannot live as a British person even 
 though I can get British citizenship. … In the end, I personally thought I need to restore my 
 identity as a Korean so I came back home and did military service. In the meantime, my 
 concern about my country and North Korea was growing serious and I concluded that the 
 national identity of South Korea necessarily includes the North, and that without restoring 
 the North, goals such as becoming a developed nation and a leading country in the 
 international arena are meaningless. 
  
 To be a Korean in Cho’s mind is first and foremost about realizing the reality of the division 
and the issue of North Korea. He voluntarily went to do military service with the goal of restoring 
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his identity as a Korean, which he could have avoided by gaining British citizenship. For most 
Koreans, whether they are progressive or conservative, the division is regarded as temporary largely 
due to the strong faith in ethnic homogeneity developed under colonial rule. In this light, it is not 
surprising to see that even though Cho lived abroad for a long time since his teens, he reveals this 
nationalistic idea that naturally includes the North, while viewing the North Korean people as 
liberated and restored from oppression. He said, however, that while doing his doctoral course of 
North Korean studies in South Korea, he experienced confusion about his political identity. In this 
portion of his narrative, Cho makes a very critical statement on understanding the way in which 
contemporary conservatives construct their narrative on national identity. First of all, being Korean 
is basically based on an ethnicity. When he started to think about his national identity, his thinking 
naturally led to considering North Korea as part of the self, lost but to be restored. 
  
 I came back to Seoul to join a doctoral program in North Korean studies. When I started 
 researching about the North, I soon realized that the criteria to distinguish progressive and 
 conservative in South Korea are quite different from what I had thought. I believed that I 
 myself was progressive while being abroad largely due to my interests in the North Korean 
 human rights issue. … What I realized was that the category of progressivism in South Korea 
 included different ideas and ideologies, even the Juche ideology of the North. And I realized 
 that what I want to argue about North Korean human rights is in line with the argument of 
 the conservative camp in Korea. … When I began my PhD in North Korean studies, I 
 expected it would be about how to change the North, which means how to overcome the 
 Kim family’s totalitarianism and ultimately to achieve unification under the liberal 
 democratic system. However, it was not the case. I found that North Korean studies in South 
 Korea is about how to have a proper understanding of North Korea and to sustain its system. 
 The issue of North Korean human rights is dealt with a bit but it is not the main focus, but 
 understanding of the Juche ideology of the North was at the core of North Korean studies. 
 … I was startled by that and then I moved on to research the history of Korean leftists. The 
 beginning of the leftists was the campus movement in the 1980s, in which some students 
 were sacrificed by the state forces. I believe that the sacrifice of those students was tragic, 
 but the fact is that many of them were dreaming of the socialist revolution in South Korea. 
 
 Here, he displays another critical factor in his understanding of Korean national identity, 
which is about how to view the North Korean regime. In terms of the North, his main goal is to 
transform the North Korean regime. The term “totalitarian”, used to describe the North Korean 
regime in his interview, aptly displays his opinion about the Kim regime. His view well accords with 
the Korean conservatives’ as he confessed. It does not really matter how long the two Koreas have 
been separated. They are united in a blood line. Hence, they should be reunited, but for conservatives 
it is most critical that the unification should be achieved under a liberal democracy, as Cho clarifies. 
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that Cho identifies the existence of the North Korean followers in the 
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South in his comment that some involved in the student movement in the 1980s were followers of 
the North Korean ideology, dreaming of revolution in the South. It is quite obvious that Cho’s idea 
about his political identity was already established before his return to South Korea for study, 
identifying himself as a progressive. Yet he found his idea belongs to the conservative strain in the 
context of South Korea, which is mainly because he identifies with the North Korean ideology and 
regime as illegal and illegitimate. In his view, the political strain commonly called “progressive” 
includes different ideas of liberals, leftists, socialists, and even communists. Hence, his ultimate 
definition of Korean identity places the ROK as the true representation of the nation and the only 
legitimate political entity at the forefront. 
 The sense of crisis that rightists have felt since Park’s impeachment is best illustrated in the 
statement of the Truth Forum addressed to the US and the international community at the conference 
held by the right-wing civic group, Save Korea Foundation, on October 12, 2018. It is declared that 
South Korea is facing a danger of takeover by Juche ideology followers among the leftists who 
undermine the very foundation of the ROK. This narrative clearly explains why the Taegukgi rally 
protesters are bearing the slogans of anti-communism. In the narrative of conservatives, the 
impeachment of Park is connected to pro-North followers’ agenda to subvert the South. This is 
addressed in the following statement: 
  
 President Moon is known to have been a democracy activist and human rights lawyer. 
 However, we must not uncritically applaud him and the democratic movement of the 1980s 
 in Korea because Kim Il Sung’s Juche ideology followers [jusapa] that sought to subvert the 
 ROK were at the core of that movement. They denounced the US as the arch enemy 
 responsible for the division of the Korean peninsula and the agent of capitalistic imperialism. 
 … President Moon appointed Juche ideology followers to many of the important positions 
 in the Blue House, including his chief of staff Im Jong-seok, who was the most prominent 
 jusapa member in the late 1980s. While the threat to the ROK and the international 
 community by North Korea and its nuclear weapons is far from being resolved, President 
 Moon is taking actions that weaken the ROK-US alliance. It should be remembered that in 
 West Germany, Gunter Güillaume, the secretary of the prime minister Willy Brandt, was 
 revealed to be a communist spy. … Many Koreans are concerned that South Korea is in 
 similar circumstances (SKF International Symposium 2018). 
 
 What should be noted here is that while all interviewees identified the impeachment as a 
crisis for conservatism and consequently the very foundation of the ROK, they all emphasized that 
the crisis should be taken as an opportunity for conservatives to go through a self-reflexive process 
to reform corrupted and distorted conservatism by politicians. With the impeachment, the traditional 
conservatism has almost been destroyed and the political power of the traditional conservative party 
has been lost. Many of the interviewees explained that this is because core values and principles of 
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conservatism were disregarded for a long time by conservative ruling elites who were satisfied with 
their enjoyment of vested interests and ignored the importance of educating the younger generation 
with those values, while leftists including pro-North followers were actively engaged in educating 
college students with their ideologies. For instance, Cho mentioned that “it is a failure of rightists 
and churches that have not been watchful over our enemy despite the fact that we, South Koreans, 
have a clear enemy.” 
 Another interviewee, Son, a PhD candidate in North Korean studies and a leader of the Truth 
Forum at Ewha University, also states that “what I have seen after the impeachment is division within 
conservatives and churches. In my opinion the impeachment provided us with an opportunity to see 
who are true and fake conservatives and Christians.” Another interviewee, Lee, a PhD candidate in 
SNU and a leader of an online right-wing broadcasting channel, also views the impeachment and 
consequent Taegukgi protests in a positive way, arguing that: 
  
 Before the Taegukgi protests there were no grassroots right-wing political forces at all in 
 South Korea. There were some civic groups which were not voluntarily organized but mostly 
 connected to the conservative party. However, with the Taegukgi rallies, the number of 
 voluntarily organized civic groups has been exploding. Some people like me started 
 broadcasting on Youtube and others organized various new civic organizations. And right-
 wing media like Pennmike were founded. This is all because many people felt the sense of 
 crisis and then they started to actively mobilize material and human resources. Even though 
 there is some discord among groups, I see this as a positive phenomenon. 
 
 He also explains that the self-reflexive processes of conservatism started with the emergence 
of the New Right in the 2000s. 
 
 One of the most serious problems of the Korean right and conservatism is that it has no 
 contents that can explain its political ideas and ideologies. We have to admit that. Leftists 
 have dominated universities with contents ranging from the Juche ideology of the North to 
 postmodernism. In this context, thanks to the New Right that emerged in the 2000s, the 
 historical reappraisal of President Rhee Syngman and Park Chung-hee began to emerge 
 among intellectuals. Many of the New Right were converted rightists from leftists and after 
 conversion they contributed to rewriting the history of South Korea based on the values and 
 perspectives of rightists. 
  
 Cho also makes a clear statement understanding the incident of impeachment as a golden 
opportunity for conservatives to reflect on their wrongdoings and return to true values of 
conservatism. 
 
 With the impeachment, conservatives, who had not known on what basis they should be 
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 united, realized that they should get together centered around principles and values that were 
 respected during the process of nation-building by President Rhee Syngman, as well as 
 cultivate an identity that acknowledges the legitimacy of South Korea. Also, this is a chance 
 to unite those who agree with the idea that this battle is between liberal democracy versus 
 totalitarianism. In particular, this impeachment was the only opportunity for ruling elites and 
 conservative Christians who just sat where they were, satisfied with what they enjoyed 
 without realizing what was coming, to become united around our values and principles, but 
 not around political interests. … This is a golden opportunity for self-reflection on how we 
 have disrespected our values of liberal democracy inherited by our ancestors who established 
 South Korea, and have neglected the sufferings of our fellow people in the North. Without 
 this self-reflection, it is difficult to persuade the masses that this government is fake, built on 
 the injustice of the impeachment. 
 
B. Irreconcilability in the National Identities of the Two Koreas 
 
 As seen in the declaration of commitments of the Truth Forum, there are two backbones in 
the narrative of rightists regarding the South Korean national identity: 1) the contemporary history 
of South Korea, which is, they argue, essential for appreciating the values of liberal democracy and 
the market economy; and 2) the identity of two significant others: North Korea and the US. The 
people in the North are regarded as fellow countrymen who should enjoy freedom and prosperity 
with South Koreans and the North Regime as tyranny that oppress its own people. The strong ROK-
US alliance is one of the key issues for the security of South Korea’s founding values as well as 
physical security. 
 The narrative of the existential threat, both physical and ideological, from the North leads to 
the irreconcilable nature of national identity in the two Koreas. For instance, as Cho argues, 
unification is regarded as the ultimate goal in both Koreas but when it comes to details of how to 
achieve it, there are sharp contrasts between them. 
 
 With the impeachment of Park, of course, I admit that President Park did some wrongdoings 
 as a president but I believed that there was a hidden force, Juche ideology followers [jusapa], 
 who drove the candlelight protests behind the scene. Politicians like Im Jong-seok, the 
 current chief secretary of the Moon government who used to be a jusapa member, have never 
 clearly declared that they are converted from it. … If you looked at the slogans that were 
 shouted in candlelight protests, their true identity was clearly revealed. For instance, a 
 slogan, “Let’s get united with the North under the confederation system [yŏnbangche],” is 
 in line with what the North has consistently argued in the name of the “Democratic 
 Confederal Republic of Koryo [Koryŏyŏnbangche]”. When seeing these slogans, I felt 
 threatened but I couldn’t do much as one individual. Later I found that a poster was posted 
 in the Seoul National University, in which the arguments about why the impeachment was 
 wrong were elaborated. And that was the beginning of the Truth Forum, a right-wing student 




 Reflecting on what happened around the incident of Park’s impeachment, his narrative 
reveals a sense of threat from Juche ideology followers and pro-North followers within South Korean 
society. The presence of pro-North followers in the current government who give away South Korea’s 
interests and security in the name of peace has come to consume the South Korean conservative 
discourses regarding ongoing inter-Korean summits for peace agreement. The strategy to pursue 
unification under the confederation system that the North wants to establish is regarded as a 
concession for the rightists that prioritizes unification under the liberal democratic political system. 
This idea is also found in the comment of Lee: 
 
 The confederation system is possible only if the North becomes a normal and liberal state 
 and thus there is no necessity of China’s intervention as a mediator. The precondition for the 
 confederation system is the collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime. That is, the totalitarian 
 system of the North should be taken down. … Some say that if we keep cooperating with 
 the North and providing aid, one day the North will open their system. But Kim is not that 
 stupid. The regime has sustained its totalitarian system for about 70 years and even if they 
 agree with economic cooperation such as the Kaesung Industrial Region, the district is 
 absolutely controlled by the state and there is no actual impact on the North Korean people 
 in other regions. 
 
 In Son’s narrative, the hidden strategy operated by the North and North Korean sympathizers 
in South Korea behind the impeachment of President Park is argued in more detail: 
 
 Why was humanitarian aid under progressive governments who disregarded the issue of 
 human rights violations conducted by the North Korean regime consistently provided to the 
 North? In the Park administration, the policies toward the North were mostly to press the 
 North Korean regime and on the contrary, President Park even mentioned that the North 
 Korean people coming to the South were always welcome in the South. It was the North that 
 felt most uncomfortable about this kind of rhetoric and policies from Park. I think this is 
 closely related to the impeachment. … As I am doing a PhD in North Korean studies, I was 
 reading the Rodong Sinmun in April 2017 to do an assignment and what I found was striking 
 as the articles that claimed that President Park must be impeached were consistently 
 published from March 2016 for about a year. Then, the impeachment actually happened in 
 2017.  … I am sure that there was a political agenda and movement for the impeachment of 
 Park operated by North Korean followers in the South, which was ordered by the North 
 Korean regime. In the North, there is no freedom of speech and thus all the articles of Rodong 
 Sinmun represent the ideas of the regime. … I was astonished by the articles so I took photos 
 of the articles, which is illegal according to the National Security Law. In the South, it is 
 only allowed to read North Korean papers within libraries for the aim of research and it is 
 not allowed to take materials out in any form, including taking photos. … However, I felt I 
 had to let this fact be known to the world so I posted the photo on my Facebook page. … I 
 got tens of thousands replies and comments over one day, which mostly criticized me for 
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 spreading fake news but the truth is that I read those articles with my own eyes in the library. 
 … While I was reading all the replies, I realized that there actually exists a group of North 
 Korean followers in the South, who threatened to kill me in messages. 
  
 Lee also clearly recognizes the North as an illegal state that oppressed its own people, and 
was thus to be destroyed. 
  
 The North Korean regime is the worst totalitarian and fake communist regime in world 
 history. In reality, it is a vicious dynasty and dictatorship which committed mass killings of 
 its own people, where the universal norms of liberty and human rights that all human beings 
 should enjoy are violated to the extreme. Thus, the North Korean regime should be destroyed 
 and its people should be saved. The North is not a partner for negotiation and cooperation. 
 It is proved in many historical cases that it is not possible to make such cooperation with 
 totalitarian communist states. 
 
 Reflecting on national identity, Cho regards too much emphasis on ethnic nationalism that 
was brought from the North’s Juche ideology as dangerous and pre-modern: 
 
 South Korean national identity is notably evident in the Constitution, in which it is clearly 
 stipulated that the fellow citizens in the North are part of the ROK and the territory of the 
 ROK covers the whole peninsula. Thus, South Korea has its ultimate duty to liberate people 
 in the North from the oppression of the illegal regime, which is our national identity. 
 President Rhee left his intention that “South Koreans should keep the national identity that 
 South Korea has a mission to save people in the North based on the founding values of the 
 ROK.” … 
 The nationalism that North Korea promotes is ethnic nationalism. This concept has been 
 brought into the South and thus we do not see “the nation” from a civic perspective. The 
 nation [minjok] commonly used in both Koreas and self-reliance [Juche] ultimately refers to 
 the fact that we, two Koreas, deal with our own issues without intervention of imperial 
 powers such as the US. Juche ideology followers [jusapa] in Korea have brought these two 
 concepts of Juche and minjok from the North so the citizens of South Korea, without 
 realizing it have been attracted to those ideas in the name of ethnic nationalism. I personally 
 think this is because the masses in South Korea still have a very weak understanding of the 
 national identity as a modern nation state. The administrations of Park Geun-hye and Lee 
 Myung-bak were trapped in this notion of one community of Korea based on the ethnic 
 notion, which is, I believe, most dangerous. … There are not many modern states which are 
 composed of only one ethnic group. A modern nation state is thus united centered around a 
 political system of a state, which in part includes ethnicity. When we think of a nation state, 
 we must consider it from a modern perspective which prioritizes loyalty to the state as a 




 Cho’s view of North Korea assumes that there are irreconcilable differences between the two 
Koreas. In keeping with right-wing South Korean political narrative, he identifies the North Korean 
regime as an evil dictatorship, which thus should be removed, while showing empathy toward North 
Korean people based on respect toward other human beings who are ill-treated by their own 
government. Further reflecting on ongoing inter-Korean summits, his view on the irreconcilability 
between the two Koreas is clearly explained: 
 
 In my opinion, the recent inter-Korean summits amount to a declaration of surrender. That 
 is, it is to give away the political system, liberal democracy, of South Korea to the system of 
 Kim Jung-un. … The reason why the North declared it would stop nuclear tests is that it had 
 completed the development of nuclear weapons. Considering this, any attempts to talk with 
 the North without clearly stating the issue of North Korean human rights violation and 
 denuclearization should be regarded as surrender to the North. Not mentioning the human 
 rights issue in the summits means abandoning South Korean national identity that includes 
 the fellow North Koreans as part of South Korea to be recovered. Furthermore, summits 
 which proceed without suggesting clear paths toward the denuclearization of the North 
 amount to giving up the security of South Korea, which is our existence. Thus, these two 
 should be included as the main agenda of the summits, which is, of course, not going to 
 happen. … What we should be more careful about is what the term, nation [minjok], is meant 
 in the North. The meaning of minjok is not one ethnic nation of Korea in North Korean terms, 
 rather it means only people who belong to the ruling class who respect the Kim Il Sung 
 family, which is what the Juche ideology means. Juche is based on nationalism but since the 
 end of the 1970s, the term, Juche has been identified with the Father Kim Il Sung, which I 
 call in my doctoral dissertation “the incarnated Supreme Leader [Suryŏng].” That is to say, 
 “the suryŏng is the state” just as Louis XIV in France said “I am the state.” Therefore, in the 
 extreme nationalism of the North, the notion of the nation is interpreted through the lens of 
 Juche ideology, so whoever is opposed to the Juche ideology does not count as a human 
 being. When the North Korean regime argues that North Korea is a state centered around 
 humans, we should know that dissenters in the North are not included in the category of 
 humans. This justifies the North’s claim whenever submitting the human rights report to the 
 UN every year that North Korea is the state that respects human rights. This is because from 
 its perspective, political opponents are not counted as humans. 
  
 Also, Cho states that the national identity of North Korea has been constructed around its 
unchanging goal of unification under communism, presenting his negative predictions on ongoing 
inter-Korean summits achieving peace on the peninsula. In his view, conflicting national identities 
of the two Koreas cannot be reconcilable or negotiable. 
  
 The reason why Kim Jung-un came to agree to have a series of summits with the US and 
 South Korea is that the North had completed the development of nuclear weapons. They 
 have never abandoned their national identity in which the ultimate goal is unification under 
 communism. What North Koreans mean by denuclearization is well explained in the recent 
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 report, titled “What does denuclearization mean to North Korea” by Voice of America. It is 
 clear in the North’s argument for denuclearization that firstly the US military must be 
 removed from the peninsula and the US nuclear umbrella in South Korea should then be 
 taken away. They argue that only if these happen will the North remove its own nuclear 
 weapons. … Harry B. Harris Jr., who was newly appointed as the US ambassador to South 
 Korea, mentioned in his speech in the American National Assembly at the beginning of this 
 year (2018) that “the nuclear development of the North is not for its own survival but for its 
 goal of unification under communism… It is not for deterrence against the US but pressure 
 against the South Korean regime, including deterrence. … It is natural given that the 
 “democracy base theory [minjugichiron]” of Kim Il Sung, which declares the ultimate goal 
 is first to establish a socialist revolutionary state in the north of the peninsula and then to 
 extend it to the south, has never been removed in the articles of the communist party since 
 1945. … Just as we have national identity of liberal democracy, the North has its own 
 national identity which has never changed. The research aim of my doctoral dissertation was 
 to examine the intention of the Kim Family by analyzing the New Year’s addresses. Some 
 say that Kim has adopted an appeasement policy based on the 2018 New Year’s address, 
 which is wrong in my opinion. Just as we have our own national identity of liberal 
 democracy, the North has its identity which has never been transformed. 
 
 The narrative that North Korea is, for conservatives, an illegitimate group to be removed is 
revealed in all of the interviews conducted. For instance, Lim, one of the leaders in Christian right-
wing civic groups, declares: 
  
 When it comes to North Korea, we should not think of whether it is part of us or not. What 
 is important is whether North Korea is a legitimate state or not. We all know that the three 
 elements of a modern state are territory, people and sovereignty. However, in the North, 
 people do not enjoy any rights as citizens of a state but are only under oppression like slaves. 
 … Despite the fact that it is declared that the whole Korean peninsula is the territory of the 
 ROK in our Constitution, it makes no sense to acknowledge the North as a legitimate state 
 and to have summits with it. … It is very ironic that even a neighboring state, Japan, does 
 not recognize North Korea as a normal state, and a government that rejects identifying the 
 North as an enemy and illegal entity has come to take power in South Korea. 
 
 The Truth Form also makes a clear statement, regarding the North: 
 
 There is no point in having peace talks without bringing any concrete changes in North 
 Korea. These talks for the sake of talks will only extend the sufferings of the North Korean 
 people and the nuclear threat posed to the international community. We must now bring about 
 substantial and tangible changes in North Korea. We must free those unjustly suffering North 
 Koreans. The US and the ROK shed blood together to uphold freedom and truth. We must 
 fight the good fight together for the well-being of the international community and to bring 




 This argument that there must be transformation of the North has essentially led to anti-
communist discourse, which is at the core of South Korean national identity. Cho argues that: 
  
 The term, anti-communism should be replaced as it is a word that has been framed by leftists 
 in many negative ways. However, I believe that what is important is to clarify that the people 
 in the North are to be liberated from oppression by us and are part of us based on our 
 Constitution. In addition, the North Korean regime is not a state but an illegal group that has 
 committed crimes against humanity to our fellow people, which is the key of our national 
 identity that we should protect. Whether we call this “anti-communism” or something else, 
 that is the national identity of South Korea. 
 
 The importance of protecting South Korean national identity from the invasion of 
communism is also declared in the statement of the Truth Forum addressed to the US: 
  
 The communist Soviet Union, which we fought against together, collapsed. However, under 
 the tolerance of democracy, different derivative forms of socialism are still threatening our 
 values of freedom and truth. In South Korea, romantic nationalists have been advocating the 
 world’s worst slave state of North Korea while threatening liberal democracy and the market 
 economy. They intentionally instigate anti-American sentiments. Those who led the 
 “democratic” movement in the 1980s have gained control over the media, education system 
 and businesses by dominating labor unions. They have been twisting and distorting history, 
 controlling the media and spreading anti-market populism. … We are gravely concerned that 
 President Moon and the ruling party of Korea share these socialist views considering the 
 paths they have walked in the past and the policies the current administration is promoting 
 (Kim Sŏng-hun 2017). 
 
 The concern over the allegedly left-leaning government of Moon is also well elaborated in 
another statement of the Truth Forum delivered at a press conference on 26 February 2018: 
 
 Constitutional reform should be carried forward when there is sufficient political stability 
 and social consensus. The South Korean society is now severely divided since the 
 impeachment of our president merely a year ago. Many are furiously concerned by the Moon 
 administration for its socialist leanings and outright pro-North Korea stances. The Moon 
 administration’s anxious attempt to change our Constitution in the midst of all this 
 commotion is completely unreasonable. … In fact, there are sincere concerns that such a 
 rash reform effort may be hijacked by those who seek to subvert our liberal democratic free 
 market system. Already, the Constitutional reform drafts propose to delete “liberal” from 
 “liberal democracy,” the very foundational concept of freedom that defines the Republic of 
 Korea, which separates it from North Korea (Truth Forum 2018). 
 




 Leftists in America have no idea about the fact that Korean leftists support the North and 
 that is why, I think, American leftists cooperate with Korean leftists. Also, this is why we 
 should raise our voices about it. American intellectuals rarely know about the presence of 
 Juche ideology followers and their political activities within the South since the 1980s. It is 
 our duty to enlighten people. 
 
 This concern over the cooperation between progressives in South Korea and the US is also 
witnessed in this statement of the Truth Forum: 
 
 In particular, we are deeply concerned by the mistaken cooperation between the progressives 
 of the two countries. The American progressives are seemingly cooperating with the 
 “progressives” of South Korea under the value of progress. However, the American 
 progressives should realize that the so-called “progressives” in South Korea … are led by 
 Jusapa, the followers of North Korean ideologies who hold a strong grudge against the US. 
 While they speak about general human rights, they utterly ignore the grave human rights 
 violations that are being committed in the North (Truth Forum 2018). 
  
 Mirroring the master narrative of the state-centered nationalism, right-wing activists 
emphasize the importance of the founding values, liberal democracy and free market system of South 
Korea and the physical and ideological threats from the North, while acknowledging that the people 
in the North and its territory are part of the South, as stipulated in the Constitution. Unification is 
thus set as the ultimate goal to be achieved. However, one interviewee, Lee, expressed his 
disagreement over the view that sees unification as an urgent aim for the South, saying: 
 
 I believe that the national identity of South Korea is based on liberal democracy established 
 by Rhee Syngman and further developed by Park Chung-hee. In contrast, the North has 
 developed its own identity based on the ideology of Kim Il Sung. In reality, these two 
 opposing national identities are irreversible and irreconcilable, and even from a cultural 
 perspective it seems impossible to become one nation after having such a long period of 
 division. It is our duty to liberate the people in the North from oppression but it is a 
 responsibility as a human being who respects the universal norms, not because we are one 
 ethnic nation. … Unification is possible only if we have enough time and a process in which 
 the North Korean people can develop an ability to govern themselves according to the rule 
 of liberal democracy after the collapse of the illegal regime. Only after going through those 
 processes, then, can unification be discussed. 
 
 However, it is noteworthy that among 15 interviewees from 20s to 60s, Lee in his 20s is the 
only one who clearly displays the view that unification is unrealistic at the moment and undesirable 
without serious reform and transformation of the North Korean system as well as people’s mindset, 
acknowledging great gaps between people in the two Koreas in their mentality and culture. Others 
like Son, the leader of Ewha Truth Forum, and Han, of Yonsei Truth Forum, generally agree that the 
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most urgent task is not unification but liberation of North Korean people from oppression so that 
they can enjoy the same freedom South Koreans do. If this is realized, it does not really matter 
whether the North and South stay as separate states or are reunited. This argument was common 
among other Christian interviewees, who all prioritized liberating oppressed people from the North 
Korean regime over unification. 
 Lee’s criteria to be identified as a Korean are dependent on whether one accepts and respects 
the values of liberal democracy and individualism regardless of ethnicity, as opposing ideas of 
totalitarianism. Despite the widespread ethnic notion of nationalism in South Korea, I found in the 
interviews conducted that there is an increasing trend among the younger generation towards seeing 
unification as unnecessary. Lee’s view on unification reflects the analysis of Lee Nae-young (2016) 
on the perspective of unification based on the survey on national identity of South Korea conducted 
every five years from 2005 to 2015 by EAI, ARI and JongangIlbo. The number of participants who 
identified the North as the “other” and “enemy” was 10% and 8%, respectively, in 2005, but this 
increased to 13.5% and 16.1% in 2015 (Lee Nae-young 2016, p. 214). More importantly as Lee 
pointed out, it was those who viewed the North as an enemy numbering the highest for those in their 
20s and 60s, accounting for 19.3% and 19.8%, respectively, in 2015. The number of those in their 
30s who regarded the North as an enemy was slightly higher than those in their 40s and 50s, 
signifying that among the younger generation, the identity that sees the North as an enemy is 
generally increasing (ibid., p. 215). This negative view of North Korea among young people innately 
pertains to their negative or passive view on unification. In terms of unification, those who replied 
that there is no need to rush for unification was 31.9% and those who saw that unification is not 
necessary was 12.5% in the 2015 survey, which shows a sharp rise compared to 19.5% and 7.9 %, 
respectively, in 2005 (ibid, p. 222). It should also be noted that among those in their 20s, the number 
of participants who had negative or passive views on unification, including both those who saw that 
there is no need to rush unification and no need for unification at all, accounted for 55.6% in 2015. 
This indicates the growing negative view of unification among the younger generation, sharply 
opposed to the fact that over 61.6 % of those in their 60s replied that unification is necessary (ibid.). 
 The narrative that sees the North as an enemy is necessarily connected to the discourses of 
South Korea’s security in which the very presence of the North is a permanent existential threat to 
the South. The possibility of ideological invasions as well as physical attacks on the South creates 
fear and anxiety as Lee explains: 
 
 As far as I know, in the west the term liberal democracy is not frequently used. The reason 
 why only in South Korea two words are combined into one to explain its political system is 
 that there exist followers of communism within society. During the process of communists’ 
 ideological invasions to South Korea in the past, they disguised themselves as followers of 
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 true democracy or progressivism. Democratization in South Korea in the past thus meant the 
 North Korean style of people’s democracy as declared by its official name, rather than 
 democracy based on freedom of individuals, as in the west. 
 
 Cho also expresses security concerns: 
 
 Even some conservatives say that if we can achieve a peace agreement or some sort of 
 declaration, the North might not pursue unification under communism through military 
 attacks, and that in the end, it might adopt more liberal policies as a result of cooperation 
 and the free market system, as we see in the cases of China or Vietnam. What I think is that 
 it was only possible in those cases because the free market system or cooperation with the 
 liberal world were not existential threats to those regimes. As we recognize, the North knows 
 that as long as the South, a neighboring state, exists as a liberal democratic state, its political 
 system cannot survive the invasions of a free economic and liberal political system. As might 
 be expected, the totalitarian identity of the North might change with cooperation but it does 
 not seem feasible without the collapse of Kim’s dictatorship. This is because as I said before, 
 the national identity of the North will not change unless the pre-modern identity that “the 
 supreme leader [suryong] is the state” is abandoned, which naturally means a regime change. 
 … If our ultimate aim through the inter-Korean summits is a strategic aim of regime change, 
 a series of summits as a stepping stone can be seen positively. As far as has been discovered 
 so far, I can only see these summits as a surrender that is led by this government composed 
 of high officials who have history as jusapa and never declared their conversion. If the 
 government, who clearly shares the same values, principles and identity, pursues cooperation 
 with the North in the name of peace, we could agree with it as we know for a fact that the 
 government share the same identity. However, with this government the hidden intention of 
 the summits is very evident. 
 
 For the security of South Korea in broader terms, including military and ideological, the 
alliance with the US is regarded as top priority for the South, which is found in many places in the 
statements of the Truth Forum and in the interviews conducted. For instance, in the statement of 
Truth Forum in 2018, it is stated under the subtitle of “We call for a strong ROK-US alliance,”: 
  
 The alliance between the United States and the Republic of Korea is forged in blood. Without 
 the sacrifice of the American people, the Republic of Korea would not exist today. Their 
 noble sacrifices to secure our lives and freedom have not been in vain. Many South Korean 
 people are furious against the Moon administration for its attempts to damage this ROK-US 
 alliance. We sincerely insist that the US continue to cooperate with the South Korean people 
 who support Korea’s reunification under the principle of freedom and liberal democracy 
 which is shared by the American people, and to unite with our efforts to liberate the people 
 of North Korea. … Moreover, they (Juche ideology followers) have been inciting anti-
 American sentiments in South Korea to weaken the ROK-US alliance, and they capitalize 
 on the American progressives to influence the American media and its politics. We strongly 
 urge the US to stop assisting those who deny American values and principles. We also 
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 strongly urge the US to bring North Korean regime followers who live and operate within I
 ts US borders, such as MinjokTongshin (www.minjok.com), to justice (Truth Forum 2018). 
 
 Cho also emphasizes the alliance with the US: 
 
 The role of mediator that President Roh pursued as his principle of foreign policy does not 
 make sense in international politics. Small states which are not super powers have to rely on 
 alliances with strong powers. That does not mean a tributary system but a strategic alliance 
 as a sovereign state only in terms of security. Keeping a strong ROK-US alliance does not 
 harm our self-reliance. … In the name of economic cooperation, allying with China is more 
 problematic as it does not follow a value of liberal democracy, which, however, we share 
 with the US. From a Chinese perspective, we become a tributary state, which is elaborated 
 in their official documents. … If we need to choose an alliance with either the US or China, 
 it is natural that we take the US, whose values are in line with ours. 
  
 Son also makes a clear argument about the relationship with the US: 
 
 I believe that the US is a nation which chooses policies based on their values and principles. 
 The foundation of America was based on freedom. … In the end, the reason why Americans 
 fought for us was to protect their values and principles. South Korea is an ally for them which 
 shares their identity and values. In this context, I believe we are on the same side. 
 
 Lee’s statement also reveals the narrative of the US as a savior of South Korea: 
 
 We were not in a situation in which we could decide our own destiny (after liberation) and 
 as seen in other cases in the world, the foundation of the ROK would have not been possible 
 without strong support and sacrifice from America. … America is an object for us to be 
 thankful not only from a perspective of international politics but also from a religious 
 perspective. … Koreans were educated by many American missionaries. … Thanks to their 
 decision (to join the Korean War), the ROK now exists. … Another benefit we get from 
 alliance with the US is related to the historical fact of how South Korea, a small country that 
 was surrounded by states like China, Russia and North Korea, could fight against those 
 strong communist forces. This was only possible through the strong alliance with the US. 
 
 What is interesting in the statements above regarding the US, is that the importance of shared 
values and principles between the US and Korea is highlighted, rather than a military alliance. This 
means that in terms of security, they see security in broader terms. Traditional state-oriented security 
theories assume that physical survival from external threat is the primary human need which must 
be secured by a state. However, a number of scholars in the field of international security started 
applying sociological insights to broaden the concept of security, in which the basic need for security 
is dependent on management of relations with others (McSweeney 1999). From this perspective, 
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South Korea’s insecurity largely depends on North Korea’s unpredictability. South Korea feel less 
secure as it is hard to know what is going on inside the North. So it tries to improve security by 
managing relations with the most important and strongest ally, the US. 
 
C. Irreconcilability in Historical Views 
  
 The survey conducted by EAI, ARI and JongangIlbo in 2005, 2010, and 2015 regarding the 
assessment of former presidents shows that there are sharp differences in how to interpret and assess 
achievements of past presidents according to political leanings (Kang Won-taek 2016, p. 188-193). 
That is, people increasingly tend to positively assess former presidents who were from the same 
ideological strain. This clearly illustrates that historical views are more influenced by party 
preferences in South Korea, causing more conflicts regarding the history of South Korea between 
groups that hold different political preferences. 
  In the interviews I conducted, it can also be observed that in terms of what distinguishes 
rightists from leftists in South Korea, all of the participants point out the importance of the 
interpretation of South Korean history. Lee emphasizes that: 
  
 The national identity as a South Korean which we must have is that the ROK was established 
 in 1948 with the founding value of liberal democracy based on the strong alliance with 
 America. What is most important for South Korean identity is whether one accepts its 
 founding value of liberal democracy or not, and here the ethnic notion of the Korean nation 
 does not count. 
 
 Reflecting on the state-centered narrative, whether one acknowledges the founding values, 
which are at the core of its historical view, is a matter of whether one sees the establishment of a 
separate state, the South, as necessary and legitimate. This emphasis on the history and legitimacy 
of South Korea’s nation-building as a foundation of South Korean identity is also found in Son’s firm 
statement: 
 
 What divides rightists and leftists in South Korea is historical interpretation, more precisely, 
 whether one acknowledges that the ROK was established in 1948 by President Rhee 
 Syngman or not. Whenever I talk with my friends who see history from a leftist point of 
 view, I find that difference is irreconcilable with them. This is, I think, because of conflicting 
 interpretations of history. 
 The emphasis on historical interpretation in South Korean identity is also plainly evident in 
the statements of the Truth Forum. This declares that it is “committed to establishing an objective 
and balanced contemporary history of Korea, which is essential for appreciating the values of liberal 
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democracy and the market economy which form the backbone of our proud ROK” (Kim Sŏng-hun 
2018). 
 The post displayed on the walls on Yonsei University campus by the Yonsei Truth Forum on 
28 February 2018 criticizes the “pro-North historiography and policy of unification under the 
confederation system,” saying that: 
  
 Historical facts exist as facts. However, in researching history, what events are included or 
 emphasized, and how to interpret those events rely on historians’ identities and perspectives. 
 Why have we been taught that the first Rhee government needs to be blamed for the division, 
 rather than that it was an inevitable decision to prevent the communization of the southern 
 part of our nation? And why have we been taught positively only about Kim Ku, who was 
 against the establishment of a separate government and pursued talks with Kim Il Sung to 
 establish the united government? Why have we been taught negatively about the Yeosun 
 Incident where a mass killing of innocent civilians was conducted by the state, without being 
 provided with information that the incident initially occurred by resistance led by members 
 of the Workers’ Party of South Korea [Namrodang] who intended to subvert the South? … 
 Why have we been taught only about the meaning and significance of the democracy 
 movement in the 1980s, without being informed that at the core of the movement, there were 
 activities of pro-North followers like Juche ideology followers [jusapa], the National 
 Liberation (NL) strain or the National Council of Student Representatives [chŏndaehyŏp]? 
 … We want unification under liberty and freedom based on the proud history of South Korea, 
 which can liberate the fellow citizens in the North who are oppressed under the most violent 
 and tyrannical regime in the world. This can be achieved through a critical assessment of 
 leftist historians who have developed this distorted view and their pro-North historiography, 
 which has been deeply rooted among our people. Also, the critical assessment should be 
 applied to the current ruling party and government that have pursued North Korean policies 
 in the way the North has wanted, and have hindered the implementation of sanctions over 
 the North, which have strong support from the international communities (Yonsei Truth 
 Forum 2018). 
 
 The master ethnic nationalism narrative, allegedly left leaning, which is dominant and 
adopted in most of the current history textbooks, is criticized in the statement above for not being 
neutral or not offering balanced information. It seems quite obvious that the issue of historical 
interpretation and the acknowledgement of the establishment of the ROK are critical in the 
construction of South Korean national identity, thus being highly political. 
 A personal narrative of Han, a leader of Yonsei Truth Forum, well displays the significant 
influence of history education on her national identity conception: 
  
 I thought I was progressive. However, after I joined the voluntary work for helping North 
 Korean defectors’ children, I had a chance to watch videos concerning our first president, 
 Rhee Syngman, which provided me with an opportunity to realize that the knowledge I had 
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 thought was true before was not actually true but distorted, and instilled in me through 
 education. … 
 In the school education I received, the legitimacy of South Korea was denied. I was taught 
 that it was wrong to establish a separate state of the ROK. If Rhee had not established the 
 South, and the united government had been established under the leadership of Kim Ku, 
 there would not have been the tragedies of this nation, such as the Korean War, mass killings 
 of civilians conducted by Rhee, and all other corrupt acts done by ruling elites. Why this 
 country is unhappy and divided now is all due to the division of the nation so all the blame 
 for what is wrong now goes to Rhee. I believe that is why people are so excited about the 
 ongoing inter-Korean summits. People simply think that without division, there will be no 
 problems in this society. … They don’t see the most important thing, that is, what President 
 Rhee wanted to protect, even enduring the division of the nation. … I believe that Rhee 
 prioritized the liberty of the nation and faith in God. In order to protect those values, he must 
 have thought that liberal democracy was the best political system, under which each 
 individual can enjoy the freedoms such as the right to life and property rights, and live 
 independent lives with full rights and corresponding responsibilities. 
 
 In her narrative, Han claims that it was her history education that did not provide her with 
full facts or different perspectives on history but only instilled a one-sided story in her. She mentioned 
that only after realizing this, did she for the first time feel love for the nation. In constructing a 
personal narrative, Han recognizes the important values bestowed on all South Koreans, which 
people in current society have lost, saying: 
 
 I was very unhappy about this country before and my dream was thus to live abroad but after 
 realizing there are other perspectives on the origin of this country, I looked back on why I 
 had hated this nation so much and I realized how distorted were the facts about Rhee which 
 had been taught to me, and which had actually made me dislike my nation. Only knowing 
 that there exists a different perspective on Rhee, in which the origin of South Korea is viewed 
 more positively, made me loyal to this country and helped me to realize what values we must 
 protect and pursue. … This enlightenment has led me to research President Rhee in the 
 master’s program which I am enrolled on right now. … President Rhee knew that 
 communism is essentially the ideology that oppresses people and thus with the communistic 
 system, how much struggle people would have. That is why we should not just sit back and 
 watch our fellow people struggling under communism, and that is why South Korea has its 
 legitimacy. … 
 In current South Korean society, those values are all destroyed. For instance, on Facebook 
 there was a post where it was asked if you have one bullet left in your gun, between two 
 candidates for the North leader, Kim Jung-un, and Hong Jun-pyo, a former leader of the 
 conservative party, if you would like to kill Hong, you would click “like.” And more than 
 40,000 people clicked the “like” option, meaning they would kill Hong over Kim, who is the 
 murderer of loads of innocent people in the North, including his own relatives. … I thought 
 that in this society the morality and values are so destroyed and only obsessed with the idea 




 What distinguishes the Republic of Korea (ROK) from the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK), especially for South Korean conservatives, is its political system of liberal 
democracy and a free market economy. Especially distinctive is South Korea’s freedom, including 
individual freedom, freedom of the press, freedom of movement, freedom of expression, and freedom 
of assembly. The ROK’s identity is, therefore, intrinsically linked to the concept of “freedom” and 
“liberty”. This is the reason why the conservatives were so strongly against the attempts led by 
President Moon’s Democratic Party of Korea to remove the term “liberal” from the “liberal 
democracy” stipulated in the Constitution, and by the MOE to change the expression “liberal 
democracy” to just “democracy” in school textbooks. For conservatives, in the South’s political and 
economic system, “liberal” is the key that separates South Korea from the North in that the North 
officially promotes its political system as a “people’s democracy.” 
 Lee In-ho (2018), a professor emeritus in SNU, regarding the current President Moon’s 
historical interpretation, argues: 
  
 The birth of the Republic of Korea is perceived by Moon and his core supporters not as an 
 event to be remembered and celebrated, but as an unfortunate, if not unforgivable, aberration 
 resulting in the nation’s unnatural division. The fact that the Republic of Korea was born and 
 developed as an anti-communist country has to be erased, not just from history as it naturally 
 develops, but from established historical record and memory as well. 
 
 In keeping with the right-wing master narrative, Lee’s statement shows that historical 
interpretation is inherently connected to the birth of South Korea and South Korean national identity. 
The policies the Moon administration has implemented since his inauguration are considered by 
conservatives as attempts to transform the backbones of South Korean national identity. If we use a 
broader concept of security and see security as management of relations with others, security is 
inseparably connected to collective identity because it means firstly we need to go through the 
process of identifying who we are and who others are, and then we can manage relations with others 
through policies. Therefore, the issue of identity, what makes us believe we are the same and they 
are different, is inseparable from security. The activists and members of right-wing civic groups I 
interviewed commonly mentioned that differences between rightists and leftists on how to identify 
South Korea and North Korea and how to interpret the past of the two Koreas are irreconcilable, 
arguing that they cannot lose this war of history and identity because it is a matter of the existence 
of South Korea, which is under threat from the North and from its followers within the South. Also, 
there is a clear tendency among those activists to see that this battle is between totalitarianism and 
individualism (or democracy), rather than ideology of communism and democracy as seen from Son 
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and Lee’s descriptions of the North as a fake communistic state, which has existed only for Kim 
family.  
 
D. Christianity and the Right-Wing in South Korea 
 
 As mentioned earlier, 13 out of 15 interviewees were Christians, including two Catholics. It 
seems quite evident that there are close relations between Korean Christianity and the political 
rightist movement, as many scholars and media sources point out. For example, some media reports 
paid attention to religious symbols like crosses and the Israeli flags held by protesters during the pro-
Park, Taegukgi rallies. According to a rightist journalist Cho Gab-je (2017), the Taegukgi protests 
originated from massive prayer meetings held by Protestant civic groups. He further maintains that 
“the number of members of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (the leftist group) who 
mobilized people for candlelight protests was 600,000, while that of the Korean Protestants was 
15,000,000. Thus in the end, the Taegukgi won this battle (Cho Gab-je 2017).” The great influence 
of Protestants in South Korean politics is also claimed by progressive media or intellectuals. In one 
of the progressive media outlets, Hangyoreh, it is maintained that “Protestants have affected political 
ideology and policy areas of the government through rightist networks such as the National Prayer 
Meeting and the Text Forum” (Park Ki-yong & Park Yu-ri 2016). 
 The strong influence of religious faith in political tendency was observed in the interviews 
conducted with right-wing activists. Many opined that joining right-wing political activism was the 
mission of God bestowed on them in order to protect the founding values of South Korea, which are 
in line with Christian values in many ways. For instance, this can be clearly be discovered in Cho’s 
personal narrative: 
  
 I posted two posters on the walls in my campus and on Facebook pages on December 9 and 
 22, in 2017. Especially after the article about the poster I posted on 22 December was 
 published in Jongang Ilbo, I got threats from leftists, some of which actually mentioned that 
 they would kill my son and I was a bit scared because on my Facebook page, all my family 
 photos were exposed. Since then, I have thought it is a spiritual battle, rather than a political 
 movement so I asked for prayers for what I do to my Christian friends and families. 
 
 Another Son, who used to work in one of the NGOs for North Korean human rights, 
mentioned: 
  
 I was born in a Christian family and I was apolitical even though my parents were 
 conservatives. However, I happened to read a book in a hair salon on a Korean American’s 
 activities to save North Korean people and I cried so much while reading it. … I realized 
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 that I was so indifferent and ignorant about my fellow people, while only living for my own 
 welfare. I thought that it was God’s plan to provide with me a chance to read that book on 
 that day. I looked for things I could do for the people in the North and then came to work in 
 one of the NGOs for North Korea. … I thought I was a feminist in my 20s. I was very 
 interested in human rights issues, in particular in minorities who were excluded from society. 
 While staying in Canada to learn English, I was involved in activities to promote the human 
 rights of Canadian natives. After I started to work for North Korean human rights, however, 
 I realized the fact that progressives and leftists, who were usually regarded as very active in 
 protecting human rights, were silent only about the North Korean human rights issues. I 
 started to question why they had such dualistic attitudes over the human rights issues. Even 
 Christian leftists remained quiet about the issue. … Most humanitarian aid toward the North 
 goes to the North Korean government. I think that less than 10 percent of that aid goes to the 
 people. … And much of the financial aid to the North comes from Korean Christians. … 
 Since then, I have been thinking whether we, as Christians, should be a neighbor of people 
 who were robbed, or a neighbor of a robber. 
  
 Han confessed in her personal narrative why she turned from leftist to rightist: 
  
 I happen to watch the online lecture on President Rhee Syngman through Esther Prayer 
 Movement, which gave me a chance to realize that I did not know all the facts regarding 
 Rhee, and that knowledge that was taught to me in school was very distorted. Through this, 
 I realized that God didn't intend that I was born in this country to be unhappy, which I had 
 believed before, and which was the reason why I had hated this country so much. … I wanted 
 to become a diplomat just to live abroad. … I realized how distorted information on President 
 Rhee has been given to younger generations. Only by providing the correct historical 
 knowledge, can they love their nation and establish right visions and values for the future, 
 instead of being resistant to this nation, just as I turned away from that path. … I started to 
 search for more truth about my nation, which was for me the way of contributing to realizing 
 God’s vision for our nation. 
 
 A leader of SNU Truth Forum, Kim, also shared his personal narrative on why he started the 
movement: 
  
 There are five fundamental values we share which one needs to agree on when one applies 
 for membership of the Truth Forum: the legitimacy of the establishment of the ROK and the 
 values of industrialization; the importance of the US-ROK alliance; the liberation of the 
 North; the injustice of Park’s impeachment; and the principles and values of Christianity. 
 The last is the most important in fact. As Christian leftists have provided ideological 
 backgrounds for political leftists, it is our duty to protect our Christian values and principles 
 in the society regarding issues such as LGBT (lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender). … We 
 have many non-Christian members who know we run this movement based on faith in 
 Christianity, and core members of the Truth Forum are those who have faith in those 
 foundational values. Thus, if the Truth Forum loses its Christian principles, it will lose its 
 power. … Personally, if I think I do political activism, I wouldn’t be able to do this with such 
 passion and I won’t continue to do it. I do this because I believe this is connected to the 
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 restoration of the Korean churches as well as the ROK itself. Thus, the Truth Forum is not 
 ultimately a religious group, but it is based on values of Christianity and it will stay like this 
 in the future. 
 
 Another activist, Im, who used to work for North Korean human rights in one of the NGOs, 
said: 
 
 In my perspective, politicians who institute policies based on values close to Christianity are 
 mostly rightists. I know many rightist politicians are corrupt and have been doing so much 
 wrong. So it is our duty to protect the values and principles which we think are right. … I 
 became active in political movements while I was working for the NGO for human rights of 
 the North Korean people. Among Christians, there are differences between those who only 
 emphasize love as Christians and those who put equal focus on love and justice in terms of 
 the North. Some leftists have said that while we continuously provide aid to the North 
 Korean regime under an engagement policy like the Sunshine Policy, and in the end, the 
 people in the North will get benefits from it. In reality, however, we saw only that nuclear 
 weapons were developed with our financial aid. … Some who have visited the North came 
 to be on the side of the North Korean regime, protecting and supporting it. … When I asked 
 many North Korean defectors in the South why they generally become rightists, not leftists, 
 after settling down in the South, one of them said to me that “I came to the South to find 
 liberty and freedom. After settling down here, I realized that rightists at least talked about 
 the values of freedom although they are corrupt, but what leftist politicians argue is exactly 
 what I was taught in the North. Especially, when I read the textbook for elementary students 
 in South Korea, I found that the same content that I was taught in the ideological education 
 class in the North was included.” … Thus, we Christians cannot sit back naively without 
 doing anything under the current circumstances. We have many issues regarding which we 
 should raise our voices. … I believe that there is a national identity of the ROK. … This 
 country was blessed by God after the great awakening in Pyongyang in 1907. … The ROK 
 was established by God through President Rhee, who believed that if we built our nation as 
 a state of God, we would be blessed. … He had a dream of unification under liberal 
 democracy. … By simply comparing the current economic situation between South and 
 North Korea, we are so blessed and there is no country in the world that was developed in 
 such a short period of time. 
 
 Another interviewee, Park, an activist in a Protestant civic group, also recognizes that 
Christian values and principles are inherently connected to the ideology of rightist, liberal democracy: 
  
 Politicians, regardless of whether they are rightists and leftists, are all privileged groups. I 
 have never seen any conservative politicians who actually act according to the values and 
 principles that they declare they are pursuing. Despite that, the reason why I still support 
 conservatism is due to its values. … As you may know, liberal democracy originated from 
 Christianity. … In the Bible, 1 Timothy chapter 2 verses 1 and 2, … what these verses mean 
 is we should pray that the system of the nation should not interrupt our faith. That is, we 
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 Christians should first pray that the nation and its political system are not in conflict with the 
 word of God. … In a modern age, this is only possible under liberal democracy. Once a 
 religion becomes a national one, it is coerced. But in God, faith should not be coerced but 
 should be voluntary. … The political system which provides the freedom that makes it 
 possible for us to be voluntarily devoted to our faith is liberal democracy. … I am not 
 supporting rightists because I can totally agree with them, but I support them because I have 
 only two options, either rightists or leftists. … In terms of peace talks with the North led by 
 leftists, they prioritize unification, not the system of liberal democracy. … There is peace all 
 the time if we give up our faith and values. … Look at the case of China. After Xi taking 
 power, the constitution was changed and oppression toward churches and Christians was 
 growing harsh. … In terms of the North, liberation of people who have lives like slaves 
 should be prioritized rather than peace with a totalitarian regime. … Leftists attack us saying 
 “why are you guys against peace?” What this rhetoric aims at is the frame in which we 
 Christians are described as people who only care about our own interests and security. 
 
 In the interviews I conducted, the sense of identity crisis is commonly found regardless of 
the interviewees’ age and religion, and this is also viewed as an opportunity to go through self-
reflection and to have proper reforms. What is interesting is that young participants in their 20s and 
30s seem more realistic than the older ones regarding the issue of unification, acknowledging the 
irreconcilability between the two Koreas as largely due to the pronounced differences in their identity 
and historical views. Hence, many of them said the most urgent and uppermost task is not unification 
but liberation of the North Korean fellow people from the Kim family’s totalitarianism, even though 
the reasons why we should liberate the North Korean people vary from the universal humanitarian 
perspective to the argument that it is part of South Korea’s national identity stipulated in the 
Constitution or that it is part of the mission of Christianity. Also, young respondents commonly 
expressed their distrust in politicians, whether conservative or progressive, and clarified the reason 
they joined the rightist political activities to be due to the values and principles of conservatism. As 
seen in their argument that they do not want to have hasty unification because of the differences of 
national identity conception and historical views, this group of young rightists prioritizes the ideas 
and principles of conservatism, that is, liberal democracy and a market economy, as opposed to the 
North’s system. Lastly, faith in Christianity provides them with a strong sense of vocation so they 
regard their political activism as a mission given by God which functions as a driving force for people 
to act, not just remain by-standers. These young activists are doing lectures for the older rightists 
through various civic groups, holding lectures and seminars to educate people, and making 
educational materials and posting them online. Older interviewees in their 50s, 60s and 70s showed 
similarities in their narratives to that of the New Right movement. What is interesting is that they 
acknowledge that the elders need to be educated by young rightists to fight against invasion of leftists. 
 Whether they are extreme rightists or self-defined true conservatives, it seems evident that 
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conservatism is going through reforms after the impeachment of Park. These activists are seeking to 
refresh and revitalize corrupted conservatism. Although whether their attempts will be successful 
remains to be seen, the narratives on national identity of those respondents have significance. As 
mentioned, even if a political agreement is made between the two Koreas, social conflicts between 
groups who have different national identities, values, and ideologies will not be naturally resolved 
























8.1 Deepening Conflicts in South Korean Society and Contentious Narratives 
 
 According to the survey study of people’s perception of social conflict in South Korea 
conducted by Hankook Research and the Korean Center for Conflict Resolution [han’guk kaldŭng 
haeso sentŏ] in 2018, nine out of ten respondents replied that the level of social conflict in South 
Korea is high. More importantly, those who think that conflicts have been intensified under the 
current Moon Jae-in administration accounts for 52.4%, displaying a dramatic rise compared to 22.9% 
in 2017. In contrast, those who believe the conflict has been alleviated under President Moon shows 
a sharp decrease from 29.9% in 2017 to 12.3% in 2018 (Pak Chi-yun 2019). Conflicts between labor 
and management, the poor and the rich, and progressives and conservatives are chosen as the most 
serious in the survey. While inner conflicts are deepening in South Korea, the peace initiative of 
President Moon through expanding inter-Korean cooperation, including summits, inter-Korean and 
DPRK-US, is in progress. Against this backdrop, both anti-American and pro-American protesters 
took to the streets in the city center of Seoul on February 17, 2019, right before the Hanoi Summit 
between North Korea and the US (Pak Hye-yŏn 2019). Anti-American protesters shouted for 
unification without US interference, while participants in pro-American protests called for a stronger 
bond with the US for the security of South Korea. Although the number of protesters gathered was 
small, those street protests right before the second, historic DPRK-US summit have significance in 
that they clearly indicate that there still exists sharp difference within South Korea over the way to 
approach the North and to settle the peace on the peninsula. 
 As many scholars point out, the policy change toward the North of the first progressive 
regime in South Korea from containment to engagement triggered the innate divided nature of South 
Korea to come to the surface. There still exists controversy over the peace initiative of the current 
progressive President Moon for denuclearization of the North and peaceful coexistence of the two 
Koreas on the peninsula. With this in mind, why do some people disagree with the engagement policy 
toward the North? Do they really oppose the idea of peaceful coexistence with the North as the policy 
proponents argue? If so, why? The possible answers to these questions can be discovered in suggested 
assumptions throughout the dissertation regarding what causes deep division in the politics and 
society of South Korea.  
 First of all, this study assumes that the absence of a transcendent narrative on the national 
identity and history of South Korea has contributed to the divided nature of South Korea. The 
partition of one nation into two states raises the tension between two contradictory aspects of Korean 
politics, the strong myth of homogeneity developed under the Japanese colonial rule as an anti-
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imperial ideology, and the actual reality of oppositional identity practices, which creates and 
intensifies the internal division in South Korean society. While the antagonistic forms of identity 
based on anti-communism that identify the North as the evil enemy to its own existence have been 
deeply entrenched in the societal consciousness of South Korea throughout past years, an alternative 
narrative which views the past events of the two Koreas from a different angle has emerged as a 
strong challenger to the state-sanctioned narrative identity of the authoritarian regime with political 
democratization. With the two progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun that 
took office from 1998 to the 2008, this alternative narrative came to be institutionalized in different 
areas from foreign to domestic policies. It is, however, a challenging task to transform the identity 
of the North from the arch enemy toward a partner state for peaceful coexistence, as well as changing 
the perspective on the US from the closest ally or even the “savior” of South Korea toward one of 
the imperial powers that has pursued its own interests on the peninsula. Furthermore, it is a far more 
difficult task to transform the narrative about its violent past of war and self identity as a victim 
suffering from evil communists’ invasion. Since the mid-1960s, internal divisions of societies and 
separatism within a single political entity have been more frequently observed than international 
wars between nation states in the world (Psaltis et al. 2017, p.1). In such a context, the primary 
challenge is for former enemies to find a way to not only live together peacefully but also, when 
necessary, to cooperate and share power, which is what South Korea has been experiencing in the 
post-Cold War era. 
 This study is concerned with clashes between South Korean conservatives (rightists) and 
progressives (leftists) over almost all areas from foreign policies toward North Korea and the US to 
domestic issues related to the interpretation of history, which have created the phenomenon of deep 
domestic conflicts, called “a house divided” (Hahn Chaibong 2005), or more commonly known as 
the “South-South conflict” to South Koreans. The fundamental assumption of this research is that to 
have a better understanding of social and political conflicts in South Korea, one must take national 
identity into consideration. The most contentious and ideologically conflicting issue, which reaches 
far beyond South Korea’s domestic political arena, was the effort for the progressive governments to 
redefine the country’s relationship with North Korea on the one hand, and with the US on the other, 
which essentially pertains to the identification of the significant others in national identity formation. 
National identity is constructed around two important concepts of the “self” and the “significant 
others” because national identity as collective identity is present not only to define who we are, but 
also to separate us from others. Hence, the concept of the other is inextricably linked to the notion of 
national identity. North Korea and the US are the most significant others to the South. The fact that 
the “South-South conflict” phenomenon has initially occurred around the issue of foreign policies 
toward those two significant others, and recently the issue of how to interpret its modern and 
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contemporary history, well illustrates that the polarization of South Korean society and politics 
intrinsically pertains to the contradictory narratives regarding national identity. 
 Because the Korean nation was divided along the ideological line of communists and 
capitalists, ideology among all other factors that influence the formation of national identity is the 
most important component. Thus, traditional approaches focused on ideology as a major cause of 
societal conflicts in South Korea. It is true that ideology is discursively constructed as a crucial 
element of national identity discourses in order to draw the line between the self and others in South 
Korea. However, as mentioned, in this research ideology is treated as one of the components that 
comprise national identity. Especially in the narratives of the authoritarian regimes and currently 
conservatives, Korean communists are excluded from the category of self, the “true” Korean nation, 
because of their political ideology. Hence, in the context of South Korea, ideology is not separable 
from the concept of national identity. 
 This study primarily argues that disagreement over national identity has been a source of 
inner conflicts in South Korea and a major challenge for national reconciliation between conflicting 
groups in the post-conflict era. Through historical case studies, this research identified two dominant 
yet contentious narratives in discourses on South Korean identity: “the ethnic nationalism” narrative 
of progressives, which prioritizes one ethnic Korean nation to a separate state, South Korea, and 
emphasizes the masses’ suffering under the authoritarian ruling elites who are blamed for the division 
of the nation and for their collaboration with the imperial powers for the sake of their own interests; 
and the “state-centered nationalism” narrative of conservatives, originating from the state-sanctioned 
narrative of the authoritarian regime, which blames uncivilized communists and the North Korean 
regime for Koreans’ tragedies and emphasizes loyalty to South Korea, the only legitimate and “true” 
representation of the Korean nation. It further examines the process in which the master narrative on 
South Korean national identity has been gradually transformed from the state-sanctioned narrative 
of the authoritarian regimes to the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives, which was 
institutionalized through foreign policies toward two significant others, North Korea and the US, and 
through domestic policies such as “clearing up the past wrongdoings” and history textbook revision 
under the two successive progressive administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun. This 
transformation created strong resistance from the conservative camp whose narrative based on anti-
communism has been firmly entrenched in society and has enjoyed hegemony since its division. 
With the process of narrative transformation, conservatism has been forced to go through self-
reflective reforms in accordance with the democratic political context. In the process of reforms, the 
New Right that separated itself from the traditional conservatives emerged and political activism of 
its civic organizations came to the fore in the 2000s when traditional conservatism experienced loss 
of its hegemonic power by losing consecutive presidential elections. With the retaking of office of 
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two conservative presidents, Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, conservatives seemed to 
successfully regain some political power but the impeachment of President Park in 2017 totally 
changed the political scene in institutional politics as well as in civic political activism. What this 
study points out is that although the traditional conservative party has lost its hegemonic status in the 
formal politics of South Korea, there are still many who see the reality through the narrative identity 
of conservatives.  
 Another important factor to bear in mind regarding South Korean national identity is that it 
was originally constructed in the context of intractable conflicts with the North. Narrative identity 
created in intractable conflicts is formed with strong certainty of the self and others, thus being 
resistant to any change. In particular, the state-centered nationalism narrative of conservatives has 
been reformulated based on the state-sanctioned narrative that was originally formed during and in 
the aftermath of the war. Accordingly, it was built on the rigid certainty that the North is an inherently 
evil aggressor and the South is a victim that has a mission to protect the “true” Korean nation from 
communists’ invasion. Thus, those who hold the state-centered nationalism narrative which still 
views the North as the great existential threat find it extremely difficult to adapt to the alternative 
narrative that identifies the North as a normal neighboring state to coexist with. It is of great 
significance to note that narrative identity constructed in the intractable conflicts or post conflict 
context is extremely difficult to be transformed, and those who hold a strong concept of identity 
based on the state-centered nationalism narrative assume that the opponents’ narrative identity is 
irreconcilable with their own narrative. In sum, this research primarily assumes that competing 
narratives on national identity have created and deepened domestic conflicts in South Korea, found 
in almost every field of society and politics. Reforms led by progressive regimes were not able to 
construct a transcendent narrative of national identity which their opponents can agree with, resulting 
in conservatives’ resistance to narrative transformation being intensified.  
 
 
8.2 Identity Politics: Rhetoric of Othering/Exclusion and Victimization Narrative 
 
 Secondly, identity politics of South Korea conducted by both conservatives and progressives, 
in which rhetoric of othering is commonly used, has greatly contributed to a deepening polarization 
of South Korean society. The rhetoric of othering or exclusion is a commonly used tactic in the world, 
in particular in extremism politics. This research adopts a discursive approach to identity construction, 
in which not only symbolic constructions but also institutional practices are deemed significant. 
Identities are (re)produced and transformed through institutional practices including state policies 
and everyday interactions. Discourses around national identity operate in the context of institutional 
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supports and practices that they depend on, and it is specific individual and collective narratives that 
reproduce and transform discourses. Specific narratives of the nation are understood as important 
components of broader discourses of national identity. The narrative conceptualization of identity 
emphasizes the importance of stories and storytelling for processes of identity construction. Giddens 
(1991), for example, argues that identity is constituted through the continuous formulation and re-
formulation of narratives of “the self”, which means that self-identity is reflexively construed through 
“stories” by the individual concerned, as well as by others. In this light, national identities are 
conceptualized as narratives in this study, which are concerned with the drawing of boundaries 
between members of the nation and non-members. Such boundaries are crucially bound up with 
political processes and mechanisms of othering, in which specific groups of people are constructed 
as the others, who are fundamentally different. Another point to bear in mind is that at times of war, 
mechanisms of othering the enemy become particularly intense, often taking the form of presenting 
the other as non-human or evil. In political discourse, the enemy is thus frequently represented 
through evil imagery. 
 The self-understanding of a nation is primarily crafted in relation to its own history. We learn 
who “we” are by gaining an awareness of how we got where we are now, that is, by gaining an 
understanding of our own history. South Korea’s deep division also stems from radically different 
interpretations of the modern nation’s birth and development, thus pertaining to interpretations of 
history. As much of the rest of the world does, conservatives celebrate South Korea’s industrialization 
and democratization despite the many shortcomings, such as human rights abuse and authoritarian 
rule of the regimes. The progressives, in contrast, are relentlessly critical of the nation’s history 
despite these achievements. This is because progressives believe that South Korea achieved the 
current developments through too many compromises and much injustice, including dictatorship, 
human rights violations, and dependence on foreign powers. Around the world, attempts at dealing 
with nations’ violent pasts have proven to be highly contentious. A history of collective violence and 
abuse has often led to conflicting memories and polemic confrontation around the historical “truth”. 
It also sparks intense debates on how to educate younger generations about the past for the sake of a 
better future. Schools, as key instruments of socialization, have inevitably been affected by societal 
dynamics and tensions in the context and aftermath of conflicts, including power struggles and 
related “memory wars,” and making them a crucial arena in contestations for political legitimacy. In 
particular, the history taught in schools, as an important site of collective identity and memory, has 
been the object of great political and societal contention in countries emerging from violent conflict. 
On the other hand, school history has also increasingly been considered a significant element in 
peacebuilding and transitional justice processes aimed at reconciling divided societies. So-called 
“South-South conflicts”, which initially came to the surface with the policy change toward significant 
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others under the progressive administrations in the early 2000s, are now more intense regarding how 
to interpret the birth and development processes of South Korea, which strongly supports the main 
argument of the dissertation that inner conflicts within South Korea are deeply connected to the issue 
of national identity. 
 In the rhetoric of conservatives, conflicts between the North and South originally framed 
based on “anti-communism” are recently understood in the frame of the “anti-South” that accords 
with South Korean centralism of the New Right’s narrative. While classifying dissidents as 
communists or North Korean sympathizers, which was the most powerful strategy under 
authoritarian regimes, is still quite frequently adopted in discourses of conservative politicians and 
their supporters, a new rhetoric of exclusion that takes a frame of “anti-South” has emerged in the 
New Right discourses. Anti-South generally refers to those who oppose the legitimacy of the South 
Korean government as the only lawful political entity on the peninsula, while sympathizing with the 
North. This anti-South rhetoric has been adopted since the New Right’s attempt to reassess South 
Korean modern history. Anti-South rhetoric also pertains to distinctive definition of the nation in the 
New Right discourses, in which the North Korean regime and its followers are excluded from the 
nation, as they are uncivilized and so cannot be included in the modern civilized Korean nation, that 
is, South Korea. Like the state-sanctioned narrative, the state-centered nationalism narrative of the 
New Right employs the rhetoric of exclusion with a political aim, classifying political opponents and 
dissidents as pro-North or anti-South forces, and excluding them from its own concept of the nation. 
Thus, patriotism and nationalism of conservatives are defined primarily through vigilance against 
internal betrayal by pro-North and anti-South groups, justified by every aggressive move taken by 
North Korea. 
 On the other hand, the ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives establishes a new 
dichotomy between “nation (minjok)” as the self that is pure and absolute, and collaborators with 
foreign powers (mostly Japan and the US) as traitors to the nation, as a result creating new evil others. 
In this regard, the historical narrative of progressives is also monumental just like the narrative of 
conservatives. Societies recovering from recent violence often choose to create a monumental history 
to serve the function of legitimizing the ruling regime and promote it as innocent and heroic, thus 
unifying its people and developing loyalty among the younger generation. Alternatively, they can 
choose to teach a critical history that holds all perpetrators accountable and shows the complex roots 
of violence without promoting loyalty to one particular side. The state-sanctioned narrative which 
had been dominant and the only narrative allowed as an official presentation of history before 
democratization, is clearly monumental in that it was the main instrument to legitimize the ruling 
regimes of South Korea and to raise loyalty to the nation. With democratization, however, this 
dominant narrative was challenged by an alternative ethnic nationalism narrative of progressives, 
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which is partly critical given that it brings back erased memories into official history, such as the Jeju 
April 3 incident in 1948, in which many innocent civilians were killed by state forces in the name of 
anti-communism. However, it still displays some features of monumental history. For instance, it 
establishes a new dichotomy between good nationalists and evil anti-nationalists. The ethnic 
nationalism narrative, which is now officially accepted in most history textbooks, describes Japanese 
collaborators with a high level of collective generality, perceiving collaborators as a single entity 
with uniform beliefs and attitudes, and more importantly, disregarding the personal and societal 
contexts in which they served and related to the colonial government. Hence, those who were once 
categorized as collaborators by historians are depicted as homogeneously evil and the descendants 
of those collaborators also often fall into the same category of evil traitors who are assumed to 
demonstrate the same fixed vicious patterns of behavior. The ethnic nationalism narrative that is 
constructed based on a deep belief about the in-group of the Korean nation and the masses as pure 
victims, and the out-group of internal betrayers, that is, collaborators, as essentially evil aggressors, 
significantly decreases the possibility of mutual understanding among conflicting groups within 
South Korea. 
 The rhetoric of exclusion in both narratives has led to intensification of victimization 
discourses. In the ethnic nationalism narrative, the masses [minjung] and the nation were exploited 
by evil pro-Japanese collaborators, later by pro-American imperialists and ruling elites who only 
pursued their own interests. Thus, in the dichotomy of the ethnic nationalism narrative, the masses 
are depicted as victims, and imperialists and ruling elites are blamed for all the tragedies of the nation 
including the division of the nation. On the contrary, in state-centered nationalism, the Korean people 
are portrayed as victims suffering from the evil communists’ invasion. The North Korean regime and 
its followers are the arch enemy, who started the Korean War and are thus blamed for the national 
partition. Accordingly, both narratives fail to provide comprehensive understandings of the violent 
and painful past of modern and contemporary South Korea. This is largely because of their notions 
of dualistic identification and simplistic victimization. As a result, history and narrative identity have 
been heavily politicized as a strategic tool to delegitimize opponents. 
 
 
8.3 Absence of a Dialogical Space 
 
 Lastly, the idea of the “transformative performative dimension” (Bentrovato 2017) of the 
history textbook project that emphasizes the importance of an open and inclusive “dialogical space” 
between competing groups can have significant implications regarding the inner conflicts of South 
Korean society. The processes of cooperation and negotiation with the North led by progressives, 
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liberals and leftists in past regimes have failed to create this dialogical space with the policy 
opponents, mostly the conservative camp. Choi Jang-jip (2017) points out that it is essential for the 
current Moon Jae-in administration to have dialogues with his opponents to persuade and include 
them in the process of the peace initiative in order to avoid the same mistakes of the past progressive 
regimes. Choi argues that considering the domestic context where conservatives do not recognize the 
North as a normal state and thus see peaceful coexistence with it as almost unfeasible, it seems 
impossible to realize peace on the peninsula without the processes of negotiation and persuasion with 
those who have different ideologies and values. His point is in line with the idea of the 
“transformative performative dimension” in the history textbook project discussed in chapter 6, 
which emphasizes that the conciliatory potential of textbook revision lies in the capacity of the 
processes of collaboration between conflicting groups. Peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas 
can only be achieved if the policy makers of engagement in South Korea, mostly the progressive 
camp, involve conservative politicians and activists in the processes of policy decision making and 
enforcement (Choi Jang-jip 2017). The lesson learned from past experiences in the Kim Dae-jung 
and Roh Moo-hyun administrations that enthusiastically promoted the engagement policy is that 
peace between the two Koreas cannot be attainable only if all agree the ideal of peace, yet it can be 
achieved through patient and inclusive processes. Establishing a positive domestic context in South 
Korea toward peace through consensus and cooperation with those who have different values and 
ideologies is a necessary condition for conflict transformation and peace settlement on the peninsula. 
Hence, the ongoing peace initiative of President Moon heavily relies on whether cooperation between 
progressives and conservatives in South Korea is crafted or not. 
 
 
8.4 Implications for Peace Settlement on the Korean Peninsula 
 
 In order for an eventual unification to be achievable and sustainable, it is not enough just to 
say that both Koreas must be united under one system. Indeed, this would assume a top-down 
approach, meaning that governmental structures, legal systems, economic policies, as well as other 
components of a country, would be reformulated in order to accommodate both North and South 
Koreans. However, unification or any other type of political integration between the two Koreas must 
address the emotional and personal components of individuals which a nation consists of. It is 
insufficient to assume that people will naturally develop a sense of unity and belonging to a reunited 
Korea, considering the fact that such processes are extremely complex. Even if an agreement of peace 
or political integration is made in high politics, it can be easily dissolved by the public, as we are 
currently witnessing in the case of Brexit, the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union (EU). 
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Rhetoric of exclusion has great impact on contemporary politics, fanning the flames of victimization 
discourses in political extremism in which structural injustice and inequality are attributed to such 
specific groups as migrants in most of the western world. Individuals drawn to rhetoric of exclusion 
and consequent victimization narrative believe they are victims deprived of benefits by out-groups 
they naturally should enjoy, whether the out-groups are immigrants, anti-nationalists, or communists. 
 In essence, a Korean reunification will necessarily lead to the building of a new nation. At 
the time of writing, the expectation for a peace settlement on the Korean peninsula is greater than 
ever due to ongoing inter-Korean summits, as well as the historical encounters between the two 
leaders of the US and North Korea. However, we have seen in other post-conflict societies like 
Germany or Northern Ireland that a political declaration or peace agreement does not necessarily 
guarantee genuine peaceful relations and reconciliation between the former adversaries. 
Reconciliation goes beyond conflict resolution in representing a transformation in each party’s 
identity. This is why the narratives of conservatives in South Korea, whether they are extremists or 
true conservatives who hold a strong narrative on national identity that still identifies the North as an 
arch enemy, are of great importance in the progress of achieving peace with the North. With the 
impeachment of the former President Park, the institutional conservative parties are in crisis, losing 
their political power, and pro-Park supporters are commonly described as irrational elderly people 
and are disregarded in academia. However, there are still quite a good number of South Korean 
people who see the current political and societal issues through the prism of the conservative 
narrative identity and, as seen in chapter 7, there is a new trend of conservatism, in which younger 
activists have emerged as leaders who seek to revitalize values and principles of “true” conservatism. 
Even if a political declaration of peaceful coexistence or unification is made between the two Koreas, 
the effort should be made to create a transcendent narrative on national identity on which those South 
Koreans who have hostile attitudes to the North can agree. In doing so, creating an open dialogical 
space between conflicting groups in South Korea is critical. 
 It seems evident that political rhetoric of exclusion based on conflicting identity concepts 
between progressives and conservatives cannot bring genuine peace on the Korean peninsula. It is, 
therefore, time to make efforts to transform the inherently divided nature of Korean national identity 
among South Koreans and to develop an integrative and transcendent narrative both parties can 
accept. More importantly, politicians should stop using rhetoric of exclusion to serve their own 
political interests, thus intensifying identity politics. As mentioned in chapter 6, history textbook 
pluralization without creating a dialogical space in which competing parties can reassess and redefine 
their narratives has simply replaced an old narrative with a new one, thus only deepening 
controversies. It is, however, argued through empirical case studies in societies emerging from a 
violent past that textbook work can provide a great potential for conflict transformation through 
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creating a dialogical space and facilitating cooperative interaction and critical and constructive 
confrontation with the controversial past. This lesson provides the insight for South Korea that the 
ultimate conflict transformation within South Korean society, as well as between the two Koreas, 
cannot be accomplished without the processes of cooperative interaction with their opponent groups. 
 This research aims to contribute to the field of identity politics and peacebuilding by offering 
novel insights into the role of narrative identity and history in the contexts of protracted, identity-
based conflict and the peacebuilding process. Its particular focus is on the Korean peninsula, one of 
the areas where the legacy of the Cold War is still lingering and history is deeply contested and 
politicized. In addition, the present study can offer theoretical grounds for rethinking inner conflicts 
with South Korea so as to lead to conflict transformation and an ultimate peace settlement on the 
peninsula. The analysis of this dissertation has paid much attention to narrative identity at the 
collective level, while partly examining relations between the master and individual narratives 
through the analysis of interviews with right-wing activists in chapter 7. 
 In the future, multi-level analysis of narrative identity, including the analysis of collective 
and individual levels as well as the correlation between them, will need to be further researched. A 
recent shift toward identifying the relationship between master narratives and personal narratives in 
peace and conflict studies reveals an attempt to link the idea of narrative identity at multiple levels 
(Hammack 2008). In this approach, master narrative is understood as dominant scripts which can be 
identified in cultural products and storylines (Hammack 2010, p. 178). Identity as narrative is not 
static. Rather, narrative identity development is best understood as a process of narrative engagement 
in which individuals confront multiple discursive options for making meaning of their experience 
through language. The construction of narrative identity at the individual level is accessed through 
the telling of a life story, and at the collective level through historical and ethnographic analysis 
(Hammack 2008), providing a window into not only processes of personal psychological adjustment 
and development, but also larger processes of social reproduction or resistance. This idea of narrative 
identity at multiple levels might provide us with insights regarding the way in which South Korea 
can craft a more inclusive and transcendent narrative for peaceful coexistence with its former enemy, 
and how individuals can make sense of their lives as Koreans engaging with collective stories of the 
nation. In the empirical study of Israeli youth, Hammack (2009) suggests that in the absence of the 
institutional and cultural support for coexistence, young Israelis have difficulty in integrating a 
transformative ideological perspective in their personal narratives, so tend to reproduce a status quo 
of nationalist discourse, which is a reason for the perpetuation of Israeli and Palestinian conflicts (p. 
70). He thus concludes that peace-building efforts depend on both personal and political 
transformation that can contribute to ultimate social change and conflict reduction. In order to find a 
way of resolving conflicts within South Korea as well as between the two Koreas, we can derive 
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great benefit from the recently growing literature in the social psychology of peace and conflict that 
recognizes the salience of narrative in the maintenance and reproduction of intractable conflict. In 
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